Titus v. State Tax Commission

132 N.W.2d 647, 374 Mich. 476, 1965 Mich. LEXIS 348
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 2, 1965
DocketCalendar 7, Docket 50,664
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 132 N.W.2d 647 (Titus v. State Tax Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Titus v. State Tax Commission, 132 N.W.2d 647, 374 Mich. 476, 1965 Mich. LEXIS 348 (Mich. 1965).

Opinions

Souris, J.

On plaintiffs’ application, we granted them leave to appeal in the nature of certiorari from an order of the State tax commission confirming the 1963 city real property tax assessment of their Lansing homes. It is their claim that in 1963 the Lansing assessor assessed about 20% of the real .property in Lansing, including their own, by a method of assessment different from that used in the assessment of the remainder of the real property in the city, thereby depriving them, of thq guaranties [478]*478of equality and uniformity granted by article 10, § 3, Constitution of 1908 and by CLS 1961, § 211.24 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 7.24).

Although the record made before the commission is not as complete and detailed as might be desired, we may conclude therefrom that beginning in 1963 the assessor undertook to reappraise all of the real property in the city. Because of the enormity of the task, it was contemplated it would require several years to complete. In the first year of the project, the tax year here involved, 20% of the properties were physically examined and reappraised. Land appraisal was based on current sales prices for comparable land. Improvements were appraised on the basis of their current cost of reproduction less depreciation. These properties then were assessed by a method not theretofore utilized in Lansing. Their assessed value was determined by in•creasing the appraised value of improvements by 15%, 20%, or 25%, depending upon the subdivision in which located,1 and by adding 40% of the resultant to 40% of the appraised value of the land. The remaining real property in' Lansing was not physically examined. Instead, the assessor used the same .appraised value determined in prior tax years for those properties and, after “reviewing” the preceding tax year’s assessed value in a manner not described by the assessor, the assessed value was “re-posted” for 1963. While the assessor did not describe the methods by which the appraised and assessed values of those properties theretofore had been determined, there was admitted in evidence, without •objection, a report of a citizens’ committee on tax 'assessments, dated January 29,1962, which describes the methods of assessment then used in Lansing. [479]*479That description has not been challenged as inaccurate. Prom it we determine that prior to 1963 the Lansing' assessor assessed land at a “certain” percentage of its 1936 value while improvements were assessed on the basis of cost of reproduction less depreciation adjusted to 1947 construction costs.

The record discloses that the city council of Lansing, recognizing the manifest unfairness of the assessment of a part only of the city’s real property by the new method of assessment, by unanimous resolution2 requested the board of review to postpone a change in the method of assessment until the new method could be applied uniformly to all property in the city. The council’s request was not granted.

Prom the record made before the defendant commission the conclusion is inescapable that plaintiffs’ real property, as well as about 20% of the property in Lansing, was assessed by a method different from that applied to the assessment of the remainder of [480]*480tbe real property in Lansing. Whether either of the methods used conformed to the then applicable legislative mandate that real property be assessed at its “true cash value” (CLS 1961, § 211.24 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 7.24]), is unnecessary to be determined; it is sufficient for purpose of decision that the variant methods used deprived plaintiffs of the guarantee of uniformity of taxation provided by article 10, § 3 of the Constitution of 1908. See Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority v. Boards of Supervisors of Five Counties, 304 Mich 328, 335, 336, where this Court adopted the following from Exchange Bank of Columbus v. Hines, 3 Ohio St 1, 15:

“‘What is meant by the words “taxing by a uniform rule?” And to what is the rule applied by the Constitution? No language in the Constitution, perhaps, is more important than this; and to accomplish the beneficial purposes intended, it is essential that they should be truly interpreted, and correctly applied. “Taxing” is required to be “by a uniform rule;” that is, by one and the same unvarying standard. Taxing by a uniform rule requires uniformity not only in the rate of taxation, but also uniformity in the mode of the assessment upon the taxable valuation. Uniformity in taxing implies equality in the burden of taxation; and this equality of burden cannot exist without uniformity in the mode of the assessment, as well as in the rate of taxation. But this is not all. The uniformity must be coextensive with the territory to which it applies. If a State tax, it must be uniform over all the State; if a county, town, or city tax, it must be uniform throughout the extent of the territory to which it is applicable.’ ”

The order of defendant State tax commission of October 8, 1963, is vacated and the commission is directed to determine the true and lawful assessment of plaintiffs’ property, as provided in CLS 1961, § 211.152 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev §7.210), and in [481]*481accordance with this opinion.3 ' No costs may be taxed.

Dethmers, Kelly, Black, Smith, and O’Hara, JJ., concurred with Souris, J.

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132 N.W.2d 647, 374 Mich. 476, 1965 Mich. LEXIS 348, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/titus-v-state-tax-commission-mich-1965.