Thompson v. Hagan

523 P.2d 1365, 96 Idaho 19, 1974 Ida. LEXIS 371

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Decided: June 26, 1974
• Docket: 11413
• Status: Published

Opinions

McQUADE, Justice.

This is an original proceeding seeking a writ of mandate to require application of the motor vehicles guest statute in a proceeding based upon an automobile accident that occurred on October 20, 1972, in Owyhee County, Idaho. The petitioner,¹ F. Chad Thompson, was driving an automobile, and Harvey Adams, a passenger, was injured when the vehicle left the road. Adams filed an action against the petitioners alleging that he was not a guest passenger. The petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits that alleged Adams was a guest passenger and therefore his action was barred by the Idaho guest statute.² Judge Hagan denied the motion for summary judgment on the ground that the Idaho guest statute was unconstitutional or had been impliedly repealed by the enactment of Idaho comparative negligence statutes.

The petitioners filed a petition with this Court requesting a writ of mandate directing the respondent, Judge Hagan, to apply the Idaho guest statute and grant their motion for summary judgment. This Court issued an alternative writ of mandate ordering Judge Hagan to show cause why the order denying the motion for summary judgment should not be vacated, and why an order granting the motion for summary judgment should not issue. Both parties have presented briefs and oral argument on the constitutionality of the Idaho guest statute.

The Idaho guest statute provides,

“Liability of motor owner to guest. — No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause for damages against such owner or operator for injuries, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of the said owner or operator or caused by his intoxication or gross negligence.” ³

The respondent contends that the guest statute violates the equal protection guarantee of the Idaho⁴ and United States⁵ Constitutions because it denies to automobile guests injured in an accident a cause of action against a driver-host in an accident based on ordinary negligence, but it permits all other persons including guests in other automobiles, paying passengers, other drivers and pedestrians to recover for their negligently caused injuries. It is argued that the guest statute arbitrarily singles out guests of the negligent driver for special treatment and therefore denies to them the same treatment accorded to all other persons involved in accidents in violation of the guarantees of equal protection of the law.

To determine whether a statutory classification scheme violates the equal protection guarantee, the United States Supreme Court has followed a two tier test.⁶ If the classification involves a fundamental right such as the right to vote,⁷ or if the classification involves a suspect classification such as race,⁸ it has been held that the state bears a heavy burden to justify the classification distinctions. The analysis for fundamental rights and suspect classifications is called the strict scrutiny test. In all other areas of the law such as social welfare legislation,⁹ a restrained standard of review is applied. In the recent case of Reed v. Reed this restrained review was articulated as,

“The Equal Protection Clause of that amendment does, however, deny to States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’ Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920).” ¹⁰

The restrained review approach requires that the statutory classification be reasonably related to the purpose of the statute.¹¹ For the purposes of this opinion the proper standard of review is the restrained review test.¹² The question presented by this proceeding is whether the denial of an automobile guest’s negligence cause of action against his host bears a rational relationship to the objectives sought to be advanced by the guest statute.

Two arguments have been advanced in justification of the guest statute’s classification scheme.¹³ First, it is said that the guest statute promotes hospitality by insulating drivers from lawsuits by ungrateful guests. Second, it is suggested that the guest statute eliminates collusive lawsuits in which a host fraudulently confesses negligence to enable his guest to recover from his insurance company. The petitioners set forth the above two justifications for the guest statute and add a third rationale that the guest statute is a legislative attempt to bring automobile guests into parity with licensees on real property. Each of the three justifications must be examined separately to determine if the denial of a guest’s negligence action against his host bears a rational relationship to the objectives of promotion of hospitality, prevention of collusion and parity between licensees and automobile guests.

The explanation of the hospitality rationale is that hosts should not be burdened by lawsuits by ungrateful guests who do not pay for their transportation. The explanation may have had validity in 1931 when the guest statute was first enacted, but today, the widespread incidence of liability insurance has destroyed the basis for the argument.¹⁴ Because of liability insurance, the statute appears to result in the protection of insurance companies, not generous hosts, from lawsuits by negligently injured guests. The fact that insurance companies are the real beneficiary of the guest statute’s protection is made clear by the second justification of the guest statute of prevention of collusive lawsuits which is discussed below. The guest statute cannot be reasoned to promote hospitality by protecting hosts from lawsuits by guests.

It is argued that the guest statute is directed against the hitch-hiker who reimburses his generous host with a lawsuit. However, it has been pointed out,

“Dean Prosser disclosed that he had once found a hitch-hiker case but had mislaid it and had been ‘unable to find another.’ The present writer having monitored the advance sheets in Torts for a generation has never found a single hitch-hiker case. ‘The typical guest act case is that of the driver who offers his friend a lift to the office or invites him out to dinner, negligently drives him into a collision, and fractures his skull —after which the driver and his insurance company take refuge in the statute, step out of the picture, and leave the guest to bear his own loss. If this is good social policy, it at least appears under a novel front.’ Prosser, Torts 187 (4th ed. 1971).” ¹⁵

The spector of the ungrateful guest bringing a lawsuit against his generous host has an analogy in the beneficiary of a charity bringing a lawsuit against the charity. Similar to the guest statute, the common law developed the theory of charitable immunity to protect charities from negligence actions and the immunity was applied by the Idaho courts. In the case of Bell v. Presbytery of Boise¹⁶ the charitable immunity doctrine was rejected in total. It was held that,

“Personal injury is no less painful, disabling, costly or damage-producing simply because negligent harm is inflicted by a charitable institution rather than a non-charitable one. As the author of one opinion stated:

‘It has not been right, is not now right, nor could it ever be right for the law to forgive any person or any association of persons for wronging any other person.’ [Mullikin v. Jewish Hospital Ass’n of Louisville, Ky.] 348 S.W.2d [930] at 932, infra.” ¹⁷

Similarly, the guest statute deprives automobile guests of a cause of action for negligence against their host, but allows tort actions by paying passengers, guests in other vehicles, drivers of other vehicles and pedestrians.

In conclusion, the guest statute does not promote hospitality or the sharing of transportation and therefore there is no reasonable relationship between the denial of a guest’s negligence cause of action and the purpose of promotion of hospitality.

The second justification of the guest statute is that it prevents collusive actions at law against insurance companies. The theory behind the justification is that since a host and guest are likely to be friends, the host will fraudulently state that the accident was caused by his negligence so that the guest may recover from the host’s insurer. To prevent the risk of fraudulent collusion, the guest statute eliminates a negligence cause of action for all guests. If, as the rationale suggests, a host will agree to fraudulently state that he was negligent, there is nothing preventing him from stating that he was grossly negligent or intoxicated in order that the guest may recover from the insurer.

By denying all guests’ negligence actions against their driver, the guest statute is over inclusive in its sweep and bars all the actions. The judicial system has several means for prevention and discovery of fraud which includes perjury, cross-examination under oath and various discovery devices. There is no reason to believe that they would be ineffective for the prevention of collusion in suits by a guest against a host’s insurance company. There is no reasonable relationship between the guest statute and its purpose to prevent collusion.

The third rationale of the guest statute advanced by the petitioners is that it is a legislative means of bringing the duty owed by the automobile host to his guest into parity with the duty owed by a landowner to a licensee. The third rationale is not a statement of purpose because there is no apparent need for the duties of automobile hosts and landowners to be the same.

By stating that the purpose of the guest statute is to bring into parity the duties of automobile hosts and landowners, the third rationale erroneously assumes that the two situations involve the same duties. Under the guest statute the automobile host has a negative duty towards his guest of not causing an accident through gross negligence or intoxication. The landowner’s duty towards a licensee is to avoid exposing him to unknown dangerous hazards or instrumentalities.¹⁸ The landowner’s duty towards licensees centers around warning him of dangers, but the automobile host’s duty looks to the activities of the host in controlling the automobile.

There are also factual distinctions between an automobile host-guest situation and a landowner-licensee situation. Once inside a moving vehicle, the guest has no means of escaping his host’s negligence, but a licensee can leave the landowner’s property upon notice of neglient or hazardous activity. The automobile host is in full control of the vehicle unless the accident is caused by a mechanical defect, but the landowner need not be present when the licensee is exposed to danger, and it is impossible for him to control all areas of his property.

There is little similarity between the host-guest situation and the landowner-licensee situation and therefore the guest statute does not place the guest on a parity with a licensee.

From the above analysis it is concluded that the guest statute’s denial of the guest’s negligence cause of action against his host does not bear a rational relationship to the objectives of the guest statute of promotion of hospitality, prevention of collusion and parity between licensees and automobile guests. By denying automobile guests a negligence cause of action against their host, but allowing negligence actions against the host by paying passengers, guests in other automobiles, drivers of other automobiles and pedestrians, the guest statute draws an impermissible classification scheme and is in violation of the equal protection of the laws guarantees of the Idaho and United States Constitutions.

The petitioners contend that for this Court to hold the guest statute unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection would be contrary to a great number of cases that have upheld the constitutionality of guest statutes. They argue that the case of Silver v. Silver¹⁹ should control this Court’s decision. In that case the United States Supreme Court held that a Connecticut automobile guest statute did not violate the equal protection guarantee. It must be remembered that the Silver case was decided in 1929 which was prior to the advent of widespread automobile liability insurance. The case did not consider the three justifications of the guest statute to determine if there was a rational connection between the objectives of the statute and the means to accomplish the objectives provided in the statutes. The Silver case appears to have taken the approach that all regulations of automobiles are constitutional without examining the regulations in detail. Because of the lack of analysis, the Silver case is not persuasive in our interpretation of the Idaho Constitution.

The petitioners point out that guest statutes have been recently upheld by the Illinois and Utah Supreme Courts in the cases of Delaney v. Badame²⁰ and Cannon v. Oviatt.²¹ Not all the recent cases have been in accord. The California Supreme Court held that the guest statute is in violation of the equal protection guarantee in the case of Brown v. Merlo ²² which was followed by the Kansas Supreme Court in the case of Henry v. Bauder.²³ and the North Dakota Supreme Court in the case of Johnson v. Hassett.²⁴ The Brown case represents an exhaustive analysis of the guest statute in relation to the equal protection guarantee and was relied upon by the district court in this proceeding. After reviewing the above authorities, we are persuaded that the California decision in the Brown case should be followed and the guest statute declared unconstitutional.

The final argument presented by the petitioners in support of the guest statute is that this Court should severely restrict its review of the guest’s statute’s classification scheme and declare it constitutional. Although the equal protection guarantee requires this Court to determine if there is a rational connection between the statute’s objectives and the statute’s means for achieving the objectives, it is argued that if this Court goes beyond a cursory examination of the statute’s objectives it is usurping the legislature’s function. In effect, the petitioners argue that if a statute is passed by the legislature, it cannot be a denial of equal protection. It is an accepted rule of statutory construction that constitutional issues should be avoided, but when this Court is squarely presented with a constitutional issue, as in this proceeding, it must rule on the issue. The legislature should have wide discretion in the enactment of statutory schemes to promote the general welfare, but this Court has a duty to protect the people’s rights as enumerated in the Idaho and United States Constitutions from legislative encroachment. We conclude that the guest statute violates the equal protection guarantee of the Idaho and United States Constitutions and therefore we must hold it unconstitutional.

Since this action involves a major change in a host’s liability in a negligently caused automobile accident, the question of its applicability to past, pending and future cases must be addressed. In the case of Linkletter v. Walker,²⁵ the United States Supreme Court made an exhaustive analysis of retroactivity of court decisions. It was held that there are no constitutional requirements concerning retroactivity, and it is a matter of discretion for the state courts. Three different approaches to retroactivity can be identified. The first approach is the traditional rule which is derived from the concept that courts do not pronounce new law, but only discover the true law. Under this approach there are no new decisions, but only clarifications of the true law which makes a decision applicable to both past and future cases. The second approach is the prospective rule. Under this rule a decision is effective only in future actions, and does not affect the rule of law in the case in which the new rule is announced. The third approach is the modified prospective rule which is a combination of the traditional and prospective rules. Under the modified prospective rule, the new decision applies prospectively and to the parties bringing the action resulting in the new decision; or, to the parties bringing the action and all similar pending actions.

To aid the courts in determining which rule to apply, Linkletter v. Walker set forth the following factors to be considered. First, the purpose of the new decision must be analyzed in connection with the question of retroactivity. The purpose of holding the automobile guest statute unconstitutional is to prevent guests from being denied equal protection of the law. The purpose would be served by applying the case to both past and future actions. The second factor is reliance on the prior rule of law. The possibility exists that hosts may have offered rides to guests relying on the protection of the guest statute from negligence actions. Additionally, insurance companies may have relied upon the guest statute in setting their rates. The factor of reliance is very strong in this action. The third factor is the effect on the administration of justice. This factor takes into account the number of cases that would be reopened if the decision that the guest statute is unconstitutional is applied retroactively.

After weighing the three factors, it is concluded that the modified prospective rule should be applied in this action. The decision holding the guest statute unconstitutional applies to this action and all pending actions at the date of this decision, and it applies to all actions arising in the future.

Costs to defendant.

DONALDSON and BAKES, JJ., concur.

1 . The parties to special proceedings are properly referred to as “Plaintiff” and “Defendant.” I.O. § 7-101. However, in order to avoid confusing the instant parties with those in the case below, in this opinion the litigants in this action are called “petitioners” (the Thompsons) and “respondent” (District Judge Hagan).

2 . I.O. § 49-1401.

3 . Id.

4 . Idaho Const. art. I, §§ 2 and 13.

5 . United States Const. amend. XIV, § 1;

6 . See: Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065 (1969).

7 . Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966).

8 . Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967).

9 . Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970).

10 . Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76, 92 S.Ct. 251, 254, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971).

11 . Evans v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 95 Idaho 54, 501 P.2d 1054 (1972); Nelson v. Marshall, 94 Idaho 726, 497 P.2d 47 (1972); State v. Cantrell, 94 Idaho 653, 496 P.2d 276 (1972).

12 . It can be argued that the right to bring an action for negligently inflicted injuries is a fundamental right under art. I, § 18 of the Idaho Constitution, but we need not reach that issue in this opinion.

13 . W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 34, at 186-187 (4th ed. 1971) ; 2 F. Harper and F. James, The Law of Torts § 16.15, at 961 (1956).

14 .Only statistic available is federal estimate that 75% to 79% of Idaho motorists have liability insurance. U. S. Dept, of Transportation, Driver Behavior & Accident Involvement: Implications for Tort Liability, pp. 201-205 (1970).

15 . The Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Newsletter, at 56-57, March, 1973.

16 . 91 Idaho 374, 421 P.2d 745 (1966).

17 . Bell v. Presbytery of Boise, supra, note 16, at 376, 421 P.2d at 747.

18 . Gowen v. Davis, 85 Idaho 221, 377 P.2d 950 (1963).

19 . 280 U.S. 117, 50 S.Ct. 57, 74 L.Ed. 221 (1929).

20 . 49 Ill.2d 168, 274 N.E.2d 353 (1971).

21 . 520 P.2d 883 (Utah Supreme Court, March 26, 1974).

22 . 106 Cal.Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212 (1973) ; see: Comment, Review of the Past, Preview of the Future: The Viability of Automobile Guest Statutes, 42 Cinn.L.Rev. 709 (1973) ; 23 Drake L.Rev. 216 (1973); 50 N.D.L.Rev. 139 (1973); 5 U.W.L.A.L.Rev. 53 (1973).

23 . 518 P.2d 362 (Kan.Sup.Ct.1974).

24 . 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D.Sup.Ct., filed March 29, 1974).

25 . Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965); see also: Sims v. State, 94 Idaho 801, 498 P.2d 1274 (1972); Dawson v. Olson, 94 Idaho 636, 496 P.2d 97 (1972); Smith v. State, 93 Idaho , 473 P.2d 937 (1970); Ostrager, Retro-activity and Prospectivity of Supreme Court Constitutional Interpretations, 19 N.Y.L.F. 289 (Fall 1973); Comments, 7 Wake Forest L.Rev. 500 (1971); 42 Yale L.J. 779 (1933); 10 A.L.R.3d 1371.