¶14 A trial court's determination of whether a defendant was in custody when he was interrogated presents a mixed question of law and fact. People v. Clark , 2020 CO 36, ¶ 21, ––– P.3d ––––. We defer to the trial court's findings of historical fact and credibility as long as those findings are supported by competent evidence in the record. Id. But our analysis is not strictly limited to the factual findings that form the basis of the trial court's order; we may also consider undisputed facts in the record. People v. Davis, 2019 CO 84, ¶ 18, 449 P.3d 732, 738. Also, we may independently review audio-recorded interrogations:
"[W]here the statements sought to be suppressed are audio- and video-recorded, and there are no disputed facts outside the recording controlling the issue of suppression, we are in a similar position as the trial court to determine whether the statements should be suppressed." Thus, we may undertake an independent review of the audio or video recording to determine whether the statements were properly suppressed in light of the controlling law.
Clark, ¶ 23 (quoting People v. Kutlak, 2016 CO 1, ¶ 13, 364 P.3d 199, 203 ). Finally, we review de novo the legal question of whether the facts, taken as a whole, establish that the suspect was in custody when he was interrogated. Id. at ¶ 21.
B. Law Relating to Custody for Miranda Purposes ¶15 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution ensures that no criminal defendant may be compelled to testify against himself. In Miranda, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, to secure this Fifth Amendment right, a person subjected to custodial interrogation must be afforded certain procedural safeguards; specifically, police must provide warnings that inform the person of his right against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602. If police fail to give these warnings, the state may not introduce, in its case-in-chief, statements made by a defendant during the custodial interrogation. Id. at 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602. But Miranda warnings are required only when a person is both in custody and subjected to police interrogation. People v. Garcia, 2017 CO 106, ¶ 19, 409 P.3d 312, 317.
¶16 "A person is in custody for Miranda purposes if [he] has been formally arrested or if, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have felt that [his] freedom of action had been curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest." Id. at ¶ 20, 409 P.3d at 317. "A Miranda custody assessment considers ‘the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not ... the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.’ " Davis, ¶ 19, 449 P.3d at 738 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) ). "In making this determination, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances under which the interrogation was conducted." Mumford v. People, 2012 CO 2, ¶ 13, 270 P.3d 953, 957. We have outlined a nonexhaustive list of nine factors for courts to consider when assessing the circumstances of the encounter between the defendant and the police:
(1) the time, place, and purpose of the encounter; (2) the persons present during the interrogation; (3) the words spoken by the officer to the defendant; (4) the officer's tone of voice and general demeanor; (5) the length and mood of the interrogation; (6) whether any limitation of movement or other form of restraint was placed on the defendant during the interrogation; (7) the officer's response to any questions asked by the defendant; (8) whether directions were given to the defendant during the interrogation; and (9) the defendant's verbal or nonverbal response to such directions.
Matheny, 46 P.3d at 465-66 (quoting People v. Trujillo, 938 P.2d 117, 124 (Colo. 1997) ). No single factor is determinative. Clark, ¶ 27. With these principles in mind, we turn to the facts of this case.
¶17 In this case, the suppressed statements were audio-recorded. The district court also made two findings of undisputed fact outside the bounds of the recording that bear on whether Padilla was in custody: (1) that Padilla was required to attend his probation appointment, and his probation officer exerted a good deal of influence over him that day; and (2) that police had attempted to contact Padilla for several months before the interrogation, and Padilla had intentionally avoided them. Therefore, with no disputed facts outside the recording, we may conduct an independent review of the recording in conjunction with the district court's findings to determine whether the statements should be suppressed. To make this determination, we apply the Matheny factors.
¶18 First, as to the time, place, and purpose of the encounter, we note that the interrogation took place at the El Paso County Probation Department. Padilla was in the Probation Department to attend a mandatory probation meeting. After that meeting, Padilla's probation officer brought him to meet with the detectives. Following initial introductions, the probation officer left and Padilla sat down to talk with the detectives in a windowless, unlocked conference room. Detective Gardner had previously made numerous attempts to contact Padilla to discuss the allegations with him; therefore, Padilla knew that he was being investigated for a sexual assault.
¶19 Second, as to the persons present during the interrogation, Padilla did not have a representative with him. There were two detectives present, and Padilla was unfamiliar with both.
¶20 Third, with respect to the words spoken by the officers to the defendant, and fourth, with respect to the officer's tone of voice and general demeanor, Detective Gardner's words were nonconfrontational and his tone and general demeanor remained friendly throughout the interrogation. When Padilla first entered the room, Detective Gardner asked him how much time he had, and while Padilla indicated a preference to talk at a later date, Padilla agreed that he had a few minutes before he needed to leave. Detective Gardner accepted the terms set by Padilla and stated that talking for just a few minutes was "perfect." Detective Gardner never raised his voice, and he maintained a conversational tone throughout the encounter. He allowed Padilla to discuss his schedule and work release sentence—topics that had no bearing on the investigation—without interrupting, even though he knew their time was limited. At one point, Detective Gardner implied that Padilla was holding back about a sexual encounter with J.M. It is evident, however, that the detective was talking about the possibility of a consensual, extramarital affair, noting that "that happens sometimes." At the end of the interrogation, Detective Gardner stated that he was appreciative of Padilla's time and wished him good luck.3
¶21 Fifth, regarding the length and mood of the interrogation, the interrogation lasted only ten minutes, and the mood was casual: Detective Gardner indicated that he was there as a fact finder and was open to believing Padilla; Padilla chuckled when discussing his willingness to take a DNA test; and a large portion of the ten-minute interrogation was spent discussing Padilla's schedule and work release sentence.4
¶22 With respect to the remaining Matheny factors, the detectives neither touched Padilla, nor placed him in any physical restraints. Padilla did not ask any questions, and the detectives did not give any directions.
¶23 A review of the Matheny factors, therefore, shows that some facts weigh in favor of finding that Padilla was in custody. These include that Padilla's probation appointment was mandatory, his probation officer exerted a good deal of influence over Padilla that day, and the Probation Department conference room more closely resembled a traditional interrogation room than other settings. Cf. Garcia, ¶¶ 21-22, 409 P.3d at 317 (noting that a location such as one's home or a public space weighs against finding a defendant was in custody). Padilla also did not know the detectives and did not have any representative or neutral party present. Cf. Matheny, 46 P.3d at 467 (noting that the defendant had interacted with the interrogating officers before and that the defendant's mother was present at the interrogation).
¶24 Conversely, other facts suggest that Padilla was not in custody. Detective Gardner remained nonconfrontational and friendly in his questioning and demeanor. See, e.g., People v. Klinck, 259 P.3d 489, 494 (Colo. 2011) (holding that a deputy's use of nonconfrontational, open-ended questions and a conversational tone weighed against finding that the defendant was in custody).5 Also, the conversation was short in length and casual in mood. See Clark, ¶ 30 (finding that the brevity of an encounter weighed against custody); Klinck, 259 P.3d at 494 (same). Notably, Padilla himself dictated that it would be a short encounter, and the conversation centered on Padilla's schedule and availability. Detective Gardner was deferential to Padilla's terms and, as a result, the encounter lasted only ten minutes. Finally, Padilla was not restrained or given directions by the detectives. See Clark, ¶ 33 (discussing cases that have "relied on the absence of handcuffs or other restraints as suggesting that the suspect was not in custody"); Garcia, ¶ 28, 409 P.3d at 318 (partially relying on the fact that officers did not give any directions to the defendant to hold that the defendant was not in custody).
¶25 In weighing all the facts, we place particular emphasis on the fact that Padilla dictated the length of the interrogation. While no one factor is determinative, this fact is significant because a reasonable person who sets the length of an interrogation is unlikely to believe that his freedom of action has been curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. Simply put, the time, mood, topics, and length of the conversation made it clear that Padilla was leaving the room of his own accord after a short period of time.
¶26 With all of these facts in mind, we conclude that under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Padilla's position would not have felt that his freedom of action had been curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. Hence, Padilla was not in custody for Miranda purposes.