Thrifty Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc v. Department of Transportation

601 N.W.2d 420, 236 Mich. App. 674

• Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 22, 1999
• Docket: Docket 205136
• Status: Published

Opinions

Per Curiam.

This case presents a question of first impression regarding whether MCL 600.2925a; MSA 27A.2925(1) requires that notice be given to a potential contributee who cannot join the suit for lack of jurisdiction. Because we find that the statute requires that the potential contributee receive notice, we affirm.

Plaintiff is a rental car company. In 1993, a man driving one of plaintiffs cars crossed the median of I-75, crashing through attenuator barrels filled with sand, and hit a car traveling in the opposite direction. The occupant of the second car sued plaintiff in federal court and won a judgment for several hundred thousand dollars. After satisfying the judgment, plaintiff filed this suit for contribution in the Michigan state Court of Claims. Plaintiff advanced four allegations in its complaint against defendant Michigan Department of Transportation. It claimed that defendant failed to properly maintain the highway’s shoulder, median, and attenuator barrels, that defendant failed to repair defective attenuator barrels, that defendant constructed that portion of 1-75 so that it had an improper slope and curvature, and that defendant failed to warn drivers about these defects.

Defendant moved for partial summary disposition, arguing that its liability for defective highways under MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102) extended only to “the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.”¹ MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1). Defendant argued that the median was not an improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and that defendant therefore was immune from tort liability under MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107). The trial court agreed and granted defendant’s motion. Defendant then moved for summary disposition regarding the remaining allegations, arguing that plaintiff had failed to notify it of the original suit as required under the relevant provision of the statute governing contribution between tortfeasors, MCL 600.2925a(5); MSA 27A.2925(1)(5). Again, the trial court granted defendant’s motion. Plaintiff appealed as of right.

We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition. Groncki v Detroit Edison Co, 453 Mich 644, 649; 557 NW2d 289 (1996). For reasons we will yet discuss, we agree with the trial court’s holding that defendant, a potential contributee under MCL 600.2925a(5); MSA 27A.2925(1)(5), was entitled to notice of the suit in federal court. Because no notice was given, plaintiff cannot bring this action for contribution. Furthermore, because plaintiff’s claim is barred in its entirety under MCL 600.2925a(5); MSA 27A.2925(1)(5), we do not need to address the trial court’s first order granting partial summary disposition.²

As noted above, defendant argued that plaintiff failed to comply with the relevant provision of the contribution statute, MCL 600.2925a(5); MSA 27A.2925(1)(5), which states:

A tort-feasor who satisfies all or part of a judgment entered in an action for injury or wrongful death is not entitled to contribution if the alleged contributee was not made a party to the action and if a reasonable effort was not made to notify him of the commencement of the action. Upon timely motion, a person receiving such notice may intervene in the action and defend as if joined as a third party.

Plaintiff argued that US Const, Am XI prevented it from adding defendant as a party in federal court.³ The trial court agreed, but found that the contribution statute, MCL 600.2925a; MSA 27A.2925(1), required that notice be given to a potential contributee, even if adding that contributee was a constitutional impossibility.⁴

This case requires us to interpret the statute. Normally, if the plain and ordinary meaning of a statute’s language is clear, judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted. Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370, 376; 483 NW2d 844 (1992). However, if a literal construction of the statute results in an unreasonable or unjust result inconsistent with the purposes of the statute, then we may depart from that literal construction. Rowell v Security Steel Processing Co, 445 Mich 347, 354; 518 NW2d 409 (1994). When interpreting a statute, we strive to avoid absurd or unreasonable consequences. McAuley v General Motors Corp, 457 Mich 513, 518; 578 NW2d 282 (1998). In this case we find that a literal interpretation of MCL 600.2925a(5); MSA 27A.2925(1)(5) appears to nullify the statute’s notice requirement, because the statute does not appear to apply to those situations where a party cannot join a suit for jurisdictional reasons. This result wreaks an injustice on the potential contributee by denying it notice of the original action.

The provisión requires that two conditions be met before a potential contributee can be sued for contribution. First, someone in the original action, the suit against the tortfeasor who is seeking contribution, must have made the contributee a party to the original action. Second, someone in the original action must have made a reasonable effort to notify the con-tributee that the action had commenced.⁵ The statute’s drafters joined these two conditions with a conjunction, and together they form the antecedent in a conditional.⁶

In other words, both conditions must be satisfied before the tortfeasor can sue the potential con-tributee for contribution. Both sides agree that plaintiff could not add defendant to the federal lawsuit. Plaintiff argues that, because it could not add defendant, it had no obligation to notify it that the action had commenced. In short, plaintiff argues that, because it could not satisfy one-half of the antecedent, MCL 600.2925a(5); MSA 27A.2925(1)(5) simply does not apply. We disagree.

Although we agree that the statute does not contemplate a situation where the potential contributee cannot join the original action, plaintiff should have observed those statutory requirements that it could have easily satisfied. We hold that where the potential contributee cannot be added for lack of jurisdiction, the potential contributee must still receive notice of “the commencement of the action” as a condition to a tortfeasor’s suit for contribution under MCL 600.2925a(5); MSA 27A.2925(1)(5). Our interpretation of this provision is consistent with the entire statute, which emphasizes both notice and an opportunity to join the proceedings. We understand plaintiff’s argument that MCL 600.2925a(5); MSA 27A.2925(1)(5) appears primarily concerned with offering the potential contributee the opportunity to join the litigation, but we note that the provision appears equally concerned with notice. While this interpretation does render part of this provision surplusage, we find that it furthers the Legislature’s overall intent that potential contributees have some notice of the original action against the tortfeasor. Plaintiff’s argument rests on the implied premise that notice without the opportunity to join is worthless, a notion we reject.

Affirmed.

1 Apparently, at the time of its first motion for summary disposition, defendant did not understand the full breadth of plaintiffs complaint. Specifically, it did not address plaintiffs claims concerning the slope and curvature of the highway. It was only after receiving plaintiffs reply brief, which was filed late, that defendant realized that plaintiffs claim included allegations beyond negligent maintenance of the barrels. At the hearing regarding defendant’s first motion, defendant admitted that its motion addressed only part of plaintiffs complaint and, therefore, it was only a motion for partial summary disposition.

2 While not necessary to our decision, we note that plaintiff’s claim that the median is part of the “improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel” likely fails in light of this Court’s decision in Fogarty v Dep’t of Transportation, 200 Mich App 572, 574; 504 NW2d 710 (1993). In that case, we held that “[t]he grassy median . . . which separates the northbound and southbound lanes of 1-75, is not part of the portion of the roadbed designed for vehicular travel. Accordingly, governmental immunity applies, and the dot should not be held liable for . . . injuries.” Id. Given that immunity extends to the median, it is difficult to fathom how a barrel sitting in the median could be part of the improved portion of the highway.

3 “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” US Const, Am XI.

4 While the issue raises interesting constitutional questions, we need not address them because both parties agree that defendant, a state agency, could not have been made a party to the federal action.

5 We note that the provision does not require the defendant in that action to join and notify the potential contributee, only that the contributee receive notice and an opportunity to join.

6 For example, MCL 600.2925a(5); MSA 27A.2925(1)(5) can be restated, in relevant part, as the following conditional: If the alleged contributee was (1) made a party to the action and (2) a reasonable effort was made to notify him of the commencement of the action, then the tortfeasor can bring an action for contribution. This interpretation assumes that the other conditions listed in the provision have been satisfied (i.e., satisfaction of the judgment).