Time Warner Cable v. National Labor Relations Board

160 F.3d 1, 333 U.S. App. D.C. 71, 159 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2726, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 28138
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedNovember 6, 1998
Docket97-1524
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 160 F.3d 1 (Time Warner Cable v. National Labor Relations Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Time Warner Cable v. National Labor Relations Board, 160 F.3d 1, 333 U.S. App. D.C. 71, 159 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2726, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 28138 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

Opinion

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LeCRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge:

Time Warner Cable, Inc. (Time Warner) petitions for review of an order of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) concluding that it engaged in an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the Communication Workers of America, Local 1120 (Union). Time Warner Cable, 324 N.L.R.B. No. 25 (Aug. 5,1997). The NLRB eross-applies for enforcement of its order. Time Warner admitted that it refused to bargain but challenged the validity of the Union’s certification based on the NLRB’s disqualification of a challenged, and potentially determinative, ballot. As explained below, we conclude that the NLRB’s decision was not based on substantial evidence and therefore, grant Time Warner’s petition and deny the Board’s cross-application for enforcement.

I.

On March 5,1995, the Union petitioned the NLRB seeking certification as the exclusive collective bargaining representative at Time Warner, formerly Paragon Communications d/b/a Paragon Cable of Newburgh, New York (Cable), 1 for "all fulltime and regular part-time service technicians ... employed by the employer at or out of its 400 Auto Park Place, Newburgh, New York facility.” Paragon Communications d/b/a Paragon Cable, Hearing Officer’s Report (Sept. 18, 1996) (hereinafter Hearing Officer’s Report), Joint Appendix (JA) 7A. The original election ended in a tie and the Union filed an objection alleging management misconduct. The NLRB agreed with the Union and on September 25,1995, it ordered a second election. The Notice of Second Election also specified the eligible voters:

Included: All full-time and regular part-time service technicians, installer technicians, warehouse coordinators, customer service representatives, production staff, and dispatchers employed by the employer at or out of its 400 Auto Park Place, New-burgh, New York Facility;
Eligible voters are those in the unit who were employed during the payroll period ... [ending September 15],

Paragon Communications d/b/a Paragon Cable, Notice of Second Election (Sept. 18, 1996), JA 1A-2A. The rerun election was conducted on October 6, 1995. Of the twen *3 ty-eight ballots cast, fourteen were for unionization, thirteen wére against and the Union challenged one ballot, cast by Willie Jackson. JA8A.

Cable had hired Jackson in February 1994 as an installer and promoted him to the position of installer technician in August 1994, at which time he received a raise. JA 12A. After an initial orientation period, Jackson was assigned a vehicle and generally worked alone, performing installation and some repair work. Id. In March 1995 Jackson applied for and received a higher paid position performing similar work for Primes-tar. At Primestar Jackson oversaw “quality control of the work performed by contractors retained to install satellite dishes.” Id.

While the Union initially challenged Jackson’s ballot on the ground that he was a member of management, id. at 10A, it changed its position during the hearing to challenge whether Cable had employed Jackson in the unit as of the eligibility date. Id. The hearing officer then issued a subpoena for relevant documents 2 and allowed testimony on the Union’s new issue. Id. at 8A-9A n. 2. The Union, however, called no additional witnesses on the issue. It had already called Jackson to testify on the management member issue and Cable then called Gemma Sla-eik, Paragon Northeast’s area manager. Based on perceived inconsistencies between their testimony and the documentary evidence, the hearing officer decided that Jackson was not a regular part-time employee as of the eligibility date. Id. at 17A-19A. She concluded that “as of September 15, the payroll eligibility date herein, Jackson had a conditional promise of employment, but had not yet returned to work as a regular, part-time employee” of Cable. Id. at 20A. Noting an earlier Board decision that had declared ineligible an employee who was in the bargaining unit before the eligibility date but had not performed unit work for a “ ‘sufficiently substantial amount of time,’ ” the hearing officer implied a similar fate for Jackson. Id. at 20 n. 11 (quoting Meadow Valley Contractors, 314 N.L.R.B. 217, 217 (1994)).

Cable filed exceptions to the hearing officer’s report and on January 15, 1997 the Board issued an order denying oral argument and affirming the hearing officer. In re Paragon Communications d/b/a Paragon Cable, 2-RC-21521 (Jan. 15, 1997), JA 24A. On March 28, 1997, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that Cable violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. by refusing to bargain. Cable admitted its failure to negotiate but challenged the Union’s status as the exclusive bargaining representative. On August 5, 1997 the Board concluded that “[a]ll representation issues raised by [Cable] were or could have been litigated in the prior representation proceeding,” Time Warner Cable, 324 N.L.R.B. No. 25, at 1 (Aug. 5, 1997), granted the General Counsel’s summary judgment motion and ordered Cable to cease and desist from violating sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Act. Id. at 2. Cable petitioned for review, invoking this Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to section 10(f) of the Act.

II.

Our role in reviewing the NLRB’s findings of-fact is limited. We will reverse the NLRB only if its findings are not “supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e); see also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 493, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). We also give substantial deference to the inferences drawn by the NLRB from the facts. Peoples Gas Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35, 42 (D.C.Cir.1980). We do not, however," ‘merely rubber stamp NLRB decisions,”’ Davis Mem’l Goodwill Indus. v. NLRB, 108 F.3d 406, 410 (D.C.Cir.1997) (quoting Avecor, Inc. v. NLRB, 931 F.2d 924, 928 (D.C.Cir.1991)) and, in reviewing the findings, we must “take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from [their] weight.” Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488, 71 S.Ct. 456.

*4 In order to vote in a representation election, an employee must be “employed and working on the eligibility date.” NLRB v. Dalton Sheet Metal Co.,

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160 F.3d 1, 333 U.S. App. D.C. 71, 159 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2726, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 28138, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/time-warner-cable-v-national-labor-relations-board-cadc-1998.