Thomas v. Hampton

1978 OK 114, 583 P.2d 506, 1978 Okla. LEXIS 469
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedAugust 30, 1978
Docket52668
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 1978 OK 114 (Thomas v. Hampton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomas v. Hampton, 1978 OK 114, 583 P.2d 506, 1978 Okla. LEXIS 469 (Okla. 1978).

Opinions

BARNES, Justice:

In the spring of 1978, Mr. Howard C. Thomas and Mr. James E. McGuire began preparations to conduct a music festival, the Utopia Mountain Festival, on land belonging to Mr. McGuire, located a few miles outside of Pawhuska, Oklahoma.

The festival, which was to feature entertainers such as David Allan Coe and Black Oak Arkansas, was to start at noon on Sunday, September 3,1978, and conclude at 11:00 p. m., of the same day. In preparation for the festival, the petitioners have had 30 acres of Mr. McGuire’s land fenced in with a 7-foot high chain link fence, have arranged for catering services, have arranged for portable toilet facilities, water facilities, removal of both solid and liquid waste, as well as for staging equipment, lights, and the entertainers. To date, petitioners have spent in excess of $23,000.00 and are committed to spend a great deal more.

On August 4th of this year, William Hall, District Attorney for Osage County, filed an action on behalf of the State seeking to enjoin petitioners from holding the festival. After a hearing on the matter, respondent Trial Judge, the Honorable Don H. Hampton, issued a permanent injunction restraining the petitioners from operating, supervising, maintaining, consenting to, advertising or promoting in any fashion the Utopia Mountain Festival, or similar function, on or about the 3rd day of September, 1978, on or about petitioner McGuire’s land.

As the usual appeal procedure, because of the time limitation involved, would clearly not offer a remedy to the petitioners, they have petitioned this Court asking us to assume original jurisdiction, arguing that the Trial Court, under the facts presented, abused its discretion, by enjoining the production of the music festival in its entirety.

As the injunction was issued on August 11th, and the activity being enjoined is scheduled to take place September 3rd, it is axiomatic that the appeal procedure, the only ordinary remedy at law available to the petitioners, is totally inadequate. For this reason, we assume original jurisdiction to consider the case.

In O’Laughlin v. City of Fort Gibson, 389 P.2d 506 (Okl.1964), which involved a suit to enjoin the proposed construction of a sanitary sewage treatment facility, we stated:

“To enjoin a threatened nuisance, it must appear that the injury would be irreparable in damages, and the evidence must be clear and convincing, not of a possibility or apprehension, but of reasonable probability, that the injury will be done.” [Quoting from Syllabus No. 3.]

Similarly, in Sunray Oil Co. v. Cortez Oil Co., 188 Okl. 690, 112 P.2d 792 (1941), in which this Court set aside an injunction granted by the Trial Court, we stated:

“It is said that the right to the injunction must be established ‘with certainty’; that the evidence must be ‘clear’, ‘clear and convincing’, 'clear and satisfactory’; that the right must be supported by the ‘clearest’ proof, etc. 32 C.J. 350.
[508]*508“Summed up, the various statements as to proof necessary, as shown by the cases cited in the text, are in substance that every material fact essential to authorize the issuance of an injunction must be established to a reasonable certainty, or at least a reasonable probability, by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence, and the injunction should be denied where the evidence is such as to leave in doubt the existence of any fact necessary to authorize the issuance of the injunction.’’ [Emphasis added]

In the case before us, the evidence supporting the total prohibition of the music festival fell far short of being clear and convincing. In fact, most of the evidence presented was highly speculative in nature, and did not warrant the issuance of an injunction, totally preventing petitioners from producing the festival.

In seeking the injunction, the State, speaking through District Attorney Hall, argued that the production of the festival would create health and safety hazards, both at the festival site and in the surrounding community.

Mr. John H. Armstrong, a registered professional sanitarian employed by the State Department of Health, testified that the portable toilets, waste removal facilities, and the catering accommodations were more than adequate to provide for the number of possible ticket holders at the festival. Additionally, at the cost of $22,000.00, petitioners have hired one hundred security guards to aid in crowd control, man the gates, and maintain order.

Likewise, the emergency medical facilities planned, barring a major catastrophe, the occurrence of which is highly unlikely and highly speculative, were said to be adequate. The only person to testify who had experience with outdoor music festivals was Larry Shaffer, who has produced many shows of this type, and has been involved in the production of approximately five hundred outdoor .concerts. He testified that the most serious injury at any show he ever produced was a broken ankle, and that in all the shows he has produced the largest number of spectators that ever needed medical attention was approximately twenty, and that no individual at any concert ever required hospitalization. In light of this testimony, the only testimony which was not purely speculative in nature, the medical facilities to be provided, a mobile first-aid station, manned by a doctor or intern, and three registered nurses, clearly appear adequate.1

The State also complained that the production of the festival would create undue fire hazards in the surrounding vicinity. First, witnesses for the State testified that the parking of automobiles in fields upon petitioner’s land would, because of the heat of catalytic converters, create a hazard of fire, particularly in light of the fact of high grass in those fields. Countering this testimony was testimony of the petitioners, that they intended to first allow cattle to graze on the land involved, then mow and blade, then rake the area, so that the grass would be as low as possible on the day of the festival. Additionally, petitioners indicated that they would have six cattle-spraying trucks filled with water available to help control any fire that should occur. Although complete plans to man all six trucks had not been made at the time of trial, petitioners indicated that if desired such would be done.

Secondly, the State argues that petitioners’ use of water from the lines of the Pawhuska Water District will lower the water pressure in two residential areas, thus making it more difficult to fight a fire, [509]*509and creating the possibility of total loss of water, should consumption at the festival be heavy. Even if an injunction were called for because of this possible danger, certainly less prohibitive measures could have been taken by the Court, which would have both allowed the festival to continue and at the same time lessened the hazards involved. Additionally, we would point out that petitioners testified that they could, if necessary, provide adequate water through the use of water tanks and trucks, and not utilize the drinking facilities already installed and connected to the Pawhuska water lines.

Additionally, the State argued that any campfires in the vicinity might also constitute a fire hazard. Testimony indicated that it could be expected that some spectators might arrive the day prior to the festival and wish to camp in the fields on petitioner’s land adjacent to the fenced-in festival site.

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Thomas v. Hampton
1978 OK 114 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1978)

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Bluebook (online)
1978 OK 114, 583 P.2d 506, 1978 Okla. LEXIS 469, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-v-hampton-okla-1978.