WOLLMAN, Justice.
This is an appeal from a circuit court judgment denying petitioner habeas corpus relief. We hold that petitioner was not entitled to seek relief by way of habeas corpus.
Following his plea of guilty in May of 1977, petitioner was sentenced to serve concurrent sentences of five and eight years in the South Dakota State Penitentiary. In November of 1981, an officer of the penitentiary filed a rule infraction report alleging that petitioner had possessed marijuana in violation of an institutional rule. Petitioner subsequently pleaded guilty to the rule infraction before the disciplinary board and was sentenced to thirty days’ punitive confinement.
Petitioner then automatically lost thirty days of good time pursuant to the amended version of SDCL 24-2-12.
Petitioner contends that this amended statute, which became effective July 1, 1981, is an ex post facto law. The relief sought by petitioner is the restoration of good time that he lost pursuant to SDCL 24-2-12 and the implementation of the provisions that governed the disciplinary process prior to the 1981 legislative enactments.
During
oral argument, petitioner conceded that he could lose as much or more good time under the pre-amendment provisions.
The circuit court concluded that it had jurisdiction to issue a writ under SDCL 21-27, but concluded that SDCL 24-2-12 was not an ex post facto law and that petitioner was therefore not entitled to the restoration of his good time. The State has filed a notice of review, contending that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ in the first instance.
Although petitioner concedes that he does not fall within any of the categories enumerated in SDCL 21-27-16,
he contends that SDCL 21-27-1 has expanded ha-beas corpus relief to include a case such as his own. SDCL 21-27-1 provides:
When any person shall be committed or detained, imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any color or pretense whatever, civil or criminal, he or she may apply to the Supreme or circuit Court in term time, or any justice or judge thereof in vacation, for a writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioner relies on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475,93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), to support his contention that SDCL 21-27-1 encompasses the type of relief he is seeking.
Preiser
held that when a state prisoner seeks immediate or speedier release from imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. The
Preiser
case, however, dealt only with the federal habeas corpus statute and the federal courts.
Although illegal detention is the basis for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, the scope of the writ has been enlarged to include such matters as child custody disputes,
see, e.g., Application of G.K.,
248 N.W.2d 380 (S.D.1976). Likewise, we have recognized that habeas corpus relief is appropriate in certain cases where an incarcerated defendant has been deprived of basic constitutional rights.
See, Application of Kiser,
83 S.D. 272, 158 N.W.2d 596 (1968);
State ex rel. Burns v. Erickson,
80 S.D. 639, 129 N.W.2d 712 (1964). Also, we have extended the availability of habeas corpus relief to pretrial detainment in exceptional cases.
Matter of Kozak,
256 N.W.2d 717 (S.D.1977).
As pointed out by the Supreme Court of Oregon in
Penrod v. Cupp,
283 Or. 21, 581 P.2d 934 (1978), it is the promptness of the relief available under a writ of habeas corpus that is the hallmark of that writ.
A central characteristic of the writ, the main purpose achieved by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, is the speed with which it triggers a judicial inquiry. The asserted deprivations may range from serious claims of present or impending cruel and unusual punishment as in
Bekins [v. Cupp,
274 Or. 115, 545 P.2d 861 (1976) ] or infringements of religious freedom as in
Newton, [v. Cupp,
3 Or.App. 434, 474 P.2d 532 (1970) ] which if valid require urgency, to many other kinds of claims for which another remedy available to prisoners is adequate. For instance, given access to other remedies, habeas corpus nor
mally should not be needed to challenge overcrowding, the quality of prison food, the opportunities for recreation or exercise, or similar conditions of imprisonment even when the challenge has merit. Whether the legal remedies opened to prisoners by ORS 137.275, or administrative remedies that may be developed, will be adequate for any given class of claims cannot be decided in the abstract.... Equity provides the flexible remedy of injunction for conditions found to be contrary to law, and temporary restraining orders, if timely available to petitioners when needed, may obviate the need for habeas corpus where that need rests only on speed. Other forms of effective and speedy independent inquiry outside the courts could be imagined.
581 P.2d at 934, 937 (footnote omitted).
We agree with the Oregon court’s analysis. SDCL 21-27-12 requires a hearing to be held within five days after a return has been made upon a writ of habeas corpus. Moreover, SDCL 21-27-6 imposes a $500 forfeiture against a judge who “corruptly” refuses to issue a writ that should lawfully have been issued.
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WOLLMAN, Justice.
This is an appeal from a circuit court judgment denying petitioner habeas corpus relief. We hold that petitioner was not entitled to seek relief by way of habeas corpus.
Following his plea of guilty in May of 1977, petitioner was sentenced to serve concurrent sentences of five and eight years in the South Dakota State Penitentiary. In November of 1981, an officer of the penitentiary filed a rule infraction report alleging that petitioner had possessed marijuana in violation of an institutional rule. Petitioner subsequently pleaded guilty to the rule infraction before the disciplinary board and was sentenced to thirty days’ punitive confinement.
Petitioner then automatically lost thirty days of good time pursuant to the amended version of SDCL 24-2-12.
Petitioner contends that this amended statute, which became effective July 1, 1981, is an ex post facto law. The relief sought by petitioner is the restoration of good time that he lost pursuant to SDCL 24-2-12 and the implementation of the provisions that governed the disciplinary process prior to the 1981 legislative enactments.
During
oral argument, petitioner conceded that he could lose as much or more good time under the pre-amendment provisions.
The circuit court concluded that it had jurisdiction to issue a writ under SDCL 21-27, but concluded that SDCL 24-2-12 was not an ex post facto law and that petitioner was therefore not entitled to the restoration of his good time. The State has filed a notice of review, contending that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ in the first instance.
Although petitioner concedes that he does not fall within any of the categories enumerated in SDCL 21-27-16,
he contends that SDCL 21-27-1 has expanded ha-beas corpus relief to include a case such as his own. SDCL 21-27-1 provides:
When any person shall be committed or detained, imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any color or pretense whatever, civil or criminal, he or she may apply to the Supreme or circuit Court in term time, or any justice or judge thereof in vacation, for a writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioner relies on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475,93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), to support his contention that SDCL 21-27-1 encompasses the type of relief he is seeking.
Preiser
held that when a state prisoner seeks immediate or speedier release from imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. The
Preiser
case, however, dealt only with the federal habeas corpus statute and the federal courts.
Although illegal detention is the basis for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, the scope of the writ has been enlarged to include such matters as child custody disputes,
see, e.g., Application of G.K.,
248 N.W.2d 380 (S.D.1976). Likewise, we have recognized that habeas corpus relief is appropriate in certain cases where an incarcerated defendant has been deprived of basic constitutional rights.
See, Application of Kiser,
83 S.D. 272, 158 N.W.2d 596 (1968);
State ex rel. Burns v. Erickson,
80 S.D. 639, 129 N.W.2d 712 (1964). Also, we have extended the availability of habeas corpus relief to pretrial detainment in exceptional cases.
Matter of Kozak,
256 N.W.2d 717 (S.D.1977).
As pointed out by the Supreme Court of Oregon in
Penrod v. Cupp,
283 Or. 21, 581 P.2d 934 (1978), it is the promptness of the relief available under a writ of habeas corpus that is the hallmark of that writ.
A central characteristic of the writ, the main purpose achieved by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, is the speed with which it triggers a judicial inquiry. The asserted deprivations may range from serious claims of present or impending cruel and unusual punishment as in
Bekins [v. Cupp,
274 Or. 115, 545 P.2d 861 (1976) ] or infringements of religious freedom as in
Newton, [v. Cupp,
3 Or.App. 434, 474 P.2d 532 (1970) ] which if valid require urgency, to many other kinds of claims for which another remedy available to prisoners is adequate. For instance, given access to other remedies, habeas corpus nor
mally should not be needed to challenge overcrowding, the quality of prison food, the opportunities for recreation or exercise, or similar conditions of imprisonment even when the challenge has merit. Whether the legal remedies opened to prisoners by ORS 137.275, or administrative remedies that may be developed, will be adequate for any given class of claims cannot be decided in the abstract.... Equity provides the flexible remedy of injunction for conditions found to be contrary to law, and temporary restraining orders, if timely available to petitioners when needed, may obviate the need for habeas corpus where that need rests only on speed. Other forms of effective and speedy independent inquiry outside the courts could be imagined.
581 P.2d at 934, 937 (footnote omitted).
We agree with the Oregon court’s analysis. SDCL 21-27-12 requires a hearing to be held within five days after a return has been made upon a writ of habeas corpus. Moreover, SDCL 21-27-6 imposes a $500 forfeiture against a judge who “corruptly” refuses to issue a writ that should lawfully have been issued. These draconian provisions are consistent with the need for a speedy determination of a claim of unlawful detention within the traditional meaning of that term. Petitioner does not contend that he is entitled to immediate release. It would trivialize the great writ if every inmate grievance, real or imagined, stemming from penitentiary disciplinary actions could trigger the expedited procedures mandated by SDCL ch. 21-27. Accordingly, we, like the Supreme Court of Oregon, look to the existence of other remedies that may be available to redress legitimate inmate grievances.
At oral argument, the State conceded that petitioner would be entitled to seek prospective relief by way of an application for a writ of prohibition against a threatened reduction in good time and by way of an application for a writ of mandamus to compel the restoration of good time.
In addition to the traditional extraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus, petitioner had available the administrative remedy provided by ARSD 17:50:07:07, which authorizes an inmate to appeal to the Board of Charities and Corrections the disciplinary board’s reduction of good time.
A number of jurisdictions allow judicial review of penitentiary disciplinary actions under the Administrative Procedures Act.
See Alvarez v. State, Dept. of Corrections,
638 P.2d 804 (Colo.App.1981);
Bowling v. Florida Dept. of Corrections,
389 So.2d 1031 (Fla.App.1980);
State ex rel. Armistead v. Phelps,
365 So.2d 468 (La.1978);
Bryant
v.
Department of Pub. Saf. & Correc. Serv.,
33 Md.App. 357, 365 A.2d 764 (1976);
Meadows
v.
Marquette Prison Warden,
117 Mich.App. 794, 324 N.W.2d 507 (1982);
Pruitt v. State,
274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980),
cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1036, 101 S.Ct. 613, 66 L.Ed.2d 498 (1980). Other jurisdictions do not allow such judicial review.
See Langley v. Scurr,
305 N.W.2d 418 (Iowa 1981);
Reed
v.
Parratt,
207 Neb. 796, 301 N.W.2d 343 (1981);
Dawson v. Hearing Committee,
92 Wash.2d 391, 597 P.2d 1353 (1979).
The State argues that penitentiary inmates who seek a redress of grievances
relating to penitentiary disciplinary procedures should be relegated to the federal courts under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 or under the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S. C.S. § 2254. Given the current workload of the federal courts, to adopt the State’s position on this matter would constitute an abdication by the State of its responsibilities.
See
Posner, “Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function,” 56 S.Cal.L.Rev. 761 (1983).
Although the State could no doubt effectively bar inmate access to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, just as it has under the habeas corpus statutes,
see
footnote 5,
supra,
until the State has so acted, we are of the opinion that penitentiary inmates have a right to judicial review in the state courts of the administrative action taken by penitentiary officials to reduce their good time credit. Thus we reject the State’s suggestion that we turn over to the federal courts the responsibility for providing such judicial review and join with those courts that have approved judicial review of penitentiary disciplinary actions pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act. Accordingly, we hold that a penitentiary inmate is entitled to judicial review of the final decision of the Board of Charities and Corrections entered after an appeal to that Board pursuant to ARSD 17:50:07:07. To the extent that our decision in
Matter of Maxwell,
248 N.W.2d 400 (S.D.1976), is inconsistent with our decision today, we no longer adhere to the views expressed in that case.
Because petitioner had available not only the remedies of the writs of prohibition and mandamus, those to be issued only when other relief is not available, of course, but also relief by way of administrative and ultimately judicial review of the disciplinary board’s action, we conclude that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus under SDCL ch. 21-27. In view of this holding, we decline to consider the ex post facto issue.
Inasmuch as the trial court should not have issued the writ in the first instance, we reverse the judgment and remand the case to the circuit court with directions to quash the writ.
All the Justices concur.