Thomas v. Cornerstone Services, LLC

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 28, 2026
• Docket: 3-24-0568
• Status: Published

Opinion

2026 IL App (3d) 240568

Opinion filed April 28, 2026 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

TIARA THOMAS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Will County, Illinois, ) v. ) Appeal No. 3-24-0568 ) Circuit No. 23-LA-157 ) CORNERSTONE SERVICES, INC., ) Honorable ) Roger D. Rickmon, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BERTANI delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Brennan and Davenport concurred in the judgment and opinion. ____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶1 This interlocutory appeal seeks clarification on the scope of an exemption within the

Biometric Information Privacy Act (Act). 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. (West 2024). The pertinent

statutory provision, referred to by the parties as the “government contractor exemption,” provides

that “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to apply to a contractor, subcontractor, or agent of a

State agency or local unit of government when working for that State agency or local unit of

government.” Id. § 25(e).

¶2 The dispute concerns the exemption’s qualifying phrase “when working for” to which the

parties offer competing interpretations. Defendant, Cornerstone Services, Inc. (Cornerstone), argues the phrase is unambiguous, merely temporal, and exempts a government contractor from

liability under the Act during the time that it performs services pursuant to a government contract.

Under Cornerstone’s interpretation, section 25(e) confers categorical exemption to contractors in

possession of an active government contract no matter how large or small. The exemption applies,

according to Cornerstone’s view, irrespective of whether purported violations occurred outside the

scope of a government contract. Conversely, plaintiff, Tiara Thomas, asserts the phrase is

ambiguous and the exemption only applies when the contracted entity is working as a government

contractor.

¶3 In October 2023, Thomas filed an amended class action complaint against Cornerstone as

her former employer alleging its timekeeping system violated the Act. In denying Cornerstone’s

motion to dismiss the amended complaint, the circuit court adopted Thomas’s position that the

exemption does not apply to a contractor’s violations occurring outside of its government contract

and granted Cornerstone’s subsequent motion to certify two questions for review pursuant to

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019):

“Does the exemption under Section 25(e) of BIPA declaring that BIPA ‘shall not

be construed to apply to a contractor, subcontractor, or agent of a State agency or

local unit of government when working for that State agency or local unit of

government’ apply to exempt from BIPA only those contractors or subcontractors

who work exclusively for state agencies or local units of government,”

and

“If the answer to the foregoing is ‘no,’ what is the meaning of the phrase ‘when

working for the State agency or local unit of government’ as used in Section

25(e)?”

2 ¶4 Based on its plain language, we conclude that the government contractor exemption applies

only to exempt a contractor from liability when acting within the scope of its government contract.

We answer the first certified question in the negative and hold that the Act does not require an

exclusive contractual relationship with a state agency or local unit of government for the

exemption to apply. We answer the second certified question by concluding that the unambiguous

construction of the phrase “when working for” is not merely temporal; rather, it also qualifies the

conduct exempted such that a government contractor is immunized from liability under the Act

only when its violation occurred when acting within the scope of its governmental contractual

relationship.

¶5 I. BACKGROUND

¶6 Cornerstone is a corporation that provides services and support to individuals in Illinois

with intellectual and developmental disabilities. It has a contractual relationship with the State of

Illinois and receives funding from the Department of Human Services (DHS), a state agency.

Thomas was employed at Cornerstone from 2020 to 2022. During her employment, Cornerstone

allegedly tracked Thomas’s time on the job through the use of a biometric time tracking system,

i.e., a finger-scanning time clock.

¶7 Thomas, a putative class representative, filed a class action complaint against Cornerstone

for its alleged violations of the Act in its unauthorized disclosure of employee biometric identifiers.

The amended complaint included the following factual allegations. Cornerstone has used and

stored its employees’ fingerprints for time tracking purposes since around 2008 and had its

employees sign a consent form related to its biometric data collection policy. The form did not

notify Cornerstone employees, nor did Cornerstone otherwise receive employee consent, that their

biometric information would be disclosed to Automatic Data Processing (ADP), a third-party

3 vendor Cornerstone used to process payroll. Cornerstone disclosed Thomas’s and the putative

class’s fingerprint biometric identifiers to ADP in violation of section 15(d) of the Act.

¶8 Cornerstone filed a combined motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code of

Civil Procedure seeking dismissal, in part, on the grounds that Cornerstone’s exempted status as a

government contractor barred Thomas’s claim. 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1, 2-619(a)(9) (West 2024).

Cornerstone pleaded that it received funds from the DHS for providing housing and support

services to qualified applicants with disabilities, including more than $23 million annually during

the years in which Thomas was employed. Cornerstone attached a declaration of its chief executive

officer, Ben Storz, to its motion averring that payments from the DHS constituted 60% to 73% of

its revenue during those years. Accordingly, Cornerstone argued it was exempt from liability under

the Act because it provided services pursuant to a government contract for the duration of

Thomas’s employment.

¶9 Thomas responded to the motion to dismiss by seeking leave to conduct discovery pursuant

to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 191(b) (eff. Jan. 4, 2013) and moved to stay briefing on the motion.

She argued the applicability of the exemption depended upon whether Cornerstone collected and

handled employee biometrics while providing services pursuant to its government contract and

that publicly available information made it reasonable to infer that Cornerstone was not a state

contractor at all relevant times. In opposing the motion to stay, Cornerstone argued discovery was

unnecessary to respond to its claim of exemption and confirmed it provides services and receives

revenue outside of its state contracts. Thomas filed a motion to reconsider the court’s February 13,

2024, denial of her motion for discovery and to stay.

¶ 10 On April 24, 2024, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the parties’ outstanding motions

and denied Cornerstone’s motion to dismiss. It questioned whether the exemption applies for work

4 done outside of the government contractor role, stating: “[y]ou can have two separate roles I

suppose you’d say. [Thomas’s] whole argument is some of your work clearly is for the state” and

“[s]ome of it might not be, so now you have a mixed situation.” The court contemporaneously

denied Thomas’s motion to reconsider the denial of her Rule 191(b) motion, ordered Cornerstone

to answer the complaint, and directed the parties to proceed with discovery.

¶ 11 Thereafter, the court granted Cornerstone’s motion to certify the above stated questions for

interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 308(a). Ill. S. Ct. R. 308(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2019). On November

19, 2024, this court entered an order denying Cornerstone’s application for leave to appeal under

that rule. However, our supreme court issued a supervisory order on March 26, 2025, directing

that we vacate our order, allow the application, and answer the certified questions.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 The circuit court granted Cornerstone’s motion to certify questions pursuant to Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019). Certified questions present questions of law subject

to de novo review. Rozsavolgyi v. City of Aurora, 2017 IL 121048, ¶ 21. The scope of review under

a Rule 308 appeal is limited to answering the certified questions (Spears v. Association of Illinois

Electric Cooperatives, 2013 IL App (4th) 120289, ¶ 15) and does not reach the propriety of the

underlying claims (Coldwater v. Village of Elwood, 2020 IL App (3d) 190247, ¶ 13). A certified

question that requires an answer that is advisory, provisional, or depends upon the underlying facts

of a case is improper. Rozsavolgyi, 2017 IL 121048, ¶ 21.

¶ 14 To answer the certified questions before us, we must interpret the language of the Act by

engaging in statutory construction. Statutory construction presents a question of law also subject

to de novo review. Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014

IL 116023, ¶ 16. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the

5 legislature’s intent. Mosby v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 2023 IL 129081, ¶ 30. A statute’s

language is the best indicator of legislative intent, “ ‘and we give that language its plain and

ordinary meaning.’ ” Id. (quoting In re E.B., 231 Ill. 2d 459, 466 (2008)). “ ‘We construe the

statute as a whole and cannot view words or phrases in isolation but, rather, must consider them in

light of other relevant provisions of the statute.’ ” Id. (quoting E.B., 231 Ill. 2d at 466).

¶ 15 If the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied as written without

resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction. Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 44 (2009). If the

statute’s language is ambiguous, it is construed “to avoid rendering any part meaningless or

superfluous.” Id. Beyond the statute’s language, in efforts to determine legislative intent, courts

may consider “ ‘the reason and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the

purpose to be achieved.’ ” Lavery v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2025 IL

130033, ¶ 22 (quoting In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 308 (2002)).

¶ 16 In 2008, the General Assembly enacted the Act seeking to protect a “weary” public’s

“welfare, security, and safety” from the precipitously growing field of biometrics by regulating

“the collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage, retention, and destruction of biometric

identifiers and information.” 740 ILCS 14/5(g) (West 2024). The definition of “[b]iometric

identifiers” includes fingerprints and hand scans. Id. § 10. Corporations such as Cornerstone are

among the defined “private entit[ies]” at risk of being held legally responsible for violating the

Act. Id. §§ 10, 15. Absent consent or other exceptions not germane to our inquiry, the Act

proscribes private entities in possession of biometric identifiers from disclosing a person’s

biometric identifiers. Id. § 15(d).

¶ 17 Section 25 delineates certain circumstances excepted from the Act’s ambit. See id. § 25. In

its entirety, the exemption at issue here reads that “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to apply

6 to a contractor, subcontractor, or agent of a State agency or local unit of government when working

for that State agency or local unit of government.” Id. § 25(e). Both certified questions depend on

the construction of this provision, and more narrowly, turn on an interpretation of the clause that

concludes the provision—“when working for that State agency or local unit of government.” Id.

This clause functions as an adverbial element of the preceding clause. Paul R. Kroeger, Analyzing

Grammar An Introduction 219 (2005). Typically, as is the case here, adverbs that supply “clause

information such as *** time often occur after the first auxiliary” verb. Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s

Modern English Usage 31 (5th ed. 2022). In this instance, the adverbial phrase modifies when the

Act shall not apply, i.e., when a government contractor will be exempt. We must determine the

meaning behind the adverbial phrase “when working for” in order to define the scope of the

exemption.

¶ 18 Enriquez v. Navy Pier, Inc., 2022 IL App (1st) 211414-U, ¶¶ 5-6, 19, an unpublished Rule

23 order, is the only state appellate decision to date to interpret the Act’s government contractor

exemption. The crux of plaintiff’s putative class action in Enriquez and that before us are the same.

Both alleged their private-entity employers violated the Act through the wrongful dissemination

of their fingerprints related to the use of a biometric time clock. Id. ¶¶ 2, 12. The employer in

Enriquez, Navy Pier, Inc. (NPI), also sought dismissal pursuant to the Act’s government contractor

exemption. Id. ¶ 14.

¶ 19 The Enriquez court explained the government contractor exemption applies when a private

entity is “(1) a contractor (2) of a unit of government and (3) was working for that unit of

government at the time it collected or disseminated biometric information” and had little difficulty

holding NPI was exempted from the purview of the Act under those parameters. Id. ¶¶ 19, 25.

NPI’s sole purpose was to develop, operate, and maintain Navy Pier in place of a local government

7 unit that relinquished its authority over these responsibilities to NPI. See id. ¶¶ 8, 10. NPI and the

local government unit entered into a lease for a nominal fee in exchange for the exclusive authority

to operate and manage the pier. Id. ¶ 10. Because the local government unit was statutorily required

to undertake these functions, the First District ruled that NPI held the designation of a government

contractor by performing these “core governmental services” pursuant to its contract. Id. ¶ 22. It

similarly held that NPI was “working” for the local government unit, which merely meant it was

“in some type of employment or services relationship” with the unit. (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id. ¶ 23. Furthermore, while not raised by the plaintiff, NPI’s actions forming the basis

of the class action complaint “were within the scope of its work” for the local government unit,

and it therefore was exempted from the Act’s purview. Id. ¶ 25.

¶ 20 Beyond the factual similarities, however, Enriquez’s guidance on this appeal’s certified

questions is limited. NPI operated “exclusively” for the purpose of fulfilling governmental

functions for Navy Pier in place of the local government unit ((internal quotation marks omitted)

see id. ¶ 8), whereas Cornerstone offers privatized services outside of its work for DHS.

¶ 21 A. Certified Question No. 1

¶ 22 The first certified question asks whether the Act’s government contractor exemption

applies only to contractors that work exclusively for state agencies or local units of government.

Inversely, the question asks whether there are circumstances wherein a contractor that engages in

private undertakings and government contracts may invoke the exemption.

¶ 23 While government contracts “must of necessity be different in nature from private

undertakings” (Hunt v. Blasius, 55 Ill. App. 3d 14, 20 (1977)), nothing in the plain language of the

Act rescinds a government contractor’s ability to assert the exemption by virtue of engaging in

separate private undertakings. Had the legislature intended to limit the exemption to apply only to

8 contractors in an exclusive relationship with the government, it would have included language to

that effect. Goldberg v. Astor Plaza Condominium Ass’n, 2012 IL App (1st) 110620, ¶ 42 (“[I]f

the legislature had intended to include words in the statute, it would have done so.”). We refuse to

depart from the statute’s plain language by reading into the exemption a limitation that the

legislature did not express. Mosby, 2023 IL 129081, ¶ 31. The language exempting a contractor’s

purported violation of the Act “when working for” the “State agency or local unit of government”

hinges on the time and nature of the contractor’s work, not the extent of its contractual relationship

with the government. 740 ILCS 14/25(e) (West 2024). We therefore answer the first certified

question in the negative, holding that a contractor need not have an exclusive contractual

relationship with a state agency or local government for the Act’s government contractor

exemption to apply.

¶ 24 B. Certified Question No. 2

¶ 25 Having answered the first certified question in the negative, we turn to the second certified

question, which seeks the determination of when the Act’s government contractor exemption

applies through the construction of the phrase “when working for.” Id.

¶ 26 Cornerstone’s interpretation concentrates on the word “when,” arguing its ordinary

meaning is “at what time” or “at or during which time.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/when (last visited Apr. 24, 2026)

[https://perma.cc/BC29-DZEM]. According to Cornerstone, a government contractor is exempt so

long as it is working under a government contract at the same time as a potential claim arises.

Thomas interprets the word “when” as a subordinate conjunction explaining under what

circumstance the exemption shall apply. Read as part of a conjunctive phrase, she argues the word

“when” can encompass multiple meanings: one similar to Cornerstone’s construction (“at or

9 during the time that”) and others indicating the word denotes an understanding beyond a mere

timeframe (“just at the moment that” and “in the event that”). Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/when (last visited Apr. 24, 2026)

[https://perma.cc/BC29-DZEM]. She argues that in light of these multiple meanings, the

exemption is ambiguous.

¶ 27 The Act’s government contractor exemption is clear and unambiguous. The parties’

erroneous readings stem from assigning too much import on one word in the exemption which, as

a result, divorces the word “when” from the remainder of the exemption’s adverbial phrase. In

construing a statute, we cannot view words in isolation. Mosby, 2023 IL 129081, ¶ 30. The

definition of “working (for)” means “as in serving” and “to be a servant for.” (Emphasis in

original.) Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/thesaurus/working%20%28for%29 (last visited Apr. 24, 2026)

[https://perma.cc/C9BP-B87B]. Read in its entirety, the adverbial phrase is more than just a

temporal question, as Cornerstone suggests, in that it exempts a government contractor at which

time it is serving the state agency or local unit of government. As such, a government contractor

is exempt under the Act when operating within the scope of its governmental contractual

relationship. A government contractor is not exempt when it violates the Act while pursuing

private undertakings outside of its government contractual responsibilities.

¶ 28 Had the legislature intended to afford government contractors categorical exemption

during the time in which they possess a government contract, the exemption’s qualifying clause—

“when working for that State agency or local unit of government”—would be rendered

meaningless. 740 ILCS 14/25(e) (West 2024). The inclusion of that phrase conveyed the

legislature’s intent that there must be a nexus between the violation of the Act and the scope of the

10 defendant’s work with the government for the exemption to attach. Payton v. Union Pacific R.R.

Co., No. 24 C 153, 2025 WL 2462963, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2025), motion to certify appeal

granted, No. 24 C 153, 2025 WL 3012662 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2025). We answer the second certified

question by concluding that the phrase “when working for the State agency or local unit of

government” exempts a government contractor’s actions only when it possesses a government

contract and its alleged violation was within the scope of its government contractual work.

¶ 29 We note that this holding is congruent with the Enriquez decision. 2022 IL App (1st)

211414-U, ¶ 25. There, NPI was created to subsume the role of the local unit of government it

contracted with. See id. ¶ 8. Therefore, there was no question as to whether its alleged violations

occurred when working for that governmental unit. Id. ¶¶ 19, 23. Nonetheless, the First District

clarified the actions complained of arose out of NPI’s contractual relationship with the local unit

of government to operate and manage Navy Pier. Id. ¶ 25.

¶ 30 We briefly address Cornerstone’s argument concerning the practical adverse effect of

answering the second certified question in this fashion. Cornerstone forewarns that the reading that

we have adopted creates an “unworkable scheme” where some operations by government

contractors are exempt and others are not. Under such arrangement, Cornerstone states government

contractors need to separate portions of their workforce to ensure compliance with the Act. Such

concerns are beyond our purview where the language of the Act is plain and unambiguous.

Parenthetically, we observe that the Act provides various alternatives for private entities to comply

with the dissemination of biometric identifiers and information, e.g., receiving the necessary

consent. See 740 ILCS 14/15 (West 2024).

¶ 31 The purpose behind enacting the Act and the ramifications of the parties’ interpretations

may be considered. See Lavery, 2025 IL 130033, ¶ 22. It is presumed that by enacting the Act, the

11 legislature “did not intend absurdity, inconvenience or injustice.” DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d

49, 60 (2006). Cornerstone’s interpretation would afford a categorical exemption by mere

possession of any government contract regardless of the contract’s scope and would insulate a

private entity from responsibility under the Act for all of its activities, even those not connected

with the contract. That interpretation would invalidate the intended purpose of the Act, which seeks

to protect the public from private entities that compromise biometric data. See 740 ILCS 14/5, 15

(West 2024).

¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 33 For the foregoing reasons, we answer the first certified question in the negative and hold a

contractor need not have an exclusive contractual relationship with a state agency or local

government for the Act’s government contractor exemption to apply. We answer the second

certified question and determine that the plain language of the exemption and its qualifying phrase

“when working for” exempts a government contractor from liability under the Act only if its

violation occurred when acting within the scope of its governmental contractual relationship.

¶ 34 Certified questions answered.

¶ 35 Cause remanded.

12 Thomas v. Cornerstone Services, Inc., 2026 IL App (3d) 240568

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 23-LA-157; the Hon. Roger D. Rickmon, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys Kristine R. Argentine, Paul Yovanic Jr., and Claire C. for Kossmann, of Seyfarth Shaw LLP, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys Pasha Vaziri, of Vaziri Law LLC, of Chicago, for appellee. for Appellee: