Thomas & Warner, Inc. v. City of New Orleans

89 So. 2d 885, 230 La. 1024, 1956 La. LEXIS 1483
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedJune 29, 1956
Docket42800
StatusPublished
Cited by28 cases

This text of 89 So. 2d 885 (Thomas & Warner, Inc. v. City of New Orleans) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomas & Warner, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 89 So. 2d 885, 230 La. 1024, 1956 La. LEXIS 1483 (La. 1956).

Opinion

VIOSCA, Justice ad hoc.

This is an appeal by the City of New Orleans, defendant, from a judgment in favor of Thomas & Warner, Inc., plaintiff, in the sum of $5,157, which the District Court found to be the diminution in the value of plaintiff’s property, as the result of the construction of an underpass in the vicinity thereof. Plaintiff answered the appeal, asking that the judgment be increased to $18,000, the amount originally prayed for, and that the fees of its expert *1027 witnesses be fixed at the sum of $1,200 each and taxed as costs.

Plaintiff was the owner of a tract of land, with a commercial building thereon, located at the corner of Paris Avenue and Florida Avenue — a “J” Industrial Zone under the Zoning Ordinance of the City of New Orleans.

To eliminate the Paris Avenue crossing of the railroad right-of-way on Florida Avenue, the City of New Orleans constructed the Paris Avenue Underpass as part of its Union Passenger and Grade Separation Program. This work was commenced in October of 1953 and completed in December of 1954.

Plaintiff instituted suit in 1955 to recover $18,000' as damages alleged to have been suffered from—

“1. Reduction and impairment of frontage on two important boulevards.
“2. Loss of a corner location for a large industrial tract.
“3. Loss (or denial and impairment) of accessibility to the property.
“4. Loss due to substantial change in grade.
“5. Creation of a dead-end or ‘cul de sac’.
“6. Diminution and destruction of right and mean's of ingress and egress to the property.”

Defendant- filed an' exception of no cause of action, which was overruled. Its answer is in the form of a general denial.

The case was tried on the merits, and in his reasons for judgment the trial judge said:

“ * * * Plaintiff contends his damage is threefold: (1) The downward slope of the sidewalk in front of its property on Paris Avenue makes it difficult for customers to park and approach the building, formerly a suburban shopping center, now an office building; (2) That Florida Avenue has been dead-ended, denying it and its customers and tenants access to Florida Avenue from Paris Avenue; and (3) That to offset the loss of the street parking, plaintiff must devote part of his lot (28 feet front on Paris Avenue, and widening in the rear) for off-street parking for its tenants. * * * ”

The trial judge awarded plaintiff the sum of $5,157 to cover the damages claimed in Item (2) above and disallowed the other claims.

Defendant reurges in this Court its exception of no cause of action. The exception is not well founded, since all of the well pleaded facts in the petition must be accepted as true for the purposes of the exception. In its petition plaintiff alleges that there has been a reduction in the value of its-property, because of changes in grade *1029 and a “destruction of right and means of ingress and egress to and from” the property, which is sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The evidence shows that plaintiff’s property was leased to various retail stores at the time the . construction work began. Traffic flowed from Florida Avenue into Paris Avenue and from Paris Avenue into Florida Avenue, and plaintiff had a parking space behind its building, which could be reached'from either Florida Avenue or Paris Avenue. Access to the property facing Paris Avenue was 28 feet wide, and the Florida Avenue access was S3 feet.

The grade of Paris Avenue was lowered when the underpass was constructed. To remove a traffic' hazard, a barricade was set up at the corner of Florida and- Paris Avenues to prevent vehicular traffic on Florida Avenue from entering Paris Avenue and to prevent vehicular traffic on Paris Avenue from entering Florida Avenue. However, no obstruction was placed either on the Florida Avenue frontage or the Paris Avenue frontage of plaintiff’s property, and ingress and egress to and from the property was not affected in any way. Travel to plaintiff’s property was made circuitous in some respects, in that motorists travelling on Paris Avenue, who desire to enter the property from Florida Avenue, are required to circle the block, and motorists travelling on Florida Avenue, who desire to enter the property from Paris Avenue are, likewise, required to circle the block.

During the construction work plaintiff lost a number of its tenants and by agreement cancelled one lease. Just, prior to the completion of the underpass it began a renovation of its building, expending approximately $3,100, and, thereafter, rented it primarily for office purposes.

Plaintiff’s cause of action is founded on Article I, Sec. 2, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, LSA, which provides:

“* * * Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, private property shall not be taken or damaged except for public purposes and after just and adequate compensation is paid.” (Italics ours.)

When private property is damaged for public purposes, the measure of compensation is the diminution in the market value of the property damaged. McMahon & Perrin v. The St. Louis, Arkansas and Texas Railroad Company, 41 La.Ann. 827, 6 So. 640, 641. 1

*1031 Plaintiff’s claim that its property has diminished in value as a result of the construction of this underpass is based primarily on the fact that there has been a decrease in rentals.

Vernild G. Warner, vice-president of the plaintiff corporation, testified that his company received approximately $1,003 monthly in rentals before the construction of the underpass and approximately $775 monthly after its completion. He attributed this decrease to the fact that his company was compelled to give up renting to retailers and found it necessary to rent to persons desiring office space. His testimony is to the effect that they lost their retail renting trade because of the loss of the corner location with direct parking availability and immediate access and egress to and from their building from Florida and Paris Avenues. Working on a 7% basis, Warner, testifying as an expert realtor, placed a value of $79,000 on the property before the construction of the underpass and a value of $62,800 after the completion of the underpass. He placed a loss of $6,000 to $8,-000 on the destruction of the corner.

Eugene Aschaffenburg, an expert realtor, testified that the value of the property was $67,300 before construction of the underpass and $51,900 afterwards. He estimated rental decreases at 15%.

Plaintiff’s experts attributed the decrease in value to the change in grade of Paris Avenue, the closing of the entrance of Florida Avenue into Paris Avenue with a consequent loss of corner influence, and the loss of street parking. 2 As we see it, plaintiff is entitled to recover nothing for any of these causes.

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Bluebook (online)
89 So. 2d 885, 230 La. 1024, 1956 La. LEXIS 1483, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-warner-inc-v-city-of-new-orleans-la-1956.