Robert Reid v. Brodeur, et al. CV-96-492-B 01/24/00 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Robert Reid
v. Civil N o . 96-492-B Opinion N o . 2000 DNH 022 Paul Brodeur, et al.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Robert Reid has sued 18 present and former members of the
New Hampshire Department of Corrections seeking damages and
injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that
the defendants violated: (1) his Eighth Amendment right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment; (2) his First Amendment
right to be free from retaliation for exercising his First
Amendment rights; (3) his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection; (4) his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due
process; and (5) his First Amendment right of access to the
courts. He has sued all of the defendants in both their
individual and official capacities.
Reid’s core complaint is that several prison guards beat and physically harassed him on several occasions. He asserts that
the beatings and harassment were inflicted to retaliate against
-2- him because he filed unspecified complaints and because he is
black. He also asserts that he was disciplined, reclassified,
placed in solitary confinement, and moved from one section of the
prison to another without justification and without the
procedural safeguards to which he is entitled. Finally, he
claims that prison officials denied him the assistance of a law
clerk and tampered with his legal mail.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim. I briefly address the defendants’ arguments.
I. Official Capacity Claims
Reid’s official capacity claims for damages are barred by
the Eleventh Amendment but his claims for prospective injunctive
relief are not. See Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v . New England
Newborn Screening Program, 187 F.3d 2 4 , 27 (1st C i r . ) , cert.
denied, 120 S . C t . 615 (1999). Accordingly, I dismiss only
Reid’s official capacity claims for damages.
II. Eighth Amendment Claim - Excessive Force
The test for an Eighth Amendment claim alleging the use of
-3- excessive force is whether force was applied “maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm” rather than in a “good faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline.” Hudson v . McMillian, 503
U.S. 1 , 7 (1992). Here, Reid alleges that prison guards
repeatedly physically abused him, not in an effort to maintain
and restore discipline, but to retaliate against him and because
he is black. These allegations state an Eighth Amendment
violation.1 Defendants’ motion to dismiss Reid’s Eighth
Amendment claims is denied.
III. First Amendment - Retaliation Claims
To prevail on a claim of retaliation in violation of his
First Amendment rights, Reid must show that: (1) he had a First
Amendment right; (2) the defendants took an adverse action
against him; (3) with an intention to retaliate; and (4) the
retaliatory act caused the injury for which he is seeking
1 It is unlikely that all of the defendants can be liable for Eighth Amendment violations. Because defendants have not attempted to specify which of them may be held liable and which may not, I will not attempt to sort the matter out on my own. I follow the same approach with respect to Reid’s remaining claims.
-4- compensation. See McDonald v . Steward, 132 F.3d 225, 231 (5th
Cir. 1998). Reid claims that he was beaten, harassed and
suffered other adverse actions because he filed lawsuits against
-5- the prison. This is sufficient to state a claim of unlawful
retaliation. Defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims is
denied.
IV. Fourteenth Amendment
To prove a claim of racial discrimination in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, Reid must
show that the defendants injured him by intentionally subjecting
him to discrimination without justification because of his race.
See Judge v . City of Lowell, 160 F.3d 6 7 , 75 (1st Cir. 1998).
Here, Reid alleges that he was subject to beatings and other
physical harassment simply because he is black. This is
sufficient to state an equal protection claim. Defendants’
motion to dismiss these claims is denied.
V. Fourteenth Amendment - Procedural Due Process
Reid alleges that he was placed in punitive segregation,
moved from one tier to another within the prison’s special
housing unit, reclassified, and subjected to a loss of good time
credits without the procedures to which he is entitled by state
-6- law and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.
-7- Defendants first argue that these claims are defective
because Reid has not sufficiently alleged that they have deprived
him of a protected liberty interest. Insofar as Reid argues that
he has a protected liberty interest in avoiding punitive
segregation, movement within the special housing unit, and
reclassification, I agree. See Sandin v . Conner, 512 U.S. 472,
485-86 (1995) (holding hat prisoner’s discipline in segregated
confinement "did not present the type of atypical, significant
deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty
interest”); Harper v . Showers, 174 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 1999)
(holding that prisoner had no protected property or liberty
interest in custodial classifications). I decline to decide
whether Reid has alleged a liberty interest in the loss of good
time credits as the issue is factually and legally complex, see,
e.g., Gotcher v . Wood, 66 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 1995)
(vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1238 (1997)), and has not
been properly briefed. I also decline to consider whether Reid
must first pursue his claim for loss of good time credits in an
-8- action for habeas corpus, see, e.g., Anyanwutaku v . Moore, 151
F.3d 1053, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
-9- I dismiss Reid’s procedural due process claims to the extent
that he bases the claim on punitive segregation, transfer within
the special housing unit, or reclassification. I decline to
determine at the present time whether Reid has stated a claim
that he has a protected liberty interest in avoiding the loss of
good time credits and whether he must first pursue this claim
through a habeas corpus petition before bringing a claim for
damages based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants also argue that they are absolutely immune from
liability for any procedural due process violations arising from
the prison disciplinary process. This claim has no merit. See
Cleavinger v . Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 206 (1985) (recognizing
qualified, but not absolute, immunity for members of prison
disciplinary committee); Hameed v .
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Robert Reid v. Brodeur, et al. CV-96-492-B 01/24/00 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Robert Reid
v. Civil N o . 96-492-B Opinion N o . 2000 DNH 022 Paul Brodeur, et al.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Robert Reid has sued 18 present and former members of the
New Hampshire Department of Corrections seeking damages and
injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that
the defendants violated: (1) his Eighth Amendment right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment; (2) his First Amendment
right to be free from retaliation for exercising his First
Amendment rights; (3) his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection; (4) his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due
process; and (5) his First Amendment right of access to the
courts. He has sued all of the defendants in both their
individual and official capacities.
Reid’s core complaint is that several prison guards beat and physically harassed him on several occasions. He asserts that
the beatings and harassment were inflicted to retaliate against
-2- him because he filed unspecified complaints and because he is
black. He also asserts that he was disciplined, reclassified,
placed in solitary confinement, and moved from one section of the
prison to another without justification and without the
procedural safeguards to which he is entitled. Finally, he
claims that prison officials denied him the assistance of a law
clerk and tampered with his legal mail.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim. I briefly address the defendants’ arguments.
I. Official Capacity Claims
Reid’s official capacity claims for damages are barred by
the Eleventh Amendment but his claims for prospective injunctive
relief are not. See Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v . New England
Newborn Screening Program, 187 F.3d 2 4 , 27 (1st C i r . ) , cert.
denied, 120 S . C t . 615 (1999). Accordingly, I dismiss only
Reid’s official capacity claims for damages.
II. Eighth Amendment Claim - Excessive Force
The test for an Eighth Amendment claim alleging the use of
-3- excessive force is whether force was applied “maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm” rather than in a “good faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline.” Hudson v . McMillian, 503
U.S. 1 , 7 (1992). Here, Reid alleges that prison guards
repeatedly physically abused him, not in an effort to maintain
and restore discipline, but to retaliate against him and because
he is black. These allegations state an Eighth Amendment
violation.1 Defendants’ motion to dismiss Reid’s Eighth
Amendment claims is denied.
III. First Amendment - Retaliation Claims
To prevail on a claim of retaliation in violation of his
First Amendment rights, Reid must show that: (1) he had a First
Amendment right; (2) the defendants took an adverse action
against him; (3) with an intention to retaliate; and (4) the
retaliatory act caused the injury for which he is seeking
1 It is unlikely that all of the defendants can be liable for Eighth Amendment violations. Because defendants have not attempted to specify which of them may be held liable and which may not, I will not attempt to sort the matter out on my own. I follow the same approach with respect to Reid’s remaining claims.
-4- compensation. See McDonald v . Steward, 132 F.3d 225, 231 (5th
Cir. 1998). Reid claims that he was beaten, harassed and
suffered other adverse actions because he filed lawsuits against
-5- the prison. This is sufficient to state a claim of unlawful
retaliation. Defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims is
denied.
IV. Fourteenth Amendment
To prove a claim of racial discrimination in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, Reid must
show that the defendants injured him by intentionally subjecting
him to discrimination without justification because of his race.
See Judge v . City of Lowell, 160 F.3d 6 7 , 75 (1st Cir. 1998).
Here, Reid alleges that he was subject to beatings and other
physical harassment simply because he is black. This is
sufficient to state an equal protection claim. Defendants’
motion to dismiss these claims is denied.
V. Fourteenth Amendment - Procedural Due Process
Reid alleges that he was placed in punitive segregation,
moved from one tier to another within the prison’s special
housing unit, reclassified, and subjected to a loss of good time
credits without the procedures to which he is entitled by state
-6- law and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.
-7- Defendants first argue that these claims are defective
because Reid has not sufficiently alleged that they have deprived
him of a protected liberty interest. Insofar as Reid argues that
he has a protected liberty interest in avoiding punitive
segregation, movement within the special housing unit, and
reclassification, I agree. See Sandin v . Conner, 512 U.S. 472,
485-86 (1995) (holding hat prisoner’s discipline in segregated
confinement "did not present the type of atypical, significant
deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty
interest”); Harper v . Showers, 174 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 1999)
(holding that prisoner had no protected property or liberty
interest in custodial classifications). I decline to decide
whether Reid has alleged a liberty interest in the loss of good
time credits as the issue is factually and legally complex, see,
e.g., Gotcher v . Wood, 66 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 1995)
(vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1238 (1997)), and has not
been properly briefed. I also decline to consider whether Reid
must first pursue his claim for loss of good time credits in an
-8- action for habeas corpus, see, e.g., Anyanwutaku v . Moore, 151
F.3d 1053, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
-9- I dismiss Reid’s procedural due process claims to the extent
that he bases the claim on punitive segregation, transfer within
the special housing unit, or reclassification. I decline to
determine at the present time whether Reid has stated a claim
that he has a protected liberty interest in avoiding the loss of
good time credits and whether he must first pursue this claim
through a habeas corpus petition before bringing a claim for
damages based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants also argue that they are absolutely immune from
liability for any procedural due process violations arising from
the prison disciplinary process. This claim has no merit. See
Cleavinger v . Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 206 (1985) (recognizing
qualified, but not absolute, immunity for members of prison
disciplinary committee); Hameed v . Mann, 57 F.3d 217, 224 (2d
Cir. 1995) (holding that hearing officer was not entitled to
absolute immunity but may have been entitled to qualified
immunity). Defendants also argue that Reid’s claims must be
dismissed because the due process clause requires proof of more
-10- than mere negligence. This argument makes no sense in light of
Reid’s allegation that the defendants intentionally deprived him
-11- of his due process rights.
VI. First Amendment - Right of Access to The Courts
Reid asserts that the defendants interfered with his right
of access to the courts by (1) failing to provide him with a law
clerk to assist him in preparing his legal filings; (2) “taking”
his legal papers outside of his presence; and (3) on one occasion
failing to send promptly by certified mail two pleadings that he
wished to file with the court of appeals.
While a prison inmate retains a First Amendment right of
access to the courts, a prison may impose reasonable restrictions
on the manner in which that right is exercised. For example, a
prison is not constitutionally obligated to provide inmates with
law clerks if a prisoner can satisfy his right of access to the
courts through other means. Further, a plaintiff alleging a
denial of his right of access to the courts must establish that
he suffered actual injury as a result of defendants’ allegedly
illegal actions. See Lewis v . Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-52
(1996). Here, Reid has failed to allege the kind of conduct by
-12- the defendants that could support his claims. Accordingly, I
grant defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims.
-13- VII. Conclusion
I grant defendants’ motion to dismiss Reid’s official
capacity claims for damages, his procedural due process claims to
the extent that they are based on alleged deprivations of
anything other than his loss of good time credits, and his right
of access to the courts claims. I otherwise deny defendants’
motion to dismiss (doc. n o . 8 8 ) .
SO ORDERED.
Paul Barbadoro Chief Judge
January 2 4 , 2000
cc: Robert Reid, pro se Nancy Smith, Esq.
-14-