Thomas L. Eovaldi, Etc., and Cross-Appellant v. The First National Bank of Chicago, and Cross-Appellee

596 F.2d 188
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedApril 27, 1979
Docket76-1263, 76-1264
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 596 F.2d 188 (Thomas L. Eovaldi, Etc., and Cross-Appellant v. The First National Bank of Chicago, and Cross-Appellee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomas L. Eovaldi, Etc., and Cross-Appellant v. The First National Bank of Chicago, and Cross-Appellee, 596 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1979).

Opinion

FAIRCHILD, Chief Judge.

Defendant Bank has appealed from a judgment against it for $127,899 and attorney’s fees. The principal amount is to be distributed in equal shares among a class of BankAmeriCard cardholders. The judgment was entered on plaintiff’s amended Count II on the theory that when the Bank, having agreed to provide monthly statements, omitted a separate statement for one month as an incident of a shift in the beginning dates of its monthly billing period, the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z thereunder required the Bank to give notice of the change thirty days before its March, 1971 billing dates, and that the notices given were not timely. The court had earlier denied plaintiff summary judgment on Count I and original Count II, which presented other theories. Plaintiff cross-appealed.

Many facts are undisputed. The Bank operates a BankAmeriCard program which is an “open end consumer credit plan” under the Act and Regulation Z. A credit card issued under this plan may be used for the purchase of goods and/or for borrowing money (“cash advances”), for which services the Bank imposes finance charges. Typically, when a cardholder borrows money, he incurs a finance charge from the date the indebtedness is contracted. For purchases of goods and services, however, the card *190 holder incurs no finance charge until approximately twenty-five days after the billing date shown on the statement which first bills the purchase.

The Truth in Lending Act requires that creditors such as the Bank send to cardholders a billing statement “for each billing cycle at the end of which there is an outstanding balance in that account or with respect to which a finance charge is imposed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1637(b). Billing statements must set forth, among other items, the indebtedness outstanding at the beginning and end of the statement period, and all charges and credits to the account (including finance charges) during that period.

Prior to April, 1971, defendant’s Ban-kAmeriCard cardholders were divided into five groups for billing purposes, each with a billing cycle beginning on a different day of the month. At the end of each cycle billing statements were prepared and mailed to cardholders. As the number of cardholders grew, however, defendant concluded that its five-cycle system would not adequately manage the increasing burden. In spring of 1971, the Bank responded to these anticipated difficulties, and changed to a ten-cycle system.

The conversion to a ten-cycle system necessarily changed the billing dates for most cardholders. To facilitate the computer changes and to prevent some cardholders from receiving two billing statements within a short interval, all billing cycles commencing in March were extended into May. As a consequence, cardholders did not receive billing statements in April, but received their initial billing statements under the new ten-cycle system.

During the March to May period, the Bank modified its billing procedure in accordance with the conversion. Purchases reported to the Bank after the March billing date were not posted until the May billing date. Thus as to some purchases, cardholders received extensions of time to May without cost. In addition, the Bank did not immediately impose finance charges on cash advances during the conversion period. Finance charges did accrue, however, on the balance billed on the March statement, and remaining unpaid, unless paid in full.

Cardholders were advised of the Bank’s billing conversion by notices which were mailed together with February and March billing statements. Cardholders were informed of the system changes described above. Their March statements contained the billing information for the old cycles, ending in March, and stated the date in April when full payment must be made to escape an additional finance charge.

Plaintiff Eovaldi is a cardholder to whom credit had been extended under defendant’s BankAmeriCard system. In July of 1971, he brought this action on behalf of himself and a class of 90,000 cardholders under the Bank’s system. Plaintiff’s complaint sought to recover both actual damages and statutory penalties because of three claimed violations of the Act and Regulation Z:

(1) Count I alleged that the notice of the intended omission of the April statement, sent out with the March statement, was not clear and conspicuous.

(2) Count II alleged that the omission of the April statement was a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1637(b) requiring a statement at the end of a billing cycle, and of § 226.6(b), Regulation Z, requiring periodic statements.

(3) At the direction of the district court, plaintiff amended Count II to claim that because the Bank had previously disclosed that monthly statements would be furnished, § 226.7(e), Regulation Z, required the Bank to give notice of its intention to omit the April billing statement at least thirty days prior to the beginning of the cycles which ended in April. The district court granted judgment on Count II as amended.

Plaintiff claimed, in substance, that each violation impaired his opportunity to make *191 a payment during the latter part of April, and thus resulted in a greater finance charge than would have accrued had he made a payment. He does not claim that he could not have made a payment with the desired effect, but that his opportunity was impaired by the lack of information the statement would have provided.

The substance of plaintiff’s claim of injury can be illustrated by the facts of his account. The Bank sent him a billing statement dated March 8, 1971, showing a new balance of $303.14, a minimum payment due of $15.16, and that the new balance must be paid by April 2 to avoid additional finance charge. This statement was accompanied by the notice referred to in Count I, concerning the changes in the billing system, and stating in part “You will receive no April statement from BankAmeriCard” and indicating that his next statement would be mailed May 12th.

Plaintiff’s billing cycle began March 9 and would, but for the change, have ended April 8. By reason of the change, the cycle ended May 11, just before the new billing date assigned to plaintiff. Plaintiff made no payment before April 2, but paid $50.00 April 12. His billing statement issued May 12 showed a finance charge of $8.94. Pour dollars and fifty-five cents ($4.55) of that amount accrued on the $303.14 owing from March 9 through April 8. The remaining $4.39 accrued on the $303.14 owing from April 9 to April 12 and the $253.14 owing from April 12 through May 12.

Plaintiff’s claim is that by reason of lack of timely and proper notice or otherwise he was entitled to a statement dated April 8 informing him of his new balance of that date and of a date by which (presumably May 3) he would have been able to avoid the $4.39 by payment in full. He does not claim that he would have done so, and his practice was to make only partial payments, but he claims he was entitled to the information and the opportunity. He appears also to claim that if he had received an April statement, he would at least have made another partial payment, thus reducing the $4.39.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Barnes v. Fleet National Bank, N.A.
370 F.3d 164 (First Circuit, 2004)
Wiley v. Earl's Pawn & Jewelry, Inc.
950 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D. Alabama, 1997)
In Re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation
597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. New York, 1984)
Wright v. Tower Loan of Mississippi, Inc.
679 F.2d 436 (Fifth Circuit, 1982)
Luella Wright v. Tower Loan Of Mississippi, Inc.
679 F.2d 436 (Fifth Circuit, 1982)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
596 F.2d 188, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-l-eovaldi-etc-and-cross-appellant-v-the-first-national-bank-of-ca1-1979.