The Peoples Gas Light And Coke Company v. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

742 F.2d 1109, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 18893
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedSeptember 5, 1984
Docket83-2025
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 742 F.2d 1109 (The Peoples Gas Light And Coke Company v. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Peoples Gas Light And Coke Company v. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 742 F.2d 1109, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 18893 (7th Cir. 1984).

Opinion

742 F.2d 1109

The PEOPLES GAS LIGHT AND COKE COMPANY and North Shore Gas
Company, Petitioners,
and
Iowa Power and Light Company and Northern Indiana Public
Service Company (NIPSCO), Intervening Petitioners,
v.
The FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Respondent,
and
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, a Division of Tenneco, Inc.,
Intervening Respondent.

No. 83-2025.

United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 12, 1984.
Decided Sept. 5, 1984.

Thomas M. Patrick, Chicago, Ill., for petitioners.

Andrea Wolfman and A. Karen Hill, F.E.R.C., Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Before PELL and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and NICHOLS, Senior Circuit Judge.*

NICHOLS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Petitioners seek review of an order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) which (1) disallowed a composite emergency rate charged by Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America (Natural) to off-system customers, (2) selected a lower rate "prescribed" in Natural's filed tariff schedule, and (3) ordered Natural to refund to the off-system purchasers the excess charges. Petitioners allege that the Commission's decision choosing a specific rate to apply to the emergency sales in question was unreasoned, made in contradiction of the Commission's own rules and regulatory interpretations, and thus arbitrary or capricious. Because we find that the Commission failed to provide an adequate explanation for its rate-choosing approach, we vacate its decision and remand the case for further proceedings.

I.--Background

On May 30, 1980, Natural filed an application for a general rate increase which, by Commission order of December 7, 1981, 17 F.E.R.C. p 61,205, was resolved for all but one issue. The reserved issue concerned the proper disposition of about $37 million in revenues Natural received from three off-system interstate pipelines (Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, Texas Eastern Transmission Company, and Lone Star Gas Company) for emergency sales of natural gas which Natural made to them pursuant to the Commission's 60-day emergency sale regulations, 18 C.F.R. Sec. 157.45-.52 (issued pursuant to Section 7(c)(1)(B) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 717f(c)(1)(B) (1982)). Natural's purchased gas costs for this gas amounted to about $1.82 per million British thermal units (MMBtu); it sold the gas at a rate of $3.00 per MMBtu.

Natural calculated its $3.00 rate on the basis of components from various rates it had on file with the Commission. Natural had not filed the $3.00 rate itself, however, when it made the emergency sales. The Commission held that because the $3.00 rate which Natural charged for this particular type of service did not appear on the face of the tariff, the rate was not "prescribed" in the tariff schedule as 18 C.F.R. Sec. 157.49(a) requires. Because no special circumstances were present, the Commission held that Natural could not justify under Commission regulations its use of the $3.00 rate in connection with the emergency sales. The petitioners do not contest the Commission's decision as to this point.

Once it was held that Natural's $3.00 rate was improper, however, a determination of the proper rate remained. During the period in which Natural made these emergency sales, it had several published volumetric rates (i.e., rates charged at stated prices per MMBtu of gas purchased) in effect for various sales services. The highest of these, the WS-1 (winter service) rate, was less than the $3.00 rate Natural charged. The presiding official in the initial hearing, who bore the responsibility to remedy Natural's overcharge and to establish the correct "prescribed" rate, reviewed all of Natural's filed rates and concluded that Natural had only one "prescribed" rate for emergencies, its E-1 rate. The E-1 rate, the lowest of Natural's published rates, is not by its terms available to off-system purchasers, however, because its availability is limited to "any utility, municipality or pipeline company which is a Buyer of natural gas under Rate Schedules DMQ-1 or G-1 of this Tariff." Despite this restriction, the presiding official decided that equity required him to do "that which should have been done, namely the modification of Natural's tariff in order to include the off-system emergency sales in its E-1 rate schedule."

The Commission affirmed the presiding official's application of the E-1 rate to Natural's off-system sales. It asserted here that there is no significant cost difference between emergency sales to on-system and off-system customers, but it did not explain why this is so. It ordered Natural to refund the revenue in excess of the E-1 rate, approximately $19 million, to the three purchasing off-system pipelines. Under Commission regulations, 18 C.F.R. Sec. 157.50(a), the net revenues derived from the emergency sales had been credited to, or set off against, the pipeline's unrecovered purchased gas cost, and had resulted in the flowing through of the benefit of the net revenues to the pipeline's on-system customers. A refund, therefore, will cause a corresponding increase in the costs to Natural's on-system customers. Natural itself neither benefits nor loses by the Commission's rate choice; therefore, its customers challenge, as the real parties in interest, the Commission's choice of the E-1 rate.

II--Discussion

Our review of Commission decisions reached under the Natural Gas Act is limited to assuring that the decisions are reasoned, principled, and based upon substantial record evidence. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 628 F.2d 578, 593 (D.C.Cir.1979). Thus, when we review a Commission order, our responsibility is to determine (1) whether the Commission abused or exceeded its authority; (2) whether each essential element of the Commission's order is supported by substantial evidence; and (3) whether the Commission has given reasoned consideration to each of the pertinent factors in balancing the needs of the industry with the relevant public interests. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 791-92, 88 S.Ct. 1344, 1372-1373, 20 L.Ed.2d 312 (1968). Giving the required deference to the Commission, we are nevertheless unable to find in the record any reasoned justification for requiring that Natural apply the E-1 rate instead of any other higher prescribed rate.

The Natural Gas Act does not mandate that the Commission use any specific formula in determining the proper rate to apply to emergency sales to off-system customers when no prescribed rate is applicable. The pertinent language concerning rates is brief and susceptible to varying interpretation: "Sales by interstate pipelines shall be made at rates prescribed in their tariffs * * *." 18 C.F.R. Sec. 157.49. The Commission interpreted its emergency sale regulation's "prescribed rate" requirement to preclude the construction of a composite rate based on cost-justified rate components.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
742 F.2d 1109, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 18893, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-peoples-gas-light-and-coke-company-v-the-federal-energy-regulatory-ca7-1984.