Tillmon v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: March 26, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-1176
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANTOINE D. TILLMON,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 24-cv-1176 (DLF) WASHINGTON METROPOLITIAN AREA TRANSITY AUTHORITY,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Antoine Tillmon, proceeding pro se, moves for leave to file his proposed second amended

complaint under Rule 15. Mot., Dkt. 21. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant in part

and deny in part the motion.

I. Background

Tillmon works as a bus operator for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

(WMATA). Proposed Second Am. Compl. ¶ 1, Dkt. 21-1. He applied for and received leave due

to a mental-health condition under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601

et seq. Id. ¶¶ 4, 9. But beginning in October 2023, Tillmon “began noticing a pattern of ‘Adverse

Administrative Actions’ closely following engaging in ‘Protected Activity.’” Id. ¶ 10; see id.

¶¶ 11–20 (alleging various adverse actions). He says that WMATA placed him on administrative

leave pending an investigation on November 22, 2023, after he “engaged in his Protected Activity”

the preceding day. Id. ¶ 12. In December 2023, WMATA terminated Tillmon from his position as

a train operator, and he remained out of work until February 2024, when WMATA reassigned him to work as a bus operator, the “same position where his mental health conditions originally

developed.” Id. ¶¶ 16–18.

Tillmon initiated this lawsuit on April 23, 2024, see Dkt. 1, and filed his First Amended

Complaint on May 14, 2024, Dkt. 8. WMATA moved to dismiss Tillmon’s First Amended

Complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. 17.

The Court granted that motion, holding that it lacked jurisdiction over Tillmon’s ADA and FMLA

self-care claims due to WMATA’s sovereign immunity, Mem. Op. & Order 6, Dkt. 20, and that

Tillmon had failed to allege a family-care claim under the FMLA, id. at 8. The Court dismissed

Tillmon’s First Amended Complaint without prejudice and ordered him to “file an amended

complaint that addresses the deficiencies identified” in the opinion. Id. at 9. Before the Court is

Tillmon’s motion for leave to file his Proposed Second Amended Complaint. Mot.

II. Legal Standard

Under Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a “court should freely give

leave [to amend a complaint] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However,

“[w]hen evaluating whether to grant leave to amend, the Court must consider (1) undue delay;

(2) prejudice to the opposing party; (3) futility of the amendment; (4) bad faith; and (5) whether

the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” Howell v. Gray, 843 F. Supp. 2d 49, 54

(D.D.C. 2012) (citing Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); see also

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

An amendment “is futile and should be denied” when it “would not survive a motion to

dismiss—such as where a claim sought to be added is barred by the statute of limitations.”

Palacios v. MedStar Health, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 3d 87, 90 (D.D.C. 2018); see e.g., James Madison

Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Courts may deny a motion to

2 amend a complaint as futile . . . if the proposed claim would not survive a motion to dismiss.”).

This review for futility is functionally “identical to review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on

the allegations in the amended complaint.” In re Interbank Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 629 F.3d

213, 216 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citation modified). Thus, “in assessing a motion for leave to amend,

the Court is required to assume the truth of the allegations in the amended complaint and construe

them in the light most favorable to the movant.” Flaherty v. Pritzker, 322 F.R.D. 44, 46 (D.D.C.

2017) (citing Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1086 (D.C.

Cir. 1998)). The party opposing amendment “bears the burden of showing why an amendment

should not be allowed.” Abdullah v. Washington, 530 F. Supp. 2d 112, 115 (D.D.C. 2008).

“[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). “But even

though a pro se complaint must be construed liberally, the complaint must still present a claim on

which the court can grant relief.” McFadden v. WMATA, 168 F. Supp. 3d 100, 105 (D.D.C. 2016)

(citation modified).

III. Analysis

A. Scope of Leave

WMATA argues that the Court should deny Tillmon’s motion for leave to amend because

his Proposed Second Amended Complaint “fails to cure the factual deficiencies identified in the

Court’s Opinion.” Def.’s Opp’n 3, Dkt. 22. Because the Court identified deficiencies with

Tillmon’s FMLA claim for family-care leave after his son’s injury, see Mem. Op. & Order 9 & n.2,

WMATA contends that Tillmon “exceeds the scope of amendment permitted by the Court’s” earlier

opinion. Def.’s Opp’n 3.

3 The Court disagrees. Although Tillmon’s Proposed Second Amended Complaint omits his

earlier FMLA family-leave allegations about his son, he brings his other claims under different

statutes than his First Amended Complaint—statutes that he contends avoid the sovereign-

immunity issues identified in the Court’s opinion on the motion to dismiss. See Mot. 2 (the

proposed amendment “addresses the Court’s concerns” by “introducing viable legal theories”);

Proposed Second Am. Compl. ¶ 7. The decision whether to grant or deny leave to amend is

“committed to a district court’s discretion,” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir.

1996), and leave to amend may be granted when a plaintiff’s amended complaint contains a new

claim, see Miss. Ass’n of Coops. v. Farmers Home Admin., 139 F.R.D. 542, 544–45 (D.D.C. 1991)

(granting leave to add new claims and new parties that related “in a substantive way to the original

complaint”). Moreover, Tillmon’s reliance on new legal theories is not disqualifying because

“[u]nless a defendant is prejudiced on the merits by a change in legal theory . . . a plaintiff is not

bound by the legal theory on which he or she originally relied.” Harrison v. Rubin, 174 F.3d 249,

253 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citation modified). Here, WMATA does not identify any prejudice nor does

the Court discern any prejudice from permitting Tillmon to pursue new legal theories that

“address[] [some of] the deficiencies identified” in the Court’s earlier opinion, Mem. Op. & Order

9, by attempting to avoid the sovereign-immunity issues that barred his earlier ADA and FMLA

self-care claims. Because the Proposed Second Amended Complaint does not exceed the scope of

permissible amendment, the Court will consider whether the proposed amendment is futile.

B. Futility

1. Rehabilitation Act Claim

Tillmon first brings a claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794.

Proposed Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24–28. The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear this

4 claim because WMATA has waived its sovereign immunity under the Rehabilitation Act. See

Barbour v. WMATA, 374 F.3d 1161, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“WMATA waived its immunity from

suit under the Rehabilitation Act by accepting federal transportation funds.”). WMATA

nevertheless argues that Tillmon’s Rehabilitation Act claim is futile.

First, WMATA complains that Tillmon repackaged his FMLA retaliation claim as a

Rehabilitation Act claim. Def.’s Opp’n 4. But repackaging a claim is not by itself a reason to deny

leave to amend. See Bronner v. Duggan, 324 F.R.D. 285, 293 n.2 (D.D.C. 2018) (rejecting the

defendants’ argument that repackaging claims indicates bad faith).

Second, WMATA—in a single footnote—contends that Tillmon’s request for leave is not

actionable under the Rehabilitation Act because it was not a request under the ADA. See Def.’s

Opp’n 4 n.2. WMATA cites Acker v. Gen. Motors, L.L.C., 853 F.3d 784 (5th Cir. 2017), which

held that “a request for FMLA leave is not a request for a reasonable accommodation under the

ADA.” Id. at 791; see Def.’s Opp’n 4 n.2. But, outside of the Fifth Circuit, the caselaw on this

issue is mixed. 1 Given the scant briefing on this open statutory question, the Court cannot at this

1 The D.C. Circuit has rejected a plaintiff’s “argument that her requests for FMLA leave should have been construed as requests for an ADA accommodation.” Waggel v. George Wash. Univ., 957 F.3d 1364, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 2020). But other judges on this Court have noted that “there may be circumstances where an employee’s FMLA application could put an employer on notice that the employee was also requesting an accommodation under the ADA.” Murphy v. District of Columbia, No. 18-1478, 2022 WL 2643554 at *3 (D.D.C. July 8, 2022) (citation modified). The Sixth Circuit has also held that a “request for FMLA leave, by itself” does not “constitute[] a request for reasonable accommodations,” Jackson v. USPS, 149 F.4th 656, 676–78 (6th Cir. 2025) (emphasis omitted), while clarifying that its ruling was “not to say that a request for FMLA leave can never support a request for accommodation,” id. at 677 (emphasis omitted). At least one district court has construed an FMLA request for leave as a request for accommodation under the “ADA/Rehabilitation Act.” See Schobert v. CSX Transp., Inc., 504 F. Supp. 3d 753, 788 (S.D. Ohio 2020).

5 early stage say that WMATA has carried its “burden of showing why an amendment should not be

allowed.” Abdullah, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 115. 2

Third, WMATA argues that Tillmon’s Proposed Second Amended Complaint does not

allege sufficient facts to state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act. See Def.’s Opp’n 4. “To make

out a retaliation claim under the Rehabilitation Act, ‘an employee must show []he engaged in

protected activity, as a consequence of which her employer took a materially adverse action against

h[im].’” Porfiri v. Eraso, 121 F. Supp. 3d. 188, 200 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Taylor v. Solis, 571

F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). When a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, as Tillmon

does, he “must show that (i) []he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (ii) []he suffered a

materially adverse action by h[is] employer; and (iii) a causal link connects the two.” Doak v.

Johnson, 798 F.3d 1096, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation modified). While “the Rehabilitation Act

imposes a stricter causation standard than the ADA,” Drasek v. Burwell, 121 F. Supp. 3d 143, 154

(D.D.C. 2015), at this stage “the [C]ourt does not need to undertake a full causation analysis in

determining whether [the] plaintiff has stated a claim,” Williams v. Donovan, 219 F. Supp. 3d 167,

173 (D.D.C. 2016) (citation modified).

WMATA has not shown that Tillmon has failed to state a claim under the Rehabilitation

Act. Tillmon alleges that he engaged in statutorily protected activity in the form of medical leave,

see Proposed Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8–12, and that he suffered materially adverse actions

including administrative leave, termination from his position as a train operator, and loss of pay,

id. ¶¶ 12–17. He further alleges that a pattern of adverse actions “closely follow[ed]” his protected

medical leaves, sometimes within a day or two. Id. at ¶¶ 10–12; see id. ¶ 4 (alleging a “pattern”

2 Should WMATA move to dismiss Tillmon’s Proposed Second Amended Complaint, the Court will revisit—with the benefit of full briefing—its argument that Tillmon’s request for FMLA leave did not constitute a request for accommodation under the ADA.

6 of adverse actions that were “within close Proximity in Time”). The alleged temporal proximity

between Tillmon’s protected activity and WMATA’s adverse actions support an inference of

causation. See Congress v. District of Columbia, 324 F. Supp. 3d 164, 175 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding

a retaliation claim under the Rehabilitation Act sufficiently pled because the plaintiff “state[d] that

immediately after [his protected] meeting, the [defendant] re-opened a . . . investigation against

[plaintiff],” “giv[ing] rise to a causal inference”). Because Tillmon’s Proposed Second Amended

Complaint, construed liberally, alleges facts that support each element of a Rehabilitation Act

claim, WMATA has—again—not borne its burden of showing that his Rehabilitation Act

amendments are futile.

Because the Rehabilitation Act claim in his Proposed Second Amended Complaint is not

futile, the Court will grant Tillmon’s motion for leave to amend with respect to Count 1.

2. Section 1983 Claim

Tillmon’s proposed Second Amended Complaint also includes a new claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. See Proposed Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29–31. But “WMATA cannot be sued under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it is not a ‘person’ under the statute.” Austin v. WMATA, No. 19-2718,

2020 WL 2962609 at *13 (D.D.C. May 28, 2020) (citing Plater v. D.C. Dep’t of Transp., 530 F.

Supp. 2d 101, 104 (D.D.C. 2008)); see also White Coat Waste Project v. WMATA, 710 F. Supp. 3d

15, 25 (D.D.C. 2024); Cutchin v. District of Columbia, 174 F. Supp. 3d 427, 430 (D.D.C. 2016).

Tillmon cites Jones v. WMATA, 205 F.3d 428, 431–32 (D.C. Cir. 2000), to argue that WMATA

“may, in certain circumstances” be subject to suit under § 1983. Pl.’s Reply 2, Dkt. 23. Although

Jones discussed WMATA’s creation as a compact enacted by Congress and joined by Virginia,

Maryland, and the District of Columbia, the case did not mention § 1983, let alone establish that

WMATA is a “person” subject to suit under that statute. See Jones, 205 F.3d at 432. Because

7 WMATA is not subject to suit under § 1983, Tillmon’s effort to assert a Fourteenth Amendment

claim through § 1983 is futile. See James Madison Ltd., 82 F.3d at 1099 (“Courts may deny a

motion to amend a complaint as futile . . . if the proposed claim would not survive a motion to

dismiss.”). Accordingly, the Court will deny Tillmon’s motion for leave to amend with respect to

Count 2 in his Proposed Second Amended Complaint.

C. Remaining Factors

Two factors remain in the Court’s consideration of Tillmon’s Rule 15 motion: undue delay

and prior amendments. WMATA advances no argument as to either prong of the Rule 15 analysis.

See generally Def.’s Opp’n. First, the Court identifies no undue delay in Tillmon’s motion to

amend, which was docketed before the Court’s deadline to file such a motion. See Mem. Op. &

Order 9 (setting April 29, 2025 motion deadline); Mot. 1 (filed April 25, 2025). “Typically, courts

deny Rule 15 motions on the basis of undue delay only when the plaintiffs waited many years

before seeking amendments, after discovery had already concluded or summary judgment had

already been granted.” Gilliard v. Gruenberg, 302 F. Supp. 3d 257, 273 (D.D.C. 2018) (citation

modified). Because Tillmon’s timely motion followed the Court’s grant of WMATA’s motion to

dismiss, it does not raise concerns of undue delay. Second, although Tillmon had already filed a

First Amended Complaint, the Court allowed Tillmon the opportunity to seek leave to amend to

address the deficiencies identified in its earlier opinion. A second amendment to cure those

deficiencies aligns with the liberal standard of “freely giv[ing] leave when justice so requires.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is

8 ORDERED that the plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend, Dkt. 21, is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part. It is further

ORDERED that the plaintiff shall file his Proposed Second Amended Complaint—

without the futile § 1983 claims—on or before April 9, 2026, or the Court will close this case. It

is further

ORDERED that the plaintiff’s Motion for a Status Conference, Dkt. 24, is DENIED as

premature.

SO ORDERED.

________________________ DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH United States District Judge March 26, 2026