Appellate Case: 25-3064 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/09/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 9, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court TERRI L. THURMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 25-3064 (D.C. No. 5:23-CV-04044-JWB) STATE OF KANSAS, (D. Kan.)
Defendant - Appellee. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before BACHARACH, McHUGH, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
This appeal grows out of a claim of gender discrimination when
Ms. Terri Thurman was a court clerk in Kansas. While working as the
clerk, Ms. Thurman was allegedly bullied by a judge (the Hon. Fred
Johnson) with the acquiescence of an administrator (Mr. Mac Young). The
* The parties waive oral argument, and it would not materially help us to decide this appeal. So we have decided the appeal based on the briefs and the appellate record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if otherwise appropriate. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Appellate Case: 25-3064 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/09/2026 Page: 2
overarching issue is whether a reasonable fact-finder could attribute the
bullying and acquiescence to Ms. Thurman’s gender. We answer no.
1. The judge allegedly bullies Ms. Thurman.
Ms. Thurman’s problems with the judge started at a budget meeting.
There she allegedly angered Judge Johnson by saying that she didn’t know
when she would retire. Mr. Young saw the episode; rather than intervene,
however, he allegedly asked Ms. Thurman about her own job performance.
Ms. Thurman later complained to state agencies about Judge Johnson’s
bullying and Mr. Young’s reaction.
The agencies dismissed Ms. Thurman’s complaint against Judge
Johnson and recommended training for Mr. Young. Afterward,
Ms. Thurman was told that she needed to improve in coaching performance
and in disciplining employees. Tensions continued, and Ms. Thurman
requested a meeting with the district’s chief judge. The chief judge said
that she was tied up and referred Ms. Thurman to Mr. Young. Rather than
meet with Mr. Young, Ms. Thurman retired and later sued the State of
Kansas under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming a hostile
work environment, retaliation, and constructive discharge. The district
court granted summary judgment to the State.
2. We independently apply the summary-judgment standard.
We conduct de novo review, applying the same standard that
governed in district court. Sanderson v. Wyo. Highway Patrol, 976 F.3d
2 Appellate Case: 25-3064 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/09/2026 Page: 3
1164, 1173 (10th Cir. 2020). That standard requires the State to show the
absence of a genuine dispute of material fact and entitlement to judgment
as a matter of law. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670–71
(10th Cir. 1998). To determine whether the State made that showing, we
view all of the evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of
Ms. Thurman. Sanderson, 976 F.3d at 1173–74.
3. Ms. Thurman fails to link her abusive work environment to her gender.
The first claim involves a hostile work environment. For this claim,
Ms. Thurman needed to show that the workplace had become abusive
because of her gender. Throupe v. Univ. of Denver, 988 F.3d 1243, 1251
(10th Cir. 2021).
The underlying incidents are gender neutral: Ms. Thurman claims
that the judge had bullied her and that the administrator failed to help. But
we must also consider the context to determine whether the bullying and
inaction were part of a pattern of gender discrimination. Sanderson v. Wyo.
Highway Patrol, 976 F.3d 1164, 1174 (10th Cir. 2020).
Ms. Thurman did present evidence that Judge Johnson
• had mistreated two other women and
• hadn’t appeared to mistreat two male employees (the administrator and a court reporter).
But this distinction proves little: It shows only that there were many
employees—both male and female — who didn’t complain about the judge. 3 Appellate Case: 25-3064 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/09/2026 Page: 4
We rejected a similar theory of mistreatment in Overfield v. Kansas,
No. 23-3057, 2024 WL 1611473 (10th Cir. Apr. 15, 2024) (unpub.). That
case involved another claim of gender discrimination by a court reporter in
Ms. Thurman’s office. The court reporter alleged a hostile work
environment from bullying by the same judge (Judge Johnson). Like
Ms. Thurman, the Overfield plaintiff claimed gender discrimination,
arguing that Judge Johnson had targeted females for mistreatment while
providing better treatment to the same male employees involved here (the
administrator and court reporter). For that claim, the female employee
pointed to Judge Johnson’s mistreatment of Ms. Thurman and her daughter,
adding that the judge hadn’t been known to mistreat males. Id. at *4.
We held that the State of Kansas was entitled to summary judgment
on this claim because
• a fact-finder couldn’t attribute Judge Johnson’s conduct to gender discrimination and
• the undisputed evidence showed that Judge Johnson had mistreated colleagues of both genders.
Id. at *4–7. 1
This reasoning applies here too. Ms. Thurman argues that Judge
Johnson didn’t mistreat males. But she lacks any evidence of a
1 We also reasoned that the plaintiff hadn’t presented evidence that she was similarly situated to the male employees. Overfield, 2024 WL 1611473 at *5.
4 Appellate Case: 25-3064 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/09/2026 Page: 5
discriminatory motive. In fact, Ms. Thurman testified that she thought
Judge Johnson had lashed out at any statement that he didn’t like—even if
it had come from another male judge. 2 And the State presents evidence of
Judge Johnson’s hostile conduct toward a male colleague. So the totality of
the circumstances don’t support an inference of gender discrimination.
Given the similarities with Overfield, we apply its reasoning here.
Though our opinion there isn’t precedential, see note*, it is persuasive and
shows that a reasonable fact-finder couldn’t tie Ms. Thurman’s abusive
work environment to gender discrimination. So the district court didn’t err
in granting summary judgment to the State of Kansas on the claim of a
hostile work environment.
4. The retaliation claim fails because Ms. Thurman hasn’t shown causation between her complaints and her mistreatment.
Ms. Thurman also claims retaliatory harassment based on her
complaints about Judge Johnson and Mr. Young. For this claim,
Ms. Thurman needed to show that the State had taken a materially adverse
action in order to retaliate. Univ. of Tex. Sw.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Appellate Case: 25-3064 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/09/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 9, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court TERRI L. THURMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 25-3064 (D.C. No. 5:23-CV-04044-JWB) STATE OF KANSAS, (D. Kan.)
Defendant - Appellee. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before BACHARACH, McHUGH, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
This appeal grows out of a claim of gender discrimination when
Ms. Terri Thurman was a court clerk in Kansas. While working as the
clerk, Ms. Thurman was allegedly bullied by a judge (the Hon. Fred
Johnson) with the acquiescence of an administrator (Mr. Mac Young). The
* The parties waive oral argument, and it would not materially help us to decide this appeal. So we have decided the appeal based on the briefs and the appellate record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if otherwise appropriate. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Appellate Case: 25-3064 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/09/2026 Page: 2
overarching issue is whether a reasonable fact-finder could attribute the
bullying and acquiescence to Ms. Thurman’s gender. We answer no.
1. The judge allegedly bullies Ms. Thurman.
Ms. Thurman’s problems with the judge started at a budget meeting.
There she allegedly angered Judge Johnson by saying that she didn’t know
when she would retire. Mr. Young saw the episode; rather than intervene,
however, he allegedly asked Ms. Thurman about her own job performance.
Ms. Thurman later complained to state agencies about Judge Johnson’s
bullying and Mr. Young’s reaction.
The agencies dismissed Ms. Thurman’s complaint against Judge
Johnson and recommended training for Mr. Young. Afterward,
Ms. Thurman was told that she needed to improve in coaching performance
and in disciplining employees. Tensions continued, and Ms. Thurman
requested a meeting with the district’s chief judge. The chief judge said
that she was tied up and referred Ms. Thurman to Mr. Young. Rather than
meet with Mr. Young, Ms. Thurman retired and later sued the State of
Kansas under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming a hostile
work environment, retaliation, and constructive discharge. The district
court granted summary judgment to the State.
2. We independently apply the summary-judgment standard.
We conduct de novo review, applying the same standard that
governed in district court. Sanderson v. Wyo. Highway Patrol, 976 F.3d
2 Appellate Case: 25-3064 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/09/2026 Page: 3
1164, 1173 (10th Cir. 2020). That standard requires the State to show the
absence of a genuine dispute of material fact and entitlement to judgment
as a matter of law. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670–71
(10th Cir. 1998). To determine whether the State made that showing, we
view all of the evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of
Ms. Thurman. Sanderson, 976 F.3d at 1173–74.
3. Ms. Thurman fails to link her abusive work environment to her gender.
The first claim involves a hostile work environment. For this claim,
Ms. Thurman needed to show that the workplace had become abusive
because of her gender. Throupe v. Univ. of Denver, 988 F.3d 1243, 1251
(10th Cir. 2021).
The underlying incidents are gender neutral: Ms. Thurman claims
that the judge had bullied her and that the administrator failed to help. But
we must also consider the context to determine whether the bullying and
inaction were part of a pattern of gender discrimination. Sanderson v. Wyo.
Highway Patrol, 976 F.3d 1164, 1174 (10th Cir. 2020).
Ms. Thurman did present evidence that Judge Johnson
• had mistreated two other women and
• hadn’t appeared to mistreat two male employees (the administrator and a court reporter).
But this distinction proves little: It shows only that there were many
employees—both male and female — who didn’t complain about the judge. 3 Appellate Case: 25-3064 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/09/2026 Page: 4
We rejected a similar theory of mistreatment in Overfield v. Kansas,
No. 23-3057, 2024 WL 1611473 (10th Cir. Apr. 15, 2024) (unpub.). That
case involved another claim of gender discrimination by a court reporter in
Ms. Thurman’s office. The court reporter alleged a hostile work
environment from bullying by the same judge (Judge Johnson). Like
Ms. Thurman, the Overfield plaintiff claimed gender discrimination,
arguing that Judge Johnson had targeted females for mistreatment while
providing better treatment to the same male employees involved here (the
administrator and court reporter). For that claim, the female employee
pointed to Judge Johnson’s mistreatment of Ms. Thurman and her daughter,
adding that the judge hadn’t been known to mistreat males. Id. at *4.
We held that the State of Kansas was entitled to summary judgment
on this claim because
• a fact-finder couldn’t attribute Judge Johnson’s conduct to gender discrimination and
• the undisputed evidence showed that Judge Johnson had mistreated colleagues of both genders.
Id. at *4–7. 1
This reasoning applies here too. Ms. Thurman argues that Judge
Johnson didn’t mistreat males. But she lacks any evidence of a
1 We also reasoned that the plaintiff hadn’t presented evidence that she was similarly situated to the male employees. Overfield, 2024 WL 1611473 at *5.
4 Appellate Case: 25-3064 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/09/2026 Page: 5
discriminatory motive. In fact, Ms. Thurman testified that she thought
Judge Johnson had lashed out at any statement that he didn’t like—even if
it had come from another male judge. 2 And the State presents evidence of
Judge Johnson’s hostile conduct toward a male colleague. So the totality of
the circumstances don’t support an inference of gender discrimination.
Given the similarities with Overfield, we apply its reasoning here.
Though our opinion there isn’t precedential, see note*, it is persuasive and
shows that a reasonable fact-finder couldn’t tie Ms. Thurman’s abusive
work environment to gender discrimination. So the district court didn’t err
in granting summary judgment to the State of Kansas on the claim of a
hostile work environment.
4. The retaliation claim fails because Ms. Thurman hasn’t shown causation between her complaints and her mistreatment.
Ms. Thurman also claims retaliatory harassment based on her
complaints about Judge Johnson and Mr. Young. For this claim,
Ms. Thurman needed to show that the State had taken a materially adverse
action in order to retaliate. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S.
338, 352 (2013); Byrnes v. St. Catherine Hosp., 158 F.4th 1107, 1114 (10th
2 On appeal, Ms. Thurman questions the admissibility of her own testimony on this point based on hearsay and personal knowledge; but she didn’t raise hearsay or personal knowledge in district court. See Jiang v. City of Tulsa, 169 F.4th 1194, 1204 (10th Cir. 2026) (“[W]e ordinarily decline to consider arguments made for the first time on appeal.”). 5 Appellate Case: 25-3064 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/09/2026 Page: 6
Cir. 2025). 3 The evidence must allow the fact-finder to infer that a desire
to retaliate had constituted a but-for cause of the adverse employment
action. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352.
For evidence of a retaliatory motive, Ms. Thurman relies in part on
Judge Johnson’s alleged announcement to staff that she had filed a
complaint against him. But Ms. Thurman lacks any evidence that Judge
Johnson had made this announcement. Ms. Thurman testified that she had
learned of the announcement from two other employees, but conceded that
they hadn’t said who made the announcement. So she lacks evidence of a
retaliatory motive.
Ms. Thurman also complains about Zoom meetings and an inability to
use a local newspaper when advertising a vacancy in her office. But
Ms. Thurman doesn’t tie the Zoom meetings or inability to advertise in a
newspaper to her complaint against Judge Johnson or Mr. Young. These
incidents didn’t take place until more than a year after Ms. Thurman had
complained. See Lauck v. Campbell Cnty., 627 F.3d 805, 815 (10th Cir.
2010) (stating that the fact-finder cannot infer causation from temporal
3 The State raised causation in the summary-judgment motion, but the district court rejected the retaliation claim on a different ground (the failure to show a materially adverse action). App., vol. 2 at 374–75. But we can affirm the ruling on different grounds because the State raised causation in the summary-judgment motion and on appeal, the availability of summary judgment is legal rather than factual, and the record is adequately developed. I Dig Texas, LLC v. Creager, 98 F.4th 998, 1009 (10th Cir. 2024). 6 Appellate Case: 25-3064 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/09/2026 Page: 7
proximity alone when the act took place more than three months after the
protected activity); Wells v. Colo. Dept. of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1217
(10th Cir. 2003) (stating that a five-month gap is ordinarily too long to
support an inference of causation in a retaliation claim).
Finally, Ms. Thurman relies on
• Mr. Young’s failure to promptly fill a vacancy in the clerk’s office and
• a delay of roughly three months to get the weekly calendar.
But there’s no evidence tying the delay in filling the vacancy to
Ms. Thurman’s complaint. Mr. Young promptly advertised the vacancy, 4
and Ms. Thurman immediately started interviewing applicants; but it took
roughly six months to find a good fit. The delay in finding a good fit
doesn’t suggest a retaliatory motive.
Nor could a retaliatory motive be inferred from the delay in sending
Judge Johnson’s calendar. The person responsible for sending the weekly
dockets was Myra Freeman, not Judge Johnson; and other clerks sent the
dockets to Ms. Thurman whenever she requested. And after Ms. Thurman
flagged the issue, the weekly calendars came to her as a matter of course.
4 Ms. Thurman does argue that the administrator should have allowed newspaper advertising. See p. 6, above. We reject that argument based on the failure to link the Mr. Young’s decision to Ms. Thurman’s complaint. See id.
7 Appellate Case: 25-3064 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/09/2026 Page: 8
In these circumstances, a fact-finder couldn’t reasonably infer a retaliatory
motive from the prior delay in sending the weekly dockets to Ms. Thurman.
5. The claim of constructive discharge fails based on Ms. Thurman’s inability to show gender discrimination.
Ms. Thurman also claims constructive discharge when the chief judge
rebuffed an invitation to meet. For this claim, Ms. Thurman needed to
show impermissible discrimination. Rivero v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
New Mexico, 950 F.3d 754, 761 (10th Cir. 2020). But as discussed above,
Ms. Thurman failed to present any evidence of such discrimination. See
Parts 3 and 4, above. This failure to present evidence of discrimination is
fatal on the claim of constructive discharge. See Rivero, 950 F.3d at 761.
Affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge