Thompson v. Donald J. Trump Inc. U.S.A.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 12, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-02025
StatusUnknown

This text of Thompson v. Donald J. Trump Inc. U.S.A. (Thompson v. Donald J. Trump Inc. U.S.A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thompson v. Donald J. Trump Inc. U.S.A., (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ODRAY KEVIN THOMPSON, Plaintiff, -against- 23-CV-2025 (LTS) DONALD J. TRUMP, INC., USA; PRINCE ORDER OF DISMISSAL ANDREW; PRINCESS KATE MIDDLETON MEGAN MARKLE; L. WARD; ALVIN BRAGG; BENNY BOSCIO, JR.; WARDEN CORT, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff was detained at the George R. Vierno Center on Rikers Island when he filed this action pro se. By order dated March 10, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 Thereafter, Plaintiff was transferred to Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Center. Plaintiff brings this action against members of the British royal family (“Prince Andrew,” Kate Middleton, and Meghan Markle); “Donald J. Trump, Inc. (USA)”; New York Supreme Court Justice Laura Ward; Anna M. Kross Center Warden Cort; New York County District Attorney Alvin Bragg; and New York City Correction Officers Benevolent Association (COBA) President Benny Boscio, Jr. The Court dismisses the complaint for the reasons set forth below and allows Plaintiff, within 60 days, to amend his complaint to replead certain claims.

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915I(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). “[A]n action is ‘frivolous’ when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . ; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”) Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those

facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleges the following:2 I did the applecaion with Noble Pearson Bay. I hav a docket number, my S.S. number is still active here in New York City and this is the 3rd times I have been kidnaped by that NYPD Police Gang and the Supreem Court of New York and this slave complex Rickers Island. I am a Mooris American of MST of A. The trib am from the Maroons/Isrillight Moor/Moslem. What I stand for is love truth peace justice unity [illegible] power. I need my brith right and right natinolty. Am sueing because my name is in capital letter of the strawman. (ECF 2 at 6.) Plaintiff further seeks to “come for[war]d to the Kings and Queens of England, [and] even the prince and princess.” (Id. at 5.) He notes that Jamaica has demanded “billions in slavery reparations from UK.” (Id.) In response to a question on the form complaint about his injuries, Plaintiff writes: Kidnapping by NYPD Department of Police. Druge wrongfuly by the court of Supreme Brooklyn, Manhattan, Queens Bronx. Traumatized, eye raping handcuffed bind back beating in jeail working as a slave for 5 five cents a day. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff seeks “freedom out of jail, reparations for slavery of Africa,” and recognition that he is a creditor landlord with land, money, and gold worth more than $70 billion.

2 All spelling and punctuation in quoted material is from the original. DISCUSSION A. “Redemptionist” and Sovereign Citizen Theories Plaintiff’s assertions appear to be based, at least in part, on the “redemptionist” or “sovereign citizen” theory. Courts have explained the idea behind these false and misguided ideas: “Redemptionist” theory . . . propounds that a person has a split personality: a real person and a fictional person called the “strawman.” The “strawman” purportedly came into being when the United States went off the gold standard in 19[3]3, and, instead, pledged the strawman of its citizens as collateral for the country’s national debt. Redemptionists claim that government has power only over the strawman and not over the live person, who remains free. Individuals can free themselves by filing UCC financing statements, thereby acquiring an interest in their strawman. Thereafter, the real person can demand that government officials pay enormous sums of money to use the strawman’s name or, in the case of prisoners, to keep him in custody. If government officials refuse, inmates are encouraged to file liens against correctional officers and other prison officials in order to extort their release from prison. Adherents of this scheme also advocate that inmates copyright their names to justify filing liens against officials using their names in public records such as indictments or court papers. Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 203 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); United States v. Cook, No. 3:18-CR-00019, 2019 WL 2721305, at *2 (E.D. Tenn.

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Bluebook (online)
Thompson v. Donald J. Trump Inc. U.S.A., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thompson-v-donald-j-trump-inc-usa-nysd-2023.