Thomas Long v. Sears Roebuck & Company Sears Merchandise Group. Thomas G. Long

105 F.3d 1529

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: March 11, 1997
• Docket: 96-1264
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION OF THE COURT

MANSMANN, Circuit Judge.

Thomas Long, a former Sears employee, appeals an order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Sears in an action filed by Long based in part on the Age Discrimination in ' Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., as amended by Title II of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990 (“OWBPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). The main issue, one of first impression for us, concerns the effect of a release, drafted by Sears and executed by Long, by which Long purported to waive all claims, including those based on age discrimination, associated with his termination. The district court rejected Long’s argument that the release was invalid because it failed to meet specific and detailed requirements of the OWBPA. The court declined to consider alleged deficiencies in the release, concluding that the document, even if flawed, was ratified when Long accepted and retained severance benefits paid to him following execution of the release. Reasoning that the ratified release operated to preclude all claims associated with Long’s termination, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Sears.

Because we are convinced that the ratification doctrine should not apply to a waiver of age discrimination claims which is invalid under the OWBPA and that Long should not be required to tender back severance benefits before proceeding with his age discrimination claims, we find that the grant of summary judgment with respect to these claims was inappropriate. We will, therefore, reverse in part the order of the district court relating to the ADEA claim. We will remand the non-ADEA claims for further consideration.

I.

The relevant facts, which relate primarily to Long’s employment history with Sears, are undisputed. Long, who was born in 1936, had a thirty year history with Sears where, beginning in 1964, he worked in a variety of sales capacities. From the early 1980s Long was employed in Sears’ Home Improvement Products and Services Division (HIPS). As a HIPS employee, Long, at different times, sold heating and air conditioning, siding, windows, and doors, although his primary responsibility was to sell roofing. By all accounts, Long’s job performance was excellent and his earnings, based on straight commission, were in the neighborhood of $100,000 per year;

In 1992, Sears analyzed the HIPS division’s economic performance and concluded that reorganization was warranted. In January 1993 Sears announced that its HIPS division, with the exception of one unit, would close nation-wide. HIPS employees were told that Sears would discontinue its home improvement services permanently and that it would lay off employees not transferred to other Sears positions by mid-April. Employees allegedly were promised that every effort would be made to place them elsewhere in the Sears organization ’ and were told that placement preference would be given to long-term HIPS employees with satisfactory performance.

In February 1993 Sears offered Long and certain other employees a reorganization package which included severance benefits. In exchange for the package, eligible employees were asked to sign a “General Release and Waiver” which read as follows:

GENERAL RELEASE AND WAIVER I

In consideration of the benefits I will receive under the Sears Closed UniV Reorganization Severance Allowance Plan . as described in the attached Benefit Notification form, I, _ hereby release, waive, and forever discharge officers, successors, and assigns from any and all actions, causes of action (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ACTIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT, STATE CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITY ACT), damages or claims of damage of every character whatsoever by reason of my employment with Sears, whether known or hereafter discovered, including, but not limited to, my termination from Sears.

I have read this General Release and Waiver and understand all of its terms. I have signed it voluntarily with full knowledge of its legal significance. I have been given the opportunity to consult with an attorney but have chosen not to do so.

Date:-

/al-

Written in capital letters across the top of the release was the following: “DO NOT SIGN THIS UNTIL YOU HAVE READ THE ATTACHED NOTICE.” '

The notice attached bore a heading which read: “IMPORTANT NOTICE: THIS NOTICE IS BEING PROVIDED TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE OLDER WORKERS BENEFIT PROTECTION ACT.” The notice itself provided that: 1) an employee would have up to forty-five days from receipt of the severance package to decide whether to sign the release; 2) the release was revocable for up to seven days following its execution and no severance payments would be made until this seven day period had passed; 3) a list was attached showing the birth dates and job titles of those to whom the package had been offered; and 4) if applicable, a list was attached which included a list of employees deemed ineligible to receive the package. The notice also contained a provision suggesting that the employee consult an attorney prior to signing the release and clarified that rights which might arise in the future would not be waived by signing the release. Although he now alleges that he did not understand the terms or significance of the release, Long signed the document on March-18, 1993. He contends that he was pressured by his supervisor to sign and did so, in part, based upon his confidence that he would eventually be placed elsewhere in the Sears organization. Although he actively sought a transfer, Long was not offered another position; his last day of work was April 9,1993.¹

On March 8, 1994, after having signed the release and receiving more than $39,000 in severance benefit payments,² Long filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission alleging violations of the Age in Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.C. § 621-634, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act of 1955 (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 951-863. Long claimed that he was discriminated against based on his age because, following his layoff, Sears “retrained younger employees with less seniority” to work in other departments and, contrary to its representation, Sears “continued its Home Improvement Operations.”

On January 10, 1995, Long filed a complaint in the district court claiming age discrimination under the ADEA and the PHRA. He also alleged that Sears violated Section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1140, by terminating his employment to avoid further accrual and payment of pension benefits, and asserted state common law claims.³

In response to Long’s complaint, Sears filed an answer raising, among others, the following affirmative defense: “Plaintiff has waived and released all claims against [Sears]” and “Plaintiff ratified his waiver and released all claims against [Sears] by his acceptance of and failure to return Ms severance payment.”

Thereafter, Sears filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that Long’s claims were barred by the release. Specifically, Sears argued that the release satisfied the requirements of the OWBPA and that, in any event, Long had ratified the release, making it enforceable despite any statutory deficiencies. Long opposed this motion with facts alleged to demonstrate discrimination and filed a crossmiotion for summary judgment contending that the release was invalid for failure to comply with the requirements of the OWBPA⁴ and was void and unenforceable because it had been obtained by fraud. Long agreed to credit severance pay received against any damages awarded.

On March 1, 1996, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Sears on all claims without addressing Sears’ compliance with the OWBPA. While the court recognized that “[wjhether the Sears release meets the facial requirements of the OWBPA is a question of fact not resolvable here by summary judgment,” it concluded that summary judgment was, nonetheless, appropriate. In reaching tMs conclusion the district court relied on authority holding that releases wMch fail to conform to the OWBPA are merely voidable and, under traditional principles of contract law, may be ratified by retention of benefits received. Citing the decision in Wamsley v. Champlin Refining and Chemicals, Inc., 11 F.3d 534 (5th Cir.1993), the district court concluded that the ratification doctrine had survived the enactment of the OWBPA and operated to bar Long’s claims:

Beeause Long retained, and did not offer to return more than $39,000 paid in consideration of a Release that he suspected was defective, we hold that he ratified that Release and is precluded from pressing claims arising from Ms termination by Sears. ■

1996 WL 94537 at *8 (E.D.Pa. March 1, 1996).⁵ This appeal followed.

II.

Our review of the district court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary. “[BJecause the facts are undisputed, we decide [tMs] appeal as a matter of law.” DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham, 48 F.3d 719 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 306, 133 L.Ed.2d 210 (1995). The legal questions before us are straightforward: (1) Are releases of ADEA claims which fail to conform to the requirements of the OWBPA enforceable or can they be rendered enforceable, or ratified, by an employee’s acceptance and retention of severance benefits? (2) Where ratification does not apply, does retention of severance benefits operate nonetheless to prevent an employee from pursuing a claim under the ADEA?⁶ (3) Where a release of ADEA claims is invalid under the OWBPA and does not, therefore, release the employer from liability for the ADEA claims, is the release nonetheless effective in insulating the employer with respect to non-ADEA claims covered by the release?

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Sears, predicting that we would hold that Long, by retaining severance benefits, ratified the allegedly defective release and, as a result, is precluded from pursuing a claim under the ADEA. This prediction was based, in part, on the decision in Ponzoni v. Kraft General Foods, 774 F.Supp. 299 (D.N.J.1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d 14 (3d Cir.1992). In Ponzoni, a pre-OWBPA case, we affirmed without opinion the district court’s determination that a release of AJDEA claims which was not knowing and voluntary could be enforced, nonetheless, because it had been ratified through retention of benefits. As we will explain, we conclude that the enactment of the OWBPA changed the legal landscape with respect to the release of ADEA claims. In light of the law as it now stands, we conclude that the ratification doctrine does' not apply to ADEA releases which fail to comply with the OWBPA.⁷ As a result, the district court erred in granting Sears’ motion for summary judgment. This error is rooted in the fact that the law with respect to employee releases which fail to comply with the OWBPA is unsettled.

In order to place the issues raised here in context we turn to the language and legislative history of the OWBPA.

III.

The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act became effective on October 16, 1990, as an amendment to the ADEA. Its purpose was two-fold: to “make[] clear that discrimination on the basis of age in virtually all forms of employee benefits is unlawful,” and to “ensure[ ] that older workers are not coerced or manipulated into waiving their rights to seek legal relief under the ADEA.” S.Rep. No. 263,101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990). Congress’ concern over employee waiver of rights under the ADEA was summarized as follows:

[E]arly retirees or employees offered the chance to participate in exit incentive or other group termination programs can effectively be forced to waive their right to file a claim when the employer conditions such participation on the signing of a waiver. The problem is particularly acute in large-scale terminations and lay-offs, where an individual employee would not reasonably be expected to know or suspect that age may have played a role in the employer’s decision, or that the program may be designed to remove older workers from the labor force. The preemptive waiver of rights occurs before a dispute has arisen and indeed before an employee is even aware of any potential or actual pattern of discrimination. Such a preemptive waiver may also preclude the employee from asserting claims that arise out of subsequent discriminatory conduct by the employer, e.g. hiring younger workers to replace the terminated older workers. These waivers are both unfair and inconsistent with the intent of the ADEA.

S.Rep. No. 79, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1989).⁸ The Report emphasized the need for protective legislation, noting that:

Age discrimination victims typically earn more than the minimum wage, but their average annual income is only $15,000. Moreover, once out of work, these older Americans have less than a 50/50 chance of ever finding new employment. The[y] often have little or no savings, and may not yet be eligible for Social Security. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that many employees would be coerced by circumstances into accepting significant compromises. This is especially true where employees are unable even to recognize the potential of their claims because no dispute exists between them and their employer.

Id. In an effort to protect older workers, Title II of the OWBPA defined those circumstances in which ADEA waivers would be permitted.

Prior to the OWBPA, the general approach of the courts was to find waivers permissible subject to a requirement that they be made “knowingly” and “willfully.” “Under the [OWBPA,] waivers must [still] be made knowingly and voluntarily. However, they cannot be deemed to be so unless several statutory minima are met.” Pellieciotti, Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990: Congress Responds to Betts Decision, 35 Res Gestae 114, 115 (1991). These minimum requirements are set forth at 29 U.S.C. § 626(f):

(1) An individual may not waive any right or claim under this chapter unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary.... [A]waiver may not be considered knowing and voluntary unless at a minimum—

(A) the waiver is part of an agreement between the individual and the employer that is written in a manner calculated to be understood by such individual ...;

(B) the waiver specifically refers to rights or claims arising under this chapter;

(C) the individual does not waive rights or claims that arise after the date the waiver is executed;

(D) the individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for consideration in addition to anything of value to which the individual already is entitled;

(E) the individual is advised in writing to consult with an attorney prior to executing the agreement;

(F) ... (ii) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or other employment termination program offered to a group or class of employees, the individual is given ... at least 45 days within which to consider the agreement;

(G) the agreement provides that for a period of at least 7 days following the execution of such agreement, the individual may revoke the agreement;

(H) if a waiver is requested in connection with an ... employment termination program ... the employer ... notifies the individual in writing in a manner calculated to be understood ... as to— -

(i) any class, unit or group of individuals covered by such program, any eligibility factors for such program, and any time limits applicable ...; and

(ii) the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or selected for the program, and the ages of all individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit who are not eligible or selected....

The statute also specifies that the party asserting the validity of the waiver bears the burden of showing that the waiver was indeed knowing and voluntary. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(4).

While Congress carefully defined what must be included in a knowing and voluntary waiver under the ADEA, it did not characterize the legal effect of a release which fails to satisfy the statutory requirements. Courts asked to determine whether deficient waivers should be enforced have purported to rely on “clear” congressional intent. They have reached different conclusions, however, with respect to whether Congress intended that waivers deficient under the OWBPA be declared void or merely voidable.

IV.

The view that deficient releases are void was adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Oberg v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 11 F.3d 679 (7th Cir.1993).⁹ The court in Oberg held that releases which fail to conform to the OWBPA have no legal significance; they cannot be ratified or enforced.¹⁰ Relying on OWBPA language that “[a]n individual may not waive any right or claim ... unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary,” the court concluded that, “unless a waiver contract takes the form required by the statute, an employer and an employee eannot contract to waive the ADEA provisions.... No matter how many times parties may try to ratify such a contract, the language of the OWBPA ... forbids any waiver.” Id. at 682. In light of the OWBPA’s unambiguous statutory prohibition against waiver where one or more of the statutory requirements are absent, the court concluded that further analysis was unwarranted:

When the plain text of a statute is clear then “courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says. When the words of a statute are unambiguous then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’” Connecticut Nat. Bank. v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 1149, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992).

Id. at 682 (citations omitted).

Having pronounced non-conforming releases void, the court next considered whether an employee is required to tender back severance benefits in order to maintain suit under the ADEA.¹¹ The court concluded that employees “were not required to tender back their severance benefits before filing ADEA claims, notwithstanding [the] previously executed waiver of all claims_” Id. at 684.

The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have rejected the Oberg approach, holding instead that defective waivers are merely voidable and are, therefore, subject to ratification by an employee’s retention of severance benefits.¹² See Wamsley v. Champlin Refining and Chemicals, Inc., 11 F.3d 534 (5th Cir.1993); and Blistein v. St. John’s College, 74 F.3d 1459 (4th Cir.1996). In Wamsley the court wrote:

We do not interpret the language of section 626(f)(1) [of the OWBPA] to mean that a waiver which fails to meet the requirements of subsections (A) through (H) is void of legal effect. Rather, we interpret it to mean that such waivers are not knowing and voluntary and thus are subject to being avoided at the election of the employee. ...

Therefore, we hold that neither the language nor the purpose of the OWBPA indicates a congressional desire to deprive an employee of the ability to ratify a waiver that fails to meet the requirements of the OWBPA. When [the employees] chose to retain and not tender back to [the employer] the benefits paid them in consideration for their promise not to sue ..., they manifested their intention to be bound by the waivers and thus, made a new promise to abide by their terms.

Id. at 539-40. In part, the court’s conclusions were drawn from the legislative history of the OWBPA: .

The legislative history indicates that the fundamental purpose of the OWBPA waiver provisions is to ensure that an older worker who is asked to sign an ADEA waiver does so in the absence of fraud, duress, coercion, or mistake of material facts. S.Rep. No. 101-263,101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)_ The circumstances against which. these provisions were designed to protect are the same circumstances that have traditionally given rise to grounds upon which a party can avoid contractual obligations. That the Committee enumerated several of the traditional grounds of avoidance is significant. Also significant is the absence of any language in the statute and any statement in the legislative history indicating that a waiver executed in contravention of the OWBPA requirements is void ... and cannot be ratified_

Id. The court also cited section 626(f)(1)(G) of the Act which provides that an employee may revoke a waiver for any reason within seven days of its execution' and that the agreement is not enforceable during that seven-day period. “If non-compliance with the other subparts of section 626(f)(1) rendered the agreement void, thére would be no need for subpart (G).” Id. at 539. According to the court, declaring defective waivers void:

would be inconsistent with one of the expressed purposes of the ADEA: “to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 621(b). The simplest and easiest way to further this purpose is to give effect to private agreements which resolve age-related employment problems without the inevitable delays and costs associated with litigation.

Id

Finally, the court held that “justice and equity require the employee who seeks to avoid the obligations to which he agreed under the settlement agreement to return the consideration which he received for his promise not to sue.” Id at 542.

While the district court in the case before us adopted, the reasoning underlying the decision in Wamsley, on balance we find the Oberg approach to tender back to be more consistent with the purposes underlying the OWBPA.

V.

While we, like the court in Oberg, reject the argument that Long is precluded from maintaining an ADEA claim because he retained severance benefits, we reach this end via a different route. In both Oberg and Wamsley the courts focused first upon whether a defective release should be characterized as void or voidable. It was only after this question was resolved that the courts considered the import of the plaintiffs failure to return severance benefits. In Wamsley, the court concluded that the allegedly defective release was voidable. The plaintiffs retention of benefits served to ratify the defective release and, therefore, suit was barred. The court in Oberg reasoned that defective releases were void and that ratification could not apply. The court found it necessary, however, to address the issue of retention of severance benefits in that tender back of benefits has been viewed by some courts as a prerequisite to suit. The court in Oberg relied on Supreme Court precedent and other policy arguments to hold that tender back should not be a prerequisite to an ADEA suit where the release at issue is defective under the OWBPA.

Although the analysis in Oberg and Wams-ley might suggest otherwise, resolution of the void/voidable issue does not control our disposition of this appeal. No matter how we characterize a release which fails to comply with the OWBPA — void or voidable — we must, under either theory, decide whether Long’s retention of severance benefits should prevent him from pursuing his ADEA claim. Because we conclude that neither ratification nor tender back was meant to apply in the ADEA context, we need not address the void/voidable distinction.¹³

The court in Oberg declared that releases which fail to conform to the OWBPA are void and, consequently, found it unnecessary to consider the ratification doctrine. Our analysis, however, requires that we consider its application. The language of the OWBPA and its legislative history convince us Congress did not intend that the ratification doctrine be invoked to enforce the terms of a deficient release.

Prior to the OWBPA, it was generally recognized that employees could waive federal ADEA rights in private settlements with their employees so long as the employees’ consent to the settlement was knowing and voluntary. Even during this pre-OWBPA period, however, there was disagreement over the standard to be applied in assessing whether a waiver was, in fact, knowing and voluntary. The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits'held that ordinary state contract law principles ■ controlled.¹⁴

We, however, elected to apply a more stringent federal “totality of the circumstances test,” reasoning that “in recognition of the important interests involved ... careful evaluation of the release form itself as well as the complete circumstances in which it was executed [is] warranted.” Cirillo v. Arco Chemical Co., 862 F.2d 448, 450 (3d Cir.1988).¹⁵ Factors relevant in assessing the totality of the circumstances included, but were not limited to, the following:

(1) the clarity and specificity of the release language; (2) the plaintiffs education and business experience; (3) the amount of time plaintiff had for deliberation about the release before signing it; (4) whether plaintiff knew or should have known his rights upon execution of the release; (5) whether plaintiff was encouraged to seek, or in fact received benefit of counsel; (6) whether there was an opportunity for negotiation of the terms of the Agreement; and (7) whether the consideration given in exchange for the waiver and accepted by the employee exceeded] the benefits to which the employee was already entitled by contract or law.

Id. at 451.

In enacting the OWBPA, Congress resolved this dispute regarding the standard to be applied in determining whether a release is “knowing and voluntary.” Congress rejected the applicability of common law contract principles and declined to embrace even the more demanding “totality of the circumstances” test:

Even the decisions that have followed the more protective “totality of the circumstances” approach ... have not held that certain protective factors must be present. ... The [OWBPA], by contrast, will limit unsupervised waivers to certain situations and then spell out clear and ascertainable standards to govern those situations.

S.Rep. No. 79, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1989) (emphasis added).

The requirements established in order for releases to be “knowing and voluntary” under the OWBPA clearly exceed the protections available under the common law. The right to seek counsel, the 45-day consideration period, the seven-day right of revocation, and the provision of detailed information about those affected by group terminations are all protections which were unavailable under the “knowing and voluntary” standard of the common law: In addition, the OWBPA establishes that waivers must be in writing, must specifically refer to rights under the ADEA, and are subject “to an average person” standard; whether a particular plaintiff understood the implications of the release is irrelevant. The OWBPA also effected a shift in the burden of proof applicable in judicial proceedings. Where, under the common law, the employee challenging a waiver was required to show that the waiver was not “knowing and voluntary,” the OWBPA shifts this burden to the employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(3). These requirements, too, overrode pre-OWBPA decisions applying common law principles.¹⁶ Most importantly, Congress, after grappling with the question of whether to permit ADEA waivers at all, stated unequivocally that unless the enumerated requirements are met, an individual “may not waive” ADEA rights. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (emphasis added).

We are convinced that in enacting the OWBPA, Congress intended to occupy the area of ADEA releases and, in doing so, to supplant the common law; the OWBPA was enacted to “establish[ ] a floor, not a ceiling.” Soliman v. Digital Equipment, 869 F.Supp. 65, 68 n. 12 (D.Mass.1994). Enforceability of a waiver is made contingent upon the presence of certain enumerated factors.

Given the clear and specific goals of the OWBPA, we cannot accept that Congress intended that the common law doctrine of ratification be applied to releases invalid under the OWBPA.¹⁷ The common law fiction of a “new promise” forged from retention of benefits has no place in this statutory scheme.¹⁸ To conclude otherwise would be to say that Congress only intended that the OWBPA requirements apply to the “first” waiver. Such a result is inconsistent with the aims of the Act and works a hardship on employees who could not have known that by retaining severance pay they were, in effect, declining the protection of the OWBPA. This conclusion applies as well to the common law concept of tender back of benefits as a pre-requisite to suit under the ADEA.¹⁹

Although our rejection of the ratification and tender back theories could rest alone on the language and legislative history of the OWBPA, we find additional support for our position in Supreme Court precedent and the caselaw interpreting that precedent.

VI.

In the leading case rejecting a tender back requirement under the ADEA, Oberg, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the employer’s argument that “Plaintiffs must tender back the consideration received for executing ... Severance Agreements” in order to maintain a claim under the ADEA. 11 F.3d 679, 683. Recognizing that the requirement might initially seem “appealing under common law notions of fairness,” the court nonetheless held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Hogue v. Southern R. Co., 390 U.S. 516, 88 S.Ct. 1150, 20 L.Ed.2d 73 (1968), compelled a different result. M²⁰

In Hogue, a brief per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court considered the tender back requirement in a case arising under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1939). Stating that the tender back question was to be resolved under federal rather than state law, the Court concluded that requiring a refund would be “wholly incongruous with the general policy of the [FELA].” Id. at 518, 88 S.Ct. at 1152 (citation omitted). The court in Oberg summarized the Hogue decision as follows: Id. at 683-84 (citations omitted). The Court in Oberg was “convinced that ... analogizing the policy of [the] ADEA to that of [the] FELA, and thus applying Hogue, [was] cor-reet.” Id. at 684. We agree, based on a number of factors.

In Hogue, the Court rejected any notion that state common law principles could help resolve the tender back question in FELA cases., The Court stated that “[t]he question whether a tender back of the consideration was a prerequisite to the bringing of the suit is to be determined by federal rather than state law.” The Court went on to hold that an employee, who previously executed an employer release, need not, as a precondition to bringing suit under FELA tender back to his employer any of the consideration he received for executing the' release. The Court did, however, state that the benefits paid should be deducted from any award to the employee.

A.

First, we note that courts have regularly applied the analysis in Hogue to reject tender requirements in lawsuits brought under a variety of federal remedial statutes.²¹ It is impossible to view the ADEA as anything other than a federal remedial statute. The ADEA was enacted in order to further the dual goals of compensating discrimination victims and deterring employers from practicing discrimination. As the Supreme Court wrote in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, —, 115 S.Ct. 879, 884, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995): “The private litigant who seeks redress for his or her injuries vindicates both the deterrence and compensation objectives of the ADEA.” In light of this clear recognition of the purpose of the ADEA, we are confident that the tender back rule rejected in suits under the FELA should be rejected in suits under the ADEA as well.²² Imposing a tender back rule in the ADEA context would almost certainly compromise the purposes underlying that statute.. The concerns expressed by our sister court in the pre-OWBPA case of Forbus v. Sears Roebuck & Company, 958 F.2d 1036, 1041 (11th Cir.1992), apply with equal force here:

The Court in Hogue found that a tender requirement would deter meritorious challenges to releases in FELA lawsuits. The same deterrence factor applies to ADEA claims. Forcing older employees to tender back their severance benefits in order to attempt to regain their jobs would have a crippling effect [sic] on the ability of such employees to challenge releases obtained by misrepresentation or duress. Such a rule would ... encourage egregious behavior on the part of employers in forcing certain employees into early retirement for the economic benefit of the company. The ADEA was specifically designed to prevent such conduct, and we reject a tender requirement as a prerequisite to instituting a challenge to a release in an ADEA case.

B.

Second, any doubt about whether Hogue’s rejection of the tender back rule should apply to ADEA claims was resolved with the enactment of the OWBPA. The very specific requirements of this Act, considered against the background of its legislative history, demonstrate that Congress intended to provide protections unavailable at common law; congressional focus extended beyond ensuring that ADEA releases were untainted by fraud, duress, or some other defect recognized at common law.²³ Congress explicitly stated that it intended to protect employees who might waive rights under the ADEA before they were “even aware of any potential or actual pattern of discrimination.” H.R.Rep. No. 664 at 23. See also S.Rep. No. 268, 101st Cong.2d Sess. 32 (1990) (recognizing “need for adequate information before waivers are signed.”). Imposing a tender requirement where a release is defective under the OWBPA would effectively eviscerate that act.

Through the OWBPA Congress sought to insure that employees faced with deciding whether to sign an ADEA waiver and forego an ADEA claim be provided with sufficient information to allow them to evaluate the merits of that claim. Applying a ratification-tender back rule would require employees in Long’s position, who arguably did not receive the required information, to make a similarly uninformed choice. These employees would be forced by the ratification and tender back doctrines to decide, in the continued absence of information, whether to surrender severance pay or waive all claims under the OWB-PA. Employees whose releases are defective under the OWBPA would be no better off than before the OWBPA was enacted; they-could be forced to make critical decisions without information deemed essential by Congress.

The choice which the Wamsley approach, adopted by the district court, places before older employees amounts to no choice at all: pursue your claim at the risk of your livelihood. Testimony before Congress established that older workers facing termination “could not afford” to do without separation benefits. Age Discrimination in Employment Waiver Protection Act of 1989: Hearing on 5.5b. Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the ■ Senate Comm, on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1989) (Testimony of Robert Patterson). Other excerpts from the OWBPA’s legislative history emphasize the economic plight of older workers and Congress’ intention to better equip them to make choices directly affecting their rights and livelihood. Applying ratification or a tender back requirement in the circumstances presented here would mean that:

[n]o matter how egregiously releases might violate the requirements of the [OWBPA], employees would be precluded from challenging them unless they somehow ... come up with the money they were given when allegedly forced into retirement.

Isaacs v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765 F.Supp. 1359, 1367 (C.D.Ill.1991).

Courts which have applied tender-ratification principles to ADEA releases which fail to conform to the OWBPA have rendered the OWBPA meaningless. The gist of these holdings is, as Long argues, “to uphold flawed ADEA releases [to] block discrimination claims [rather] than ... require employers to comply fully with federal law.” (Long br. at 38).

C.

Application of the tender-ratification doctrines and rejection of Hogue stem, we believe, from an incomplete analysis of the equities involved in allowing an employee to retain severance benefits while pursuing ADEA claims. The court in Wamsley expressed concern that were ratification and tender back held not to apply, employers would face “continued litigation with opponents who could use, and very possibly already have used, to finance their suit, the very funds paid as consideration to avoid litigation.” 11 F.3d at 589. Amicus, Equal Employment Advisory Council,²⁴ frames the concern even more starkly, warning that abrogation of the tender-ratification doctrines, “improperly encourages nefarious plaintiffs to secure the benefits awarded for signing a release and then press for more gains through a legal challenge.” (Br. at 7). While this argument, although stated in extreme terms, is not without merit, it misper-ceives the economic reality for many older workers. The congressional assumptions underlying the OWBPA posit that most covered employees need severance benefits to fund living rather than legal expenses. Employees with baseless, claims have strong financial incentives to keep severance payments rather than risk them in prolonged litigation.

Neither will rejecting ratification and tender back principles mean that employees will receive a “double recovery” by first accepting a severance payment and later winning a judgment. An employer found liable will be entitled to a set-off of any severance benefits paid. Oberg, 11 F.3d at 684. In any event, the windfall argument cuts two ways. Presumably, employers offer severance packages, in part, in exchange for the employees’ release of claims. Where an employee must tender severance benefits prior to suit, it is very difficult to return that employee to his pre-release position. He is not restored to employment, the employer may still assert the release as an affirmative defense, and there is no guarantee that the employee will receive the information to which he was entitled under the OWBPA. “Such an exchange would arguably unjustly enrich the employer.” Isaacs, 765 F.Supp. at 1867.

The equities associated with applying the logic of Hogue to eliminate the tender-ratification rule in the ADEA context are at least in equipoise. In this circumstance, we will give effect to what we believe Congress intended: the OWBPA was designed to protect employees negotiating with employers, not to protect employers from overreaching plaintiffs. Employers are, by far, in a better position to protect their own interests than are older employees. Employers should not need the ratification doctrine in order to ensure that their releases are effective; they need to comply with the OWBPA. Most OWBPA requirements are clear and specific, and, once these requirements are met, waivers executed by employees will be valid and enforceable. If prodded by necessity into following the mandates of the OWBPA, employers will have purchased a valid affirmative defense against suit.²⁵

D.

A final factor favoring Hogue’s rejection of a tender back rule in the ADEA context is practicality. “[IJmposing a ‘tender’ requirement for challenges to ADEA releases would frequently create insoluble practical problems.” Isaacs, 765 F.Supp. at 1367.

A tender requirement in such eases would ... create a conundrum as to how much [consideration] should be tendered to restore the pre-release status quo. There is no available method of forcing the parties to agree on what an appropriate amount would be, since typically the employer does not specify how much of the consideration paid to the employee is for the retirement and how much is for the release.

Id. at 1368.²⁶

To require tender of the full amount of a severance payment would force an employee to return a sum that typically incorporates consideration for multiple factors not challenged in an age case: waivers for other violations of law or contract, rolled-in vacation and sick time, and a public relations benefit to the employer that itself may deter other litigation.²⁷ This approach “would appear to leave the employer better off and the employee worse off than they were under the status quo.” Id. at 1370. We are convinced that “[i]t would not serve the purposes of the ADEA to impose a tender requirement that creates such disputes and inequities.” Id. at 1368.

Having examined the language of the OWBPA, the purposes underlying its enactment, and the caselaw bearing on its application, we hold that where a release of ADEA claims fails to comply with the provisions of the OWBPA, the common law doctrines of ratification and tender back should not be applied to bar an employee’s ability to pursue claims under the ADEA.²⁸ In light of this holding, the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Sears on claims brought pursuant to the ADEA was erroneous. Accordingly, we will reverse that portion of the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Sears with respect to the ADEA claims.'

VII.

One final matter remains. Our rejection of the void/voidable distinction in reaching this result has implications for the non-ADEA claims asserted by Long. This case has, from its inception, centered on the question of whether the release, as a whole, was void or voidable. The parties have consistently framed and briefed the issues in terms of this distinction and, indeed, the district court rested its grant of summary judgment as to all claims on its finding that the release as a whole was voidable and had been ratified. Because Long approached this case by arguing that the entire release — including non-ADEA claims — was void we believe that these nonADEA claims were adequately preserved for consideration on appeal.

Our holding, confined as it is to ADEA releases invalid under OWBPA, does not automatically dispose of the remainder of Long’s claims as might be the case if we had rested our decision on the void/voidable distinction. Therefore, in order to ensure that the parties have an opportunity to analyze the remaining claims in terms of our holding and to present that analysis to the district court, we will vacate the district court’s entry of summary judgment as to the non-ADEA claims and remand for further consideration.

1 . Because Sears placed Long on a one-year leave of absence, his actual date of termination was April 8, 1994.

2 . It is undisputed that Long was not otherwise entitled to receive these payments from Sears. Unlike the Sears general pension plan, the severance package offered to Long provided for twenty-six weeks of pay in addition to other benefits. Sears allegedly failed to inform Long that he could opt to accept a less generous severance package without executing a release.

3 .In October, 1995, Long amended his complaint to add a claim alleging that Sears discriminated against him on the basis of age after the date of his termination when it failed to rehire him.

4 . Specifically, Long alleges that the release violated the OWBPA in the following respects; 1) it purported to bar future claims; 2) the release was not accompanied by the required data relating to other Sears employees; and 3) the release materials were incomprehensible to Long and other employees.

5 . Two days prior to trial the district court, in a pretrial conference, signalled its intent to grant summary judgment in favor of Sears. Understanding that the court's decision turned on his retention of benefits, Long submitted a brief in which he offered to tender the money. This brief and the court’s order granting summary judgment were docketed the same day. Apparently, they "crossed in the mail.”

6 .Long also asks that we determine whether the release at issue waived future claims in violation of the OWBPA. Because the district court found it unnecessary to determine whether the release did, in fact, fail to comply with the OWBPA, our consideration of this issue would be premature. Our disposition of this appeal will require that the district court assess the merits of this argument, as well as Long's other allegations of statutory deficiency.

7 . The decision in Ponzoni does not control the outcome of this case as our affirmances, without opinion, of district court decisions are not binding precedent. See Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398, 411 (3d Cir.1988).

8 . This language was adopted by reference in S.Rep. No. 263, 101st Cong.2d Sess. 15 (1990).

9 . On January 9, 1997, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in Raczak v. Ameritech Corp., 103 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir.1997). Two panel members, on divergent grounds, agreed that the plaintiffs were not precluded from pursuing an action under the ADEA despite having executed waivers deficient under the OWBPA and retained payments made pursuant to these waivers. One of these panel members adopted the ratification analysis set forth in Oberg while the other concurred in the result only, concluding that "there was not a total failure of consideration when the ADEA claim was instituted without plaintiffs tendering back benefits received ...” and "reserv[ing] judgment as to whether a release limited to ADEA claims would require a different result.” Id. at 1271. The remaining panel member adopted an analysis similar to that undertaken by the district court in this case. .

This decision, fractured though it is, means that the appellate courts, prior to our opinion, are evenly divided on the issue of tender back.

10 . .The common law doctrine of ratification results in the enforcement of "a promise to perform aE or part of an antecedent contract of the promisor, previously voidable by him, but not avoided prior to the making of the promise." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 85 (1981). Promises that are void cannot be ratified. Void promises are not legally binding, have no legal effect and, therefore, are not contracts. Id. § 7 cmt. a.

11 . Because void releases cannot be ratified, the court did not consider whether failure to tender back might amount to ratification.

12 . The Oberg analysis has been adopted by a majority of district courts outside the Seventh, Fourth and Fifth Circuits. See EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 923 F.Supp. 994 (W.D.Mich.1995) (no ratification; where waiver is deficient under the OWBPA, employer and employee cannot contract to waive ADEA provisions); Elliott v. United Technologies Corp., 94 CV 01577, slip op. (D.Conn. March 24, 1995) (ratification at odds with plain language of the OWBPA); Soliman v. Digital Equipment Corp., 869 F.Supp. 65 (D.Mass.1994) (defective release cannot be ratified; tender back will chill bringing of meritorious claims); Raczak v. Ameritech Corp., 1994 WL 780899 (E.D.Mich.1994), rev'd in part, 103 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir.1997), (Oberg approach better reasoned); Carr v. Armstrong Air Conditioning, 817 F.Supp. 54 (N.D.Ohio 1993) (plaintiff waived no rights since severance agreement violated the OWBPA; tender requirement not consistent with purposes of the ADEA); Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 1993 WL 18437 (N.D.Ill.1993) (OWBPA requirements preclude waiver by ratification); Collins v. Outboard Marine Corp., 808 F.Supp. 590, 594 (N.D.Ill.1992) (scope of defective release did not include claim under ADEA; consideration received need not be returned since it was not paid for relinquishment of ADEA claim); Isaacs v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765 F.Supp. 1359 (C.D.Ill.1991) (ratification and tender-back not applicable to releases deficient under the OWBPA). But see Hodge v. New York College of Podiatric Medicine, 940 F.Supp. 579 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (Oberg rejected; defective releases subject to ratification); and Rivers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1217, 1995 WL 888612 (E.D.Mo.1995) (failure to tender back benefits precluded ADEA claim even where release was deficient under OWBPA).

13 . Indeed, to resolve that question here is premature. The district court has yet to determine whether the release at issue is, in fact, defective under the OWBPA. While this case does not turn upon whether an allegedly defective release is void or voidable, we recognize that it might be necessary to reach this question under a different set of facts. For example, holding a release of ADEA claims void could have implications for non-ADEA claims also covered by the release.

14 . See, e.g., O'Shea v. Commercial Credit Corp., 930 F.2d 358, 362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 859, 112 S.Ct. 177, 116 L.Ed.2d 139 (1991); Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda Co., 809 F.2d 539 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 928, 107 S.Ct. 3212, 96 L.Ed.2d 699 (1987); and Runyan v. National Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1045 (6th Cir.1986) (enbanc).

15 .The totality of the circumstances test was also adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in O’Hare v. Global Natural Resources, Inc., 898 F.2d 1015, 1017 (5th Cir.1990); and by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Bormann v. AT & T Communications, Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir.1989).

It is significant that even prior to enactment of the OWBPA, we concluded that ordinary contract principles were not sufficient to vindicate the protective purpose of the ADEA. Cirillo, 862 F.2d at 450. It is difficult, therefore, to understand the dissent’s "urging” that we retreat to traditional common law principles in order to decide thiscase.

16 . See Taylor v. Gordon Flesch Co., 793 F.2d 858, 862 (7th Cir.1986) (oral waivers enforceable); Runyan v. National Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039 (6th Cir.1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850, 107 S.Ct. 178, 93 L.Ed.2d 114 (1986) (if plaintiff understood release, whether anyone else would have understood it was not controlling); Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda Co., 809 F.2d 539 (8th Cir.1987) (release enforced despite failure to refer to ADEA); and Harrison v. Arlington Ind. School Dist., 717 F.Supp. 453, 455 (N.D.Tex.), aff'd without op., 891 F.2d 904 (5th Cir.1989) (under common law, employee challenging waiver on "knowing and voluntary” grounds carried burden of proof).

17 . It is significant that neither the text of the OWBPA nor its legislative history discusses ratification as a bar to suit; there is no mention of the ratification doctrine or reference to caselaw invoking that doctrine. In fact, at the time of the OWBPA’s enactment, not a single court of appeals had held that a waiver which was not knowing and voluntary could, nonetheless, be enforced pursuant to a ratification theory. Many courts, however, including ours, had resolved waiver questions without reference to the doctrine. See O’Hare v. Global Natural Resources, Inc., 898 F.2d 1015, 1017 (5th Cir.1990); Bormann v. AT & T Communications, Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir.1989); Cirillo v. Arco Chem. Co., 862 F.2d 448, 451-55 (3d Cir.1988); Coventry v. United States Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 523 (3d Cir.1988); Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda Co., 809 F.2d 539, 541 (8th Cir.1987); Runyan v. National Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1044 (6th Cir.1986) (en banc). Several of these cases are cited in the OWBPA's legislative history. See H.R.Rep. No. 664, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1990). Furthermore, we believe that it would be wrong to conclude, as does the dissent, that simply because ratification is not rejected in the text or legislative history of the OWBPA that the common law is unchanged. The Act establishes that validity and enforceability are inextricably linked; adherence to the terms of the Act is fundamental to enforcement. The critical point is not that the Act fails specifically to do away with ratification. It is instead that the ratification doctrine is logically inconsistent with the specific terms of the OWBPA.

18 .We are not persuaded by the dissent’s argument that "the policy of the OWBPA requires that an employee should be able to ratify a defective release" (Dissent at 1546), nor do we believe that the dissent’s "dramatic” example purporting to illustrate this conclusion is apposite. The OWBPA was written to govern waivers of the right to file a claim. This "pre-emptive waiver of rights occurs before a dispute has arisen and indeed before an employee is even aware of any potential or actual pattern of discrimination.” S.Rep. No. 79, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1989). We certainly have not suggested, nor, as far as we know, is there any authority for the proposition that the OWBPA might apply to the terms of a settlement agreement forged after the taking of evidence in a civil trial.

In any event, it is a given that even well-designed remedial legislation may result in unintended consequences. Suffice it to say that we are not aware, nor was counsel for the EEOC when questioned at oral argument, of any case where an employer has sought to avoid its obligations under a severance agreement by invoking its own failure to comply with the OWBPA. That 'case, should it ever arise, is a matter for a different day; we need not decide this case on the basis of what might happen in a hypothetical ease which might come before us at some point in the future.

19 . "States that require a tender to challenge a release sometimes use the language 'condition precedent to suit’ and sometimes use the language of 'ratification.' But there is no meaningful difference between the two." Isaacs v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765 F.Supp. 1359, 1372 (C.D.Ill.1991).

In any event, the legislative history indicates that Congress was aware of the benefit retention issue and chose not to include in the OWBPA a proviso prohibiting this retention. The minority members of the Committee on Education and Labor referred to a letter from IBM, which mentioned the possibility that former employees might retain benefits while pursuing an ADEA claim. H.R.Rep. No. 664 at 81 proposed a substitute bill containing the following provision: “If a waiver is set aside for any reason, any damages received through a discrimination action shall be offset by the consideration received for the waiver." Id. at 200. This proposal did not mention ratification or tender back but was a moderate response to the possibility of retention of benefits. It was, nonetheless, rejected. Id. at 29.

20 . The dissent argues that the holding in Oberg was undermined by the decision in Fleming v. United States Postal Service AMF O'Hare, 27 F.3d 259 (7th Cir.1994). In Fleming the court of appeals refused to extend the reasoning of Hogue to a Title VII case, limiting Hogue to the "context of a federal statute that regulates releases, displacing common law rules." Id. at 261-62. The OWBPA is precisely such a statute.

21 . See Botefur v. City of Eagle Point, 7 F.3d 152, 156 (9th Cir.1993) (Hogue generalizable to .other federal compensatory statutes including Title VII); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Spectrum Electronics, Inc., 100 F.R.D. 379, 382 n. 1 (E.D.Pa.1983) (not citing Hogue but holding that under antitrust law benefits available under federal law cannot be defeated by state common law rules; no ratification where plaintiffs failed to tender back); Wahsner v. American Motors Sales Corp., 597 F.Supp. 991 (E.D.Pa.1984) (not citing Hogue but finding Pennsylvania law with respect to ratification releases incongruous with Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act where Act was intended to provide redress for the very activity alleged; amount retained was to be set off against any damages); Smith v. Pinell, 597 F.2d 994, 996 (5th Cir.1979) (plaintiff allowed to proceed under Jones Act despite having signed release and received settlement; Jones Act analogized to FELA); Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 287 F.2d 448 (3d Cir.1961) (cases regarding necessity for tender are in hopeless confusion; in case involving Sherman Act, plaintiffs not required to tender back consideration received for release).

22 . In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of the fact that other courts have rejected Hogue's applicability to ADEA releases. In Wamsley, for example, the court of appeals wrote:

[Hogue ] is founded on the recognition that a "tender back” requirement would be "wholly incongruous” with the right of recovery provided under the FELA and inconsistent with the objectives of the act. The right of recovery under the FELA, however, is unique in that it advances a congressional intention of facilitating recovery by injured railroad workers against their employers.

11 F.3d 534, 540. The Court concluded that by eliminating the tender requirement in connection with FELA releases, "Congress advanced the FELA's purpose of providing liberal recovery to injured rail workers_ No such purposes underlie the ADEA.” Id. at 542.

There is no question that the FELA and ADEA are not identical in purpose. Nor, in our view, need they be in order for the rule in Hogue to apply. The mandate of Hogue is that tender back requirements imposed in connection with the release of federal rights be evaluated in light of the general policy of the statute in question. That the ADEA as amended by the OWBPA serves a purpose distinct from that underlying the FELA does not change the fact that a tender back requirement is "wholly incongruous” with the general policies of the ADEA and the OWB-PA. In enacting the OWBPA, Congress specifically regulated ADEA releases in order to provide employees with protection not available at common law. To strip them of this protection through application of the common law principle of tender back would be anomalous indeed. “When federal law limits a class of releases, ... the common law requiring tender ... may have to give way.” Fleming v. U.S. Postal Service, 27 F.3d 259, 260 (7th Cir.1994).

23 . The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Wamsley, 11 F.3d at 539, rested its conclusion that common law contract principles should apply to ADEA releases on one portion of the OWB-PA’s legislative history which provides that the primary purpose underlying the OWBPA was to ensure that workers executing ADEA waivers do so "in the absence of fraud, duress, coercion, or mistake of material facts. S.Rep. No. 263, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1539.” The court reasoned that these concerns were the same as those "that have traditionally given rise to grounds upon which a party can avoid contractual obligations." Id. The court's reliance on this single statement fails to take into account the fact that both the provisions of the statute and other statements in the legislative history clearly establish that Con- . gress rejected and intended to move beyond application of common law principles.

24 . The Equal Employment Advisory Council, in an amicus brief filed on behalf of Sears, identifies itself as an organization comprised of nearly 300 major TJ.S. corporations and several industry associations. The organization exists "to promote sound approaches to the elimination of employment discrimination."

25 . We are not swayed by the argument that rejection of the tender-ratification theory will discourage employers from offering severance packages and will encourage plaintiffs and their counsel knowingly to sign releases that do not comply with the OWBPA in order to receive benefits to which they are not entitled even though they have no intention of honoring the release agreement. The ratification-tender theory has been applied only by Courts of Appeals in the Fourth and Fifth circuits. There is no empirical evidence to show that in other areas of the country severance plans are offered less often or that there is a greater volume of litigation turning on allegedly inadequate ADEA releases.

26 . Another practical problem identified by the district court in Isaacs is the fact that "ordinary contract principles” governing tender back are not uniform:

Some states impose no tender requirement for law suits that challenge releases. Some state impose [a] tender requirement for certain kinds of challenges to releases, but not for others, bécoming enmeshed in the technicalities of "void” versus "voidable” contracts. Some states impose universal tender requirements. Some states cannot make up then-minds from decision to decision.

765 F.Supp. at 1372. The court in Isaacs concluded that, "[t]he confusion ... on this issue is reason enough for this Court to decide this [question] not on the basis of state-law contract doctrines, but — as Hogue commands ... on the simple basis of what rule best serves the purposes of the ADEA.” Id.

27 . Our decision in DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 306, 133 L.Ed.2d 210 (1995), does not resolve this difficulty as that case did not address tender back or the effect of OWBPA section 26(f)(1)(D). We do not read DiBiase to suggest that all severance pay received must be allocated to ADEA claims for purposes of tender back.

28 .Contrary to the position taken in the dissent, we do not read our decision in McNemar v. The Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir.1996), petition for cert. filed Dec. 16, 1996, as having any bearing on this case. In McNemar we held that a plaintiff was precluded from pursuing a claim under the ADA based on the fact that he had made assertions inconsistent with his right to recover in proceedings before the Social Security Administration and two state agencies. The dissent argues that because "our ultimate conclusion ... was that conduct which the ADA never addressed, barred McNemar's action.... Similarly, the OWBPA does not set forth the controlling law in this case as it does not address the ratification issue.” (Dissent at 1549). The point seems to be that a plaintiff may be barred from pursuing a claim by factors lying outside the statute pursuant to which the claim is brought. We agree with McNemar's basic premise. Nevertheless, McNemar is distinguishable, from this case both legally and factually. McNemar has nothing to do with what Congress intended in enacting the OWBPA nor with the analysis of those factors outside the statute which might bear on how the OWBPA should be applied in a particular circumstance. We have discussed these policy underpinnings at length and conclude that the issues here have little in common with the invocation of judicial estoppel in McNe-mar.