The Upper Deck Company v. Pixels.com, LLC

District Court, S.D. California·Decided February 26, 2026·No. 3:24-cv-00923·Unknown

Opinion

THE UPPER DECK COMPANY, Case No. 24-cv-00923-BAS-DEB

Plaintiff, ORDER: v. (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SEAL (ECF No. 164); Defendant. AND

(2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SEAL (ECF No. 169)

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Upper Deck Company’s (“Upper Deck”) renewed motions to seal. (ECF Nos. 164, 169.) For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Upper Deck’s motion (ECF No. 164) in accordance with Appendix A. The Court GRANTS Upper Deck’s motion (ECF No. 169) in accordance with Appendix B. Defendant Pixels.com (“Pixels”) allegedly interfered with Upper Deck’s exclusive rights to use intellectual property assets associated with the brand of world-famous basketball player, Michael Jordan (“Jordan”), to develop sports memorabilia. More specifically, Pixels allegedly advertised and sold products appropriating Jordan’s likeness online without either Upper Deck’s or Jordan’s permission. (ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 25–35.) Upper Deck obtained the rights to use Michael Jordan’s likeness through licensing agreements. (Id. ¶¶19–24.) Furthermore, Pixels’ products also allegedly misappropriated Upper Deck’s own trademarks—including Upper Deck’s logo. (Id. ¶ 11.) On May 28, 2024, Upper Deck initiated this action against Defendant Pixels.com (“Pixels”). (ECF No. 1.) On October 1, 2024, Upper Deck filed the operative complaint in this action alleging causes of action, inter alia, for: (1) false advertising and unfair competition claims under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a); (2) trademark dilution under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c); (3) trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114; (4) deprivation of rights of publicity, Cal. Civ. Code § 3344; (5) deprivation of rights of publicity under California common law; (6) unfair competition under California statutory, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq, and common law. (ECF No. 24.) Throughout the course of this action, both parties filed motions to seal. (See ECF Nos. 75, 78, 81, 88, 91, 95, 97, 102, 107.) The Court granted in part and denied in part Parties’ motions (see ECF Nos. 110, 160, 163.) Now pending before the Court are Upper Deck’s motions to seal portions of expert reports, third-party sublicensing agreements attached to Parties’ motions for summary judgment (ECF No. 164), and portions of exhibits attached to Parties’ pretrial disclosures (ECF No. 169). In ECF No. 164, Upper Deck moved to seal specific portions of the following documents: 1. An executed agreement between Brevettar, LLC and Trends International, LLC for Trends International, LLC to sublicense Brevettar, LLC’s rights to use Michael Jordan’s intellectual property (ECF No. 165, Ex. 20); 2. An expert report by Upper Deck’s expert, Christian Tregillis (ECF No. 165-1, Ex. 94); 3. An expert report by Pixels’ expert, Lindsey Fisher. (ECF No. 165-2, Ex. M.) In ECF No. 169, Upper Deck moved to seal portions of the following exhibits attached to pretrial disclosures: 4. An email exchange between third-parties Estee Portnoy and Dwight Manley dated June 10, 2021. (ECF No. 170, Ex. 2.) 5. An email exchange between Jason Masherah (Upper Deck) and third-party Estee Portnoy dated March 14, 2024. (ECF No. 170-1, Ex. 3.) 6. An email exchange between Estee Portnoy and Jason Masherah dated between April 1, 2021 and April 5, 2021. (ECF No. 170-2, Ex. 4.) 7. An email exchange between Estee Portnoy and Jason Masherah dated between April 23, 2021 and April 27, 2021. (ECF No. 170-3, Ex. 5.) 8. An email exchange between Estee Portnoy and Jason Masherah dated between April 23, 2021 through April 30, 2021. (ECF No. 170-4, Ex. 6.) In this Order, the Court evaluates Upper Deck’s pending motions to seal above. (ECF Nos. 164, 169.) “[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). “Unless a particular court record is one ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point.” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). “The presumption of access is ‘based on the need for federal courts, although independent—indeed, particularly because they are independent—to have a measure of accountability and for the public to have confidence in the administration of justice.’” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2nd Cir. 1995)). A party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming the strong presumption of access. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135. The showing required to meet this burden depends upon whether the documents to be sealed relate to a motion that is “more than tangentially related to the merits of the case.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1101. When the underlying motion is more than tangentially related to the merits, the “compelling reasons” standard applies. Id. at 1096–98. When the underlying motion does not surpass the tangential relevance threshold, the “good cause” standard applies. Id. “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). As to this last category, courts have been willing to seal court filings containing confidential business material, “such as marketing strategies, product development plans, licensing agreements, and profit, cost, and margin data,” where the parties have been able to point to concrete factual information to justify sealing. See, e.g., Cohen v. Trump, No. 13-cv-2519-GPC-WVG, 2016 WL 3036302, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 27, 2016). However, “[t]he mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. Similarly, it is not enough to “mention[] a general category of privilege, without any further elaboration or any specific linkage with the documents.” Id. at 1184. A blanket protective order is not itself sufficient to show “good cause,” let alone compelling reasons, for sealing particular documents. See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1133; San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., N. Dist., 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999). The decision to seal documents is “one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court” upon consideration of the “relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599. In addition, parties moving to seal documents must comply with the procedures set forth in this Court’s Standing Order for filing documents under seal. See Standing Order of the Hon. Cynthia Bashant for Civil Cases § 5. These procedures limit sealing to “only those documents, or portions thereof, necessary to protect such sensitive information.” Id. Thus, although sometimes it may be appropriate to seal a document in its entirety, whenever possible, a party must redact. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1183 (noti

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