KONENKAMP, Justice.
[¶ 1] We are again faced with the question whether city and county officials owed a “special duty” to protect four-year-old Crystal Tipton who was severely mauled when she strayed into an nearby yard and approached a cage holding two wolfdog hybrids. Following remand in the earlier appeal, the circuit court, applying our new standard, granted summary judgment, concluding as a matter of law no special duty affixed. Although existence of a special duty is a question of law, ordinarily breach of duty is a question of fact for a jury. Nonetheless, we conclude summary judgment was proper as none of the required special duty factors were established here.
Procedural Background
[¶ 2] Daniel G. Tipton, his wife, Lisa Tip-ton, and their children, Crystal and Daniel E. Tipton, sued the Town of Tabor, Bon Homme County, and certain government employees after Crystal was mauled by Kenneth Holland’s wolfdogs. Summary judgment was granted to the defendants on the issue of liability. On appeal, we reversed and remanded “for further consideration by the trial court” in view of our revised test. Tipton v. Town of Tabor, 538 N.W.2d 783, 788 (S.D.1995)(Tipton I).
Facts
[¶ 3] In 1987, Kenneth Holland purchased two wolf-German Shepherd hybrids (Canis lupus crossed with Canis familiaris). They were reputedly close to ninety-five percent wolf, the product of six or seven generations of crossbreeding. From their appearance and behavior, it was evident they had wolf-like characteristics. For almost three years, Holland kept them in his back yard in Tabor in a secure, fenced enclosure. This pen was constructed of chain link fence on two sides and livestock panels on the other two sides. It had wire buried under the surface to prevent the animals from digging out. Three feet of wire all around the top prevented them from jumping or climbing over. As they had a “nervous” disposition, the hybrids were never allowed to run free, and Holland recommended to persons interested in seeing them that they visit only when he was present. Openings in the fencing were wide enough to allow the wolfdogs to stick at least part of their heads out in some places and fully out in others. Holland believed his wolfdogs would never attack anyone unless provoked. He kept them in the secure cage for “bonding” purposes. The animals were male and female; their pups lived in an adjoining cage.
[¶4] Some people in the community had concerns about the safety of their children, but for a variety of reasons, no one complained to law enforcement authorities, including Chief of Police Eugene Sutera or County Sheriff Lyle O’Donnell, about anything other than being disturbed by howling.1 In February 1989, Doris Muller, the town Finance Officer, issued licenses for “wolf hybrids” to Teresa Holland, Kenneth’s wife, in accordance with a town ordinance and based on a veterinarian’s rabies vaccination receipt for six animals: “3 wolf & 3 dogs.” Muller informed the Town Board of the licensure. At the end of 1989, the licenses expired, and, in 1990, Kenneth Holland appeared before the Board to declare he would no longer license his animals because he believed the licensing ordinances were not being enforced.2 Both Sutera and O’Donnell examined the pen and the wolfdogs at some point [355]*355before the mauling, but did so only in response to concerns about howling. Both looked into state and local enactments covering possession of such animals, but felt no laws precluded keeping wolfdogs, especially as they were securely controlled in their pen.
[¶ 5] On November 12, 1990, the Tiptons were in Tabor visiting relatives who lived near the Hollands. Crystal, four years old at the time, wandered into Hollands’ yard, over to the hybrids’ pen. The animals apparently grabbed her as she stood near their enclosure. She was severely mauled. The Tip-tons, who were uninsured, incurred over $33,000 in medical expenses for Crystal’s care. Soon after the incident, the Hollands discharged their liability through bankruptcy. In their suit, the Tiptons assert (1) Tabor was negligent in licensing the hybrids, violating town ordinances, which increased the risk of harm to others and created a nuisance; (2) Tabor was negligent in allowing the hybrids to remain in town knowing of the danger; and (3) the county was negligent in not abating the nuisance the hybrids presented as witnessed by Sheriff O’Donnell who had actual knowledge of the hybrids’ vicious proclivities.
[¶ 6] In Tipton I, we modified the bright-line test in Hagen v. City of Sioux Falls, 464 N.W.2d 396, 399 (S.D.1990), which relied solely upon statutory language to ascertain the existence of a special duty to protect a person or class of persons. Tipton I, 538 N.W.2d at 787. For the Hagen analysis, we substituted the four-part test found in Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn.1979), making “any combination” of the following four factors determinative in assessing the existence of a special duty: (1) actual knowledge of the dangerous condition; (2) reasonable reliance by persons on official representations and conduct; (3) an ordinance or statute setting forth mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of persons rather than the general public; and (4) failure to use due care to avoid increasing the risk of harm. Id. (citing Cracraft, 279 N.W.2d at 806-07). “Whether a special duty has been breached is generally a question for the jury to decide.” De Long v. County of Erie, 60 N.Y.2d 296, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611, 616, 457 N.E.2d 717, 722 (1983). The trial court again granted summary judgment to the defendants and the Tiptons appeal.
Standard of Review
[¶ 7] “In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must decide whether the moving party has shown there is no genuine issue of material fact and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; the evidence must be viewed most favorably to the nonmoving party and reasonable doubts should be resolved against the moving party.” Great West Cas. Co. v. Bergeson, 1996 SD 73, ¶ 5, 550 N.W.2d 418, 419 (citing Nelson v. WEB Water Development Ass’n., Inc., 507 N.W.2d 691, 693-94 (S.D.1993); Pickering v. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758, 760 (S.D.1989)); Klatt v. Continental Ins. Co., 409 N.W.2d 366, 368 (S.D.1987); Wilson v. Great Northern Ry., 83 S.D. 207, 212, 157 N.W.2d 19, 21 (1968). “When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in § 15 — 6— 56, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials” in the pleadings, but must present specifics showing genuine, material fact issues for trial. SDCL 15-6-56(e). Our task on appeal is to determine only whether issues of material fact exist and whether the law was correctly applied. Moss v. Guttormson, 1996 SD 76, ¶ 5, 551 N.W.2d 14, 16; Flynn v. Lockhart, 526 N.W.2d 743, 745 (S.D.1995). If any legal basis emerges to support summary judgment, we must affirm. Sparagon v. Native American Publishers, Inc., 1996 SD 3, ¶ 33, 542 N.W.2d 125, 133.
Analysis and Decision
[¶ 8] The Public Duty Doctrine — Rationale
[¶ 9] Recognizing a need for redress when local government torts result in injury, our Legislature conditionally waived sovereign immunity. “To the extent that any public entity, other than the state, participates in a risk sharing pool or purchases liability insurance ... the public entity shall be deemed to have waived the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity....” SDCL 21-32A-1. Despite this waiver, however, South Dakota continues to observe the public [356]*356duty rule, as do most jurisdictions abrogating immunity. Catone v. Medberry, 555 A.2d 328, 331 (R.I.1989)(citing cases).
[¶ 10] Essentially, the rule declares government owes a duty of protection to the public, not to particular persons or classes.3 Sound reasons support this doctrine. Furnishing public safety always involves allocating limited resources. Law enforcement entails more than simply reacting to violations; it encompasses the art of keeping the peace. Deploying finite resources to achieve these goals is a legislative and executive policy function. To allow individuals to influence through private litigation how resources must be disposed would render government administration chaotic and enfeebled. Unrestricted liability might discourage communities from acting at all or encourage action merely to avoid suit, without regard to the common good.4 The rule promotes accountability for offenders, rather than police who through mistake fail to thwart offenses. Otherwise, lawbreaker culpability becomes increasingly irrelevant with liability focused not on the true malefactors, but on local governments. A “public duty” conception acknowledges that many “enactments and regulations are intended only for the purpose of securing to individuals the enjoyment of rights and privileges to which they are entitled as members of the public, rather than for the purpose of protecting any individual from harm.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288 cmt. b (1965).
[¶ 11] Some have criticized this doctrine for perpetuating formerly repealed immunity.5 A few courts have taken it upon themselves to repudiate the rule.6 To be sure, competing policy considerations are at stake.7 Upholding this rule, however, involves mat[357]*357ters altogether different from a mere litigation cost-benefit analysis, a function our Legislature has now apparently resolved by waiving immunity where insurance coverage exists. Yet absent legislative preemption, courts still decide the existence of duty, as it is “entirely a question of law, to be determined by reference to the body of statutes, rules, principles and precedents which make up the law....” W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 37, at 236 (5th ed 1984); City of Colton v. Schwebach, 1997 SD 4, ¶ 8, 557 N.W.2d 769, 771; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328B (1965). In carrying out our responsibility to ascertain duty, we must ponder the nature of government’s relation to its citizens and ask to what extent it should and can tolerate accountability for the negligence and misdeeds of third persons.8 Logically, without restriction on the scope of responsibility, local governments could be exposed to potential liability for every failure to appropriately enforce some enactment. Law enforcement officials would be put in the position of guaranteeing protection to each community member. “[S]o vast an expansion of the duty of protection should not emanate from the judi-
cial branch.” Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 74 N.Y.2d 251, 544 N.Y.S.2d 995, 1000, 543 N.E.2d 443, 448 (1989).
[¶ 12] Though some consider this doctrine a form of immunity, we view the rule principally within the framework of duty — if none exists, then no liability may affix.9 When our Legislature waived immunity for public entities, it created no new causes of action, but only imposed upon those entities basically the same liability in tort individuals bear. Local governments will not ordinarily be liable for the conduct of third parties where private persons are not.10 Generally, the law imposes “no duty to prevent the misconduct of a third person.” Cra-craft, 279 N.W.2d at 804. Tort liability depends upon the existence and breach of duty, and unless a specific statute creates a legal obligation, ascertaining a duty and defining its limitations, as we have said, remain a function of the courts. “A duty, in negligence eases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.” Keeton et al., supra, § 53, at 356.11
[358]*358[¶ 13] A widely accepted corollary to the public duty doctrine is the “special duty” or “special relationship” rule.12 See Restatement of Torts (Second) § 315 (1965). To establish liability under this restrictive template, plaintiffs must show a breach of some duty owed to them as individuals. The reason justifying this exception holds that when a public entity acts on behalf of a particular person actively causing injury, the law may impose liability because the government has by its conduct already made a policy decision to deploy its resources to protect such individual.13 This exception is not peculiar to the public duty rule; it follows the tort principle, most suitable with respect to rendering service to another, that persons are generally not liable for failure to act, but once having acted, must proceed without negligence. See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965); Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 185 Cal.Rptr. 252, 649 P.2d 894 (1982). While many plaintiffs have invoked the special duty rule to support claims against public entities, most courts have found no liability for matters such as failure to adequately inspect a structure for violations of fire and building codes, Benson v. Kutsch, 181 W.Va. 1, 380 S.E.2d 36, 40 (1989)(citing cases); failure to solve crime, Von Batsch v. American Dist. Telegraph Co., 175 Cal.App.3d 1111, 222 Cal.Rptr. 239 (1985); or failure to apprehend drunk drivers who later injure others. James L. Isham, Annotation, Failure to Restrain Drunk Driver as Ground of Liability of State or Local Government Unit or Officer, 48 A.L.R.4th 320 (1986).
[¶ 14] Application of the Rule
[¶ 15] On remand, the circuit court applied our four-element analysis from Tipton I— actual knowledge, reliance, ordinance enacted for the protection of a particular class of persons, aggravation of harm — and concluded the Tiptons failed to satisfy any factor with requisite “strong evidence.” See Tipton I, 538 N.W.2d at 787 (“Strong evidence concerning any combination of these [Cracraft ] factors may be sufficient to impose liability on a government entity”). We now examine each of the four elements in a light most favorable to plaintiffs.
[¶ 16] 1. Actual Knowledge of Dangerous Condition
[¶ 17] “Actual knowledge” means knowledge of “a violation of law constituting a dangerous condition.” Hage v. Stade, 304 N.W.2d 283, 288 n. 2 (Minn.1981). Constructive knowledge is insufficient: a public entity must be uniquely aware of the particular danger or risk to which a plaintiff is exposed. Arnold v. Village of Chicago Ridge, 181 Ill.App.3d 778, 130 Ill.Dec. 494, 497, 537 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1989). It means knowing inaction could lead to harm. See Lorshbough v. Township of Buzzle, 258 N.W.2d 96, 99-102 (Minn.l977)(decided before Minnesota’s present public duty rule as espoused in Cracraft; county’s actual knowledge of dangerous condition in government-operated dump created a special relationship between city and injured property owners). Actual knowledge goes beyond simple failure to perceive a violation. Runkel v. New York, 282 A.D. 173, [359]*359123 N.Y.S.2d 485, 488 (1953)(pre-Oitj^ rule case defining actual knowledge: specific knowledge of code violations and failure to abate abandoned open structure “so rotted and dilapidated” it was in “imminent danger of collapse,” forming a trap or a “dangerous instrumentality” which is in the “same class as an explosive substance, inflammable material, a live electric wire or a spring gun”— also ordinance created mandatory duty for benefit of particular class).
[¶ 18] As foreseeability is a necessary element in the duty formulation, actual knowledge denotes a foreseeable plaintiff with a foreseeable injury. Mid-Western Elec., Inc. v. DeWild Grant Reckert, 500 N.W.2d 250, 254 (S.D.1993). Public officers must have subjective knowledge of the violation, but “knowledge of facts constituting the statutory violation, rather than knowledge of the statutory violation itself, is all that is required.” Coffel v. Clallam County, 58 Wash.App. 517, 794 P.2d 513, 517 (1990)(po-lice are presumed to know the penal law). In Livingston v. City of Everett, 50 Wash.App. 655, 751 P.2d 1199 (1988), a four-year-old boy was bitten and scratched by Doberman Pinschers. In reversing summary judgment for the city, the court found genuine issues of material fact on whether the city had breached a special duty to protect the child based on evidence the Animal Control Department had received complaints about the dogs biting and lunging at persons and running loose. With these reports, the city had notice at least one dog was dangerous, thus its animal control officers may have possessed “actual knowledge of a statutory violation” and failed “to take corrective action despite a statutory duty to do so, and the plaintiff was within the class the statute intended to protect_” Id., 751 P.2d at 1200 (citations omitted). Although actual knowledge may be shown by both direct and circumstantial evidence, it may not be established through speculation. Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 118 Cal.Rptr. 741, 748 n. 4 (1975)(referring to knowledge necessary to put landlord on notice of a vicious dog on leased premises). “Only where the circumstances are such that the defendant ‘must have known’ and not ‘should have known’ will an inference of actual knowledge be permitted.” Id. See also Minick v. Englert, 84 S.D. 73, 79, 167 N.W.2d 551, 555 (1969)(detour warning signs, barricades and flares gave actual knowledge: “There was no obstruction or impairment of visibility and no reasonable excuse for defendant’s failure to see the signs and the approaching hazard.”). In sum, actual knowledge imports “knowing” rather than “reason for knowing.”
[¶ 19] The circuit court found, as a matter of law, defendants had no actual knowledge about the hybrids’ dangerous propensities. As we noted in Tipton I, the existence of actual knowledge is in “sharp dispute” and is perhaps the overarching consideration here, most bolstered by evidentia-ry support. The Tiptons allege several circumstances became apparent to Sutera and O’Donnell through their investigations, generating actual knowledge about the wolfdogs’ viciousness. Solidly reinforced and over seven feet tall, the very structure of the pen suggested contact with the creatures it held may be dangerous.14 Ford v. Steindon, 35 Misc.2d 339, 232 N.Y.S.2d 473, 474 (1962)(eit-ing cases)(manner in which dog tied up and precautions taken to restrain it evince knowledge of its vicious propensities). See also Radoff v. Hunter, 158 Cal.App.2d 770, 323 P.2d 202, 204 (1958)(animal confined in a manner appropriate for dangerous beast); Barger v. Jimerson, 130 Colo. 459, 276 P.2d 744 (1954); Layman v. Atwood, 175 Ind.App. 176, 370 N.E.2d 933 (1977). These cases all refer to knowledge on the part of owners. Yet can we advance this as actual knowledge by defendants? They did not build the cage, and other than their observations of it and the animals within, had no subjective information on why the cage was so constructed. Holland had previous experience in raising wolfdogs and represented them to be safe.
[360]*360[¶ 20] The hybrids were never allowed to run loose, although they could stick their heads out of the cage through the livestock panels. They looked somewhat like wolves and, to a certain extent, behaved as wolves. Neighbors were verbally discouraged from approaching the pens, although there was no yard fence or guard rail around the pen preventing close contact. Neighborhood and community discussion about the animals centered on keeping children away from the pen, but no one ever made a complaint about any danger the animals posed.
[¶21] Tabor’s licenses described the animals as “wolf hybrids,” yet the rabies receipt witnessed by Muller referred to each as a “wolf.” Muller understood the animals to be wolf hybrids, not wolves, and she so informed the Town Board: “I told them just what [Mrs. Holland] had told me. They were called wolf hybrids.” Shortly before the attack, Tabor sought to change its licensing ordinance to specifically address wild animals, but there is contradictory evidence on whether this was in response to the wolf-dogs.15 Nonetheless, of those who said the new ordinance was in part a reaction to the wolfdogs, the only concern they raised was the annoyance from howling. No one expressed to the Town Board any concern about safety. Although controversy persists over what subjectively prompted O’Donnell and Sutera to investigate the hybrids, they insist it was only in response to complaints about howling.16
[¶ 22] To Tabor and Bon Homme’s knowledge, the hybrids had never bitten or snapped at anyone who had approached the cage. Before the attack on Crystal, the animals were nothing more than a community curiosity and annoyance. If their ancestry engendered concerns about viciousness, the record reflects no history of problems with these particular animals. “Warning flags,” as the Minnesota Supreme Court has noted, are not enough for actual knowledge under Cracraft. Andrade v. Ellefson, 391 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn.1986). At least at the time of the attack, there is no support in the record for the assertion there was actual knowledge wolfdog hybrids were more dangerous than other dogs. Nonetheless, the Tiptons offered information about the special dangers of wolf hybrids from such sources as Newsweek, The Sioux Falls Argus Leader, and Wolfiracks, a publication of Wolf Haven America.17 These articles raise serious con[361]*361cerns about keeping wolfdogs as pets, particularly in town. However, our quandary with this is twofold: (1) the articles were all published sometime after the attack on Crystal Tipton; and (2) there is no showing that Sutera, O’Donnell, or other employees of Tabor or Bon Homme were ever aware of this information. In truth, only in recent years has public awareness been raised about the hazards of maintaining wolf hybrids, especially by irresponsible owners.
[¶ 23] Tabor’s ordinance in effect at the time forbade keeping dogs of fierce, dangerous or vicious propensities. Owning or keeping vicious dogs also constitutes a public nuisance under state law. SDCL 40-34-13. South Dakota law provides the following definition:
For the purposes of §§ 40-34-13 to 40-34-15, inclusive, a vicious dog is:
(1) Any dog which, when unprovoked, in a vicious or terrorizing manner approaches in apparent attitude of attack, or bites, inflicts injury, assaults or otherwise attacks a human being upon the streets, sidewalks or any public grounds or places; or
(2) Any dog which, on private property, when unprovoked, in a vicious or terrifying manner approaches in apparent attitude of attack, or bites, or inflicts injury, or otherwise attacks a mailman, meter reader, serviceman, journeyman, delivery man, or other employed person who is on private property by reason of permission of the owner or occupant of such property or who is on private property by reason of a course of dealing with the owner of such private property.
SDCL 40-34-14. But see SDCL 40-34-15 (“No dog may be declared vicious if an injury or damage is sustained to any person who was committing a willful trespass.... ”). Other jurisdictions have arrived at similar definitions:
The terms “vicious propensities” and “dangerous propensities” have been defined as “[a]ny propensity on the part of the dog, which is likely to cause injury under the circumstances in which the person controlling the dog places it ... and a vicious propensity does not mean only the type of malignancy exhibited by a biting dog, that is, a propensity to attack human beings.” 3A CJS Animals § 199, at page 701 (1973); Dansker v. Gelb, 352 S.W.2d 12, 16-17 (Mo.Sup.1961). It “ ‘includes as well a natural fierceness or disposition to mischief as might occasionally lead him to attack human beings without provocation.’ ” (Citation omitted.) Frazier v. Stone, [515 S.W.2d 766,] 768 [ (Mo.App.1974) ].
Farrior v. Payton, 57 Haw. 620, 562 P.2d 779, 785 (1977). Some courts even allow a jury to reason a posteriori, to decide from the nature and result of the attack on a plaintiff, whether an animal had vicious propensities. Lynch by Lynch v. Nacewicz, 126 A.D.2d 708, 511 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122 (N.Y.App.Div.l987)(citing cases); Carlisle v. Cassasa, 234 A.D. 112, 254 N.Y.S. 221, 226 (N.Y.App.Div.l931)(“The very viciousness of the attack upon plaintiff ... clearly demonstrates that the defendant’s dog was of a vicious and ferocious disposition.... ”). This is not the law in South Dakota. Bauman v. Auch, 539 N.W.2d 320 (S.D.1995).
[¶ 24] If we regard these animals as simply “dogs,” then at least until the attack on Crystal, they would not fit within the vicious category. The problem here though is trying to define whether these wolfdogs were domestic or wild. An owner’s liability often depends upon the distinction. If an animal is domesticated, the owner must know of its dangerous tendencies to be strictly liable: “But the notice necessary to hold an owner of an animal strictly liable for an attack on a human being is notice that the animal had a propensity to attack human beings, and notice that it had a ferocious disposition toward other animals may not be sufficient.” 3 F. Harper et al., The Law of Torts § 14.11, at 274 (2d ed 1986)(citing Re[362]*362statement (Second) of Torts, § 509 cmt g (1977)). On the other hand, “It is well known that wild animals born in captivity are untrustworthy and, although seemingly gentle, will on occasion revert to their savage propensities.” 3 Harper et al., supra, § 14.11, at 270. Dogs, however, are presumed tame and docile and the burden is on plaintiffs to show otherwise. See Lucas v. Kriska, 168 Ill.App.3d 317, 119 Ill.Dec. 74, 522 N.E.2d 736 (1988); 7 Speiser et al., supra, § 21:46, at 456.
[¶ 25] These wolfdogs were part German Shepherd. Some courts have suggested in dicta that German Shepherds are a vicious breed as a matter of law: “vicious propensities” may be implied from the fact the dog was a German Shepherd, said to have inherited “wild and untamed” tendencies from its “wolf ancestors.” Kelley v. Hitzig, 71 Misc.2d 329, 336 N.Y.S.2d 122, 126 (N.Y.Nassau Cty. Ct.1972) (citations omitted); contra Lundy v. California Realty, 170 Cal.App.3d 813, 216 Cal.Rptr. 575, 580 (1985)(vieiousness of German Shepherds not an appropriate subject of judicial notice).18 Here, of course, liability is more attenuated as we are measuring accountability for law enforcement officials who purportedly failed to control the animals or their owner. Even owners are ordinarily not liable for injury caused by a dog unless the owner knows or should have known of the particular dog’s vicious tendencies. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 509 (1965); SDCL 40-34-14 (definition of “vicious dog”). See also Arcara v. Whytas, 219 A.D.2d 871, 632 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1995)(sum-mary judgment should have been granted in case of undisputed proof dog had never before bitten anyone and had never growled or bared its teeth when someone approached). An owner of a wild animal, on the other hand, is liable for damage resulting from dangerous propensities characteristic of its class, even when the owner is unaware of any specific vicious tendencies of the particular animal. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 507 (1977).
[¶26] What distinguishes a wild from a domesticated animal when crossbreeding the two occurs? Consider Restatement (Second) of Torts § 506 (1977):
(1) A wild animal ... is an animal that is not by custom devoted to the service of mankind at the time and in the place where it is kept.
(2) A domestic animal ... is an animal that is by custom devoted to the service of mankind at the time and in the place where it is kept.
Traditional or “customary service” signifies domestication of a species, but this may be of little assistance in categorizing a particular crossbreed. 3 Harper et al, supra, § 14.11, at 266. See also SDCL 40-1-1(5):
“Domestic animal,” any animal that through long association with man, has been bred to a degree which has resulted in genetic changes affecting the temperament, color, conformation or other attributes of the species to an extent that makes it unique and different from wild individu- • als of its kind....
Some courts recognize a third category: wild animals capable of domestication. Spring Company v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 25 L.Ed. 487 (1878)(buck deer attacked plaintiff; deer though ferae naturae may be domesticated, and if so owner must have notice animal was vicious); Pate v. Yeager, 552 S.W.2d 513 (Tex.App.l977)(four-year-old’s finger bitten after sticking it in pet monkey’s cage). Wolves obviously would not fit in this category as they are considered unsafe no matter how “domesticated” their owners may consider them. Hays v. Miller, 150 Ala. 621, 43 So. 818 (1907); Collins v. Otto, 149 Colo. 489, 369 P.2d 564 (1962)(coyote, or “prairie wolf,” Canis latrans). Can wolfdogs be included in the “capable of domestication” category? 19 [363]*363Certainly, the owner here thought so. Perhaps all that can be said is that the results of breeding wild with domesticated dogs is unpredictable. This brings us back to the question at hand: How much “actual knowledge” did defendants possess?
[¶ 27] Compare actual knowledge in other private duty situations: In Corridon v. City of Bayonne, 129 N.J.Super. 393, 324 A.2d 42, 44 (App.Div.1974), an off-duty police officer was required to carry a service revolver. It was well known the officer had frequent bouts of intoxication in public places. “[A] municipality has a plain duty of care in its supervision of those whom it arms.” Id. In Campbell v. City of Bellevue, 85 Wash.2d 1, 530 P.2d 234 (1975), a landowner electrically lit a creek running through his property. The electrical inspector knew the wiring was nonconforming, and a dead raccoon was found in the creek, presumably electrocuted. Knowing this dangerous condition, the inspector failed to disconnect the system as required by ordinance. In both cases the public entity had certain knowledge of a dangerous violation — a frequently drunk police officer who the city required to be armed even while off-duty and a lethal wiring violation of the electrical code which directed immediate disconnection. How can those instances compare with public officials faced with assessing the potential danger of a crossbred pet? Not one person in Tabor ever voiced a public complaint about any danger these animals posed. Even assuming public officers carry more acute awareness of dangerous violations, to imbue them with “must have known” cognizance of potentially dangerous characteristics of crossbred species goes beyond rational expectations. Danger of escape would have been a foremost concern; however, them cage was so secure escape was unlikely, as the officers’ inspection verified. As Holmes reflected in The Common Law, “[A] law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average member of the community would be too severe for that community to bear.” 0. Holmes, The Common Law 50 (Dover 1991) (1881). Rumors of danger and fears of mixing dog species creates no actual, but constructive knowledge. Constructive knowledge is too remote to sustain a special duty. What we now know about wolfdogs in general, and these animals in particular, was not available to the city and county officials under scrutiny here. Only with the aid of hindsight can one justly say, “they should have known,” but that is not enough. We conclude no strong evidence of actual knowledge has been shown.20
[¶ 28] Let us proceed for a moment with the assumption the Tiptons have sufficient evidence to support the actual knowledge factor. Is proof satisfying this element [364]*364enough to establish a special duty? In An-drade, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted, “We might add, too, as to the four Cracraft factors, that while they should all be considered, all four need not necessarily be met for a special duty to exist.” 391 N.W.2d at 841. Chief Justice Miller restated the same observation in Tipton I when writing “any combination” of factors may be sufficient. 538 N.W.2d at 787. It may be conceivable for some other factor by itself to create liability; we need not decide that question today. No matter the proof on actual knowledge, however, alone it is inadequate to establish a private duty. To impose tort liability upon local law enforcement for failure to protect an individual solely upon actual knowledge of imminent danger directly conflicts with the principal rationale behind the public duty rule: it judicially intrudes upon resource allocation decisions belonging to policy makers. For a rudimentary illustration on this point, one need only imagine a variety of simultaneous public emergencies. Only when actual knowledge is coupled with one or more of the other factors, can we uphold both the spirit and substance of the private duty exception. Consider, for example, actual knowledge of a dangerous violation of an enactment protecting a special class, or such knowledge accompanied by reasonable reliance, or local entity conduct aggravating danger. In each of these combinations, the rationale appears to remain intact.
[¶ 29] We are unaware of any “public duty” jurisdiction which pins special duty liability solely upon actual knowledge. Minnesota courts have yet to decide this question. Washington cases link actual knowledge with violation of an enactment protecting a special class. See Campbell, supra; Livingston, 751 P.2d at 1200 (although Washington liberally defines special class). But see, e.g., Mullin v. Municipal City of South Bend, 639 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind.l994)(foreseeability not the only consideration under Indiana’s private duty test). As Prosser states, “‘duty’ is a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff....” Keeton et al, supra, § 53, at 356. No government should carry a burden of protection based purely on foreseeability; or to state it another way, with foreseeability as the sole standard, the public duty rule vanishes. Even if the Tiptons established actual knowledge, this element must be coupled with another of the four factors.21 We proceed to the remaining factors.
[¶ 30] 2. Reasonable Reliance
[¶ 31] The Tiptons state they relied upon the defendants “to keep the Town of Tabor safe from dangerous conditions [because people] should be able to visit relatives in a town and not be exposed to dangers such as wolf-hybrids.”
The primary purpose of dog ordinances and statutes is protection of the public from injury or damage ... [D]ogs because of their propensities are, and from time immemorial have been ... peculiarly subject to rigorous police regulation.
Dogs have been viewed as constituting nuisances, at least where they are ferocious or have the habit of jumping and biting at children or other people. Indeed, such a dog is a nuisance of the worst sort.
7 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 24.284, at 195 (3d ed. 1989). The licensing enactment here was created for the general well being of the community, not for any particular persons or classes. Even if plaintiffs could assume the wolfdogs’ presence in Tabor was legally sanctioned through licensing, it would not be adequate to create personal reliance. Dogs bite, licensed or not. For reasonable reliance to occur, the Tiptons must have depended on “specific actions or representations which [caused them] to forgo other alternatives of protecting themselves.” [365]*365Andrade, 391 N.W.2d at 842 (citing Cracraft, 279 N.W.2d at 806-07). See also Lorshbough, 258 N.W.2d at 99 (noting reliance occurs from “some sort of contact between the governmental unit and the plaintiff which usually induces detrimental reliance by the individual”). Not only is licensing insufficient for reliance, but the fact that law enforcement officials investigated the pens is also an inadequate basis for the type of reliance that creates a special duty. Cracraft, 279 N.W.2d at 807 (“[Rjeliance on the inspection in general is not sufficient.”); see also Andrade, 391 N.W.2d at 841 (“The regulatory and licensing presence of the state and its political subdivisions in the affairs of the public is pervasive. If there were blanket liability, it would be a rare lawsuit where some unit of government would not be sued”).
[¶ 32] Reliance must be based on personal assurances. Instructive of this axiom is Champagne v. Spokane Humane Society, 47 Wash.App. 887, 737 P.2d 1279 (1987), where a child was attacked by pit bulldogs. Over a five-month period, people complained about these dogs “running loose and threatening the neighborhood.” Id., 737 P.2d at 1283. In response, the Humane Society, regarded as a government agency under the public duty rule, “assured [complainants it] would patrol the area and apprehend any stray dogs.” Id. at 1284. On the day before the attack, the Society assured the parent of the child later injured that the area would be patrolled. Consequently, a material issue of fact arose over whether the Society breached a private duty after creating reliance upon assurances of protection. Id.; see Meaney v. Dodd, 111 Wash.2d 174, 759 P.2d 455 (1988)(overruling earlier cases and holding a governmental duty cannot arise from implied assurances). Similar types of direct assurances have created reasonable reliance. See, e.g., De Long, supra (911 caller assured of help coming “right away”). In contrast, no direct promises were given here. Not even townsfolk, much less visitors in Tabor, were assured of any protection from the wolfdogs, except in so much as they were always penned. Licensing the animals only warranted they had vaccinations and perhaps obliquely assured they would not be allowed to roam free.
At the heart of most of these “special duty” cases is the unfairness that the courts have perceived in precluding recovery when a municipality’s voluntary undertaking has lulled the injured party into a false sense of security and has thereby induced the injured party either to relax his or her own vigilance or to forego other available avenues of protection.
18 McQuillin, supra, § 53.04.50, at 179.
[¶ 33] Nothing in the record suggests that when the Tiptons arrived in town, they knew of the local enactments or practices regarding animal licensure. They arrived only minutes before the attack. No representations were made to them about the safety of the wolfdogs caged in the neighbor’s yard. Trusting upon some feeling they would be safe wherever they went in Tabor is perhaps comprehensible; however, it does not rise to the level of reliance causing them to forgo self-precaution.22 We detect no facts to support reasonable reliance within this record.
[¶ 34] 3. Enactment for Protection of Particular Class
[¶ 35] Here we consider as only one factor what once was the entire test in Hagen.
[A] legislative enactment ... whose purpose is found to be exclusively (a) to protect the interests of the state or any subdivision of it as such, or (b) to secure to individuals the enjoyment of rights or privileges to which they are entitled only as members of the public, ... [does not create a standard of conduct to be used to impose tort liability].
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288 (1965). This element “permits recovery against a government entity for negligent failure to enforce its laws only when there is language in a statute or ordinance which shows an intent to protect á particular and circum[366]*366scribed class of persons.” Tipton I, 538 N.W.2d at 786; Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Iowa 1979)(“Duty can be created by statute if the Legislature purposed or intended to protect a class of persons to which the victim belongs against a particular harm which the victim has suffered.”). In Tipton I, we recognized the illogie of using this factor as a single test, for a class denoted in an ordinance may have been inserted purely by happenstance. Tipton I, 538 N.W.2d at 787. But see Campbell, 530 P.2d at 241 (allowing a broad definition of special class, including person killed after inspector failed to disconnect blatant electrical safety violation; safety ordinance was for the benefit of special class, persons residing within the ambit of the danger involved); Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wash.2d 673, 574 P.2d 1190, 1193 (1978)(hotel fire death; declaration of purpose in Seattle Housing Code specified it was “enacted for the benefit of a specifically identified group of persons as well as, and in addition to, the general public”). Although Washington recognizes a broad definition of special class, we follow the Cracraft standard, which narrowly includes only “a particular and circumscribed class of persons.” Tipton I, 538 N.W.2d at 786. See also Andrade, 391 N.W.2d at 842 (ordinance enacted wholly for protection of small children in licensed daycare facilities). If we were to adopt Washington’s definition — “all persons and property who come within the ambit of the risk” — then we ought candidly to announce the demise of Tipton I, as it would control nothing. Notably, the Washington Supreme Court admits that under its concept of the public duty doctrine, “its myriad exceptions may well reveal that the exceptions have virtually consumed the rule.” Bailey v. Town of Forks, 108 Wash.2d 262, 737 P.2d 1257,1260 (1987).
[¶ 36] Does SDCL 7-12-29, which empowers a sheriff to take possession of dangerous animals, create a special duty?23 This statute delineates no particular class to be protected, nor does it create a mandatory obligation. The general nuisance law, SDCL 21-10-1, another statute the Tiptons raise, creates no special class or a mandatory duty, either.24 SDCL 21-10-3 names no “particular and circumscribed class,” but general classes, and only for the purpose of defining the difference between public and private nuisances. Tabor’s vicious dog ordinance mentions no particular class. We believe the generality of these enactments is determinative. Simply because certain laws give Tabor and Bon Homme authority to act does not mean that a special class is created and needs to be protected. These enactments have no particular applicability to children, visitors to town, or anyone in particular. The record fails to support this element.
[¶37] 4. Failure To Avoid Increasing Risk of Harm
[¶ 38] Under this factor official action must either cause harm itself or expose plaintiffs to new or greater risks, leaving them in a worse position than they were before official action. Could Tabor have aggravated the risk of harm by licensing the hybrids?'25 Failure to diminish harm is not [367]*367enough. Andrade, 391 N.W.2d at 843 (county’s negligent licensing, inspecting and supervising day care home sufficient to create liability under third factor, ordinance for a special class (children), but it did not satisfy fourth factor). Though wolves are federally protected, no South Dakota law specifically prohibits keeping them, much less wolf hybrids: private ownership of wild animals is statutorily sanctioned. SDCL 43-2-3: “Animals, wild by nature, are the subjects of ownership when tamed or taken and held in possession, or disabled and immediately pursued.” But see SDCL 40-3-26 (regulations and permits for captive nondomestic mammals); ARSD § 12:68:18:03 (last amendment effective December 31,1993)(permit required to possess any nondomestic mammal or any of its hybrids of the family Canidae). The risk after licensing the animals was no greater than the risk before they were licensed. The Hollands kept the dogs in town two years before they were licensed and at the time of thé attack on Crystal, the licenses had expired. Nor can inspection of the pen by law enforcement officials support this element. See Cracraft, 279 N.W.2d at 808 (“[W]e refuse to impose a duty of care merely because an inspection is undertaken, for it would create a new tort.”).
[¶39] Neither licensing the wolfdogs nor inspecting their pens were affirmative acts increasing the risk of harm to those approaching the hybrids. See Von Batsch, supra, in which investigating officers failed to find evidence of intruders, and, after the police left, the intruders killed a businessperson. “The officers did not create the peril to decedent. They took no affirmative action which contributed to, increased, or changed the risk which would have otherwise existed. At most they merely failed to eliminate the danger of unknown intruders.” 222 Cal. Rptr. at 246-47. See also Lopez v. City of San Diego, 190 Cal.App.3d 678, 235 Cal.Rptr. 583, 585 (1987)(McDonald’s restaurant massacre: “The police can in no way be charged with lulling [the killer’s] victims into a false sense of security, nor can the alleged inaction by police reasonably be said to have increased the risk of harm to which the victims were subject.”).
[¶ 40] In Sampson v. City of Lynn, 405 Mass. 29, 537 N.E.2d 588 (1989), the chief of police issued a pistol permit to a so-called “disreputable person,” who was “unfit,” “improper,” and “not competent” to carry a gun. Id., 537 N.E.2d at 588. The permittee later shot and killed someone. In finding no special duty, the court wrote:
The plaintiff has not pointed us to any statutes or ordinances which establish that the city owed the decedent, as a member of an identifiable subclass, a special duty of care.... The [permit] statute does not evince a legislative intent to protect a particular group of individuals. Rather, the beneficiaries of the statute are members of the general public.'...
The plaintiff has not alleged any foreseeable risks, the knowledge of which would have enabled the city to prevent the harm which ultimately occurred.... The allegations in this ease do not support a claim that the city’s purported negligence created a risk of immediate and foreseeable injury.
Id. at 589 (citations omitted). Failure to diminish potential harm is insufficient. Defendants cannot bear liability under this element.
[¶ 41] In summary, we conclude as a matter of law no private duty liability exists here, as none of the four Cracraft elements have been met.
[¶ 42] Affirmed.
[¶ 43] MILLER, C.J., and AMUNDSON and GILBERTSON, JJ., concur.
[¶ 44] SABERS, J., dissents.