Tindall v. American Furniture Co.

4 S.E.2d 894, 216 N.C. 306, 1939 N.C. LEXIS 153

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: October 18, 1939
• Status: Published

Opinion

Devin, J.

The defendants challenge the correctness of the judgment below upon two grounds: (1) That there was not sufficient competent evidence to sustain the award, and (2) that the court should have allowed their motion and application for leave to introduce further or new evidence before the Full Industrial Commission, or a hearing Commissioner.

1. In accord with the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, it has been established by the uniform decisions of this Court that the findings of fact made by the Industrial Commission, when supported by competent evidence, must be held conclusive on appeal, and not subject to review. Lassiter v. Telephone Co., 215 N. C., 227; Porter v. Noland Co., 215 N. C., 724; Plyler v. Country Club, 214 N. C., 453. And the application of the rule of the conclusiveness of the findings of the Industrial Commission as to controverted issues of fact, when based on competent evidence, is not defeated by the fact that some of the testimony offered may be objectionable under the technical rules of evidence appertaining to courts of general jurisdiction, as was pointed out in Maley v. Furniture Co., 214 N. C., 589, and Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S., 197. Here the appellant noted certain exceptions to the hearing Commissioner’s rulings on the reception of testimony, but we find them without merit. There was sufficient competent evidence to support the findings of the Commission that the deceased came to his death as a consequence of breathing benzol fumes in the regular course of his employment, and that his death resulted from an occupational disease caused by exposure to benzol poisoning as a part of bis employment, witbin tbe provisions of ch. 123, Acts of 1935, thus constituting an injury by accident arising out of and in tbe course of bis employment by defendant Furniture Company.

2. Appellants complain that tbe Industrial Commission denied their motion for leave to offer new or additional evidence, and except to tbe judgment of tbe Superior Court affirming tbe judgment and award of tbe Industrial Commission.

Tbe Workmen’s Compensation Act (Acts 1929, ch. 120) provides that tbe Industrial Commission or any of its members shall bear tbe evidence and determine tbe dispute in a summary manner. Tbe award and statement of tbe findings of fact are required to be filed and a copy sent to parties (see. 58). If proper application be made, tbe Full Commission “shall review tbe award, and, if good ground be shown therefor, reconsider tbe evidence, receive further evidence, rehear tbe parties or their representatives, and, if proper, amend tbe award” (sec. 59).

There is nothing in tbe Workmen’s Compensation Act that gives to a party, against whom an award has been made by tbe bearing Commissioner, a substantive right to require tbe Full Commission to bear new or additional testimony. It may, and should, do so if tbe due administration of justice requires. But tbe duty to receive further evidence, in addition to reviewing tbe award, applies only if good ground therefor be shown.

Here tbe appellants waited until after notice of award against them by tbe bearing Commissioner before making tests of tbe quantity of benzol under working conditions in tbe room where deceased bad worked a year before.

In tbe Superior Court, upon appeal from an award by tbe Industrial Commission, tbe court has power in proper case to order a rehearing, and to remand tbe proceeding to tbe Industrial Commission, on tbe ground of newly discovered evidence, but this is a matter witbin tbe sound discretion of tbe court. Byrd v. Lumber Co., 207 N. C., 253, 176 S. E., 572; Butts v. Montague Bros., 208 N. C., 186, 179 S. E., 799. Tbe record does not disclose that motion for remand for rehearing by tbe Industrial Commission was made in tbe Superior Court. There was no. evidence of abuse of discretion.

Tbe rules of tbe Industrial Commission, adopted pursuant to sec. 54 of tbe Workmen’s Compensation Act, relative to tbe introduction of new evidence at a review by tbe Full Commission, are in accord with tbe decisions of this Court as to granting new trials for newly discovered evidence. Johnson v. R. R., 163 N. C., 431, 79 S. E., 690; Bullock v. Williams, 213 N. C., 321, 195 S. E., 791; Farris v. Trust Co., 215 N. C., 466; Winslow v. Carolina Conference Assn., 211 N. C., 571, 191 S. E., 403.

The Industrial Commission is primarily an administrative agency of the State, charged with the duty of administering the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but, in hearing and determining facts upon which the rights and liabilities of employers and employees depend, it exercises certain judicial functions to which appertain the rules of orderly procedure essential to the due administration of justice according to law. Hanks v. Utilities Co., 210 N. C., 312, 186 S. E., 252.

The facts found by the Industrial Commission and assigned as ground for the denial of defendants’ motion for leave to offer new or additional evidence, amply support the ruling. There was no error in the judgment of the Superior Court.

Judgment affirmed.