Tippecanoe County Assessor v. DENNIS D ABBOTT

• Court: Indiana Tax Court
• Decided: October 17, 2025
• Docket: 25T-TA-00013
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED Oct 17 2025, 4:08 pm

CLERK PETITIONER APPEARING PRO SE: RESPONDENTS: Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals ERIC GROSSMAN DENNIS D. and JOANN ABBOTT and Tax Court

Lafayette, IN Lafayette, IN

IN THE INDIANA TAX COURT

TIPPECANOE COUNTY ASSESSOR, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) Case No. 25T-TA-00013 ) DENNIS D. and JOANN ABBOTT, ) ) Respondents. )

ON APPEAL FROM THE INDIANA BOARD OF TAX REVIEW

NOT FOR PUBLICATION October 17, 2025

MCADAM, J.

The Tippecanoe County Assessor, Eric Grossman, filed an original tax appeal in

this Court without counsel. In his appeal petition, Grossman challenges the denial of a

continuance by the Indiana Board of Tax Review as biased and raises constitutional

claims related to Petitioner’s “constitutional rights to due process and fair assessments.”

(Pet. ¶1.) Grossman is not a licensed attorney and appears to have filed this appeal in

his official capacity. In an order dated August 1, 2025, the Court sua sponte raised the

issue of whether the Tippecanoe County Assessor may appear without counsel in this

appeal and whether Grossman, as the elected official, may represent the county

assessor’s office. The Court ordered Petitioner either to notify the Court of its intent to obtain legal counsel or file a brief explaining why Grossman, as the elected assessor,

may represent Petitioner in this Court. Grossman filed a brief contending that he, as the

elected assessor, is authorized to represent the Tippecanoe County Assessor’s Office.

The Respondents did not file any response by the September 30, 2025, deadline. After

reviewing the matter, the Court concludes that Petitioner must be represented by

counsel because Grossman is not authorized to represent Petitioner and has not cited

any authority that would permit him, as a non-attorney, to represent Petitioner.

No Statute Authorizes Grossman to Represent His Office in the Indiana Tax Court

The Court solicited authority from Grossman for his claim that a county assessor

may represent his office in this Court, and Grossman identified two statutes in response:

Indiana Code sections 33-26-7-1 and 6-1.1-35.7-2. Both statutes relate to

representation of the county assessor’s office, but neither permit an elected assessor

like Grossman to represent his office in Tax Court.

When reviewing statutory language, an unambiguous statute must be held to

mean what it plainly expresses, and its plain and obvious meaning may not be enlarged

or restricted. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue v. Horizon Bancorp, 644 N.E.2d 870, 872

(Ind. 1994). Interpretation is only necessary when the statute is ambiguous. Id. When

interpretation is required, this Court relies on the plain and ordinary meaning of each

word unless the statute indicates otherwise. Covance Cent. Lab’y Servs. LP v. Indiana

Dep’t of State Revenue, 204 N.E.3d 348, 355 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2023). When reading

unambiguous statutes or when interpreting statutes, the “rules of statutory construction

caution against expanding or contracting statutory language beyond its plain meaning.”

Gilday & Assocs., P.C. v. Marion Cnty. Assessor, 236 N.E.3d 1160, 1169 (Ind. Tax

2 Ct. 2024).

Grossman reads the permissive “may elect” language found in subsection (a) of

Indiana Code section 33-26-7-1 as allowing a county assessor to choose to represent

his own office in Tax Court, but this reading ignores the obvious dichotomy established

by the statute. Indiana Code section 33-26-7-1 contains two subsections which

establish a choice of representation for local officials appearing before this Court.

Subsection (a) provides that a county assessor “may elect” to hire and pay for his own

attorney in a proceeding before this Court. IND. CODE § 33-26-7-1(a) (2025). Subsection

(b) offers an alternative, stating that a county assessor “may elect to be represented by

the office of the attorney general under a written agreement.” I.C. § 33-26-7-1(b). The

parallel use of “may elect” across the subsections indicates a choice between

representation by a private attorney and representation by the Attorney General’s

Office, not a choice between representation and no representation.

Nonetheless, even if Indiana Code section 33-26-7-1 allowed a county assessor

to represent his office in Tax Court, the statute does not apply in this appeal. Indiana

Code section 33-26-7-1 only applies when the county assessor “is a defendant in a

judicial proceeding in the tax court.” I.C. § 33-26-7-1(a)(2). Because Grossman filed an

original tax appeal in this case, he is not the defendant, and Indiana Code section 33-

26-7-1 does not apply. This Court will not expand the application of this statute.

Grossman also points to Indiana Code section 6-1.1-35.7-2 as support for his

ability to represent the county assessor’s office in this Court but again attempts to

expand a statute beyond its unambiguous meaning. Indiana Code section 6-1.1-35.7-2

defines “tax representative” for proceedings before a county property tax assessment

3 board of appeals (PTABOA) and the Department of Local Government Finance (DLGF)

and excludes certain individuals from that definition. I.C. § 6-1.1-35.7-2. County

assessors are not included in the definition of tax representative, and the statute

specifically excludes “a representative of a local unit of government appearing on behalf

of the unit.” I.C. § 6-1.1-35.7-2(4). According to Grossman, this demonstrates a

legislative intent to allow non-attorney county assessors to represent their offices in tax

matters. But the plain language of the statute limits its application to proceedings before

PTABOAs and the DLGF. There is no justification for expanding its application to Tax

Court proceedings.

Even a generous reading of Grossman’s argument regarding Indiana Code

section 6-1.1-35.7-2 fails because exclusion from the definition of tax representative

does not entitle a person to represent others before this Court. The definition of tax

representative also excludes “a permanent full-time employee of the owner of the

property . . . who is the subject of the appeal.” I.C. § 6-1.1-35.7-2(3). Nonetheless,

corporations, partnerships, and LLCs are generally required to be represented by

counsel before Indiana courts, absent an exception. I.C. § 34-9-1-1. Just as full-time

employees of other organizations are excluded from the definition of tax representative

but are generally not permitted to represent their organizations before Indiana courts,

county assessors are not authorized to represent their offices before this Court simply

because they are excluded from the definition of tax representative for PTABOA and

DLGF proceedings.

In fact, the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass’n

v. Miller highlights that constitutional arguments like the one Grossman raises in his

4 petition are meaningfully distinct from valuation arguments which a tax representative

may make before the PTABOA or IBTR. 770 N.E.2d 328, 330 (Ind. 2002). In Miller, the

Indiana Supreme Court addressed whether a non-attorney should be enjoined from

representing others before the State Board of Tax Commissioners, as it then existed. Id.

at 329. The Court acknowledged that non-attorneys may be even more qualified than

attorneys to understand the property tax assessment process and, in doing so, that they

may examine “court opinions to answer the questions of what constitutes obsolescence

or depreciation.” Id. at 330. Nonetheless, the Court also noted that a non-attorney’s

expertise in the assessment process does not make them qualified in the practice of

law, specifically referencing constitutional claims as a type of issue that qualifies as

legal practice. Id. Although the Court did not enjoin the non-attorney from representing

others before the Board, it reached this conclusion only because the Board

implemented new rules that prohibited tax representatives from presenting legal

arguments, including constitutional arguments, or addressing legal issues related to the

assessment. Id. at 331. Some of Grossman’s claims appear to be constitutional in

nature and clearly constitute the practice of law. As the Supreme Court noted in Miller,

there is difference between the scope of work performed by non-attorneys, like tax

representatives, and the work performed by attorneys. Indiana Code section

6-1.1-35.7-2 does nothing to alter that allocation of responsibility.

The Indiana Supreme Court Has Not Authorized an Assessor to Represent His Office in the Indiana Tax Court

Even without statutory support, Grossman believes that an assessor’s tax

expertise and “inherent authority” should allow him to represent his office in Tax Court.

But Grossman fails to recognize that the Indiana Supreme Court has the authority to

5 determine who may practice law in this state, including who may represent another in

judicial proceedings. When exercising that authority, the Supreme Court has been clear

and explicit; it has not made any provision allowing a county assessor to represent his

office.

The Indiana Supreme Court has “the inherent jurisdiction to determine who are

qualified as attorneys to practice law in this state. This is a judicial function, separate

from that of either the executive or legislative departments.” State ex rel. Ind. State Bar

Ass’n v. Moritz, 191 N.E.2d 21, 23 (Ind. 1963). The Indiana Supreme Court has long

recognized that the “performing of services in a court of justice” constitutes the practice

of law. State ex rel. Disciplinary Comm’n v. Crofts, 500 N.E.2d 753, 754 (Ind. 1986)

(quoting Fink v. Peden, 17 N.E.2d 95, 96 (Ind. 1938)). If a statute conflicts with the rules

adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court governing the qualifications for admissions and

practice of law, then the Court’s “rules must take precedence and the conflicting

phrases within that statute must be deemed without force or effect.” State ex. rel.

Western Parks v. Bartholomew Cnty. Ct., 383 N.E.2d 290, 292 (Ind. 1978).

Generally, only a licensed attorney may represent someone other than himself in

court. “[W]hile any natural person may appear in court on his or her own behalf, only

persons duly admitted to practice law may appear on behalf of other persons. This rule

is well recognized.” Simmons v. Carter, 576 N.E.2d 1278, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).

Corporations, for instance, generally must be represented by counsel before Indiana

courts because they “cannot be wholly identified with any individual person and thus, by

necessity, must be represented by its agents.” Western Parks, 383 N.E.2d at 292. Like

corporations, the county assessor’s office represents the entire county—its citizens and

6 its units of government—and cannot be wholly identified with the elected assessor. A

loss by the assessor affects the interests of the entire county, not just the interests of

the assessor personally.

In instances when the Indiana Supreme Court permits non-attorneys to appear

on behalf of others in Indiana courts, it does so clearly and explicitly. For example,

Indiana Small Claims Rule 8 provides an exception to the general rule that corporations

and other business entities be represented by an attorney. See Ind. Small Claims Rule

8. In a small claims hearing, sole proprietorships and partnerships “may be represented

by the sole proprietor or partner, owner, counsel, or by a designated full-time employee”

and “[a]ll corporate entities, Limited Liability Companies (LLC’s), and Limited Liability

Partnerships (LLP’s), and Trusts may be represented by counsel, owner, or by a

designated full-time employee of the corporate entity, or, in the case of a trust by a

trustee.” Ind. Small Claims Rule 8(C)(2)–(3). Indiana Small Claims Rule 8 specifies

when the rule applies, what organizations may use it, and who may represent those

organizations. See Ind. Small Claims Rule 8(A), 8(C).

Here, however, Grossman has not identified any judicial rule that would permit

him to represent his office in this case. Instead of identifying judicial rules or supporting

case law, Grossman argues that he is entitled to represent the county assessor’s office

because, as an elected official, he retains the inherent authority to represent his office.

However, being an elected official with statutory duties does not inherently allow him to

represent his office in court. In fact, the Indiana Supreme Court has previously enjoined

an elected prosecuting attorney who was never a member of the bar from practicing law

despite the centrality of legal practice to the work of a prosecutor’s office. Moritz, 191

7 N.E.2d at 24–25. Despite the statutory duties conferred upon them, prosecuting

attorneys are not authorized to represent the State of Indiana when they have not been

admitted to the Indiana bar. See id. The Court can discern no reason why a non-

attorney, elected assessor should be subject to a different rule. To permit otherwise

would be to permit a person who has not been duly admitted to the practice of law to

appear on behalf of other persons.

The risks of allowing a non-attorney to represent others in court is made plainly

apparent in Grossman’s brief when he cites Hamilton Cnty. Assessor v. Allisonville Rd.

P’ship, 170 N.E.3d 1117 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2021)—a case that does not exist. Courts have

sanctioned both attorneys and pro se litigants for citing fictitious cases in briefs.

Williams v. Kirch, --- N.E.3d ----, ----, 2025 WL 2383623, at *2 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 18,

2025); see also In re Baby Boy, --- N.E.3d ----, ----, 2025 WL 2046315, at *23 (Ill. App.

Ct. July 21, 2025) (requiring an attorney who cited fictious cases in his briefs to pay

monetary sanctions and sending a copy of the opinion to the Illinois Attorney

Registration and Disciplinary Commission). False citations may also have negative

effects on the outcome of a case. See, e.g., Kruse v. Karlen, 692 S.W.3d 43, 52–53

(Mo. Ct. App. 2024) (determining that the appellant’s use of fictitious citations in his brief

mandated a dismissal of the appeal). Citing fictious cases adversely affects all parties in

a case. Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). It “wastes time

and money in exposing the deception” and takes a court’s time “from other important

endeavors.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he client may be deprived of arguments based on

authentic judicial precedents.” Id.1

1 While the Court cannot be certain of the origin of the fictitious case cited in Grossman’s brief, it appears likely to be the result of a hallucination by generative artificial intelligence. See

8 The Tippecanoe County Assessor May Not Appear Without Counsel

After reviewing the issue, this Court has determined that Petitioner may not

appear without counsel in this appeal but may take steps to hire counsel before the

appeal is dismissed. This Court has held that “while an appeal initiated by a non-

attorney on a corporation’s behalf is procedurally defective, the defect is curable.”

Wireless Advocs., LLC v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 973 N.E.2d 111, 113 (Ind.

Tax Ct. 2012) (citing Sherry Designs, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 589 N.E.2d 285,

285 n.1 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1992)). Likewise, when a corporation attempts to prosecute or

defend its case pro se, “Indiana courts generally have given the corporation an

opportunity to retain counsel, which the corporation must refuse before dismissing the

action.” Id. at 112 (citing Western Parks, 383 N.E.2d at 292–93). Petitioner shall

therefore be given an opportunity to retain counsel.

Williams, --- N.E.3d at ----, 2025 WL 2383623, at *2. The Court admonishes Grossman for citing a fictitious case in his brief and “caution[s] attorneys and pro se litigants alike against using AI to conduct legal research without independently verifying the citations generated. Judges must be able to rely on the authenticity of the authorities cited by the parties to make just decisions.” Id. Litigants have a duty to verify the authenticity of authoritative sources cited to the Court and ensure they are used accurately.

9 Therefore, the Court ORDERS that Petitioner may only proceed with legal

counsel and that Petitioner’s counsel must file a notice of appearance by November 17,

2025. If Petitioner is unable to obtain counsel by this date, Petitioner shall file a notice

with the Court by the same date detailing the efforts to retain counsel and explaining

why those efforts have been unsuccessful. If Petitioner fails or is unwilling to appear by

counsel, the case may be dismissed.

ORDERED: 10/17/2025 Justin L. McAdam Judge, Indiana Tax Court

Distribution: Eric Grossman, Dennis D. and JoAnn Abbott