ORDER
SIMONS, Senior District Judge.
This action, alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as well as pendent state law causes of action, comes before the court with the Report and Recommendation
of the United States Magistrate Judge. Based upon his detailed review of the record, the Magistrate Judge recommended that defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be granted with respect to plaintiffs Title VII and Section 1981 race discrimination and retaliation claims. He further recommended that plaintiffs remaining state law causes of action be dismissed, without prejudice.
Plaintiff has submitted Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. The court has reviewed plaintiffs Objections
de novo,
but it concludes that they are without merit. On consideration of the matter, the court hereby adopts the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, which is made a part of this Order by specific reference. For the reasons set out therein, defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted with respect to plaintiffs Title VII and Section 1981 race discrimination and retaliation claims. Plaintiffs remaining state law causes of action are hereby dismissed without prejudice, so that she may pursue such state law claims in state court.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARCHANT, United States Magistrate Judge.
This action has been filed by the Plaintiff alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,
et seq.,
as amended, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiff also asserts several pendent state law causes of action.
The Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment as to all claims with a supporting brief and exhibits. Plaintiff has filed a brief in opposition, to which the Defendant filed a reply memorandum. As both sides have extensively briefed the issues in this case, in particular with regard to the federal causes of action, and have submitted numerous exhibits and transcripts both in support of and opposition to the motion for summary judgment, a separate motions hearing was not required.
See
Local Rule 7.08. Defendant’s motion is now before the Court for disposition.
Background
Plaintiff, an African-American female, is employed by the Defendant Westinghouse Savannah River Co. (“WSRC” or “Defendant”). At the time relevant to the allegations set forth herein, the Defendant managed and operated the Savannah River Site for the United States Department of Energy. Part of the Defendant’s management responsibility was to ensure safe maintenance of the tritium stockpile as well as waste management and other cleanup and restoration efforts.
Davis Affidavit,
¶ 3.
Plaintiff was employed as a 2F Control Room Operator.
Plaintiffs Deposition,
p. 49. A Control Room Operator is responsible for monitoring the equipment used to condense contaminated waste materials and the equipment used to transfer contaminated waste material. The Control Room Operator must monitor the equipment in their area (in this case the 2F Control Room), primarily the “evaporator”,
to assure that it is maintained within safe operating or shutdown limits at all times.
Davis Affidavit,
¶¶4-5. Because of these important responsibilities, the position of Control Room Operator is considered an important and sensitive position.
Davis Affidavit,
¶ 6.
It is undisputed that the Plaintiff was on shift as the 2F Control Room Operator from 7:00 p.m. on August 21, 1994 to 7:00 a.m. on
August 22, 1994.
Plaintiffs Deposition,
p. 49. It is also undisputed that during her shift, Plaintiff recorded five (5) incorrect data readings on the evaporator log sheet at different times throughout the night.
Id.
at p. 77;
Exhibits 1-3; Davis Affidavit,
¶ 8. When confronted by management concerning these errors, Plaintiff could not explain her recordings, only acknowledging that she made a “mistake” and that she may have “just lost it.”
Plaintiff’s Deposition,
pp. 58, 77-78, 84;
Mobley Deposition,
pp. 36-37.
Plaintiff also does not contest that she deserved some form of discipline for her actions.
Plaintiff’s Deposition,
p. 173.
An investigation of this incident was conducted by Garry Davis, the Facility Manager. Davis concluded that Plaintiff had revealed a lack of understanding of the evaporator system, or had in fact falsified the documentation and her readings.
Davis Affidavit,
¶ 10. Davis considered Plaintiffs neglect of her Control Room Operator duties to be a serious matter, and that discipline was warranted. He consulted with the Human Resources Staff concerning what disciplinary action would be appropriate.
Davis Affidavit,
¶ 12;
Carpenter Affidavit,
¶ 5. As a disciplinary action, it was determined that Plaintiff would be placed on Final Employee Commitment (FEC)
and given eighty (80) hours off without pay as well as a reassignment from operator duties in order to allow for requalification. However, Plaintiff was not demoted, and has in fact since this incident been, increased, along with her co-workers, from level 18 pay status to level 20 pay status.
Davis Affidavit,
¶¶ 12-13. Further, as a result of Plaintiffs complaints about the discipline, the disciplinary action imposed was itself subsequently changed to probation and forty (40) hours off without pay.
Davis Affidavit,
¶ 13.
Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission (SCHAC) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging race discrimination and retaliation as a result of her discipline.
Plaintiff’s Deposition, Exhibit 9.
Both SCHAC and the EEOC issued “no cause” determinations. Plaintiff then filed this lawsuit in United States District Court.
Discussion
As noted, the Defendant has moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P.;
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party has the burden of proving that judgment on the pleadings is appropriate.
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970);
Charbonnages de France v. Smith,
597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir.1979). Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party must respond to the motion with “specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Rule 56(e), Fed.R.Civ.P.;
Celotex v. Catrett, supra.
The opposing party may not rest on the mere assertions contained in the pleadings.
A) Race Discrimination Claim.
Plaintiffs claim of race discrimination is for dispa
rate treatment (i.e. intentional discrimination), based on her allegation that she was discriminated against because of her race. Disparate treatment cases under Title VII require proof of intentional discrimination, either by direct evidence or by the structured procedures set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 93 5.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
See also Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).
The United States Supreme Court articulated a three-part analysis for analyzing Title VII cases in
McDonnell Douglas. First,
the Plaintiff must establish a prima facie ease
of
discrimination.
Once a prima facie case has been established, a rebuttable presumption is created that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the Plaintiff.
Second,
once this presumption has been established, the burden of production shifts to the employer to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.
Third,
if the employer shows a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions, the burden is then on the Plaintiff to come forward with evidence that the employer’s asserted reasons for its actions are a mere pretext for its true discriminatory motives, and that the actions of the employer were really based on the Plaintiff’s race.
McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
411 U.S. at 802-805, 93 S.Ct. 1817;
Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs,
450 U.S. at 252-256, 101 S.Ct. 1089;
Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
933 F.2d 231, 234-235 (4th Cir.1991). Despite these shifting burdens of production, the Plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of discrimination throughout.
Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs,
450 U.S. at 252-253,101 S.Ct. 1089;
see also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).
As noted, in order to satisfy the first prong of the
McDonnell Douglas
three-part analysis, the Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case for discrimination. In order to establish a prima facie case for her claim, the Plaintiff must establish the following: 1) that she is a member of a protected class; 2) that the prohibited conduct in which she engaged was comparable in seriousness to misconduct of employees outside the protected class; and 3) that the disciplinary measures enforced against her were more severe than those enforced against those other employees.
Cook v. CSX Transportation Corp.,
988 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir.1993). It is undisputed that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class (African-American), and that she was disciplined. However, Defendant denies that the conduct in which Plaintiff engaged was comparable to conduct engaged in by employees outside of the protected class, or that the disciplinary measures enforced against her were more severe than those enforced against those other employees.
In an effort to show a genuine issue of material fact that she was subjected to more severe discipline than similarly situated non-minority employees, Plaintiff first points to the actions taken by her supervisor, Larry Moore [white male], and to the lack of any disciplinary action taken against him as a result of this incident. Specifically, while acknowledging that she made incorrect readings and entered incorrect data, Plaintiff ar
gues in her brief that Moore was also at fault because he “failed to exercise his supervisory responsibility to take care of the matter.” Plaintiff further characterizes Moore’s actions in her brief as an “apparent deliberate failure to intervene,” and notes that she had previously complained to an “employee concerns” hotline on August 3, 1994 about Moore’s unfair treatment of black employees as a reason for Moore having failed to “step[ ] in as he should.”
However, Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence to the Court to support this argument. To the contrary, Plaintiff herself testified that Moore had nothing to do with her incorrect entries, and was not even present when she made them.
Plaintiff’s Deposition,
pp. 85-86. Plaintiff also testified at her deposition that Moore told her he “didn’t know anything about” her incorrect readings, and further testified that Moore was never aware of what discipline she received.
Plaintiffs Deposition,
pp. 74-75;
Plaintiff’s Affidavit dated December 8, 1995,
¶41. While Plaintiff has offered deposition testimony from two (2) co-workers, Grady Mobley and Kenneth Owens, to support her claim that Moore should have been disciplined because of her actions;
see Mobley Deposition,
pp. 50-51;
Owens Deposition,
pp. 79-80; neither of these two (2) individuals offers anything other than mere speculation or surmise as to why Moore should also have been subject to discipline as a result of Plaintiffs actions. Mobley testified on this point as follows:
Question:
You were not present when Larry Moore discovered the incorrect information by Ms. Thomas, were you?
Answer:
I don’t think Larry Moore discovered it, like I say, I think it was the oncoming shift that discovered it.
Question:
But you were not present when Larry Moore was made aware of her incorrect entries?
Answer:
Can’t say that I was, because I don’t know at what point he was made aware.
Question: So
you don’t have any idea what he did or said when he first discovered that, do you?
Answer:
No.
Mobley Deposition,
p. 54.
Owens offered similar testimony at his deposition:
Question:
You weren’t present when Larry Moore discovered she had put down incorrect information, were you?
Answer:
No, I wasn’t there.
Question:
So you don’t have any idea what steps he took prior to alerting other people that mistakes had been made?
Answer:
No.
Owens Deposition,
p. 82.
Further, while Plaintiff attests in an affidavit that Moore should have been required under company policy to take full responsibility for her entries;
Plaintiff’s Affidavit dated December 8, 1995,
¶ 33; she has failed to submit any evidence to show that any “policy” required Moore to be disciplined.
See Hughes v. Bedsole,
48 F.3d 1376, 1384-1385 (4th Cir.1995), ce
rt. denied,
516 U.S. 870, 116 S.Ct. 190, 133 L.Ed.2d 126 (1995).
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to show why Moore would or should have been subject to discipline for her actions. It is undisputed that it was the Plaintiff who made the incorrect readings and entered the incorrect information, not Moore. Plaintiff has provided no evidence to the Court to show that Moore knew about her incorrect entries, or to support her conclusory allegations that Moore deliberately failed to intervene in this situation so as to have her disciplined.
To further refute Plaintiffs claim of a
prima facie
case, the Defendant has offered evidence to show that it gave comparable discipline to both white and black employees when discipline was required.
See generally, Carpenter Affidavit.
Significantly, Plaintiff does not dispute this evidence of comparable disciplinary action being meted out to both white and African-American employees of the Defendant.
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition,
pp. 3, 8. Rather, Plaintiff argues that only the treatment received by employees supervised by Moore should be compared, stating in her brief that “[wjhether or not blacks and whites were treated equally in other areas of the Plant does not satisfy
the question as to why whites were given preferential treatment under Mr. Moore’s shift... .while the Defendant gives parallels of disciplinary action taken against white employees in other sections, this analysis overlooks that Plaintiff is alleging that the discrimination experience stemmed from treatment afforded black Americans in her area under her shift supervisor.”
Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition,
pp. 3-4. However, this argument is without merit because it is clear in the evidence submitted to the Court that Garry Davis (the Farm Facility Manager) and Bill Morrison (the Manager of Operations) were the ones who disciplined the Plaintiff, not Moore. Plaintiff herself testified at her deposition that it was Davis and Morrison who handled the investigation into her actions and the discipline imposed.
Plaintiffs Deposition,
pp. 106-107, 119. In fact, Plaintiff admits that Moore did not even know what discipline she ultimately received.
Plaintiffs Affidavit date December 8, 1995,
¶ 41. Therefore, as Moore was not the individual who disciplined the Plaintiff, there is no basis on which to limit the comparison of other disciplinary action taken by the Defendant just to employees under Moore’s shift, and her concession that other employees in general received similar discipline is therefore fatal to her claim.
As the evidence presented fails to show that the disciplinary measures enforced against the Plaintiff were more severe than those enforced against non-minority employees for comparable conduct, Plaintiff has failed to present a prima facie case.
Cook,
988 F.2d at 511. However, even if the Court credited Plaintiffs evidence and argument that she received more severe disciplinary treatment than two other employees (Wendy Britt and Willie Sitter) under Moore’s shift, and found that a prima facie case had been presented, the question before this Court would then be whether the evidence shows a genuine issue of fact as to whether Plaintiffs race was the reason for the disciplinary action taken against her (i.e. “pretext”). The evidence does not show pretext. Plaintiff herself admits that the Defendant was justified in taking disciplinary action against her, and the evidence as a whole shows (and Plaintiff even concedes) that whites and African-Americans in general received comparable disciplinary treatment from the Defendant. In order to maintain her claim under Title VII, the Plaintiff must present credible evidence that the decision to discipline her, and the disciplinary action taken, was based on her race, not because Davis was simply incorrect or too harsh in his disciplinary actions, or because of other factors.
Jamil v. Secretary Dep’t of Defense,
910 F.2d 1203, 1207-1208 (4th Cir.1990);
Holder v. Raleigh,
867 F.2d 823, 828 (4th Cir.1989);
Crowley v. Prince George’s County,
890 F.2d 683, 687 (4th Cir.1989),
cert. denied,
506 U.S. 833, 113 S.Ct. 101, 121 L.Ed.2d 61 (1992);
McCollum v. Bolger,
794 F.2d 602, 610 (11th Cir.1986),
cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1034, 107 S.Ct. 883, 93 L.Ed.2d 836 (1987);
see generally Moore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
683 F.2d 1321, 1323, n. 4 (11th Cir.1982);
Jones v. Orleans Parish School Board,
679 F.2d 32, 38 (5th Cir.1982),
cert. denied,
461 U.S. 951, 103 S.Ct. 2420, 77 L.Ed.2d 1310 (1983);
North Carolina Dep’t of Correction v. Gibson,
308 N.C. 131, 301 S.E.2d 78, 85 (N.C.1983);
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, supra; McCollum v. Bolger,
794 F.2d 602, 610 (11th Cir.1986),
cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1034, 107 S.Ct. 883, 93 L.Ed.2d 836 (1987);
Holder v. Raleigh,
867 F.2d 823, 828 (4th Cir.1989). Plaintiff bears the burden of producing such evidence.
Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra; St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, supra.
She has failed to do so. Therefore, it is recommended that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs Title VII and § 1981 race discrimination claim be granted.
B) Retaliation Claim. With regard to Plaintiffs retaliation claim, § 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), provides as follows:
It shall be an unlawful practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling-apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof
or applicants for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subehap-ter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subehapter.
Retaliation cases under Title VII and § 1981 are subject to the same requirements of proof as are applicable to disparate tieatment claims.
Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp.,
759 F.2d 355 (4th Cir.1985);
see also Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc.,
871 F.2d at 457;
Gairola,
753 F.2d at 1285;
Abasiekong,
744 F.2d at 1058;
Bodoy v. North Arun-del Hosp.,
945 F.Supp. 890, 894 (D.Md.1996),
aff'd,
112 F.3d 508, 1997 WL 211228 (4th Cir.1997). “The employee is initially required to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by a preponderance of the evidence. Such a prima facie case consists of three elements: (1) the employee engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer took adverse employment action against the employee; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.” '
Id.
Once a prima facie case has been presented, the Defendant employer has the burden of producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. If the employer can produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions, the employee must demonstrate that the Defendant’s proffered reason is pretextural.
Id.
A review of the evidence submitted shows that the Plaintiff has failed to establish a claim of retaliation under Title VII. Specifically, Plaintiffs retaliation claim arises out of her having made an anonymous telephone complaint to the Defendant’s “employee concerns” hotline on August 3, 1994.
Complaint,
¶ 8. In this telephone complaint, Plaintiff alleged that her supervisor, Larry Moore, discriminated against African-American employees. Two other African-American employees, Kenneth Owens and Grady Mobley, made similar complaints at approximately the same time.
Plaintiffs Deposition,
pp. 28-29;
Owens Deposition,
pp. 52-53;
Mobley Deposition,
p. 27.
For purposes of summary judgment, the Defendant does not dispute that Moore knew about these complaints, and, even though anonymous, in all likelihood knew who the complaining parties were. However, while Plaintiff engaged in protected activity (complaining about her work environment, and in particular her supervisor, Larry Moore) and had an adverse employment action taken against her (she was disciplined), she has failed to show any causal connection between her having engaged in protected activity and the disciplinary action taken. It is clear in the evidence that Moore was not the individual who took disciplinary action against the Plaintiff; rather, it was Manager of Operations Bill Morrison and Facility Manager Garry Davis.
Plaintiffs Deposition,
pp. 106-107, 119;
see also Davis Affidavit.
Plaintiff has offered no direct evidence that Morrison and Davis were even aware of the complaint she had made against Moore.
Plaintiffs Deposition,
pp. 130-132. Further, Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence to show that either Morrison or Davis, even if they knew about her complaint concerning Moore, made their decision on Plaintiffs discipline out of any retaliatory animus.
Plaintiff no doubt sincerely believes that the disciplinary action taken against her was retaliation for her having complained about Moore. However, Plaintiffs eonclusory belief does not constitute evidence sufficient to defeat a properly supported summary judgment motion. The mere fact that Plaintiff had made such complaints or engaged in protected conduct does not immunize her from otherwise proper disciplinary action based on misconduct.
Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp.,
759 F.2d 355, 366 (4th Cir.1985) [“Title VII serves the laudable goal of protecting employee access to agencies and courts. It does not shield employees from normal sanctions for misconduct.”];
Bodoy,
945 F.Supp. at 898. Here, there is no dispute that the Plaintiff engaged in the improper conduct alleged, and even Plaintiff herself admits that some disciplinary action
was warranted. Plaintiff has presented no evidence to show any racial animus on the part of either Morrison or Davis, or to show a causal connection between their disciplinary decision and her having previously complained about her supervisor. Plaintiff cannot defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment with unsupported speculation or allegations of discrimination;
Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp.,
759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir.1985);
Felty v. Graves-Humphreys, Co.,
818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.1987); nor may a party opposing summary judgment “create a genuine issue of fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another.”
Beale v. Hardy,
769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir.1985). Plaintiff’s own self-interested statements as to what he believed or perceived are not sufficient evidence.
McNairn v. Sullivan,
929 F.2d 974 (4th Cir.1991);
Smith v. Flax,
618 F.2d at 1067;
Komel v. Jewel Cos.,
874 F.2d 472, 475 (7th Cir.1989);
Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc.,
871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir.1989)(citing
Gairola v. Com. of Virginia Dep’t of General Servs.,
753 F.2d 1281, 1288 (4th Cir.1985));
United Black Firefighters of Norfolk v. Hirst,
604 F.2d 844 (4th Cir.1979).
At summary judgment, the non-moving party has an obligation to present evidence to save his or her allegations from the status of speculation, and must respond with
specific facts
showing a genuine issue for trial. Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P.;
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra; Felty,
818 F.2d at 1129-1130;
Gairola v. Com. of Virginia Dep’t of General Services,
753 F.2d 1281, 1288, n. 4 (4th Cir.1985). Plaintiff has failed to submit sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact that she was retaliated against; therefore, it is recommended that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs retaliation claim be granted.
C) Remaining State Law Claim. In addition to her federal claims under Title VII and § 1981, Plaintiff has also asserted a pendent state law cause of action for breach of contract (third cause of action).
However, if the District Court adopts the reeom-mendations made herein with regard to Plaintiffs federal claims, Plaintiffs pendent state law claim will be the only claim remaining in this lawsuit. When federal claims presented in a case originally filed in federal court are dismissed, any remaining state claim should also be dismissed, without prejudice, for resolution in state court under the general doctrine developed in
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).
See In Re Conklin,
946 F.2d 306, 324 (4th Cir.1991);
Nicol v. Imagematrix, Inc.,
767 F.Supp. 744, 746, 749 (E.D.Va.1991);
Mills v. Leath,
709 F.Supp. 671, 675-676 (D.S.C.1988);
Carnegie-Mellon v. Cohill,
484 U.S. 343, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988);
Taylor v. Waters,
81 F.3d 429, 437 (4th Cir.1996). Dismissal of any remaining state cause of action will not only allow the more appropriate court to rule on this exclusively state issue, but will not prejudice the parties, as all discovery has been completed and the parties may seek a fast track for resolution of this claim at the state level.
See
Rule 40(c), S.C.R.C.P.
Therefore, it is recommended that to the extent Plaintiff has asserted a state law cause of action, such remaining state law cause of action should be dismissed, without prejudice, in order that it maybe more properly pursued in a state forum.
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, supra; Nicol v. Imagematrix, Inc., supra; In Re Conklin, supra; Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, supra; Mills v. Leath, supra.
Conclusion
Summary judgment is appropriate where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment be granted with regard to Plaintiffs Title VII and § 1981 race discrimination and retaliation claims. It is further recommended that Plaintiffs remaining state law cause of action be dismissed,
without prejudice. This will allow Plaintiff to pursue her state law claim in state court, which is the more appropriate forum for determination of this issue.
July 31,1997