UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Tina M. Raymond, Claimant
v. Case No. 19-cv-097-SM Opinion No. 2019 DNH 007
Andrew Saul, 1 Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant
O R D E R
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), claimant, Tina Raymond,
moves to reverse or vacate the Commissioner’s decision denying
her application for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II
of the Social Security Act (the “Act”). See 42 U.S.C. § 423.
The Commissioner objects and moves for an order affirming his
decision.
For the reasons discussed, claimant’s motion is denied, and
the Commissioner’s motion is granted.
1 On June 17, 2019, Andrew Saul was sworn in as Commissioner of Social Security. He replaced the nominal defendant, Nancy A. Berryhill, who had been Acting Commissioner of Social Security. Factual Background
I. Procedural History.
In October of 2016, claimant filed an application for
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), alleging that she was
disabled and had been unable to work since February 13, 2013.
Claimant was 49 years old at the time of her alleged onset of
disability and had acquired sufficient quarters of coverage to
remain insured through December 31, 2018. Claimant’s
application was denied and she requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
In January of 2018, claimant, her attorney, an independent
medical expert (Dr. John Kwock, a board certified orthopedic
surgeon), and a vocational expert appeared before an ALJ, who
considered claimant’s applications de novo. During Dr. Kwock’s
testimony, claimant became agitated and left the room. She
returned and Dr. Kwok completed his testimony, as did claimant.
At that point, the hearing had gone on for about an hour, the
ALJ indicated that he had to end it soon, and the vocational
expert had yet to testify. Claimant’s attorney asked the ALJ
for a continuance, so the vocational expert could give
testimony. Claimant’s counsel also asked that the ALJ arrange
for claimant to undergo a psychological examination. The ALJ
agreed to continue the hearing, but declined to rule on the
2 request for a psychological examination until after he had the
opportunity to more carefully review claimant’s medical records
- particularly those related to her mental health. Ultimately,
the ALJ declined to order the psychological examination and
neither claimant nor her counsel arranged for claimant to
undergo such an examination.
The hearing was continued to May 16, 2018, at which the ALJ
heard testimony from a second independent medical expert, Dr.
James Claiborn (a board certified psychologist), and Jane
Gerrish, an impartial vocational expert. Four weeks later, the
ALJ issued his written decision, concluding that claimant was
not disabled, as that term is defined in the Act, at any time
prior to the date of his decision. Claimant requested review by
the Appeals Council. That request was denied. Accordingly, the
ALJ’s denial of claimant’s application for benefits became the
final decision of the Commissioner, subject to judicial review.
Subsequently, claimant filed a timely action in this court,
asserting that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by
substantial evidence.
Claimant then filed a “Motion for Order Reversing Decision
of the Commissioner” (document no. 7). In response, the
Commissioner filed a “Motion for an Order Affirming the Decision
3 of the Commissioner” (document no. 9). Those motions are
pending.
II. Factual Background.
A detailed factual background can be found in claimant’s
statement of facts (document no. 8) and the Commissioner’s
statement of facts (document no. 10). Those facts relevant to
the disposition of this matter are discussed as appropriate.
Standard of Review
I. “Substantial Evidence” and Deferential Review.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court is empowered “to
enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing.” Factual findings and credibility
determinations made by the Commissioner are conclusive if
supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3). See also Irlanda Ortiz v. Secretary of Health &
Human Services, 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991). Substantial
evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). Importantly,
then, it is something less than a preponderance of the evidence.
4 So, the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from
the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding
from being supported by substantial evidence. See Consolo v.
Federal Maritime Comm’n., 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). See also
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
II. The Parties’ Respective Burdens.
An individual seeking DIB benefits is disabled under the
Act if he or she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
The Act places a heavy initial burden on the claimant to
establish the existence of a disabling impairment. See Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146-47 (1987); Santiago v. Secretary of
Health & Human Services, 944 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1991). To
satisfy that burden, the claimant must prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that her impairment prevents her from
performing her former type of work. See Manso-Pizarro v.
Secretary of Health & Human Services, 76 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir.
1996); Gray v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 369, 371 (1st Cir. 1985). If
the claimant demonstrates an inability to perform her previous
work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there
5 are other jobs in the national economy that she can perform, in
light of her age, education, and prior work experience. See
Vazquez v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 683 F.2d 1, 2
(1st Cir. 1982). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512.
In assessing a disability claim, the Commissioner considers
both objective and subjective factors, including: (1) objective
medical facts; (2) the claimant’s subjective claims of pain and
disability, as supported by the claimant’s testimony or that of
other witnesses; and (3) the claimant’s educational background,
age, and work experience. See, e.g., Avery v. Secretary of
Health & Human Services, 797 F.2d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1986);
Goodermote v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 690 F.2d 5,
6 (1st Cir. 1982). Ultimately, a claimant is disabled only if
her:
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that [she] is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which [she] lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for [her], or whether [she] would be hired if [she] applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
6 With those principles in mind, the court reviews claimant’s
motion to reverse and the Commissioner’s motion to affirm his
Background - The ALJ’s Findings
In concluding that claimant was not disabled within the
meaning of the Act, the ALJ properly employed the mandatory
five-step sequential evaluation process described in 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520. See generally Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24
(2003). Accordingly, he first determined that claimant had not
been engaged in substantial gainful employment since her alleged
onset of disability: February 11, 2013. Admin. Rec. at 22.
Next, he concluded that claimant suffers from the following
severe impairments: “status-post tear in right wrist,
fibromyalgia, carpal tunnel syndrome, and anxiety.” Id. But,
the ALJ determined that claimant’s impairments, whether
considered alone or in combination, did not meet or medically
equal any of the impairments listed in Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. Admin. Rec. at 22-24.
Next, the ALJ concluded that claimant retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the exertional demands of
“light” work, subject to the following limitations: “she can
perform no more than frequent fingering or feeling with the
7 right hand. She can frequently push and pull with the right
hand. The claimant should not be in a position that requires a
production pace.” Id. at 24. In light of those restrictions,
the ALJ concluded that claimant was capable of performing her
past relevant work as a laboratory tester. Id. at 30. See also
Id. at 51-54 (vocational expert’s testimony about claimant’s
past relevant work).
Nevertheless, the ALJ continued to the final step in the
analysis. Relying upon the testimony of the vocational expert,
the ALJ concluded that, notwithstanding claimant’s limitations,
“there are other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that the claimant can also perform.” Id. As
representative examples of such jobs, the ALJ identified
“cashier,” “counter attendant,” and “linen grader.” Id. at 31.
See also Id. at 54-55 (testimony of vocational expert). In
light of those findings at both step four and step five of the
analysis, the ALJ concluded that claimant was not “disabled,” as
that term is defined in the Act, through the date of his
decision (June 20, 2018).
Discussion
Claimant challenges the ALJ’s decision on four grounds,
asserting that he erred: (1) by failing to arrange for her to
8 undergo a mental status examination to assess the extent of her
alleged memory problems; (2) by failing to give adequate weight
to claimant’s subjective complaints of disabling symptoms
(particularly those relating to her panic attacks); (3) by
failing to give adequate weight to the opinions of claimant’s
treating physician, Dr. Anthony Mollano regarding her “permanent
impairment rating” (related to her award of workers’
compensation benefits); and, finally, (4) by making factual
findings that were not supported by substantial evidence.
I. Lack of Mental Status Examination.
Claimant faults the ALJ for failing to arrange for her to
undergo a mental status examination to assess the extent of her
claimed memory issues. This court (Barbadoro, J.) has
previously discussed the scope of an ALJ’s obligation to fully
develop the evidentiary record, noting:
Although an ALJ should ordinarily be entitled to rely on claimant’s counsel to structure and present the claimant’s case in a way that adequately explores the claims, the ALJ is responsible in every case to ensure that an adequate record is developed during the disability hearing consistent with the issues raised. This duty to develop the record is heightened where the claimant is not represented by counsel, but applies in all cases. Thus, an ALJ cannot leave the record undeveloped where a claim itself seems on its face to be substantial, where there are gaps in the evidence necessary to a reasoned evaluation of the claim, and where it is within the power of the administrative law judge, without undue effort, to see
9 that the gaps are somewhat filled. The duty has been described as one of inquiry, requiring the decision maker to inform himself about facts relevant to his decision and to hear the claimant’s own version of those facts.
Brunel v. Barnhardt, No. CIV.00-402-B, 2002 WL 24311, at *8
(D.N.H. Jan. 7, 2002) (citation and internal punctuation
omitted). But, “for an ALJ’s failure to develop the record to
constitute reversible error, the claimant must demonstrate that
he or she has suffered some prejudice as a result. Prejudice is
demonstrated by showing that the additional evidence might have
led to a different decision. Gilmore v. Berryhill, 2019 DNH 15,
2019 WL 259119, at *3 (D.N.H. Jan. 18, 2019) (citations and
internal punctuation omitted). Here, claimant has not shown
that a mental status evaluation was warranted or that such an
examination might have yielded evidence that would counsel in
favor of a different outcome.
Claimant correctly notes that Dr. Claiborn, the non-
examining board-certified psychologist, testified that
complaints of memory loss are “really pretty subjective” and to
evaluate any actual deficit in memory functioning, claimant
would have to undergo a formal mental status examination.
Admin. Rec. at 49. But, as the ALJ pointed out, the medical
records repeatedly note that claimant retained normal memory.
10 Id. at 27. See also Id. at 1045, 1056, 1064, 1067, 1072, 1076,
1079, 1085, 1091, 1098, 1104, 1128, 1136, 1144, 1154, 1185,
1194, 1201, 1204, 1208, 1212, 1214, 1221, 1226, 1231, (all
suggesting that claimant did not suffer from impaired memory and
that her short term memory was intact); id. at 1654 (Neurology
office note from Dr. Borislav Nikolov, reporting that although
claimant was anxious during the examination, she had “normal
mentation” and her “memory [was] intact.”); id. at 1885 (same);
1900 (same). And, after having reviewed all of claimant’s
medical records, Dr. Claiborne concluded that claimant’s ability
to understand, remember, and apply information was only mildly
impaired. Id. at 42.
The ALJ supportably credited Dr. Claiborne’s medical
opinion. And, given the sparse record evidence of claimant’s
alleged memory impairment, the court cannot conclude that the
ALJ erred when he determined that it was not necessary to
arrange for claimant to undergo a mental status examination.
II. Claimant’s Testimony.
Next, claimant asserts that the ALJ failed to properly
credit her claims of debilitating panic attacks, overall joint
pain and swelling, and pain and numbness in two of her fingers.
The court disagrees.
11 The ALJ amply supported his RFC decision with references to
the medical record. For example, the ALJ noted that “[a]lthough
the claimant has subsequently complained of joint pains
attributed to fibromyalgia, objective physical examinations do
not establish substantial deficits in strength, mobility, and
motor skills.” Admin. Rec. at 25. He supported that conclusion
by, for example, discussing the clinical reports of Dr. Julia
Bolding (a rheumatologist who examined claimant in April of
2017) and Dr. Borislan Nikolov, to whom claimant was referred
for a neurological consultation. Dr. Bolding diagnosed claimant
as suffering from fibromyalgia, after claimant reported that
more than 11 of 18 fibromyalgia tender points were positive,
“many with vocalization and withdrawal.” Admin. Rec. at 1811.
Yet, Dr. Bolding also opined that claimant’s “somatic complaints
are far out of proportion to physical findings.” Id. at 1809.
She also noted that although claimant had been prescribed
Dilaudid for complaints of pain, “Dartmouth long ago stopped
giving her narcotics, and recently, Ms. Donovan [the referring
advanced nurse practitioner] also declined to provide more
narcotics for her.” Id. at 1810.
In May of 2017, one month after her consultation with Dr.
Bolding, claimant saw Dr. Nikolov for a comprehensive
neurological evaluation. Dr. Nikolov reported that, upon
12 musculoskeletal examination, claimant displayed “no joint
deformities. Full range of motion. No joint swelling or
redness. No muscular pain on palpation.” Id. at 1885. He also
noted that claimant had normal nerve function, normal motor
strength without weakness or atrophy, and “normal physiological
gait and posture.” Id. at 1886. Those findings are plainly
inconsistent with claimant’s assertion to Dr. Bolding that she
experienced “severe pain in every single peripheral and axial
joint.” Id. at 1811. Those findings are, however, entirely
consistent with Dr. Bolding’s opinion that claimant’s assertions
of disabling pain throughout her body “are far out of proportion
to physical findings.” Id. at 1809.
The ALJ also noted that, in that same general timeframe
(February 10, 2017), claimant was seen by Peter Loeser, MD, for
an orthopedic examination. While Dr. Loeser acknowledged
claimant’s assertions of “constant daily severe pain in all
joints to an equal degree,” id. at 754, he was largely unable to
duplicate that pain in the office or diagnose a cause. See
generally Id. at 754-57 (noting that claimant had “no noted
tenderness on palpation” of the cervical spine, thoracic spine,
or lumbar spine; “normal range of motion of the shoulders,
elbows, wrists and hands bilaterally without noted pain”; “No
noted pain on palpation of the shoulders, elbows, wrists, hands
13 bilaterally”; “normal range of motion of the hips, knees,
ankles, and feet bilaterally without noted pain. No pain on
palpation of the hips, knees, ankles, and feet”; and “Normal
ability to sit and stand, step up and down, get on and off the
examination table, remove and put back on shoes, squat and rise
from squat, ambulate, and walk on the balls and heels of both
feet.”). Ultimately, with respect to claimant’s complaints of
widespread, chronic, debilitating pain, Dr. Loeser reported:
Chronic pain: Other than abdominal pain to palpation with recent surgery for ostomy reversal, there are no significant findings on physical examination. There is available documentation related to the patient’s surgical history on her right forearm and bowels, but there is no available documentation related to chronic widespread joint pain. The patient is very pleasant to speak with, appears uncomfortable both at rest and with movement, and ambulates slowly but with relative ease around the examination room without any apparent deficits or impairments.
Id. at 756.
From the record evidence, the ALJ sustainably concluded
that although claimant has been diagnosed with fibromyalgia - an
impairment the ALJ deemed “severe” - the “objective physical
examinations do not establish substantial deficits in strength,
mobility, and motor skills.” Id. at 25. That determination is
amply supported by substantial record evidence, including the
14 findings, observations, and conclusions of Dr. Loeser, Dr.
Bolding, and Dr. Nikolov.
The ALJ did not erred in assessing claimant’s testimony
and/or her subjective complaints of disabling pain. He properly
evaluated claimant’s symptoms and limitations, and his findings
are amply supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Finally, claimant seems to assert that her various
outbursts at the two hearings before the ALJ compel the
conclusion that her panic attacks are, standing alone,
disabling. See Claimant’s Memorandum (document no. 7-1) at 3
(“Frankly, the content of Ms. Raymond’s testimony and panic
attacks she experienced at the hearings would lead even a
layperson to believe that she is seriously impaired.”). But, of
course, what a layperson believes about claimant’s panic attacks
is largely irrelevant. Whether they are real and, if so, the
extent to which they are disabling (or impose functional
limitations upon claimant) is not something about which the ALJ
is permitted to speculate. Rather, he must (as he did) ground
his decision in the record evidence.
15 III. Opinions of Claimant’s Treating Physician.
In discussing the weight that will be ascribed to the
opinions of “treating sources,” the regulations applicable to
claimant’s appeal provide that, “Generally, we give more weight
to medical opinions from [the claimant’s] treating sources,
since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals
most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [the
claimant’s] medical impairment(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
See also Social Security Ruling, Policy Interpretation Ruling
Titles II and XVI: Giving Controlling Weight to Treating Source
Medical Opinions, SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 (July 2, 1996).
Importantly, however, there is no per se rule requiring the ALJ
to give greater weight to the opinion of a treating source. To
be entitled to controlling weight, a treating source’s opinions
must be “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and [cannot be] inconsistent
with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
Here, claimant faults the AJL for not giving more
substantial weight to the opinion of a treating physician, Dr.
Anthony Mollano. Dr. Mollano treated claimant for an injury to
her right wrist (a longitudinal split tear of the ulnar tendon),
which she sustained after slipping and falling at work on
16 February 11, 2013. In December of 2014, Dr. Mollano submitted a
letter in which he stated:
Tina Raymond is a patient well known to me. She had a right wrist pain from a work injury that required surgical treatment in April, 2013, with ECU sheath release. She also had wrist ligament pathology treated with arthroscopy. She did have a difficult recovery with significant limited range of motion and significant limited function to forearm and then underwent a second surgery with an examination under anesthesia and a manipulation on 5/12/2014. She does have residual impairment of her forearm with limited forearm range of motion and does have chronic pain both of which qualify her for a permanent impairment rating.
Admin. Rec. at 609 (emphasis supplied). But, as the ALJ noted,
Dr. Mollano’s opinion that claimant has “residual impairment of
her [right] forearm” and a “permanent impairment rating” is
“vague and not a function-by-function assessment of the
claimant’s abilities despite her right wrist impairment.” Id.
at 29. The ALJ also noted that Dr. Mollano had not treated
claimant for approximately six months prior to issuing that
opinion letter and, therefore, did not have the benefit of the
more recent physical examinations documented in the record.
Moreover, during the “examination under anesthesia”
referenced in his letter, Dr. Mollano reported:
After the induction of general anesthesia, I was
17 easily and lightly able to manipulate the forearm into full supination. The elbow had full range of motion. I was able to fully pronate and fully supinate the forearm. There was no snapping of the ECU tendon. The DRUJ was stable. There was no crepitation. There was no indication for steroid injections or any other treatments. A sugar-tong splint was placed with the elbow at 90 degrees in full supination with the plan being to keep the splint on for 2 weeks and then start therapy thereafter.
Id. at 446 (“Operative Report” dated May 12, 2014). Two weeks
later, Dr. Mollano examined claimant and reported that she had
“no structural or anatomic pathology,” and he again noted that,
while under anesthesia, claimant had “full forearm range of
motion and wrist range of motion with no contracture.” Id. at
434. In light of his understanding of claimant’s wrist injury,
her treatment history, and her recovery to date, Dr. Mollano
opined that “[i]t would be confounding and difficult to say she
has a true impairment down the road.” Id. at 434.
Having reviewed the evidence of record, the court cannot
conclude that the ALJ erred in his consideration of Dr.
Mollano’s opinion that claimant suffers from a “permanent
impairment rating” or in his decision to afford it little
evidentiary weight.
18 IV. The ALJ’s Finding are Properly Supported.
Finally, claimant generally asserts that the ALJ’s factual
findings are not supported by substantial evidence. First, she
claims the ALJ failed to adequately support his findings
concerning her physical limitations. Specifically, she seems to
claim that the ALJ failed to adequately account for the symptoms
of her fibromyalgia. The court disagrees.
The ALJ amply supported his conclusions about claimant’s
physical limitations with citations to record evidence. As to
claimant’s fibromyalgia, it is true that a rheumatologist
formally diagnosed claimant with fibromyalgia (and the ALJ
properly determined that it is a “severe” impairment). But, the
symptoms of that impairment (and the extent to which they impose
limitations upon claimant) are, at best, unclear. Dr. John
Kwock, the non-examining physician who reviewed claimant’s
medical records and testified at the first hearing explained it
well:
[Claimant] also carries a diagnosis of fibromyalgia, but I believe that diagnosis would be equivocal. There are two opposing findings in the record, but we will list it [as a severe impairment].
* * *
There was an examination by a rheumatologist and they probably are the best people for making the diagnosis of fibromyalgia. On her examination, she
19 had found 11 of the 18 tender points that the American College of Rheumatology has recommended would substantiate the diagnosis of fibromyalgia.
However, she also had stated in the assessment that somatic complaints are far out of proportion to physical findings and so - and also in the upper portions, she said pretty much every single joint is tender; there is no synovitis point or over-lying erythema on any of her peripheral joints on examination. She did include fibromyalgia as one of her conclusions.
A consultative examination [was] done in February of 2017, that examiner made a point of saying no loaded tenderness on palpation of the spinous process or paraspinal muscles.
And so we have one examiner that did not really find any tenderness that would’ve been part of those 18 tender points for making the diagnosis fibromyalgia. [The] rheumatologist did find 11 out of the 18 tender points, but she has some concerns as to the validity of those findings, and so that’s mainly the reason I say that we’re going to list fibromyalgia, but I believe the diagnosis might be equivocal.
Admin. Rec. at 67-68.
In short, the record amply supports the ALJ’s conclusions
about the physical limitations imposed upon claimant as a result
of her fibromyalgia.
Claimant also takes issue with the ALJ’s decision to
discount the opinion of Dr. Mollano, as expressed in his letter
dated December 9, 2014. But, as discussed above, the ALJ’s
20 decision to give that particular opinion “little evidentiary
weight,” Admin. Rec. at 29, is fully supported by the record.
Conclusion
The ALJ’s written decision in this case is comprehensive
and his findings and conclusions are well-supported by the
record. Judicial review of that decision is both limited and
deferential. This court is not empowered to consider claimant’s
application de novo, nor may it undertake an independent
assessment of whether she is disabled under the Act.
Consequently, the issue before the court is not whether it
believes claimant is disabled. Rather, the permissible inquiry
is “limited to determining whether the ALJ deployed the proper
legal standards and found facts upon the proper quantum of
evidence.” Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999).
Provided the ALJ’s findings are properly supported by
substantial evidence - as they are in this case - the court must
sustain those findings even when there may also be substantial
evidence supporting the contrary position. Such is the nature
of judicial review of disability benefit determinations. See,
e.g., Tsarelka v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 842 F.2d
529, 535 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[W]e must uphold the [Commissioner’s]
conclusion, even if the record arguably could justify a
different conclusion, so long as it is supported by substantial
21 evidence.”); Rodriguez v. Secretary of Health & Human Services,
647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981) (“We must uphold the
[Commissioner’s] findings in this case if a reasonable mind,
reviewing the evidence in the record as a whole, could accept it
as adequate to support his conclusion.”).
Having carefully reviewed the administrative record and the
arguments advanced by both the Commissioner and the claimant,
the court concludes that there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the ALJ’s conclusion that claimant was not
disabled, as that term is used in the Act, at any time prior to
the date of his decision (June 20, 2018). The ALJ’s
determination of claimant’s RFC, his stated reasons for
crediting some medical opinions while discounting others, and
his analysis of claimant’s subjective allegations of disabling
symptoms are well-reasoned and supported by substantial
evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in
the Commissioner’s legal memorandum, claimant’s motion to
reverse the decision of the Commissioner (document no. 7) is
denied, and the Commissioner’s motion to affirm his decision
(document no. 9) is granted. The Clerk of the Court shall enter
judgment in accordance with this order and close the case.
22 SO ORDERED.
____________________________ Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge
January 10, 2020
cc: Brenda M. Golden Hallisey, Esq. Lisa G. Smoller, Esq.