Todd v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation

Ninth Circuit

Todd v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation

615 F. App'x 415

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedAugust 27, 2015

Docket13-15803

StatusUnpublished

Cited by35 cases

This text of 615 F. App'x 415 (Todd v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Todd v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, 615 F. App'x 415 (9th Cir. 2015).

Pincite

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Michael Anthony Todd appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that he has been denied the right to practice his religion. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir.2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The district court properly dismissed Todd’s due process claim because Todd had an adequate post-deprivation remedy under California law. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (no due process claim against a state employee for an unauthorized intentional deprivation of prop- ’ erty where state law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam) (“California [l]aw provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property deprivations.”).

The district court properly dismissed Todd’s claim regarding the processing and handling of his prison grievances because prisoners do not have a “constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir.2003).

However, the district court prematurely dismissed Todd’s First Amendment, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), Establishment Clause and equal protection claims because Todd’s allegations, liberally construed, were “sufficient to warrant ordering [defendants] to file an answer.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d at 1116; see also Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994-95 (9th Cir.2005) (setting forth elements of RLUIPA claim); Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir.1996) (setting forth test to determine whether a belief or movement invokes constitutionally cognizable religious interests). We express no opinion as to whether Creativity constitutes a religion.

*416 Todd’s petition filed on November 18, 2013, is construed as a motion to submit a supplemental brief, and granted.

AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part; and REMANDED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

MEMORANDUM **

Michael Anthony Todd appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that he has been denied the right to practice his religion. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir.2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The district court properly dismissed Todd’s due process claim because Todd had an adequate post-deprivation remedy under California law. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (no due process claim against a state employee for an unauthorized intentional deprivation of prop- ’ erty where state law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam) (“California [l]aw provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property deprivations.”).

The district court properly dismissed Todd’s claim regarding the processing and handling of his prison grievances because prisoners do not have a “constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir.2003).

However, the district court prematurely dismissed Todd’s First Amendment, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), Establishment Clause and equal protection claims because Todd’s allegations, liberally construed, were “sufficient to warrant ordering [defendants] to file an answer.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d at 1116; see also Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994-95 (9th Cir.2005) (setting forth elements of RLUIPA claim); Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir.1996) (setting forth test to determine whether a belief or movement invokes constitutionally cognizable religious interests). We express no opinion as to whether Creativity constitutes a religion.

*416 Todd’s petition filed on November 18, 2013, is construed as a motion to submit a supplemental brief, and granted.

AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part; and REMANDED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

615 F. App'x 415, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/todd-v-california-department-of-corrections-rehabilitation-ca9-2015.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack