OPINION
WALKER, Chief Justice.
Michael Miller Thompson, pastor of the Spindletop Unitarian Church, was charged by information with the misdemeanor offense of Criminal Trespass by “intentionally and knowingly remainpng] on the property of another, namely, DENNIS ROZELL, without the effective consent of DENNIS ROZELL, and the said defendant had received notice to depart but failed to do so[.]” A jury found Thompson guilty of said- offense and punishment was assessed by the trial court at ninety (90) days in the Jefferson County Jail and a fine of $200. The trial court suspended imposition of both incarceration and fine and placed Thompson on community supervision for a period of six months. Thompson brings forward seven appellate issues for our consideration.
We begin with issues three and seven as they complain of the lack of legally sufficient evidence to support the conviction. The evidence before us includes the transcription of verbal testimony contained in the reporter’s record as well as two video tapes depicting the events leading up to the arrest of Thompson. The video tapes depict the events in question from two separate and distinct perspectives. Specifically, issue three contends:
The court erred in denying appellant’s motion for instructed verdict for insufficient evidence: The evidence was insufficient that Rev. Thompson remained on property of Dennis Rozell without effective consent and received notice to depart but failed to do so.
The trial court’s written instructions to the jury contained several definitions of key terms. We reproduce the ones set out under paragraph 2 as follows:
By the term “notice,” as used herein, is meant oral or written communication by the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner.
By the term “enter” or “entry,” is meant intrusion of the entire body.
By the term “effective consent,” is meant assent in fact, whether express or apparent, and includes consent by a person legally authorized to act for the owner.
The term “owner” means a person who has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the defendant.
By the term “possession” is meant actual care, custody, control, or management of the property.
Mr. Thompson contends that he did not receive sufficient notice to depart. Testimony of Detective W.C. Tatum qf the Beaumont Police Department indicated that he was in attendance at the church where the seminar was taking place merely as a spectator. Tatum testified that he first noticed Thompson when Thompson began to disrupt the meeting. This was apparently during certain remarks being made by the speaker at the podium, Dennis Rozell, the pastor of Highland Avenue Baptist Church. Thompson, who was sitting very close to the podium, began to make loud comments apparently in response to statements being made by Ro-zell. At a certain point after Thompson had again made an audible remark, Rozell informed him that if he interrupted again he would be removed from the church. Thompson immediately replied with, “I’d like to see you try.” Rozell then turned to security personnel and stated, “I would like for him to be removed.” At that point, Detective Tatum, being in plain [919]*919clothes, felt that it would be less confrontational if he [Tatum] approached Thompson and asked him to leave the premises. Tatum testified that he had met Thompson several weeks earlier and Thompson knew Tatum to be a police officer.
The video tape depictions of the events indicate that Detective Tatum approached Thompson from behind, leaned over Thompson’s shoulder, began speaking to Thompson with Thompson responding verbally. Thompson then appears to gather up various papers and a tape recorder and place these items into a briefcase. Thompson, in a seated position, begins to bend at the waist in order to stand up. He hesitates momentarily, straightens back up in a seated position, crosses his legs and then looks up at Tatum who is standing in front of him. Tatum leans forward and reaches out and touches Thompson on his elbow as if to assist him in standing up. Thompson appears to make no attempt to stand up under his own power. Thompson is then physically pulled off of the bench into a kneeling position by Tatum and other uniformed security personnel. Thompson appears to make no attempt to stand. Security personnel then grasp Thompson’s arms and legs and carry him, face down, up the aisle of the church. It is at this point that both tapes end.
In addition to the visual depiction of the events, Detective Tatum’s testimony described the events in the following manner:
Q.[State’s Attorney] Okay. And were you the first individual to approach Reverend Thompson?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. What — describe that contact at that time.
A. Well, I explained to him that he’d been asked to leave; and he was going to have to leave. He refused to leave.
Q. What did he say — what was the first thing he said back to you, if you can recall?
A. That he didn’t have to leave. It was a public — public place and he had a right to be there and he wasn’t going to leave.
Q. Okay. Was he correct about that?
A. No, sir.
Q. What did you tell him?
A. I explained to him that if the preacher asked him to leave that he didn’t have a choice, that he had to leave or he was trespassing, one or the other.
Q. Do you recall what he said at that point, or what he did at that point?
A. Said he wasn’t going to leave. I told him he was under arrest for trespassing.
Q. And what happened next?
A. He started gathering up his briefcase and tape recorder and some other things, got them ready but then when he got — got them all ready, sat back down and said he wasn’t going to leave.
Q. Okay. Did he start to get up?
A. Started to, yes, sir.
Q. And then what did he do?
A. Sat back down.
Q. What happened next?
A. I got him by the arm, and he was going to have to leave.
Q. And after that what happened? How did it — did he say anything—
A. Well, he dropped down to his knees and I was going to have to carry him out but some other officers were right behind me and they helped me carry him out.
A challenge to the trial court’s ruling on a motion for instructed or directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence. See Cook v. State, 858 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (citing Madden v. State, 799 S.W.2d 683 (Tex.Crim.App.1990)). In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, our task is to consider all of the record evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury’s finding and to determine whether, based on that [920]*920evidence and those inferences, a rational jury could have found all of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Richardson v. State, 879 S.W.2d 874, 879 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). As factfinder, the jury may accept or reject any or all evidence. See Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). That the defendant presents a different factual version does not render the evidence insufficient. Anderson v. State, 701 S.W.2d 868, 872-73 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Lynch v. State, 952 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1997, no pet.).
Based upon the record evidence before us, especially the testimony of Detective Tatum, we find that Thompson was provided with sufficient notice to depart, provided an opportunity to depart, and intentionally refused to depart. The evidence indicates that Detective Tatum was “someone with apparent authority to act for the owner” as provided for in the definition of “notice.” See Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 30.05(b)(2)(A) (Vernon Supp.2000). His testimony of his verbal communication with Thompson as well as Thompson’s responses supply the essential elements of the offense so that any rational trier of fact could have found them proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Thompson’s third issue is overruled.
Issue seven mistakenly argues that the information alleged Rozell as the “owner” of the property in question and that there is no evidence to support ownership in Rozell. As set out above, the information alleged that Thompson remained “on the property of another, namely Dennis Rozell, ...” (emphasis added). Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 30.05 (Vernon Supp. 2000), the criminal trespass provision, requires only that the defendant enter or remain on property of another. To explicitly use the word “owner” instead of the word “another” is to plead an unnecessary allegation. See Langston v. State, 855 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (plurality opinion). Had the State pleaded that the property in question was “owned” by Rozell, it would have assumed the burden of proving said allegation. Id.1 In the instant case, because the State merely pleaded “property of another ” rather than explicit ownership in a particular person, the evidence in the record is legally sufficient to support that element of the offense. Issue seven is overruled.
Appellate issue one complains of a number of instances of allegedly improper jury arguments on the part of the State. To be proper, jury argument must encompass summation of evidence presented at trial, reasonable deductions drawn from said evidence, answers to opposing counsel’s argument, or plea for law enforcement. Lagrone v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602, 619 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). However, before a defendant will be permitted to complain on appeal about an erroneous jury argument, he will have to show he objected and pursued his objection to an adverse ruling. McFarland v. State, 989 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). In Arriola v. State, 969 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1998, pet. ref'd), we observed that the Court of Criminal Appeals warned of the dangers of slavish adherence to the order in which a defendant presents'his objection, request for instruction to disregard, and motion for mistrial. See Fuller v. State, 827 S.W.2d 919, 926 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). However, we can find no case in which either the motion to disregard or the motion for mistrial was not raised by trial counsel and the reviewing court found no procedural default. Put another way, while a sustained objection may be implied if the trial court instructs the jury to disregard a remark by the State during argument, the defendant must still request a motion for mistrial and have that denied to preserve the issue for appellate review. Likewise, a defendant must give the trial [921]*921court the opportunity to cure the allegedly erroneous remark by the State by requesting an instruction to disregard. See McGinn v. State, 961 S.W.2d 161 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).2
The instant record indicates each of the allegedly improper remarks by the State, if erroneous, would have been curable by a timely and specific instruction to the jury to disregard. Of the various remarks complained of at trial and set out in Thompson’s brief, all objections save one were sustained by the trial court. Thereafter, in only two instances did trial counsel follow up with a request to have the jury disregard the remark. In these two instances, Thompson received all of the relief he requested from the trial court. No error is apparent. In the remaining instances, trial counsel either went no further following the trial court’s sustaining of the objection, or immediately moved for a mistrial following the sustaining of the objection. Because the error, if any, was curable, failure to request an instruction to disregard waived examination of the issue for appellate purposes. McGinn, 961 S.W.2d at 165. The one overruled objection, that the prosecutor referred to evidence not in the record, was properly overruled in the trial court because Thompson did admit evidence that Rozell inaccurately quoted Thompson’s sermon. As Thompson either received all relief that was requested and that he was entitled to, or waived review of any alleged error, we overrule issue one.
Issue two’s complaint, that the trial court’s written instructions to the jury contained an additional element not contained in the information charging Thompson with criminal trespass, is entirely without merit. The record before us reflects that in the written instructions to the jury, paragraph 1, the abstract definition of the offense in question, does indicate that a person commits criminal trespass if he “enters or remains” on property of another. The information uses only the word “remain” in alleging how Thompson committed the trespass. However, the written instructions to the jury also include the application paragraph, paragraph 4, which clearly restricts Thompson’s criminal culpability to “intentionally or knowingly remain” on the property. The word “enters” is completely absent from the application paragraph.
In Ramirez v. State, 967 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Tex.App.— Beaumont 1998, no pet.), we reiterated the law on this issue as follows:
It is the application paragraph of a jury charge which authorizes conviction, and an abstract charge on a theory of law which is not applied to the facts is insufficient to bring that theory before the jury. McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 515 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), cert, denied, [519] U.S. [1119], 117 S.Ct. 966, 136 L.Ed.2d 851 (1997). An abstract statement of the law that goes beyond the allegations in the indictment ordinarily will not present reversible error because ordinarily such expansions on the indictment’s allegations are effectively restricted by the charge’s application of the law to the facts, which limits the jury’s deliberations to the allegations in the indictment supported by evidence. [922]*922Sandig v. State, 580 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tex.Crim. App.1979).
In the instant ease, the application paragraph clearly limits the jury’s consideration to the theory of trespassing (remaining) alleged in the information, and not to the more expansive theory (entering) of which Thompson complains. Issue two is overruled.
Issue four attacks the constitutionality of the offense of criminal trespass as applied to Thompson because of the alleged restraint on his freedom of speech and expression. At the outset, we must dispel the impression of Thompson that the premises involved was a “public place.” Highland Avenue Baptist Church is clearly private property and therefore considered a “nonpublic forum,” regardless of the description of the event in question. A “nonpublic forum” is one which neither by tradition nor government action has become a forum for public communication. Reed v. State, 762 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1988, pet. ref'd) (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, 478 U.S. 788, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985)). In other words, Highland Avenue Baptist Church is not “an area which by tradition has been devoted to public assembly or debate by the general public.” Reed, 762 S.W.2d at 644.
Speech, in a nonpublic forum, may be restricted so long as the regulations are reasonable and do not attempt to suppress expression because of public officials’ opposition to the speaker’s views. Gollinger v. State, 834 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.). Based upon the evidence contained in the record before us, the criminal trespass law, as applied to Thompson, was not used to regulate speech. There is simply no evidence in the record before us that Thompson was requested to leave the premises because of the content of any message he was there to express. The purpose of the criminal trespass statute is to regulate conduct, not speech. Otwell v. State, 850 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref'd). Although it has been recognized that First Amendment protection goes beyond the spoken or written word, see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342, 353 (1989), “[t]he Constitution does not guarantee that those who want to propagandize their views may do so wherever and however they please.” Reed, 762 S.W.2d at 643. Section 30.05, a general trespass statute, “may be constitutionally applied, even to those who trespass to communicate, so long as it is applied without discrimination and is not used to purposefully suppress speech.” Gibbons v. State, 775 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989), pet. ref'd, 815 S.W.2d 739 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (citing United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985)).
In the instant case, the evidence indicates that Thompson was asked to leave because he continued to interrupt Rozell’s presentation. There is no evidence in the record before us that indicates that Thompson was asked to leave because of the content of any “speech” that he would have presented in some fashion had he been permitted to remain on the premises. He was asked to leave because of his conduct in continuing to interrupt Rozell. Because of this, Penal Code Section 30.05, the criminal trespass statute, was not unconstitutionally applied to Thompson. Issue four is overruled.
Issue five complains of various “improper remarks” on the part of the State during both direct and cross-examination of Thompson. Contrary to the assertion in his brief, Thompson failed to properly preserve several of the “improper remarks” for appellate review. The first remark called to our attention (“playing games”) was not even objected to by trial counsel. Appellate review is therefore waived. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1). The next point in the record at which trial counsel makes an objection, that the prosecutor was suggesting that the defense was [923]*923“hiding something,’’indicates said objection was never ruled upon by the trial court. The ruling the trial court did make was in regard to the admissibility of the audio portion of one of the video tapes.
The next portion of the record we are directed to was the beginning of the State’s cross-examination of Thompson. The State’s initial question was objected to by trial counsel. The objection was sustained and trial counsel requested an instruction to disregard. The trial court complied with this request. Trial counsel did not move for a mistrial at this point. As was fully discussed in our analysis of issue one above, because trial counsel failed to pursue his objection to an adverse ruling error is not preserved. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(2). Review of alleged error was properly preserved, however, to the following questions by the State to Which our attention is directed:
Q. Isn’t it true — isn’t it true that some of the members of your own congregation aren’t real happy with the practices of some of these individuals?
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Q. The individuals that these concerns were addressed at made up a very, very small minority that didn’t practice their beliefs with the rest of your congregation?
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Q. Reverend Thompson, are you with these individuals when they practice— when they practice?
Defense counsel did not state a basis for the objection to the first question he objected to the other two questions based on relevance and relative prejudice. In none of the above instances did Thompson respond before trial counsel interjected his objection. In each instance the jury was instructed to disregard the question. The reporter’s record indicates that before the State’s first witness was called to testify, the trial court gave the following admonishment to the jury:
Members of the jury, I’ve already stated to you when you were sitting— seated out in the area as part of the larger panel, the citizen defendant, Reverend Thompson, is charged with the offense of trespassing. It will be your responsibility ultimately to decide whether or not Mr. Thompson is found guilty or not guilty of this offense. But that is the offense, and you have been summoned to pass upon that question.
The morale [sic] and ethical and religious questions that might be entertained into the offense are not a matter that you’re supposed to base any decision on. This is not the place where we settle those issues if, indeed, there is a place that it can be settled other than in the hearts of these men and women.
So, I’m telling you and I’m directing you, you are not to take into consideration these extraneous matters. Your responsibility is to pass upon the innocence or guilt of the defendant as it relates to the charge that has been filed against him.
Now, I will grant both the State and the defense some latitude that might touch upon these areas. I do that because every citizen is entitled to his day in court. The State is entitled to its day, and the citizen defendant is entitled to his. But that is the only reason I will let these extraneous matters approach your ears. I’m directing you to base your judgment upon the evidence that has come from this stand as it relates to the question of the innocence or guilt of the defendant.
Based upon the very explicit admonishment set out above and the immediate instruction to disregard the State’s questions because of their obvious reference to possible religious practices of Thompson or of people with whom he was acquainted, any error attached to said questions was cured. Issue five is overruled.
Thompson’s final issue, issue six, contends that the trial court erred in denying a motion to quash the information [924]*924for failure to give adequate notice so as to enable the accused to prepare a defense and prevent double jeopardy. Specifically, Thompson complains that the information (1) failed to specify what notice Thompson received to depart, and (2) failed to include a description of the real property where the trespass occurred. With regard to the lack of a description of the real property where the trespass took place, we initially note that the exact location of the property in question is not an essential element of the offense of criminal trespass. Reed, 762 S.W.2d at 645. Even if exact location was necessary for notice purposes, its omission is not reversible error unless it had an impact on Thompson’s ability to prepare his defense. Id. In the instant case, Thompson’s motion to quash recited the exact address of the property. Also, attached to the motion to quash was a copy of the complaint filed by the arresting officer which lists the “location” as “140 E. Threadneedle — Highland Baptist Church.” Thompson was well aware of the specific location of the premises where the trespass took place.
As for the need to detail in the information the type of notice to depart given to Thompson, he has provided us with no authority, and we have found none, categorically requiring the State to allege which of the enumerated methods of “notice” set out in Penal Code Section 30.05(b)(2) were used. See Bobo v. State, 757 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd). If Thompson is complaining that the information should have listed the name of the individual or individuals who asked him to leave the premises and the exact words used, it is axiomatic that the State need not plead evidentiary facts. See Moreno v. State, 721 S.W.2d 295, 300 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Thomas v. State, 621 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). Absolute factual allegations need not be set forth in the charging instrument. Wilson v. State, 825 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd). We find, therefore, no error on the part of the trial -court in denying Thompson’s motion to quash the information. Said information provided sufficient notice to Thompson so as to enable him to prepare his defense as well as act as a bar to future prosecution for the same offense. Issue six is overruled. The judgment and the sentence of the trial court are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.