Thomas A. Shields, et al. v. World Aquatics

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: April 1, 2026
• Docket: 3:18-cv-07393
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 THOMAS A. SHIELDS, et al., Case No. 3:18-cv-07393-JSC

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER RE: MOTION FOR FINAL 9 v. APPROVAL AND MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES, EXPENSES, AND 10 WORLD AQUATICS, SERVICE AWARDS 11 Defendant. Re: Dkt. Nos. 428, 436

12 Thomas A. Shields and Katinka Hosszú are professional swimmers who bring federal 13 antitrust claims and a state law tort claim against World Aquatics (formerly known as the 14 Fédération Internationale de Natation (“FINA”)), related to World Aquatics’ control over 15 international swimming competitions. After the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this 16 Court’s grant of summary judgment in Defendant’s favor, the parties stipulated to certification of a 17 Rule 23(b)(3) damages class and thereafter reached a classwide settlement. (Dkt. Nos. 413, 420.1) 18 The Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of the class action settlement and 19 ordered notice in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B). (Dkt. No. 427.) 20 Plaintiffs’ motion for final approval and motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and service awards for 21 the class representative are now pending before the Court. (Dkt. Nos. 428, 436.) Having 22 reviewed the briefing, including the supplemental submissions, and having had the benefit of oral 23 argument on February 26, 2026, the Court GRANTS final approval of the settlement, and 24 GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and service 25 awards. 26 27 1 BACKGROUND 2 The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the lengthy procedural history of this 3 action and incorporates Plaintiffs’ discussion of it by reference. (Dkt. No. 423 at 13.) 4 THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 5 A. The Settlement Class 6 The Agreement identifies three different Settlement Classes. 7 1. The Injunctive Relief Settlement Class:

8 All swimmers who signed contracts to participate in the International Swimming League from January 1, 2018 through the date of the 9 Settlement Agreement (August 29, 2025). 10 2. The 2018 Damages Settlement Class:

11 All swimmers who signed contracts to participate in the International Swimming League’s December 2018 event set to take place in Turin, 12 Italy. 13 3. The 2019 Damages Settlement Class:

14 All swimmers who signed contracts to participate in the International Swimming League’s 2019 season. 15 (Dkt. No. 423-2, Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 1(k), (u).) 16 B. Payment Terms 17 Under the Settlement Agreement, Defendant will pay a total of $7,627,084.00. This 18 amount consists of $3,000,000 in attorneys’ fees for what the parties characterize as fees for the 19 injunctive relief, and $4,627,084.00 in damages, allocated as $1,127,084.00 for the 2018 Damages 20 Settlement Class and $3,500,000.00 for the 2019 Damages Settlement Class (together, the 21 “Damages Classes Settlement Funds”). (Dkt. No. 423-2 at ¶ 1(j).) The damages for each of the 22 subclasses shall be distributed in pro rata shares based on the damage allocation methodology in 23 Dr. Rascher’s class certification reports. The reports take into account what each individual 24 swimmer would have earned in prize money and appearance fees absent Defendant’s 25 anticompetitive conduct. (Dkt. No. 423 at 19-20; Dkt. No. 246-7 at ¶¶ 139-145.) 26 The pro rata shares will be calculated after deducting court-approved attorneys’ fees, costs, 27 the proposed service awards for the named Plaintiffs, and taxes. (Dkt. No. 423-2 at ¶¶ 7, 28.) C. Injunctive Relief 1 In addition to the monetary relief, the Settlement Agreement provides for the following 2 injunctive relief: 3 1) no restrictions on a “Swimmer’s participation in any Sanctioned 4 Event”;

5 2) World Aquatics “will not maintain or enforce any rule, policy, or practice that restricts the organization of ” independent swimming 6 events;

7 3) World Aquatics “will not maintain or enforce any rule, policy, or practice that restricts or penalizes any Swimmer’s, [World 8 Aquatics] National Federation’s or [World Aquatics] Continental Organization’s participation in any” independent events; and 9 4) participation in any independent swimming event will not give 10 rise to any penalties imposed by World Aquatics on the Swimmer, World Aquatics National Federation, or World Aquatics 11 Continental Organization. 12 (Dkt. No. 423-2, Appx. A at ¶¶ 3-5.) Further, any swimmer’s results at independent swimming 13 events shall be recognized by World Aquatics and will be part of World Aquatics’ official results, 14 guaranteeing the same treatment for results achieved at such events so long as they comply with 15 certain World Aquatics competition regulations that World Aquatics applies to its own events. (Id. 16 at ¶ 6(b).) 17 D. Scope of Release 18 Under the Settlement Agreement, the Damages Classes release all claims that were or 19 could have been raised in this action

20 prior to filing for preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement on account of, arising out of, resulting from, or in any way relating to 21 the facts, circumstances, and events alleged in the Action, including using certain of [World Aquatics] Rules to organize a group boycott 22 against ISL and preventing top-tier swimmers from participating in professional swimming competitions and earning appearances fees 23 and prize money from those competitions. 24 (Dkt. No. 423-3 at ¶ 1(gg).) Class members also release

25 all declaratory and injunctive relief claims, demands, actions, suits, causes of action, whether class, individual, or otherwise in nature, 26 liabilities of any nature whatsoever, known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, asserted or unasserted, in law or equity, that the 27 Releasors, or any one of them, whether directly, representatively, the Action prior to Final Approval or during the Injunctive Relief 1 Settlement on account of, arising out of, resulting from, or in any way relating to the facts, circumstances, and events alleged in the Action, 2 including the using certain of its Rules to organize a group boycott against ISL and preventing top-tier swimmers from participating in 3 professional swimming competitions and earning appearances fees and prize money from those competitions, including, but not limited 4 to, claims arising under federal or state antitrust, unfair competition, unfair practices, price discrimination, unitary pricing, trade practice, 5 or civil conspiracy law, including without limitation the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. 6 E. Notice 7 Plaintiffs selected Verita as the Settlement Administrator. On October 31, 2025, Verita 8 began providing direct email notice to class members and mailed postcard notices to class 9 members for whom it had a valid address. (Dkt. No. 436-2, Cooley Decl. at ¶¶ 8-11.) Verita’s 10 direct notice campaign reached 100 percent of the identified class members in the 2018 Damages 11 Settlement Class and 98.1 percent of the 2019 Damages Settlement Class members. (Id. at ¶ 7.) 12 Verita also provided notice through press releases and news articles published on SwimSwam. 13 (Id.) 14 F. Opt-Outs and Objections 15 Settlement class members had 60 days from the date of notice (December 30, 2025) to 16 object to the settlement. (Dkt. No. 423-2 at ¶ 35; Dkt. No. 436-2, Cooley Decl. at ¶ 25.) No 17 objections were received and only two damages class members opted out of the settlement. (Dkt. 18 No. 436-2, Cooley Decl. at ¶¶ 24-25.) 19 DISCUSSION 20 The approval of a settlement is a multi-step process. At the preliminary approval stage, the 21 court should grant such approval only if it is justified by the parties’ showing that the court will 22 likely be able to (1) “certify the class for purposes of judgment on the proposal” and (2) “approve 23 the proposal under Rule 23(e)(2).” Fed. R. Civ P. 23(e)(B). If the court preliminarily certifies the 24 class and finds the settlement appropriate after “a preliminary fairness evaluation,” then the class 25 will be notified, and a final fairness hearing scheduled to determine if the settlement is fair, 26 adequate, and reasonable pursuant to Rule 23. Villegas v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. CV 09- 27 00261 SBA (EMC), 2012 WL 5878390, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2012). 1 At the second stage, “after notice is given to putative class members, the Court entertains 2 any of their objections to (1) the treatment of the litigation as a class action and/or (2) the terms of 3 the settlement.” Ontiveros v. Zamora, 303 F.R.D. 356, 363 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2014) (citing Diaz v. 4 Tr. Territory of Pac. Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1989)). Following the final fairness 5 hearing, the Court must finally determine whether the parties should be allowed to settle the class 6 action pursuant to their agreed upon terms. See Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 7 221 F.R.D. 523, 525 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 8 I. CLASS CERTIFICATION 9 Final approval of a class action settlement requires, as a threshold matter, an assessment of 10 whether the class satisfies the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b). 11 Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019–1022 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, the Court certified an 12 injunctive relief class under Rule 23(b)(2) and damages class under Rule 23(b)(3) prior to 13 settlement and on preliminary approval modified the class definition to take into account the 14 settlement. (Dkt. Nos. 299, 413, 427 at 5.) Nothing in the current submission gives the Court 15 reason to reconsider its prior certification orders. 16 II. ADEQUACY OF NOTICE 17 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), the Court “must direct notice in a reasonable 18 manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1). 19 Notice includes “[n]otice of the motion [for attorneys’ fees which] must be served on all parties 20 and, for motions by class counsel, directed to class members in a reasonable manner.” Fed. R. Civ. 21 P. 23(h)(1). 22 Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires “the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, 23 including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” The 24 notice must “clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language” the nature of the 25 action, the class definition, and the class members’ right to exclude themselves from the class. 26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B); see also Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. General Electric, 361 F.3d 566, 27 575 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Notice is satisfactory if it generally describes the terms of the settlement in 1 heard.”) (cleaned up). Although Rule 23 requires reasonable efforts be made to reach all class 2 members, it does not require that each class member actually receive notice. See Silber v. Mabon, 3 18 F.3d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting the standard for class notice is “best practicable” 4 notice, not “actually received” notice). 5 The Court finds the notice plan previously approved by the Court, as implemented by the 6 Settlement Administrator, complied with Rule 23(c)(2)(B). First, the Settlement Administrator 7 provided two types of notice: email notice and mail notice. (Dkt. No. 436-2, Cooley Decl. at ¶¶ 8- 8 13.) Second, the notice clearly and concisely provided an overview of the lawsuit, class members 9 options under the settlement, the process for requesting exclusion or objecting to all or part of the 10 settlement, provided contact information for Class Counsel and the Settlement Administrator, and 11 directed class members to a website, email, and toll-free number for additional information. (Dkt. 12 No. 436-2; Exs. A & B.) The settlement website provided a long-form notice and allowed 13 Settlement Class Members who verified their identity to view their estimated damages estimates. 14 (Dkt. No. 436-2, Cooley Decl. at ¶ 21.) Finally, between October 31, 2025, the mail notice date, 15 and December 30, 2025, the Settlement Administrator received only two requests for exclusion, 16 and no objections. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-25.) 17 Given the above, the Court concludes the parties have sufficiently provided the best 18 practicable notice to class members. 19 III. FINAL APPROVAL 20 To grant final approval, the Court must find the terms of the parties’ settlement are fair, 21 adequate, and reasonable under Rule 23(e). In re California Pizza Kitchen Data Breach Litig., 129 22 F.4th 667, 674 (9th Cir. 2025). In making this determination, courts generally must consider the 23 following factors:

24 (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of 25 maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed and the 26 stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental participant; and (8) the reaction of the 27 class members to the proposed settlement. 1 different factual contexts.” Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1376 (9th Cir. 1993). 2 Under the revised Rule 23(e), the Court must also consider whether the settlement resulted 3 from collusion among the parties. See Briseno v. Henderson, 998 F.3d 1014, 1023 (9th Cir. 2021) 4 (holding that courts must apply the collusion factors set forth in In re Bluetooth Headset Products 5 Liability Litigation, 654 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011), to post-class action settlements as well as 6 those settled before certification.) 7 A. The Fairness Factors 8 1. The Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case and Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation 9 The Court first considers “the strength of [Plaintiffs’] case on the merits balanced against 10 the amount offered in the settlement.” See Nat’l Rural Telecommunications Coop. v. DIRECTV, 11 Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 526 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The 12 Court need not reach an ultimate conclusion about the merits of the dispute to resolve this factor 13 “for it is the very uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance of wasteful and expensive 14 litigation that induce consensual settlements.” Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City & 15 Cty. of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). To that end, there is no “particular 16 formula by which th[e] outcome must be tested.” Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 965 17 (9th Cir. 2009). Rather, the Court’s assessment of the likelihood of success is “nothing more than 18 an amalgam of delicate balancing, gross approximations and rough justice.” Id. (internal quotation 19 marks and citation omitted). “In reality, parties, counsel, mediators, and district judges naturally 20 arrive at a reasonable range for settlement by considering the likelihood of a plaintiffs’ or defense 21 verdict, the potential recovery, and the chances of obtaining it, discounted to a present value.” Id. 22 Over the nearly eight years this case has been pending, there has been extensive motion 23 practice as well as an appeal. Further, while the trial of the related direct competitor antitrust 24 action brought against Defendant recently resulted in a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor, the jury 25 awarded $1 in damages. See International Swimming League, LTD v. World Aquatics, 18-cv- 26 07394-JSC, Dkt. No. 576 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2026). Given the risks posed by continuing to 27 litigate Plaintiffs’ claims, the certainty of class member recovery under the settlement weighs in 1 favor of granting final approval. 2 2. Settlement Amount 3 When considering the fairness and adequacy of the amount offered in settlement, “it is the 4 complete package taken as a whole, rather than the individual component parts, that must be 5 examined for overall fairness.” DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. at 527. “[I]t is well-settled law that a 6 proposed settlement may be acceptable even though it amounts to only a fraction of the potential 7 recovery that might be available to the class members at trial.” Id. (collecting cases). 8 The Court previously concluded the amount of the damages settlement, $4,627,084, was 9 within the range of approval. (Dkt. No. 427 at 8.) This amount is allocated between the 2018 10 Damages Settlement Subclass ($1,127,084) and the 2019 Damages Settlement Subclass 11 ($3,500,000). The estimated damages for the 2018 subclass is $563,542 and $2,754,372 for the 12 2019 subclass. (Dkt. No. 246-7 at ¶¶ 139, 145.) Thus, the portion of the settlement the parties 13 allocated to damages is 200% of the actual damages for the 2018 subclass and 127% of total 14 estimated damages for the 2019 subclass, and the total damages amount is 139.5% of the total 15 estimated damages. (Dkt. No. 423 at 26-27.) The settlement also includes significant injunctive 16 relief as discussed above, as well as an agreed upon $3,000,000 in attorney fees and costs for the 17 injunctive relief. 18 In sum, the settlement relief—damages and injunctive relief—weighs strongly in favor of 19 final approval. 20 3. Extent of Discovery Completed and Stage of Proceedings 21 In the context of class action settlements, as long as the parties have sufficient information 22 to make an informed decision about settlement, “formal discovery is not a necessary ticket to the 23 bargaining table.” Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 1998). Rather, 24 a court’s focus is on whether “the parties carefully investigated the claims before reaching a 25 resolution.” Ontiveros v. Zamora, 303 F.R.D. 356, 371 (E.D. Cal. 2014). This case has a lengthy 26 litigation history, including an appeal, and the parties attended multiple mediations and settlement 27 conferences before this settlement was reached with the assistance Jeffrey Mishkin “who has 1 international sports-related legal issues.” (Dkt. No. 423 at 15.) 2 The Court thus concludes this factor likewise weighs in favor of final approval. 3 4. Experience and Views of Counsel 4 The experience and views of counsel also weigh in favor of approving the settlement. 5 Class Counsel has extensive experience in antitrust litigation and strongly support approval of the 6 settlement given the risks and challenges involved. (Dkt. No. 423 at 25.) 7 5. Presence of a Government Participant 8 No government entity is a party to this action. This factor is therefore neutral. 9 6. Reaction of Class Members 10 As previously discussed, the notice is estimated to have reached nearly 100 percent of class 11 members and the reaction has been overwhelmingly positive. No objections have been received 12 and only two class members have opted out. “[T]he absence of a large number of objections to a 13 proposed class action settlement raises a strong presumption that the terms of a proposed class 14 settlement action are favorable to the class members.” In re Omnivision Techs., Inc., 559 15 F.Supp.2d 1036, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Churchill Vill., 361 F.3d at 16 577 (holding approval of a settlement that received 45 objections (0.05%) and 500 opt-outs 17 (0.56%) out of 90,000 class members was proper). 18 *** 19 In sum, the fairness factors weigh in favor of granting Plaintiffs’ motion for final approval 20 of the class action settlement. 21 B. The Bluetooth Factors 22 Finally, the Court must determine whether the settlement was the result of good faith, 23 arms-length negotiations or fraud and collusion. In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 24 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011). In determining whether the settlement is the result of collusion, 25 courts “must be particularly vigilant not only for explicit collusion, but also for more subtle signs 26 that class counsel have allowed pursuit of their own self-interest and that of certain class members 27 to infect the negotiations.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has identified three such signs: settlement, or when the class receives no monetary distribution 1 but class counsel are amply rewarded;

2 (2) when the parties negotiate a ‘clear sailing’ arrangement providing for the payment of attorneys’ fees separate and apart from class 3 funds, which carries the potential of enabling a defendant to pay class counsel excessive fees and costs in exchange for counsel 4 accepting an unfair settlement on behalf of the class; and

5 (3) when the parties arrange for fees not awarded to revert to defendants rather than be added to the class fund. 6 Id. at 947 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 7 For the first Bluetooth factor, the Court compares the class payout to class counsel’s fees 8 claim. See In re California Pizza Kitchen Data Breach Litig., 129 F.4th 667, 675 (9th Cir. 2025) 9 (“class counsel receiving a disproportionately large fee award compared to what the class 10 members received signals potential collusion.”) Counsel seeks the $3 million Defendant agreed to 11 pay as attorneys’ fees for the injunctive relief, plus 25 percent of the $4.627 million damages 12 common fund. So, the total amount of fees counsel seeks is $4,156,771. However, as counsels’ 13 lodestar is $6,566,883, the requested total fee award still results in a negative multiplier. (Dkt. No. 14 428-3 at 2.) And, it still results in the class receiving nearly 100% of their damages; that is, class 15 member recovery under the settlement is 95.3 percent and 150 percent of their actual damages 16 after deducting counsel’s common fund fee request. (Dkt. No. 246-7 at ¶¶ 139, 145; Dkt. No. 442 17 at 14.) 18 The second warning sign—a “clear sailing” provision—is also present here to a degree. 19 See Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 940, n.6 (“a ‘clear sailing agreement,’ wherein the defendant agrees not 20 to oppose a petition for a fee award up to a specified maximum value.”). While Defendant did not 21 agree they would not oppose Plaintiffs’ request for fees and in fact have opposed Plaintiffs’ 22 motion for fees, Defendant did agree to pay $3 million as attorneys’ fees and costs for the 23 injunctive relief portion of the settlement. (Dkt. No. 434.) 24 The third warning sign—whether the parties have arranged for fees not awarded to the 25 class to revert to the defendant rather than be added to the settlement fund, see Bluetooth, 654 F.3d 26 at 948—is also not present here. The Settlement Agreement is non-reversionary—all of the funds 27 will be distributed to the class members. (Dkt. No. 423-2 at ¶ D(10).) 1 Despite the presence of two warning signs, the Court concludes the Settlement Agreement 2 did not result from, nor was it influenced by, collusion, given the negative multiplier and the 3 outstanding result for the class. 4 * * * 5 In sum, the Churchill fairness factors support approval, and the Bluetooth factors do not 6 indicate collusion. The Court is therefore satisfied the Settlement Agreement was not the result of 7 collusion between the parties and instead is the product of arms-length negotiations between 8 experienced and professional counsel. For each of these reasons, the Settlement Agreement passes 9 muster under Rule 23(e) and final approval is appropriate. 10 IV. MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS, AND CLASS REPRESENTATIVE SERVICE AWARD 11 A. Attorneys’ Fees 12 Rule 23 permits a court to award “reasonable attorneys’ fees ... that are authorized by law 13 or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). “Attorneys’ fees provisions included in 14 proposed class action settlement agreements are, like every other aspect of such agreements, 15 subject to the determination of whether the settlement is ‘fundamentally fair, adequate, and 16 reasonable.’” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 963 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 23(e)). The Ninth Circuit has approved two methods of determining attorney’s fees in cases where 18 the amount of the attorney’s fee award is taken from the common fund set aside for the entire 19 settlement: the “percentage of the fund” method and the “lodestar” method. Vizcaino v. Microsoft 20 Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The district court retains discretion 21 in common fund cases to choose either method. Id. Under either approach, “[r]easonableness is 22 the goal, and mechanical or formulaic application of either method, where it yields an 23 unreasonable result, can be an abuse of discretion.” Fischel v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of 24 the U.S., 307 F.3d 997, 1007 (9th Cir. 2002). 25 Thus, the Court must consider the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ total requested fee award of 26 4,156,771. 27 1. Percentage-of-Recovery Method 1 The Ninth Circuit uses a 25 percent of the fund “benchmark” for awarding fees. Bluetooth, 2 654 F.3d at 942. “An adjustment, either up or down, must be accompanied by a reasonable 3 explanation of why the benchmark is unreasonable under the circumstances.” Reyes v. Experian 4 Information Services, Inc., 856 Fed. App’x. 108, 110 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Here, Class 5 Counsel seeks an award of attorneys’ fees that is 25 percent of the damages common fund or 6 $1,156,771. As noted above, this in addition to the $3,000,000 that Defendant agreed to pay for 7 settlement of the injunctive relief class. Defendant opposes Plaintiffs’ request for any fees in 8 addition to the $3 million it agreed to pay, insisting an award of 25 percent of the damages 9 common fund in addition to the $3 million approaches 90 percent of the total settlement value. 10 Plaintiffs contend the request for fees from the common fund must be considered 11 separately from the injunctive relief. In support of this proposition, Plaintiffs rely on two district 12 court cases which analyzed fees for the damages portion of a settlement separately from the fees 13 for the injunctive relief settlement; but both cases just granted the requests without discussion of 14 whether that was proper and thus are not persuasive. See In re Coll. Athlete NIL Litig., No. 20- 15 CV-03919 CW, 2025 WL 3171376 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2025); White v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc. 16 (White I), No. SACV 05-1070 DOC, 2011 WL 2971836, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2011); White v. 17 Experian Info. Sols., Inc. (White II), No. SACV 05-1070 DOC, 2011 WL 2971957, at *4 (C.D. 18 Cal. July 15, 2011). 2 Plaintiffs also insisted it was too difficult to value the injunctive relief, but 19 urges it has “significant value.” (Dkt. No. 435 at 3.) The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly cautioned 20 district courts against accepting class counsels’ valuations of their claims stating the district court 21 must “scrutinize the reasonableness.” See, e.g., In re California Pizza Kitchen Data Breach Litig., 22 23 2 In their supplemental submission, Plaintiffs also relied on Relente v. Viator, Inc., No. 12-CV- 24 05868-JD, 2015 WL 3613713, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2015), suggesting it supports not performing a percentage-of-the-fund crosscheck where the value of the injunctive relief was too 25 hard to calculate. (Dkt. No. 442 at 15.) But in Relente, there was no basis for performing a cross- check because the statute which entitled the plaintiffs to fees provided “if fees are awarded 26 pursuant to this statute, they must be calculated using the lodestar method.” Id. at *1 (citing Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 34 Cal.3d 311, 321–22 (1983)). 27 1 129 F.4th 667, 680 (9th Cir. 2025) (holding the trial court should “calculate the actual value of the 2 settlement to the class and perform a crosscheck of the lodestar against the 25% percentage-of- 3 recovery benchmark to ensure that fees are reasonable.”). 4 When pressed on this issue at the final approval hearing, Plaintiffs requested leave to 5 submit supplemental briefing to support their request for attorneys’ fees and to provide a valuation 6 of the injunctive relief. The Court agreed and both sides submitted supplemental briefs. (Dkt. 7 Nos. 442, 444.) Plaintiffs’ brief now values the injunctive relief claims at $46,521,860 based on 8 “additional prize money and appearance fees over the next ten years.” (Dkt. Nos. 442 at 9.) 9 Plaintiffs’ belated valuation of injunctive relief is dramatically overinflated. The injunctive 10 relief obtained in settlement—removal of any barriers to independent swimming competitions— 11 has essentially been in place since January 2019. And, Defendant’s competitor’s swimming 12 league held competitions in 2019, 2020 and 2021, but none since then. Further, at the January 13 2026 jury trial in the related case, the evidence showed how challenging it is to create a 14 professional swimming league because, among other reasons, outside the Olympics, the audience 15 demand has not yet materialized. Consistent with this evidence, while the jury found an antitrust 16 violation, it also found Defendant’s competitor suffered no damages. But there is some value to 17 the injunctive relief as there is now a clear and unambiguous path to independent swimming 18 competitions without a risk of World Aquatics’ interference. And World Aquatics must have 19 believed it has value as it agreed to pay $3 million in attorneys’ fees specifically for the injunctive 20 relief remedy. So, the actual value of the injunctive relief is likely a few million dollars. 21 The Court nonetheless finds that an award of fees that amounts to 40 to 50% of the total 22 settlement value is warranted for several reasons. 23 First, the related-case jury verdict, and the evidence at that trial, highlight how exceptional 24 the damages recovery is here given the significant risk of no or little damages recovery. Even if 25 the Court approves counsel’s fee request of $4,156,771, the 2019 Damages Settlement Fund will 26 be 95.3% of the claimed damages, and the 2018 Damages Settlement Fund will be 150% of the 27 claimed damages. (Dkt. No. 442 at 14.) The class will essentially be made whole, an 1 Second and relatedly, the class overwhelmingly approves of the settlement—with notice to 2 100 percent of the class not a single class member objected to the settlement or to the fees 3 Plaintiffs’ counsel requests. 4 Finally, as discussed below, a total fee award that amounts to even more than 50% of the 5 settlement’s total value is justified by the lodestar cross-check below. The requested total fee of 6 $4,156,771 is 61.51 percent of the lodestar. 7 2. Lodestar Method 8 The lodestar method “requires multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours 9 reasonably expended on the case.” Shirrod v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 809 F.3d 10 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2015). “In determining reasonable hours, counsel bears the burden of 11 submitting detailed time records justifying the hours claimed to have been expended.” Chalmers 12 City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986), amended on denial of reh’g, 808 F.2d 13 1373 (9th Cir. 1987). 14 Class Counsel calculates their lodestar at $6,758,419.50. (Dkt. No. 442-1, Supp. Kessler 15 Decl. at ¶ 1.) With their initial fees request, Plaintiffs submitted a chart which listed 30 billers, 16 their title, 2025 hourly rate, total hours, and lodestar. (Dkt. No. 428-3.) At the final approval 17 hearing, the Court asked for additional details regarding the fees. (Dkt. No. 440 at 20: 15-20 (“Do 18 you want additional detail on the fees or just the costs? The Court: I haven’t the foggiest idea how 19 you incurred that $6 million…Mr Kessler: Okay. I’ll – we’ll give you further detail on that as 20 well, Your Honor.”). Plaintiffs’ supplemental submission includes a chart which lists “the hours 21 performed by each attorney and staff member for the year, followed by the work performed by the 22 team (attorneys and staff) for that year” and is supported by a supplemental declaration from Class 23 Counsel summarizing the work performed each year. (Dkt. No. 442-1, Supp. Kessler Decl. at ¶¶ 24 6-48; Dkt. No. 442-2 (chart).) 25 Defendant continues to object that these records fail to provide sufficient detail. (Dkt. No. 26 444 at 16-17.) While the Court agrees the high-level nature of these summaries—when compared 27 with the sheer number of hours billed—is troubling, even if the Court reduces the requested 1 lodestar: $6,758,419.50 minus one-third ($2,230,278.44) equals $4,528,141.06. Further, the 2 counsel that previously represented Plaintiffs through the completion of discovery have not sought 3 their fees; so, the actual lodestar for attorney effort to achieve such an exceptional recovery for the 4 class is certainly much, much higher. 5 *** 6 In sum, both the percentage-of-recovery and the lodestar analyses support the requested fee 7 award of $4,156,771. 8 B. Costs 9 “There is no doubt that an attorney who has created a common fund for the benefit of the 10 class is entitled to reimbursement of reasonable litigation expenses from that fund.” Ontiveros v. 11 Zamora, 303 F.R.D. 356, 375 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (cleaned up). Plaintiffs’ counsel attests they have 12 expended a total of $243,526.71 in litigation expenses. (Dkt. No. 442-1, Supp. Kessler Decl. at ¶ 13 51.) Of this, Plaintiffs request $170,979.80 in litigation costs. This encompasses “100% of the 14 unreimbursed fees paid to its expert witness for its work to support the damages claims 15 ($82,569.99) and 100% of unreimbursed fees paid to the settlement administrator for 16 implementing the Damages Class notice plan ($15,818.68).” (Dkt. No. 428 at 33; see also Dkt. 17 No. 442-1, Supp. Kessler Decl. at ¶¶ 52-53.) Counsel attests they incurred an additional 18 $145,138.04 of which they seek half or $72,569.03 for the damages class related costs (the other 19 half being allocated to the injunctive relief and thus included in the stipulated $3 million). (Dkt. 20 No. 442-3.) This amount includes the following categories of costs:

21 • Non-refundable jury consultant fees: $13,256.28 22 • Airfare: $13,781.58 • Hotels: $4,943.20 23 • Long-Distance Transportation: $3,883.32 • WiFi while traveling: $33.95 24 • Copying: $6,476.70 25 • Computerized Legal Research: $58,131.27 • Electronic Discovery Services: $21,846.10 26 • Document Services: $885.09 • Business and Overtime Meals: $1,823.43 27 • Messenger Services: $408.68 1 e Mediator Services: $16,150.00 e Shipping and Mailing: $59.98 2 ¢ Local Transportation: $1,173.03 e Court Costs and Filing Fees: $1,808.39 3 e Misc: $271.36 4 || Ud.) 5 The Court’s preliminary approval order asked for “detailed information supporting the[] 6 || request for costs,” but Plaintiffs motion for attorneys’ fees and costs simply provided a chart 7 || reflecting these amounts without a declaration detailing them or even identifying the names of the 8 expert(s). (Compare Dkt. No. 427 at 13 with Dkt. No. 428-4.) At the final approval hearing, the 9 || Court requested additional information in support of the costs request. (Dkt. No. 440 at 16:1-10 10 || (“Ihave one sheet with no details. The travel. What’s it for? Did you fly —what class did you fly? 1] What hotels? Like what are the costs?.... How did you get all those costs?’’); Id. at 18:4-7 (“I need 12 || more details. I need more details. You don’t get to just fly whatever class you want, eat at

13 || whatever restaurants you want, and stay at whatever hotels you want.”). In response, Plaintiffs

14° Y 14 || have provided a slightly more detailed chart, but still insufficient detail in the supporting

2 15 declaration. (Dkt. No. 442-1, Supp. Kessler Decl. at J § ; Dkt. No. 442-3.) For example, it is still

16 || impossible to determine what class counsel flew, what hotels they stayed at, or even if counsel is

17 || seeking costs related to the appeal, which is concerning as the Ninth Circuit already awarded them

4 18 |} at least some of their costs. See Shields v. World Aquatics, No. 23-15092, Dkt. No. 68 (9th Cir. 19 || Dec. 3, 2024) (Order taxing costs). A side-by-side comparison of a portion of the charts is below: Damages and Injunctive Relief Classes Expenses 20 Damages and Injumctive Retief Classes Expenses ATEGORY Airfare for Jeffrey Kessler. Johanna Rae Hudg $13.781.58 2 1 ae Includes four trips for} Mr Kessler and five trips for Ms. $22,608.10 Hudgens, for an average of $1,531.29 $33.95 - Hearings/oral argument and required in-person meet 22 $6475.70 and confer post-appeal $58,176.77 ~ Delta and United Pass Plus Airfare $21,891.60 —_Non-refundable where possible $1,823.43 -__ 9 nights (Average: $549.24 per night) 94 $16,150.00 ~_Cars to/from airport $1,126.25 □□□ Wi-fi while traveling $1,808.39 Copying Costs $6,476.70 - Exhibits and demonstratives for use in prep, hearings. jury exercises, and oral argument C terized Legal Rs h $58,131.27* 2 6 (Dkt. No. 428-4) see rexisNexis, Westlaw searches and cases (class certification and appointment of class counsel. summary judgment and Daubert, appeals. post-appeal 2 7 class certification) 28 (Dkt. No. 442-3.) 4f

1 As the Court noted at the final approval hearing, it has “an independent obligation to 2 protect the class. It’s the class’s money, right? It’s the class’s money [from] which you’re entitled 3 to reimbursement for your incurred costs.” (Dkt. No. 440 at 18:9-11.) Notwithstanding the 4 admonition, Class Counsel decided to essentially stand on the submission Court already held was 5 inadequate. It did not provide the additional detailed information that the Court requested, and 6 many of the costs—including the $16,000 worth of airfare—appear extraordinary. The Court will 7 therefore reduce the amount of costs awarded for the damages portion of the settlement by half for 8 a total of $36,284.51. Notably, this still means Class Counsel is recovering 75 percent of their 9 costs as they have already recovered 50 percent of these costs through the $3 million injunctive 10 relief award. When this amount is added to the damages expert fees ($82,569.99) and damages 11 class notice fees ($15,818.68), this results in a total costs award of $134,673.18. 12 C. Class Representative Incentive Awards 13 “Incentive awards are fairly typical in class action cases.” Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 14 563 F.3d 948, 958 (9th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing incentive awards from incentive agreements, the 15 latter of which are “entered into as part of the initial retention of counsel” and “put class counsel 16 and the contracting class representatives into a conflict position from day one”). However, the 17 decision to approve such an award is a matter within the Court's discretion. In re Mego Fin. Corp. 18 Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 463 (9th Cir. 2000). Incentive awards “are intended to compensate class 19 representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputation risk 20 undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes to recognize their willingness to act as a private 21 attorney general.” Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 958-59. Although incentive awards are viewed more 22 favorably than incentive agreements, excessive awards “may put the class representative in a 23 conflict with the class and present a considerable danger of individuals bringing cases as class 24 actions principally to increase their own leverage to attain a remunerative settlement for 25 themselves and then trading on that leverage in the course of negotiations.” Id. at 960 (internal 26 quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, “district courts must be vigilant in scrutinizing all 27 incentive awards to determine whether they destroy the adequacy of the class representatives.” 1 In determining whether an incentive award is reasonable, courts generally consider:

2 (1) the risk to the class representative in commencing a suit, both financial and otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties 3 encountered by the class representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the duration of the 4 litigation; and (5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class representative as a result of the litigation. 5 Covillo v. Specialtys Café, No. C–11–00594-DMR, 2014 WL 954516, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 6 2014) (quoting Van Vranken v. Atl. Richfield Co., 901 F. Supp. 294, 299 (N.D. Cal. 1995)). A 7 class representative must justify an incentive award through “evidence demonstrating the quality 8 of plaintiff’s representative service,” such as “substantial efforts taken as class representative to 9 justify the discrepancy between [his] award and those of the unnamed plaintiffs.” Alberto v. 10 GMRI, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 652, 669 (E.D. Cal. 2008). Further, district courts must evaluate each 11 incentive award individually. See Staton, 327 F.3d at 977. 12 Plaintiffs seek $10,000 for each Class Representative Shields and Hosszú. Class Counsel 13 attests: 14 Class Representatives played a significant role in helping prepare the complaint, in developing Class Counsel’s litigation and trial strategy, 15 reviewing filings, and communicating with Class Counsel during settlement negotiations and throughout the settlement approval 16 process. Class Representatives contacted Class Counsel with questions and ideas. Class Representatives also engaged in document 17 and written discovery and were each deposed, with Ms. Hosszú sitting for a two-day deposition 18 (Dkt. No. 428-2, Kessler Decl. at ¶ 46.) Mr. Shields submitted a declaration elaborating on his 19 involvement and detailing the risks he took on by participating in this action. (Dkt. No. 428-7, 20 Shields Decl. at ¶¶ 5-8 (“By participating as a named plaintiff in this litigation against World 21 Aquatics, I put my ability to participate in these events in jeopardy…Given World Aquatics’ 22 gatekeeping role for swimming in the Olympic Games, I placed my ability to participate in the 23 [2020 Tokyo Olympic Games] at risk through my leading role in this litigation.”). As to Ms. 24 Hosszú, Class Counsel attests she took similar risks as she competed in professional swimming as 25 recently as June 2024. (Dkt. No. 428-2, Kessler Decl. at ¶ 47.) Under these circumstances, the 26 Court concludes a service award of $10,000 for each Class Representative is reasonable and does 27 not “undermine the adequacy of the class representatives.” Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Sols. Inc., 1 715 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2013). 2 CONCLUSION 3 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for final approval of 4 the parties’ class action settlement. In addition, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN 5 PART Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs; specifically, the Court awards the 6 following: $4,156,771 in attorney’s fees; $134,673.18 in litigation costs; and $20,000 ($10,000 7 each) in incentive awards for the Class Representatives. 8 In accordance with the Northern District's Procedural Guidance for Class Action 9 Settlements, “[w]ithin 21 days after the distribution of the settlement funds and payment of 10 attorneys' fees,” Class Counsel shall file “a Post-Distribution Accounting” that provides the 11 following, to the extent applicable:

12 The total settlement fund, the total number of class members, the total number of class members to whom notice was sent and not returned 13 as undeliverable, the number and percentage of claim forms submitted, the number and percentage of opt-outs, the number and 14 percentage of objections, the average and median recovery per claimant, the largest and smallest amounts paid to class members, the 15 method(s) of notice and the method(s) of payment to class members, the number and value of checks not cashed, the amounts distributed 16 to each cy pres recipient, the administrative costs, the attorneys' fees and costs, the attorneys' fees in terms of percentage of the settlement 17 fund, and the multiplier, if any. 18 https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/forms/procedural-guidance-for-class-action-settlements/. Class 19 Counsel shall “summarize this information in an easy-to-read chart that allows for quick 20 comparisons with other cases,” and “post the Post-Distribution Accounting, including the easy-to- 21 read chart, on the settlement website.” See id. To the extent the parties agree to a different 22 schedule including a staged process for a motion to approve distribution as discussed at the final 23 approval hearing, they shall file a stipulation with these dates. 24 The parties shall file a proposed judgment on or before April 6, 2026. 25 // 26 // 27 // 1 This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 428, 436. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 Dated: April 1, 2026 , ne 4 JAC&UELINE SCOTT CORLE 5 United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 1] a 12

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