The Habitat Company, LLC v. Bonner

2023 IL App (1st) 220515-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 12, 2023
• Docket: 1-22-0515
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2023 IL App (1st) 220515-U

No. 1-22-0515

Order filed May 12, 2023

FIFTH DIVISION

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE HABITAT COMPANY, LLC, as ) Appeal from the Agent for DREXEL PRESERVATION, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 20 M1 704983 ) HERMAN BONNER and ANY AND ) ALL UNKNOWN OCCUPANTS, ) Honorable ) Clare J. Quish, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge presiding.

JUSTICE LYLE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Mitchell concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm the judgment of the trial court as defendant has failed to furnish a sufficient record such that an error can be determined.

¶2 The defendant-appellant, Herman Bonner, appeals pro se from the trial court’s order,

entered after a bench trial, granting possession of an apartment to the plaintiff, The Habitat

Company, as an agent for Drexel Preservation. On appeal, Mr. Bonner contends that the trial court No. 1-22-0515

abused its discretion when it failed to consider Mr. Bonner’s evidence at trial. We affirm the

judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 The record on appeal does not contain a report of proceedings. The following facts are

gleaned from the common law record, which includes the Habitat Company’s complaint and

amended complaint, Mr. Bonner’s answer, and the trial court’s orders.

¶5 On May 28, 2020, the Habitat Company filed a complaint in the trial court seeking

possession of an apartment in a building on the 4400 block of South Drexel Boulevard in Chicago

(the apartment). The complaint alleged that Mr. Bonner, the lessee of the apartment, breached

certain terms of his lease, specifically, paragraphs “13(c),” “23(c)(1),” “23(c)(6)(a)(b),” and

“23(c)(10),” but did not state the content of those paragraphs or the nature of the violation. The

record on appeal, however, contains two documents file-stamped on July 21, 2020, which pertain

to the Habitat Company’s allegations.

¶6 The first document is comprised of several pages from a “MODEL LEASE FOR

SUBSIDIZED PROGRAMS.” Numbering at the bottom of each page reflects the lease contained

10 pages, but only 5 pages of the lease are included in the record on appeal. The document states

that the lease for the apartment began on September 1, 2019, ended on August 31, 2020, and would

thereafter continue on a month-to-month basis unless “automatically terminated as permitted by

paragraph 23” of the lease. The page with paragraph 23 is not included in the record on appeal.

Paragraph 13(c) prohibits “unlawful activities in the unit, in the common areas or on the project

grounds.”

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¶7 The second document, a “NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF TENANCY,” is dated May

6, 2020, and states that Mr. Bonner’s tenancy and lease would be terminated on May 18, 2020.

According to the notice, on May 5, 2020, Mr. Bonner “assaulted” two of the “landlord’s”

employees and struck a third employee with his cane in violation of paragraph 23 of the lease.

¶8 On October 5, 2020, through counsel, Mr. Bonner filed an appearance and jury demand.

Subsequently, on December 21, 2020, Mr. Bonner filed a verified answer, affirmative defense, and

counterclaim. Mr. Bonner alleged that he underwent hip surgery, but the Habitat Company’s

property manager refused his request to move from a unit on the third floor to one on the first floor.

Mr. Bonner then arranged a tenants’ meeting to discuss “issues” with the property manager. A few

days after the meeting, the property manager physically accosted Mr. Bonner. Mr. Bonner claimed

that the Habitat Company moved to evict him within one year of his engagement in certain

protected activities in violation of the Chicago Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance

(RLTO) (see Chicago Municipal Code § 5-12-150 (amended Nov. 6, 1991)), and that the

allegations in the termination notice were pretextual.

¶9 On April 6, 2021, the trial court entered an agreed order stating, in pertinent part, that the

Habitat Company was given leave to transfer Mr. Bonner to a new unit in response to Mr. Bonner’s

request for a reasonable accommodation, and that Mr. Bonner would relinquish possession of the

apartment that was the subject of the eviction proceedings. The Habitat Company thereafter filed

an amended complaint bearing Mr. Bonner’s new unit address.

¶ 10 On November 23, 2021, the matter appeared before the trial court for a settlement

conference. Mr. Bonner withdrew his jury demand, and the cause was continued.

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¶ 11 On February 1, 2022, the trial court entered an order stating that the parties had appeared

with their attorneys and conducted a bench trial via Zoom. According to the order, the court heard

the parties’ testimony, other evidence, and argument, and continued the cause until February 16,

2022, for a ruling.

¶ 12 On February 16, 2022, the trial court entered an order stating:

“For all of the reasons stated in open court, after considering all of the testimony

and evidence admitted by both parties at trial, evaluating the witnesses’ testimony and

assessing their credibility, and considering the arguments of the attorneys, the Court finds

in favor of plaintiff on its Complaint and in favor of the plaintiff on defendant’s affirmative

defense and counterclaim.”

¶ 13 On the same date, the trial court entered an eviction order awarding the Habitat Company

possession of Mr. Bonner’s new unit. On March 16, 2022, Mr. Bonner filed a pro se notice of

appeal. 1

1 On March 25, 2022, defendant filed a pro se motion for “Re-trial and Extended Stay.” In a written order entered on April 15, 2022, the trial court construed the filing as a motion to reconsider and struck it for lack of jurisdiction as defendant had already filed a notice of appeal. While the court was correct that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion, its lack of jurisdiction was not due merely to the fact that the postjudgment motion was filed after the notice of appeal. See John G. Phillips & Associates v. Brown, 197 Ill. 2d 337, 343 (2001) (“[T]he circuit court has jurisdiction to act on a timely filed post-judgment motion,” even where “that motion is filed after a notice of appeal, because the filing of the post-judgment motion renders the prior notice of appeal of no effect.”). Rather, the court lacked jurisdiction because the motion was untimely. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017) (a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the final judgment appealed from or “if a timely posttrial motion directed against the judgment is filed, *** within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending postjudgment motion” (emphasis added)); see also Habitat Co., LLC v. Peeples, 2018 IL App (1st) 171420, ¶ 15 (“[A] trial court loses jurisdiction over a case and has no authority to vacate or modify a final judgment once 30 days have elapsed, unless a timely postjudgment motion has been filed.”). Here, the court’s order was entered on February 16, 2022, and defendant’s motion was filed more than 30 days later on March 25, 2022.

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¶ 14 ANALYSIS

¶ 15 On February 15, 2023, this court entered an order taking the case for consideration on the

record and defendant’s brief only. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction

Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976) (a reviewing court may decide a case on an appellant’s brief alone

“if the record is simple and the claimed errors are such that the court can easily decide them without

the aid of an appellee’s brief”).

¶ 16 On appeal, Mr. Bonner contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it accepted

the Habitat Company’s evidence and testimony at trial, but failed to consider Mr. Bonner’s

evidence.

¶ 17 As a preliminary matter, our review of Mr. Bonner’s appeal is hindered by his failure to

fully comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), which “governs the form

and content of appellate briefs.” McCann v. Dart, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 12. Although Mr.

Bonner is a pro se litigant, this status does not lessen his burden on appeal. “In Illinois, parties

choosing to represent themselves without a lawyer must comply with the same rules and are held

to the same standards as licensed attorneys.” Holzrichter v. Yorath, 2013 IL App (1st) 110287, ¶

78. Rule 341(h) provides that an appellant’s brief should contain a statement of “the facts necessary

to an understanding of the case, stated accurately and fairly without argument or comment,” and

an argument “which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with

citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6), (7) (eff.

Oct. 1, 2020). Pursuant to the rule, a reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with

“cohesive arguments” presented and pertinent authority cited. Obert v. Saville, 253 Ill. App. 3d

677, 682 (1993).

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¶ 18 Here, although Mr. Bonner used in part a form approved by the Illinois Supreme Court

when filing his brief, he cites no legal authority on appeal. The only factual citations are to the

“page” and “line” of an unidentified source, which, as previously noted, the record on appeal does

not contain a report of proceedings. “Arguments that do not comply with Rule 341(h)(7) do not

merit consideration on appeal and may be rejected by this court for that reason alone.” Wells Fargo

Bank, N.A. v. Sanders, 2015 IL App (1st) 141272, ¶ 43. Accordingly, to the extent that Mr.

Bonner’s brief fails to comply with Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7), his arguments are forfeited.

¶ 19 Considering the content of Mr. Bonner’s brief, it would be within our discretion to dismiss

his appeal. Zale v. Moraine Valley Community College, 2019 IL App (1st) 190197, ¶ 32 (this court

has the discretion to dismiss an appeal where the appellant’s brief fails to comply with Supreme

Court Rule 341). However, because the issue in this case is easily resolved and Mr. Bonner

attempted to use the proper form, we choose not to dismiss the appeal on that ground. See Zale,

2019 IL App (1st) 190197, ¶ 32. That said, the deficiencies in the record still prevent us from

reaching this appeal on the merits.

¶ 20 Mr. Bonner has filed papers asking this court to review the decision of the trial court. Mr.

Bonner, however, submitted no transcript of the proceedings or a bystander’s report for us to

review. On appeal, an appellant has the burden to provide a complete record for review in the

appellate court to support his claim of error. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391 (1984). If no

such record is provided, “it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in

conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis.” Foutch, at 392. This is because, in order

to determine whether there was actually an error, a reviewing court must have a record before it to

review. Foutch, at 392.

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¶ 21 While Mr. Bonner submitted a copy of his lease, it was not the entire document. Further,

although the record reveals that a bench trial occurred on February 1, 2022, the record on appeal

does not contain a report of proceedings from the trial or an acceptable substitute such as a

bystander’s report or agreed statement of facts pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323. See

Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(a), (c), (d) (eff. July 1, 2017). Without a trial transcript or an acceptable substitute,

we are unable to determine what evidence was admitted or excluded at trial. Moreover, we have

no knowledge of what arguments were presented at trial and no record of the trial court’s

evidentiary or other rulings. Under these circumstances, we must presume that the court acted in

conformity with the law and ruled properly after considering the evidence before it. Corral v.

Mervis Industries, Inc., 217 Ill. 2d 144, 156-57 (2005). In the absence of a report of proceedings

or other record of the trial, we have no basis for disturbing the trial court’s judgment. Foutch, 99

Ill. 2d at 391-92.

¶ 22 CONCLUSION

¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

¶ 24 Affirmed.

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