IRVING R. KAUFMAN, Chief Judge:
For the private citizen engaged in litigation, the outcome of his lawsuit may profoundly influence the future course of his life whether the issues presented raise questions of constitutional stature and great moment to the Republic, or merely rules of law that allow of limited application and arouse slight jurisprudential interest. In this appeal we consider a single, narrow question of Massachusetts law which will determine whether Guardian Life Insurance Co. (Guardian) can avoid its obligations under four policies issued to Dr. George Robitaille who, subsequent to the issuance of the policies, was diagnosed as having multiple sclerosis. Following a jury trial, Chief Judge Blumenfeld entered judgment for Dr. Robitaille. After careful scrutiny of the facts and the relevant state law, we affirm.
I.
Since a clear understanding of the complex and technical facts is essential to the determination of this appeal, we turn first to the events preceding the litigation. Dr. Robitaille had entered active service as a medical officer in the United States Navy immediately upon his graduation in 1960 from the Tufts University Medical School. According to his testimony at trial, Dr. Robitaille applied for discharge in 1968 but, because of the ongoing hostilities in Vietnam, his application was denied. In 1969, anxious to return to civilian life and to commence the private practice of medicine in Fall River, Massachusetts, he again requested a discharge, and this time his resignation from the service was accepted.
After a complete medical examination by Navy physicians, the doctor was declared in sound health. Accordingly, just prior to his discharge, Dr. Robi-taille signed a statement releasing the Navy from responsibility for any medical problems which might develop subsequently. In anticipation of his departure from the service, and on the advice of a loeal agent for Guardian, Dr. Robi-taille purchased four insurance policies:
1. Life Insurance Policy No. 2147543, Face Amount $50,000, with a provision for waiver of premium in the event of total disability, issued July 29,1969.
2. Disability Income Policy No. G165503, monthly benefit of $800 for total disability, payable for lifetime of the insured, issued August 15, 1969.
3. Disability Income Policy No. G165473, monthly benefit of $800 for five years for total disability, with an additional monthly hospital benefit of $400 and accidental death benefit of $1,000, issued August 15, 1969.
4. Professional Overhead Expense Disability Policy No. G164897, monthly benefit of $600 for 12 months, issued June 12,1969.
In connection with these policies, Dr. Robitaille, who was 34 years old at the time, executed and signed an application, dated June 17, 1969,1 in which he an[892]*892swered questions concerning his medical history. The following questions evoked responses which are at issue in this lawsuit:
8. To the best of your knowledge and belief, have you ever had or been told that you had: (a) a mental or emotional problem requiring the help of a physician or clinical psychologist, dizziness, fainting spells, epilepsy, convulsions, nervous breakdown, recurrent headaches, stroke, or any other disease or disorder of the brain or nervous system?
No.
(e) nephritis, kidney stone, or any disease of the kidneys, bladder, prostate, genital organs, or venereal disease ?
Yes. Mild prostatitis in 1967. Treated by Dr. William Urschel, Chief of Urology, Naval Hospital, Newport, R. I. No recurrence since 1967.
(i) anemia, varicose veins or ulcers, phlebitis, disorder of blood ?
Yes. Mild saphenous varicosities L leg. No symptoms.
(j) impairment of sight or hearing or any disease or disorder of the skin, ears, eyes, nose or throat? Yes. Slight bilateral high tone hearing loss secondary to acoustic trauma (gunfire) in Navy 1961. No difficulty, no change in audi-ograms since then.2
9. Have you had an X-ray, electrocardiogram, blood studies, or other diagnostic test within the past five years ?
Yes, as a matter of routine. All normal. Naval Hosp., Newport, R. I.
13. In the past 5 years have you consulted or been treated or examined by any physician or practitioner (a) not named above?
No.
or (b) for any cause not recorded above ?
No.
In his application, Dr. Robitaille specifically authorized Guardian to examine all his medical records, a privilege which Guardian failed to exercise. On July 8, 1969, Dr. Robitaille was examined by Dr. David Greer, a medical examiner for Guardian, who indicated he was a “first class” candidate for insurance. Accordingly, the policies were issued.
Dr. Robitaille’s honorable discharge from the Navy became effective July 1, 1969. Believing himself to be in good health, he immediately proceeded to carry out his intention to establish a private practice in Fall River, Massachusetts, an endeavor which incurred the not inconsiderable expenses of renting and staffing a medical office. His career as a private practitioner was, however, short-lived. Several months after his discharge, Dr. Robitaille developed a burning sensation (paresthesias) in both legs. His condition worsened and, when he developed a weakness of the right leg, he was “no longer able to carry on.” On November 17, 1969, he entered Massachusetts General Hospital for extensive tests 3 which produced for the first time a diagnosis of multiple sclerosis, a tragic degenerative disease of the nervous system. Following his release from the hospital on December 2, he abandoned his new practice and, in order to pursue a less demanding career, joined thé staff of St. Mary’s Hospital in Waterbury, Connecticut as a hematologist.
[893]*893The diagnosis of multiple sclerosis not only had a dramatic impact on Dr. Robi-taille’s future, it also provided a basis for the perfect hindsight with which to view his past medical history. Such 20/20 hindsight is common when a final diagnosis, even one which had evaded the best medical brains, is made. But, the process of diagnosing disease is not unlike that of fitting together a jigsaw puzzle — seemingly disjointed pieces are suddenly placed in proper juxtaposition only after the critical connection is supplied. Accordingly, after Dr. Robitaille left Massachusetts General Hospital it became possible to surmise that several symptoms he had exhibited prior to his discharge from the military — symptoms which had been associated by his Navy doctors merely with the ailments revealed in his insurance application— might, now that everyone was wiser, really have been early indications of neurological disorder.
A brief recitation of the history of his symptoms is in order.4 In early June 1968, Dr. Robitaille experienced some dizziness (positional vertigo) and oscillations of the eyeball (nystagmus) which were attributed by Dr. E. J. Sacks, a Navy otorhinolaryngologist, to the acoustic trauma Dr. Robitaille suffered in 1961. Apparently no treatment was prescribed and these symptoms disappeared completely by the end of July 1968. In October 1968, Dr. Robitaille noticed a blurring of vision in his right eye which Dr. Dunbar Hoskins, a Navy ophthalmologist, examined and believed to be caused by congenital nuclear cataracts. Dr. Robitaille disclosed this finding to Guardian’s medical examiner, Dr. Greer, but the condition was subsequently recognized at Massachusetts General as a scotoma, or isolated area of depressed vision.5 According to uncontra-dicted testimony at trial, a scotoma does not necessarily impair vision and, indeed, Dr. Robitaille’s vision remained 20/20.
Finally, in early 1969, Dr. Robitaille experienced a “vague sensory disturbance” in his right leg and a numbness in his hands, which he mentioned to Dr. T. A. Grossi during his annual naval physical in April. The numbness was described as a “pins and needles” sensation which Dr. Grossi attributed to Dr. Robitaille’s habit of leaning his elbows on his desk as he worked. In addition, Dr. Grossi conducted a complete neurological examination and found no abnormality.
Despite the transitory nature of these symptoms, when Dr. Robitaille traveled to Chelsea Naval Hospital in Boston on official business in April 1969 he described his physical findings to Dr. Leland Patterson, a neurologist. During their casual conversation, Dr. Robitaille asked whether his symptoms could be associated with any neurological disease or multiple sclerosis. Dr. Patterson conducted an unofficial neurological examination (not reported in Navy records) which proved negative, as had Dr. Grosses several days earlier. Accordingly, Dr. Patterson found, and informed Dr. Robitaille in emphatic terms, that he did not have any neurological disorder.
We observe therefore, a background of unequivocal assurances that no neurological abnormalities were present, and consistent medical opinions that his symptoms were related to the prostatitis and acoustic trauma. Nevertheless, when multiple sclerosis was subsequently diag[894]*894nosed and Dr. Robitaille was unable to continue his private practice, Guardian sought to avoid liability under the policies because of alleged material misrepresentations in the application, a ground not infrequently asserted when the insurer faces substantial liability. Accordingly, Guardian brought this action to rescind the four policies and to enjoin Dr. Robitaille from making claims for payment.
In its complaint, Guardian contended that Dr. Robitaille’s failure to disclose his symptoms when he applied for the policies constituted material misrepresentations which increased the insurer’s risk of loss. In his defense to this suit, Dr. Robitaille claimed that his responses on the application adverted to all disorders which had been diagnosed and for which he had received treatment. He urged, moreover, that in light of the disclosure of all his diagnoses (prostatitis, acoustic trauma, optic inclusions) his failure to specify all symptoms underlying those diagnoses did not misrepresent the status of his health- — in fact it was because of the assurances of good health that he entered private practice, incurring the concomitant expenses that flow from opening a doctor’s office. In any event, Robitaille also asserted that he had given Guardian complete access to his medical records and, upon simple inquiry at Newport Hospital, it could have ascertained his symptoms. Above all, he claimed that the presence of multiple sclerosis, which was not detected until months later could not have been communicated to Guardian in June or July 1969.
After a two-day trial, Judge Blumen-feld, without objection by counsel for Guardian, submitted a single interrogatory to the jury which, after deliberating for only 20 minutes, returned with a response favorable to Dr. Robitaille. Guardian then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, after denying that motion, Judge Blumenfeld entered judgment for Robitaille.
II.
Federal jurisdiction in this case derives exclusively from the parties’ diversity of citizenship.6 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Judge Blumenfeld found, and the parties agreed, that Massachusetts substantive law governs the case.7 Accordingly, we turn now to the relevant Massachusetts statute, Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. c. 175 § 186, which provides:
No oral or written misrepresentation or warranty made in the negotiation of a policy of insurance by the insured or in his behalf shall be deemed material or defeat or avoid the policy or prevent its attaching unless such misrepresentation or warranty is made with actual intent to deceive, or unless the matter misrepresented or made a warranty increased the risk of loss.
[895]*895In applying the statutory standard tb the circumstances, of this case, we note at the outset that Guardian expressly disavowed any intention to prove that Robitaille acted deceitfully. Guardian’s disclaimer of liability, therefore, rested entirely on the “increased risk of loss” provision of § 186. Accordingly, we must look to the longstanding line of Massachusetts cases which make abundantly clear that the question whether misstatements in the application increased the risk of loss is, virtually in every instance, one of fact for the jury. See e. g., Davidson v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co., 325 Mass. 115, 89 N.E.2d 201, 204 (1949); Schiller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 169, 3 N.E.2d 384, 388 (1936); Smardon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 243 Mass. 599, 137 N.E. 742, 744 (1923); Coughlin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 189 Mass. 538, 76 N.E. 192 (1905); Levie v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 163 Mass. 117, 39 N.E. 792, 793 (1895). Moreover, it is a factual question on which the insurer must bear the burden of proof. See, e. g., Davidson v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co., supra, 89 N.E.2d at 204; McDonough v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 228 Mass. 450, 117 N.E. 836, 837 (1917).
At the trial, Guardian attempted to sustain its burden by offering the testimony of Dr. Phillips Lambkin, Guardian’s Medical Director, and Dr. D. Sergeant Pepper, who had served in a similar capacity for several other insurance companies. Guardian’s witnesses testified that knowledge of the symptoms and diagnostic tests omitted from Dr. Robitaille’s application was essential to the underwriters who approved the issuance of the policies. In addition, they contended that the numbness, dizziness, nystagmus, and scotoma were potentially related to multiple sclerosis and, therefore, should have been disclosed. Finally, Guardian relied on a statement Dr. Robitaille submitted to the Naval Board of Record Corrections on December 24, 1969, after his multiple sclerosis had been diagnosed. There he recounted the same symptoms he had discussed previously with Navy doctors and concluded that, upon learning of a firm and conclusive diagnosis of multiple sclerosis, retrospection8 led him to the belief that a connection might have existed between his newly diagnosed condition and the earlier symptoms which had been attributed by all examining doctors to other, less debilitating, conditions.9
Robitaille, on the other hand, asserted at trial that when he completed the application he had an honest belief that it would be more useful to the company if he were to reveal the actual diagnoses of physicians, rather than for him to itemize the various symptoms and tests upon which the diagnoses were grounded. We note, moreover, that on cross-examination even Dr. Lambkin made the telling concession that it was “logical” for a doctor to respond to an application for insurance in that fashion. His premise [896]*896undoubtedly was that the revelation of a diagnosis of disease would necessarily imply to those examining the application that specific symptoms existed and that appropriate tests had been conducted before diagnosis.
III.
Turning now from our general discussion of the positions taken by the parties to the specific facts before us, we note that in the course of his testimony Dr. Robitaille responded clearly to each alleged misrepresentation. Concerning his negative response to question 8a, he stated that the wording of the application form (“dizziness or any other disease or disorder of the brain or nervous system” (emphasis added)) required an affirmative answer only if his physical condition rose to the level of a disease of the nervous system.10 Since both he and Dr. Sacks viewed his dizziness, or vertigo, and nystagmus as byproducts of the acoustic trauma listed in response to question 8j rather than as neurological disorders, he believed his response to 8a did not require explication. In addition, the numbness in his hands, which Guardian contended may have been neurologically related, was dismissed by Dr. Grossi, after thorough examination, as a common complaint of desk-workers who habitually lean on their elbows, and certainly not noteworthy. Moreover, Dr. Robitaille testified that the particular type of vertigo he experienced (positional) is not typical of multiple sclerosis.
Dr. Robitaille believed also that his response to question 8e, which candidly set forth his mild prostatitis and treatment by Dr. William Urschel, was sufficient. Guardian argued, however, that the doctor should have disclosed that the diagnosis was based on a reduction in force in his urinary stream which culminated in a complete urinary retention on December 7, 1967. But, at the time the retention occurred, Dr. Urschel had performed a cystoscopy (described at trial as a not uncommon diagnostic procedure for determining the cause of prostatitis) and the condition subsided.11
Dr. Robitaille also rebutted the insurer’s attacks against his response to question 9, that other diagnostic tests were “routine” and their results “normal.” Guardian claimed that the doctor should have disclosed the cystoscopy, a urinalysis and glucose tolerance test in connection with the prostatitis; the examinations with regard to the vertigo and nystagmus; and neurological examinations concerning the numbness in his hands. To this claim, Dr. Robitaille reiterated his position that all the tests Guardian cites were either conducted as part of the examinations leading to the specific diagnoses clearly listed on the application or resulted in findings of “no abnormality.” Accordingly, in light of Dr. Robitaille’s disclosure of all relevant diagnoses and his consent to an examination of the records at Newport Hospital, one must ask whether he nevertheless was under a duty to furnish additional details to Guardian.12
[897]*897Finally, Robitaille explained his response to question 13 that, in the five previous years, he had not consulted any physicians other than those listed. The doctor testified at the trial that during his years in the service he did not have a personal physician, but, as is customary in the military, saw various doctors for his annual physical examinations and for specific complaints. Since he did not consult any non-military doctors, all his records were compiled and readily accessible at Newport Naval Hospital.13 Having listed the hospital and having authorized Guardian to examine his files, he did not believe it necessary to enumerate the names of the Navy doctors which were fully recited in the Newport records.
IV.
Having failed to sustain its burden of proof to the jury’s satisfaction, and despite the obviously complex factual questions presented, Guardian now contends that it is entitled, as a matter of law, to judgment in its favor. For this position, Guardian relies on a few eases which have deviated from the well established Massachusetts rule that the question whether risk of loss was increased is one to be determined by the jury. Our exhaustive study of the relevant Massachusetts ease law, however, compels the conclusion that this is not one of those aberrant cases which Massachusetts has narrowly circumscribed, in which the jury’s verdict can be lightly overturned. We believe, therefore, that Judge Blumenfeld was entirely correct in entering judgment for Dr. Robitaille.
In every case cited by Guardian for its position that the verdict should have been upset, the insured party had a grave and debilitating disease which had been discovered prior to the application for insurance.14 See, e. g., Pahigian v. Manufacturers’ Life Ins. Co., 349 Mass. 78, 206 N.E.2d 660 (1965) (Hodgkin’s disease); Brown v. Greenfield Life Ass’n., 172 Mass. 498, 53 N.E. 129 (1899) (“consumption”); Rainger v. Boston Mut. Life Ass’n., 167 Mass. 109, 44 N.E. 1088 (1896) (alcoholism). [898]*898Moreover, in each instance the evidence was clear that the insured was aware of his condition at the time he applied for insurance.
Guardian relies heavily on Lennon v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 339 Mass. 37, 157 N.E.2d 518 (1959), where the applicant for insurance stated he had not received any out of the ordinary medical treatment in the preceding five years, but one week after filing his application and before the policy issued, underwent an operation for throat cancer. Lennon did not inform the insurance company of this operation, claiming later that he was not aware the surgery was for cancer. Instead, he argued that he believed he was receiving a treatment for “hoarseness.” In voiding the policy as a matter of law, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that even though ignorant .of the reasons for which his doctor performed the operation, he had a duty to disclose a medical event as significant as surgery performed before the policy issued because the company, upon further investigation, could have discovered the diagnosis of cancer.
The case before us is clearly distinguishable. Dr. Robitaille was not found by his doctors to have multiple sclerosis until months after the policy had issued. The record indicates that while in the Navy he followed the prudent, and innocent, course of relating minor and transitory symptoms to his physicians — who were also his colleagues and with whom he was in daily contact — as soon as they appeared. He apparently followed the road of caution and, when fully assured of his sound health, acted in a manner consistent with the dictates of good faith. Indeed, he returned to civilian life to practice his profession of medicine in an office which he acquired and equipped. Not even a layman, no less a doctor, would have planned for such an active life with knowledge of a crippling (Jisease lurking in his mind. In any event, as we have indicated, his application was not barren of medical information for he did disclose the prostatitis, acoustic trauma, and visual inclusion which, the doctors believed, encompassed all the other symptoms Guardian claimed were concealed. We note that testimony at the trial, by the witnesses for Guardian as well as by Dr. Robitaille himself, indicated that these symptoms are not disease-specific to multiple sclerosis. Accordingly, there is no reason to believe —indeed, Guardian does not suggest— that even if the additional symptoms were disclosed, or if Guardian had investigated Robitaille’s hospital records as he authorized them to do, the insurer would have diagnosed multiple sclerosis, obviously a disease which is extraordinarily difficult to detect and which all the doctors examining Robitaille failed to discover. There is not the slightest suggestion here that Robitaille was subjected to surgery, to incapacitating therapy, or to any other treatment of a character comparable to the serious operation in Lennon.
V.
Guardian’s argument, therefore, is reduced to the claim that Dr. Robitaille concealed information that increased its risk of loss as a matter of law, a claim which even our dissenting brother rejects. To be sure, the application was silent on the symptoms and tests subsumed under the diagnoses which were set forth. Under the standard enunciated in the Massachusetts statute, however, omissions or falsehoods will not void the policies unless they increased the insurer’s risk of loss. We have noted that tlje amalgam of symptoms Robitaille failed to disclose is not the functional equivalent of multiple sclerosis. Accordingly, the question properly before us is not whether multiple sclerosis increases risk as a matter of law- — -a question which, in any event, would be one of first impression in a Massachusetts court — but whether dizziness, nystagmus, and cataracts do. When viewed in this light it is clear from the Massachusetts cases that Guardian’s position is untenable. Not only is the instant case distinguishable [899]*899from the small number of Massachusetts cases which, without consistent reasoning, depart from that state’s general rule that the question of increased risk is for the jury to decide, but closer examination suggests that those cases represent isolated, exceedingly rare and not favored exceptions to Massachusetts’ oft-announced and firmly entrenched principle.
Several brief examples will illustrate Massachusetts’ strong preference for submission of the risk question to the jury. In Levie v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra, the insured had suffered a strangulated hernia requiring the attendance of two doctors and an operation one year before he applied for insurance. His application contained a negative response to a question inquiring whether he had sustained any illnesses since childhood. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial judge’s denial of a directed verdict in favor of the insurer: “Very probably it might make the life of the assured less readily insurable, but whether it did so was a question of fact.” 39 N.E. at 793. Similarly, in Schiller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra, where oral testimony and hospital records established that the insured suffered from coronary infarct, angina pectoris, sclerosis of the coronary artery, and coronary inclusion before and at the time he applied for insurance, the court held, “there was nothing which required a ruling of law that the risk of loss was thereby increased .... Although the evidence appeared very persuasive, the question ought not to have been taken from the jury.” 3 N.E.2d at 388. The inelasticity of Massachusetts’ rule that the trier of fact is to determine whether risk of loss was increased was reiterated with pristine clarity in Kaufman v. National Cas. Co., 342 Mass. 412, 174 N.E.2d 35, 38-39 (1961): “The trial judge could have found that the plaintiff [insured] had a heart attack before the issuance of the rider on the policy and that he gave no notice of this change of condition to the defendant [insurer] and still have found that the plaintiff was possessed of no actual intent to deceive . . . and that the risk of loss to the defendant was not increased.” Accord, Foss v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 247 Mass. 10, 141 N.E. 498 (1923) (angina pectoris); Hogan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 164 Mass. 448, 41 N.E. 663 (1895) (kidney disease).
In view of the overwhelming weight of precedent, we cannot say that a state court in Massachusetts would have directed a verdict or granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Guardian, the party required to carry the burden of proof. See H. Taylor, Life Insurance Law of Massachusetts, supra, 19 B.U.L.Rev. at 294-95. Indeed, our thorough reading of Massachusetts law convinces us, and our dissenting brother agrees, that the state courts would have decided without hesitation that the question whether Guardian’s risk was increased was one for the jury to decide. It follows, therefore, that Judge Blumenfeld correctly rejected Guardian’s attack on the verdict.
Verdicts in hard fought civil jury cases should be disturbed only under extraordinary circumstances. After all, the framers of our Constitution clearly reflected the important role of the jury in our system of justice. See U.S.Const. Amends. VI, VII. Indeed, the Supreme Court has cautioned appellate courts against tampering with jury verdicts:
Though this case involves a medical issue, it is no exception to the admonition that, “It is not the function of a court to search the record for conflicting circumstantial evidence in order to take the case away from the jury on a theory that the proof gives equal support to inconsistent and uncertain inferences. The focal point of judicial review is the reasonableness of the particular inference or conclusion drawn by the jury. . . . Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or [900]*900because judges feel that other results are more reasonable.” Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union R. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35, 64 S.Ct. 409, 412, 88 L.Ed. 520.
Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107, 110, 80 S.Ct. 173, 175, 4 L.Ed.2d 142 (1959). See Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752, 62 S.Ct. 854, 86 L.Ed. 1166 (1942); O. W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, 127 (1881).
Dr. Robitaille’s medical history was presented to the members of the jury in a detailed and exhaustive manner by live witnesses. The jurors, had the benefit of observing these witnesses and scrutinizing their conflicting testimony in the arena of the courtroom, fully aware of the proper legal standard which was to guide them, and which was incorporated in an interrogatory submitted to them without objection by Guardian:15
Do you find that the plaintiff has proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant made or failed to make any statement in answer to questions in his application for insurance which increased the risk of loss under the policies ?
Guardian’s counsel described this interrogatory, to which the jurors responded in the negative, as “the whole issue completely.” It was precisely that and Judge Blumenfeld properly refused to upset the verdict.
Affirmed.