Thompson v. State

988 A.2d 1011, 412 Md. 497, 2010 Md. LEXIS 20

Opinions

MURPHY, Judge.

In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, a jury convicted Karl Lymont Thompson, Petitioner, of second-degree rape and related offenses. The State’s evidence, which included the victim’s testimony, was sufficient to establish that Petitioner committed the rape in 1986 and committed a third-degree sex offense in 1983. Petitioner does not argue to the contrary. He does argue, however, that he is entitled to a new trial. After the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions in Thompson v. State, 181 Md.App. 74, 955 A.2d 802 (2008), he filed a petition for writ of certiorari in which he presented this Court with two questions:

I. MAY EVIDENCE OF THE [PETITIONER’S] UNCHARGED JUVENILE CONDUCT BE ADMITTED IN A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION GIVEN THAT JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS AND THE EVIDENCE THEREIN ARE INADMISSIBLE?

II. DOES AMENDING THE INDICTMENT TO CHARGE THAT A CRIME OCCURRED DURING A DIFFERENT TIME-FRAME AND AT A DIFFERENT LOCATION CHANGE THE CHARACTER OF THE SEXUAL OFFENSE WHEN MULTIPLE OFFENSES ARE ALLEGED?

We granted the petition. 406 Md. 744, 962 A.2d 371 (2008). For the reasons that follow, we answer “yes” to the first question and “no” to the second. We shall therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

Background

The record shows that Petitioner was 40 years of age when the conduct at issue was reported to a law enforcement officer. The Court of Special Appeals provided the following factual background:

On May 10, 2005, [the victim] then thirty-one years of age and a resident of San Diego, California, spoke by telephone with Detective Edward Scott Jones of the Baltimore City Police Department, informing him that, beginning in 1978, when she was approximately five years old, until 1986, when she was thirteen, she had been sexually abused by her uncle, [Petitioner], on numerous occasions. She stated that she had not previously reported any of these incidents because she had been told by a mental health counselor that “it was too late” to do so.

At trial, the court permitted [the victim] to testify about five specific instances of sexual abuse. The first of the five incidents occurred in the summer of 1978, at the Lynview home, when [the victim] was “approximately five” years old and appellant was fourteen years old. Because of appellant’s juvenile status at that time, the State never charged appellant with any crimes associated with this incident. The second incident took place during a school vacation in 1983, when [the victim] was ten years old and appellant was nineteen and an adult. The third and fourth incidents happened during the summers of 1984 and 1985 at her grandparents’ Hampstead home, when [the victim] was about eleven years of age and appellant was twenty. The charges stemming from these incidents were dismissed during trial for lack of jurisdiction. The fifth incident occurred in November 1986, when [the victim] was thirteen and was staying at the Goodnow Road apartment of appellant, who was then twenty-two.

With respect to the 1986 incident, [the victim] testified that it occurred while she was visiting appellant at his apartment on Goodnow Road in Baltimore City, during her Thanksgiving school break. Appellant was then living at that address with his girlfriend, Stephanie Perry. [The victim] recalled that one evening, before appellant left for work, he provided her with a shirt to sleep in and told her she could share a bed with Ms. Perry. She then recounted how later that night, when appellant returned home, he “got into bed” with her and Ms. Perry and how she later awoke to find “his penis inside of [her],” while Ms. Perry slept.

Over appellant’s objection, the circuit court permitted [the victim] to testify that she had been sexually abused by appellant as early as 1978, at her grandparents’ Lynview home, when she was “[approximately five” and appellant was fourteen years old. Although appellant was never charged, either as a juvenile or an adult, with any offenses stemming from this incident, the court ruled that such testimony was admissible under Maryland Rule 5-404(b). It reasoned that because “the ... testimony would involve acts by the same Defendant against the same victim ... and the acts [were] of the [same] general nature,” the evidence was admissible as proof of “motive, opportunity, intent, common scheme, plan and absence of mistake or accident.” [The victim] then'testified as follows:

I woke up to [appellant] touching me between my legs with his hands and with his penis. It hurt. I started to whimper a little bit and I said to him that I need to go to the bathroom. I didn’t need to go to the bathroom. I just wanted to remove myself from the room. I went into the [ ] bathroom and ... s[a]t on the toilet. I remember ... my feet didn’t touch the floor. And I left the bathroom, [ ] I went [ ] into my aunt’s room ... a different bedroom and I just laid on her floor. And then he came into the room after and asked why I didn’t come back. I didn’t answer and he climbed into my aunt’s bed.

Thompson v. State, 181 Md.App. 74, 78-81, 955 A.2d 802, 806-807 (2008). (Footnotes omitted).

Discussion

I.

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to a new trial on the ground that the Circuit Court erred in admitting into evidence the victim’s testimony about the “uncharged 1978 incident, which occurred when [Petitioner] was 14 years old.” The Circuit Court ruled that evidence of the 1978 incident was admissible under Md. Rule 5-404(b), which provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

It is clear that the ruling at issue did not violate Md. Rule 5^104(b), which codified the “sexual propensity” exception to the general rule excluding “other crimes” evidence. As this Court stated in Vogel v. State, 315 Md. 458, 554 A.2d 1231 (1989), the “sexual propensity” exception is applicable to evidence of “prior illicit sexual acts [which] are similar to the offense for which the accused is being tried and involve the same victim.” Id. at 466, 554 A.2d at 1234. Before Md. Rule 5M04(b) was adopted, this Court stated:

The primary policy consideration underlying the rule against other crimes evidence “is that this type of evidence will prejudice the jury against the accused because of the jury’s tendency to infer that the accused is a ‘bad man’ who should be punished regardless of his guilt of the charged crime, or to infer that he committed the charged crime due to a criminal disposition.” Yet, in the area of sex crimes, particularly child molestation, “courts have been likely to admit proof of prior acts to show a party’s conformity with past conduct.” Professor McLain suggests that this relaxation of the general prohibition is “probably because the character evidence is believed to have greater probative value in those circumstances.” In sex crimes cases the special relevance of the other crimes evidence that may be admissible is a criminal propensity particularized to similar sex crimes perpetrated on the same victim.

Thus, in a sex offense prosecution, when the State offers evidence of prior sexual criminal acts of the same type by the accused against the same victim, the law of evidence already has concluded that, in general, the probative value, as substantive evidence that the defendant committed the crime charged, outweighs the inherent prejudicial effect. The discretion exercised by the trial judge in weighing unfair prejudice against probative value is concerned with special features in the particular case.

Acuna v. State, 332 Md. 65, 75, 629 A.2d 1233, 1238 (1993) (Citations omitted). The record shows that the Circuit Court (1) was not clearly erroneous in finding that the sexual offenses committed by Petitioner against the very same victim in 1978 had been proven by “clear and convincing” evidence, and had “special” probative value, and (2) did not abuse its discretion in admitting that evidence on the ground that its probative value outweighed the danger of unfair “bad actor” prejudice against Petitioner.

Petitioner argues that Section 3-8A-23 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ § 3-8A-23) prohibits the State from introducing evidence of “criminal acts,¹ or wrongs” that were committed by an adult defendant when he or she was a juvenile. That statute, in pertinent part, provides:

§ 3-8A-23. Effect of proceedings under [the Juvenile Causes Act] subtitle.

(b) Adjudication and disposition not admissible as evidence.

An adjudication and disposition of a child pursuant to this subtitle are not admissible as evidence against the child:

(1) In any criminal proceeding prior to conviction; or

(2) In any adjudicatory hearing on a petition alleging delinquency; or

(3) In any civil proceeding not conducted under this subtitle.

(c) Evidence given in proceeding under this subtitle inadmissible in criminal proceeding. Evidence given in a proceeding under this subtitle is not admissible against the child in any other proceeding in another court, except in a criminal proceeding where the child is charged with perjury and the evidence is relevant to that charge and is otherwise admissible.

According to Petitioner, because Md. Rule 5-404(b) must be read in light of the policy underlying the Juvenile Causes Act, evidence of unadjudicated juvenile acts allegedly committed by an adult defendant is inadmissible as a matter of law in subsequent criminal proceedings. Trial judges do not have discretion to admit evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of law. The issue of whether C J § 3-8A-23 “trumps” Md. Rule 5-404(b) presents a question of law.²

The State argues that the Circuit Court was correct in its conclusion that the admissibility of the evidence at issue was controlled by Md. Rule 5-404(b) because the statutory prohibition in CJ § 3-8A-23 does not apply to evidence that was never presented in a juvenile proceeding. The Court of Special Appeals agreed with that argument. So do we.

To resolve a question of law that is controlled by a statute, this Court must “identify and effectuate the legislative intent underlying the statute(s) at issue.” Serio v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 373, 390, 863 A.2d 952, 962 (2004) (quoting Drew v. First Guaranty Mortgage Corp., 379 Md. 318, 327, 842 A.2d 1, 6 (2003)). While this Court must be guided by the plain language of the applicable statute, we must “read statutory language within the context of the statutory scheme, considering the ‘purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body.’ ” Serio, 384 Md. at 390, 863 A.2d at 962 (quoting Drew, 379 Md. at 327, 842 A.2d at 6; citing Beyer v. Morgan State Univ., 369 Md. 335, 349, 800 A.2d 707, 715 (2002); In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 711, 782 A.2d 332, 346 (2001)).

Having applied these principles to the issue before us, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that “the purpose and plain language of § 3-8A-23 does not provide a basis for extending its application to the uncharged juvenile misconduct in this case.” Thompson v. State, 181 Md.App. 74, 87, 955 A.2d 802, 810 (2008). “A court may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute; nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application.” Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003). “Juvenile proceedings are governed by a separate, pervasive scheme of specific statutes and rules developed by the Maryland General Assembly and the Court of Appeals.” In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 96, 646 A.2d 1012, 1017 (1994). If the General Assembly intended to exclude evidence of other crimes allegedly committed by an adult defendant when the defendant was a juvenile, but never presented in a juvenile court proceeding, the General Assembly would certainly have placed that restriction in CJ § 3-8A-23. We therefore conclude that the admissibility of the evidence at issue is controlled by Md. Rule 5M:04(b).

Our conclusion is consistent with the holding of State v. Shedrick, 61 Ohio St.3d 331, 574 N.E.2d 1065 (1991), in which the Supreme Court of Ohio was presented with two conflicting interpretations of a statute that, prior to July 1, 1992,³ provided:

“The judgment rendered by the court under this chapter shall not impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by conviction of a crime in that the child is not a criminal by reason of the adjudication, nor shall any child be charged or convicted of a crime in any court except as provided by this chapter. The disposition of a child under the judgment rendered or any evidence given in court is not admissible as evidence against the child in any other case or proceeding in any other court, except that the judgment rendered and the disposition of the child may be considered by any court only as to the matter of sentence or to the granting of probation. The disposition or evidence shall not operate to disqualify a child in any future civil service examination, appointment, or application.”

R.C. 2151.358(H) (Emphasis supplied).

In the Common Pleas Court of Summit County, Ohio, a jury convicted Donald Shedrick of the aggravated murder and rape of a thirteen year old girl, Lori E., whose body was discovered on December 15, 1988. The State’s case against Shedrick included evidence that, in 1987, he raped a thirteen year old girl, Christine Y. Shedrick noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Appellate District, and presented that Court with two assignments of error:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

“The trial court erred in admitted evidence of prior acts of the defendant when such evidence and such acts had been the subject of a prior juvenile court adjudication.”

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

“The trial court erred in allowing the admission of prior acts of the defendant to prove identity, plan, scheme or design.”

A divided three-judge panel of the intermediate appellate court held that neither assignment was “well taken,” and that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. That panel, however, (1) acknowledged that the majority’s disposition of the first assignment of error was “in conflict with the judgment upon the same question by the Court of Appeals of the Eighth Appellate District,” (2) concluded that this conflict should be resolved by the Supreme Court of Ohio, and (3) therefore entered a JOURNAL ENTRY that included the following provisions:

The question of law upon which the conflict of opinion exists is whether a person who testified in a juvenile court proceeding is precluded by R.C. 2151.358(h) from testifying on the same subject in any other case or proceeding in any other court.

Therefore, the record of State v. Shedrick ... is hereby certified to the Supreme Court of Ohio for review and final determination.

While holding that a remand was necessary to determine whether the evidence of the 1987 rape should have been excluded on the ground that the witnesses who testified about that crime (Christine Y., Christine’s mother, and a detective who investigated the 1987 case) had previously testified against Shedrick in juvenile court, the Supreme Court of Ohio (1) explained what constitutes “evidence given in [juvenile] court,” and (2) rejected Shedriek’s argument that the evidence of the 1987 rape should have been excluded under Rule 404(B) of the Ohio Rules of Evidence.

On the issue of what does—and does not—constitute “evidence given in [juvenile] court,” the Supreme Court stated:

When evidence is given in the form of testimony, it is the essential subject matter of the testimony which constitutes the evidence and not the precise words used. The transcript is not the “evidence,” but only a record of the evidence. Therefore, where a witness has testified in a juvenile proceeding, R.C. 2151.358(H) prohibits that witness from giving essentially the same testimony in any other criminal case or criminal proceeding. Accordingly we hold that, under R.C. 2151.358(H), testimony, documents, or exhibits, presented as evidence against a juvenile in a juvenile proceeding, are inadmissible against the juvenile in any other criminal case or criminal proceeding except ones in which the same underlying alleged crime is being adjudicated.

Our interpretation of R.C. 2151.358(H) does not end the inquiry necessary to decide this case. Appellant argues that the “spirit” of R.C. 2151.358(H) precludes the use of any evidence which formed the basis of prior juvenile disposition. ... Appellant argues that even if he pled guilty to the allegations of a juvenile complaint, any evidence which could have been used against him is inadmissible in a subsequent case....

We do not agree. This argument is also resolved by the language of R.C. 2151.358(H). The language is unambiguous in its prohibition against “any evidence given in [juvenile] court.” The statute does not exclude evidence that might have been given in juvenile court.

Because of the discrepancy between the facts represented by state’s counsel at oral argument and the facts suggested by the record, we must remand the case to the trial court for a disposition in accordance with the law as we have set it forth. If C.Y., her mother, or [the officer who investigated the 1987 case] testified at the juvenile proceeding, then R.C. 2151.358(H) bars the testimony of those witnesses in this case to the extent that such testimony is essentially the same as that previously given. On the other hand, if any one of these three witnesses did not testify at the juvenile proceeding or if their testimony in the instant case was not essentially the same, then such testimony would be admissible in the instant case. Finally, if evidence was admitted in this case in violation of R.C. 2151.358(H), the trial court must determine whether the effect was prejudicial and whether a new trial is warranted for Shedrick.

Id. at 1068-69. (Emphasis supplied; footnote omitted).⁴

As to Shedrick’s argument that evidence of the 1987 rape should have been excluded under Rule 404(B) of the Ohio Rules of Evidence, the Supreme Court stated:

In the case before us the identity of the perpetrator is at issue because Shedrick denies that [he committed the crime]

... We conclude the similarities between the two crimes is sufficient. The evidence of the first rape tends to show the identity of the perpetrator of the second. Therefore, evidence of Shedrick’s prior rape of C.Y. meets the requirements for admission set by Evid. R. 404(B) and R.C. 2945.59 [notwithstanding that the defendant was a juvenile].

Id. at 1070.

Our conclusion is also consistent with the holdings of State v. Collier, 892 S.W.2d 686 (Mo.App. W.D.1994), and People v. Whittington, 74 Cal.App.3d 806, 141 Cal.Rptr. 742 (1977). In Collier, while affirming a murder conviction, the Court of Appeals of Missouri held that a statute similar to § 3-8A-23 did not prohibit the State from introducing evidence of the defendant’s uncharged juvenile misconduct. The Collier Court stated:

Although the defendant was a minor when the above incidents of burglary and robbery occurred, it appears that he was never subjected to juvenile proceedings for any of them. Nor were the questions on cross-examination de signed to elicit statements made to juvenile authorities or matters pertaining to any juvenile proceedings.

Id. at 691.

In Whittington, the Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed a rape conviction based in part upon evidence of another rape allegedly committed by the defendant while he was a juvenile, on the ground that the evidence at issue “clearly raises a reasonable and strong inference that defendant ... was also the perpetrator of the instant crime.” 74 Cal.App.3d at 816, 141 Cal.Rptr. 742. In support of that conclusion, the Whittington Court stated:

Here both offenses: 1) occurred at about the same time, 5 p.m. and 7 p.m., and in the same general vicinity, i.e., several blocks from one another and from defendant’s residence at 15 Middle Street; 2) began near an apartment house when defendant approached the victim on a public street; 3) included defendant’s attempt to initiate a friendly conversation with the victim; 4) occurred in a garbage collection area near the street; 5) were initiated by the defendant’s sudden seizure of victims with his hand clamped over the mouth; 6) ostensibly were for the purpose of robbery, as each victim was asked for money; 7) occurred while both defendant and his victims were only partially disrobed; he removed only his pants and each victim, only her pantyhose; 8) were consummated in a short period of time; 9) defendant told the victims not to worry because he was not diseased and that he had not had sexual relations for a long time; 10) defendant engaged the victims in conversation after consummation of the crime; 11) neither victim sustained any physical injury other than the accomplishment of the sexual act; 12) each victim was a young attractive Caucasian woman; and 13) defendant offered the identical alibi defense—his presence at Walton’s residence within walking distance of each incident.

Id. at 815-16,141 Cal.Rptr. 742.

For the reasons stated above, we hold that CJ § 3-8A-23 simply does not apply to the testimony presented by the State in the case at bar, which was clearly admissible under Md. Rule 5-404(b), and which had never been “given” in a juvenile proceeding.⁵

II.

The indictment that the Circuit Court amended on its own initiative, in pertinent part,⁶ asserted:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY State of Maryland—vs—Karl Thompson Defendant(s) Date of Offense: 05/01/86-08/31/86 Location: 5429 Lynview Avenue Complainant: [The victim’s name]

INDICTMENT

The Jurors of the State of Maryland for the body of the City of Baltimore, do on their own oath present that aforesaid DEFENDANT(S), late of said City, heretofore on or about the date(s) of offense set forth above, at the loeation(s) set forth above, in the City of Baltimore, State of Maryland, feloniously did COMMIT the CRIME of RAPE in the 2nd DEGREE, as defined in Article 27, Sections 461 and 463 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, upon the aforesaid, Complainant; contrary to the form of the Act of Assembly, in such case made and provided, and against the peace, government and dignity of the State.

SECOND COUNT

And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present that the aforesaid DEFENDANT(S), late of said City, on the said date(s), at said place, at the City aforesaid, feloniously did commit the crime of SEXUAL OFFENSE in the 3rd DEGREE, in violation of Article 27, Sections 461 and 464B of the Annotated Code of Maryland, upon the aforesaid complainant; contrary to the form of the Act of Assembly, in such case made and provided, and against the peace, government and dignity of the State.

THIRD COUNT

And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present that the aforesaid DEFENDANT(S), late of said City, on said date(s), at the said place, at the City aforesaid, unlawfully did commit the crime of SEXUAL OFFENSE in the Uth DEGREE, in violation of Article 27, Section 461 and 464C of the Annotated Code of Maryland, upon aforesaid Complainant; contrary to the form of the Act of Assembly, in such case made and provided, and against the peace, government and dignity of the State.

FOURTH COUNT

And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present that the aforesaid DEFENDANT(S), late of said City, on the said date(s), at the said place, at the City aforesaid, unlawfully did ASSAULT [the victim] in the SECOND DEGREE in violation of Article 27, Section 12A; contrary to the form of the Act of Assembly in such case made and provided and against the peace, government, and dignity of the State.

The verdict sheet pertaining to this indictment contains the following questions and answers:

VERDICT SHEET

1. Do you find that on or about November, 1986 at Goodnow Road in Baltimore City, State of Maryland, the Defendant, KARL THOMPSON, did commit the crime of Rape in the Second Degree against [the victim]?

Not Guilty Guilty yes

2. Do you find that on or about Noyember, 1986 at Goodnow Road in Baltimore City, State of Maryland, the Defendant, KARL THOMPSONS d]id commit the crime of Sexual Offense in the Third Degree against [the victim]?

Not Guilty Guilty yes

3. Do you find that on or about November, 1986 at Goodnow Road in Baltimore City, State of Maryland, the Defendant, KARL THOMPSON!, d]id commit the crime of Sexual Offense in the Fourth Degree against [the victim]?

Not Guilty Guilty yes

4. Do you find that on or about November, 1986 at Goodnow Road in Baltimore City, State of Maryland, the Defendant, KARL THOMPSONS d]id commit the crime of Assault in the Second Degree against [the victim]?

GUILTY

The record shows that the Circuit Court ruled as follows at the close of the State’s case:

[0]n my own initiative, I make this amendment finding it would not be a change in the character of the offenses. I would note that the character of the offense described by [the victim] ... was substantially the same as that described in her written statement [to Detective Worts] of May llth[, 2005,] which the Court has had an opportunity to review, and that her in-court testimony ... differed from the indictments ... only with respect to Thanksgiving and the location. I will moreover note that the defense has been aware of the location variance since before trial, because it was told to me prior to trial that her testimony with respect to the 1986 events [would be] that they occurred at [the] Goodnow Road [location] and not at the Lynview Avenue location. While it is unclear why the State has not made [a] motion [to amend the indictment] before ... it should come as no surprise to the defense that the indictments were to be amended. I will also note that the Court is not [making] any ... substantiative changes with respect to [the] indictments ____ [C]hanging the date of the offense in the indictment constitutes a matter of form and not substance ... and it may be amended in the Court’s discretion without changing the character of the offense.

From our review of the record, the victim never stated that the 1986 offenses occurred at the Lynview Avenue address. Although the victim was unable to provide Detective Wortz with the exact address, she stated that the 1986 offenses occurred at the “studio apartment type of thing” where Petitioner was living at that time. Prior to the date of his indictments, Petitioner was arrested on a warrant issued by a District Court Commissioner, who was presented with an Application for Statement of Charges that included the following:

APPLICATION FOR STATEMENT OF CHARGES

I, [Detective Jones], apply for a statement of charges and a summons or warrant which may lead to the arrest of the named Defendant because on or about 1 Jan. 79-31 Dec. 86 at 5429 Lynview Ave. Baltimore Md. 21215 and 5105 Good-now Rd. Baltimore Md. 21206, the above named Defendant Did sexually abuse and rape [the victim] F/B/31 DOB 07/29/1973 from the time she was 6 to the time she was 13 years of age.

The Statement of Charges filed pursuant to this Application mistakenly asserted that all of the offenses occurred at the Lynview Avenue address, and this clerical mistake was not corrected when the indictments were filed.

According to Petitioner, he is entitled to a new trial on the ground that this ruling violated Md. Rule 4-204, which provides:

On motion of a party or on its own initiative, the court at any time before verdict may permit a charging document to be amended except that if the amendment changes the character of the offenses charged, the consent of the parties is required. If amendment of a charging document reasonably so requires, the court shall grant the defendant an extension of time or continuance.

Petitioner argues that, even though the amendments at issue changed only the period of time within which the crimes occurred and the location at which the crimes occurred, those amendments changed “the character of the offenses charged.” While rejecting this argument, the Court of Special Appeals stated:

“Matters relating to the character of the offense are those facts that must be proved to make the act complained of a crime.” Tapscott v. State, 106 Md.App. 109, 184, 664 A.2d 42 (1995). Consequently, the only change to an indictment that requires the consent of the parties is one that would alter the elements of the crime charged. And, thus, “[a]n indictment may be corrected without the defendant’s consent if the amendment does not alter any of the elements of the offense and results in no prejudice.” Tapscott, 106 Md.App. at 134[, 664 A.2d at 54].

We have repeatedly held that the date that an indictment alleges that the criminal conduct occurred “may be amended in the court’s discretion without changing the character of the offense.” Manuel [v. State], 85 Md.App. [1,] 18—19[, 581 A.2d 1287, 1295 (1990)]. See ... Tucker v. State, 5 Md.App. 32, 35, 245 A.2d 109[, 111] (1968) (declaring that “[i]t is well-established that the State is not confined in its proof to the date alleged in the charging document”). Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in amending the date stated in the indictment.

Nor does the amendment changing the location of the conduct charged from one address to another within Baltimore City change the character of the offense charged. In Makins v. State, 6 Md.App. 466, 470, 252 A.2d 15, 17 (1969), we held that the trial court did not err in permitting the State to amend an indictment to reflect the correct address at which the alleged daytime housebreaking occurred. We explained: “The incident as drawn clearly charged the appellant with the crime of daytime housebreaking with intent to steal the personal goods of another. Each of the elements of that crime was alleged, without regard to the particular apartment number specified, and none of the essential elements of the offense were changed by the amendment.” Id. (Internal citation omitted). The same reasoning applies here. The indictment set forth the elements of the offense charged without regard to the particular house address, and therefore, “none of the essential elements of the offense were changed” by the amendment of the address.

Thompson v. State, 181 Md.App. at 98-100, 955 A.2d at 817. We agree with that analysis.

In Makins, the Court of Special Appeals relied upon Corbin v. State, 237 Md. 486, 206 A.2d 809 (1965), in which this Court stated:

As to what constitutes substance and what is merely formal in an indictment, it may be said that all facts which must be proved to make the act complained of a crime are matters of substance, and that all else—including the order of arrangement and precise words, unless they alone will convey the proper meaning—is formal.

Id. at 489-90, 206 A.2d at 811. An amendment that constitutes merely a “matter of form” does not change the character of the offense. Johnson v. State, 358 Md. 384, 388, 749 A.2d 769, 771 (2000).

In State v. Mulkey, 316 Md. 475, 560 A.2d 24 (1989), while holding that “the exact date of the offense is not an essential element, and is not constitutionally required to be set forth [in an indictment,]” this Court cited with approval several decisions of the Court of Special Appeals that “support the notion that the time of an offense stated in an indictment need not be precise.” Id. at 482, 560 A.2d at 27.

In Busch v. State, 289 Md. 669, 426 A.2d 954 (1981), while holding that the State should not have been permitted to substitute the words “resist arrest by a police officer” for “resist and hinder a police officer,” this Court stated:

Because the charging document as amended contained a specific reference to an arrest, it charged the offense of resisting arrest.

The amendment here substituted the offense of resisting arrest for the originally charged offense of resisting, obstructing, or hindering an officer in the performance of his duties. The charge as amended required proof of an arrest while the original charge did not. Thus, the basic description of the offense charged was changed.

Because the amendment changed the character of the offense originally charged, it was not a matter of form. The petitioner did not consent to the amendment, and it is, therefore, impermissible.

Id. at 679, 426 A.2d at 959. In Johnson, supra, while holding that the State should not have been permitted to substitute “cocaine” for “marijuana” in a criminal information charging violations of the Maryland Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, this Court stated:

[A]s in Thanos [v. State, 282 Md. 709, 387 A.2d 286 (1978)] and in Brown [v. State, 285 Md. 105, 400 A.2d 1133 (1979)], the description of the specific act alleged was significantly changed by the amendment. The information initially accused the defendant of possessing marijuana, whereas the amended information charged an entirely different act, possessing crack cocaine. It follows that, under Thanos and Brown, the amendment did change “the character of the offense charged.”

358 Md. at 390, 749 A.2d at 772. In the case at bar, however, the amendments did not substitute a different offense for any of the offenses charged in the indictment.

Although Petitioner did not file a demand for a bill of particulars,⁷ the record shows that he received a copy of the Application for Statement of Charges when he was arrested. The record also shows that, prior to trial, Petitioner’s trial counsel was provided with a copy of the victim’s statement to Detective Wortz. Because the discovery provided by the State made it clear that the 1986 incident occurred in November of that year at the Goodnow Road address, Petitioner is not entitled to a new trial on the ground that he was unfairly prejudiced by the amendments at issue.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. PETITIONER TO PAY THE COSTS.

GREENE, J., dissents and files opinion in which BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, J., join.

Footnotes

1

. This Court has stated that "[t]he raison d’etre of the Juvenile Causes Act is that a child does not commit a crime when he commits a delinquent act and therefore is not a criminal.” In re Darryl D., 308 Md. 475, 481, 520 A.2d 712, 715 (1987) (quoting Matter of Davis, 17 Md.App. 98, 104, 299 A.2d 856, 860 (1973)); see also Moore v. Miley, 372 Md. 663, 673-74, 814 A.2d 557, 563 (2003) (" TDhe keystone of Maryland's disposition of juvenile delinquents is that 'the moral responsibility or blameworthiness of the child [is] of no consequence,' such that delinquency adjudication is seen as the opportunity for the State to provide needed rehabilitative intervention.” (quoting Victor B., 336 Md. 85] at 91-92, 646 A.2d [1012] at 1015)). Accordingly, "[j]uvenile proceedings are governed by a separate, pervasive scheme of specific statutes and rules developed by the Maryland General Assembly and the Court of Appeals.” Victor B., 336 Md. at 96, 646 A.2d at 1017.

2

. See State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 634, 552 A.2d 896, 898 (1989), and Figgins v. Cochrane, 403 Md. 392, 942 A.2d 736 (2008) (stating that a trial judge does not have discretion to admit evidence that must be excluded as a matter of law) (quoting Hall v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 398 Md. 67, 82-83, 919 A.2d 1177, 1186 (2007)).

3

. The Ohio legislature amended R.C. 2151.358(H), effective July 31, 1992. That statute now provides:

Evidence of a judgment rendered and the disposition of a child under that judgment is not admissible to impeach the credibility of the child in any action or proceeding. Otherwise, the disposition of a child under the judgment rendered or any evidence given in court is admissible as evidence for or against a child in any action or proceeding in any court in accordance with the Rules of Evidence and also may be considered by any court as to the matter of sentence or to the granting of probation.

4

. Upon remand to the trial court, the State stipulated that (1) the testimony of Christine, her mother, and the investigating officer was presented to the jury, and (2) that testimony was inadmissible under R.C. 2151.358(H) because it was similar to the testimony presented by those witnesses in the-juvenile proceeding that preceded the jury trial. The trial court found, however, that the admission of that evidence was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,’' and that decision was affirmed in State v. Shedrick, 80 Ohio App.3d 823, 610 N.E.2d 1147 (1992). Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court denied Shedrick’s petition for writ of certiorari. Shedrick v. Ohio, 508 U.S. 923, 113 S.Ct. 2374, 124 L.Ed.2d 279 (1993).

5

. Our holding is not inconsistent with State v. Dixon, 656 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn.Crim.App.1983). That case presented the issue of whether an adult defendant could be cross-examined about whether he had—when he was a juvenile—committed acts that had resulted in delinquency adjudications. The prosecutor in that case conceded that a delinquency adjudication was not a "conviction” for purposes of Tennessee's "impeachment by conviction” rule, but argued that the defendant could be questioned about the conduct that resulted in the delinquency adjudications. The trial court accepted that argument, but the appellate court did not. In the case at bar, Petitioner was not questioned about conduct that had been the subject of a juvenile delinquency proceeding.

6

. The statutes cited in the indictment, which were in effect in 1986, were transferred to the Criminal Law Article (CL) by Chapter 26, Acts of 2002. Second degree rape is proscribed by CL § 3-304. Sexual offense in the third degree is proscribed by CL § 3-307. Sexual offense in the fourth degree is proscribed by CL § 3-308. Assault in the second degree is proscribed by CL § 3-203.

7

. Since October 1, 2002, CL § 3-317(b) has provided that, ”[i]n a case in which the general form of [charging document] described in subsection (a) of this section is used, the defendant is entitled to a bill of particulars specifically setting forth the allegations against the defendant.” From July 1, 1977 to October 1, 2002, Article 27, § 461B(b) provided that a defendant who is charged with rape or a sexual offense “is entitled to a bill of particulars specifically setting forth the allegation against him.”