Therease Anita Miles v. Hon. John Augustine Moran II

District Court, M.D. Florida·Decided August 13, 2026·No. 3:25-cv-00158·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

THEREASE ANITA MILES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25-cv-158-MMH-PDB

HON. JOHN AUGUSTINE MORAN II,

Defendant.

ORDER THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief From Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) Against Judge Augustine Moran II (Doc. 50; Motion), filed on June 15, 2026. In the Motion, Plaintiff Therease Anita Miles, who is proceeding pro se, invokes Rule 60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)) and asks the Court to vacate its dismissal of this case. Although the time for doing so has passed, Defendant did not file a response to the Motion. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for review. I. Background Plaintiff initiated this action on February 13, 2025. See Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Doc. 1). The Court struck the initial Complaint and Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Doc. 6; Amended Complaint) on April 16, 2025, which was the operative pleading in this action. On October 2, 2025, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the

Amended Complaint (Doc. 21) and Plaintiff responded in opposition on October 15, 2025 (Doc. 28). Upon review of the matter, the Court entered an Order on February 10, 2026, granting Defendant’s motion and dismissing this case with prejudice. See Order (Doc. 45). On February 12, 2026, the Clerk of Court

entered Judgment (Doc. 46) in accordance with the Court’s Order. Four months later, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion in which she contends that relief is warranted under Rule 60(b)(3) because “the Clerk’s Office committed misconduct by deliberately failing to enter Plaintiff’s timely

submitt[ed] supporting documents into the electronic filing system . . . .” See Motion at 1.1 According to Plaintiff, the failure to docket her supporting documents “directly caused the dismissal of this case” because, had the clerk filed the documents, they “would have demonstrated that the Defendant’s

involvement includes continuous harassing, stalking in (FL, MD, and NC) [sic] by using government officials, family members, attorneys, private company employees, and by the Defendant himself.” See id. at 3. Plaintiff does not specify when or how she submitted these documents for filing prior to the

1 At one point in her Motion, Plaintiff describes the misconduct somewhat differently, asserting that the Clerk’s Office “had all of Plaintiff’s supporting documents removed from the electronic court docket . . . .” See Motion at 1-2. dismissal of this case, nor does she explain why she waited until four months after the entry of Judgment to raise the issue.

Instead, Plaintiff asserts that she has now “given all of her supporting documents that was not entered in the electronic filing system” to the undersigned. See Motion at 2, Ex. B. Specifically, Plaintiff submits a delivery receipt showing that on March 13, 2026, the Clerk’s Office accepted a package

addressed to the undersigned’s chambers. See id., Ex. B. Notably, this receipt is dated a month after the Court’s February 10, 2026 Order dismissing this case and the February 12, 2026 Judgment. See Motion, Ex. B. On June 4, 2026, the Court entered an Order (Doc. 49) acknowledging receipt of this

package, which included a letter dated March 13, 2026, and lengthy attachments. See June 4, 2026 Order at 1, Att. 1. In the June 4, 2026 Order, among other things, the Court informed Plaintiff that it was improper to seek relief from the Court via letter and as such, the letter and its attachments would

not be filed. See Order at 1 (citing Local Rule 3.01(l)). Significantly, the Court also explained that “[r]egardless, the content of the letter and attachments do not in any way call into question the Court’s Judgment.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added).

II. Applicable Law Rule 60(b) “sets forth the grounds on which a court, in its discretion, can rescind or amend a final judgment or order.” See Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677, 679 (11th Cir. 1984). Specifically, this Rule allows a party to seek relief from “a final judgment, order, or proceeding” based on:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(4) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

See Rule 60(b). Where, as here, the movant invokes Rule 60(b)(3), it is the moving party’s burden to “prove by clear and convincing evidence that the adverse party obtained the verdict through fraud, misrepresentations, or other misconduct.” Cromity v. City of Orlando, No. 24-13760, 2025 WL 2742414, at *2 (11th Cir. Sept. 26, 2025)2 (quoting Waddell v. Hendry Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 329 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003)). “The moving party must also

2 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent; however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”). demonstrate that the conduct prevented [her] from fully presenting [her] case.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Waddell, 329 F.3d at 1309).

“The purpose of a Rule 60(b) motion is to allow the court to reconsider matters to ‘correct obvious errors or injustices and so perhaps obviate the laborious process of appeal.’” See id. at *2 (quoting Carter ex rel. Carter v. United States, 780 F.2d 925, 928 (11th Cir. 1986)). However, a motion under

this Rule “‘cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.’” See Terrell v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 98 F.4th 1343, 1357 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir. 2009)).

Although Rule 60(b) “should be construed in order to do substantial justice, . . . this does not mean that final judgments should be lightly reopened.” See Griffin, 722 F.2d at 680 (internal citation omitted). Rather, “[t]he desirability for order and predictability in the judicial process speaks for caution in the

reopening of judgments.” Id. III. Discussion Plaintiff’s request for relief under Rule 60 is due to be denied for several reasons. First, to the extent Plaintiff invokes Rule 60(b)(3), this Rule permits

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Therease Anita Miles v. Hon. John Augustine Moran II, (M.D. Fla. 2026).

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