OPINION OF THE COURT
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge.
In this action brought pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, The Fan-Housing Council of Suburban Philadelphia (“FHC”) appeals an order of the district court granting a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict filed by Acme Newspapers, Inc. (“Acme”), its publication, The Main Line Times, and the paper’s publisher. The district court granted this motion based on its conclusion that the FHC lacked standing under Aticle III of the United States Constitution to maintain this suit. Because we agree that the FHC failed to establish any “perceptible impairment” to its operation caused by the alleged discrimination and thus failed to satisfy the minimum standing requirements embodied in Article III, we will affirm the order of the district court.
I.
The FHC, a fair housing group which has operated in the Philadelphia area for more than forty years, describes itself as a nonprofit organization whose “purpose is to educate and promote fair housing and to oppose segregation based on the protected classes found in the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as amended.”
On February 21, 1996, the FHC filed eleven lawsuits in federal court, nine of which charged various newspaper publishers and related defendants with violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604.1 In this suit, [441]*441the FHC sought damages for injuries alleged to have been caused by real estate advertisements placed in the Main Line Times on a number of occasions during 1994 and 1995. In its complaint, the FHC alleged that:
On or about December, 1994 through at least November, 1995, defendants approved and published real estate advertisements that stated “no children,” “three persons,” as well as, upon information and belief, many other advertisements which indicated a preference or limitation on the basis of familial status.
The case was tried before a jury in December, 1996. At that time, five advertisements were at issue. These advertisements contained the following allegedly discriminatory phrases 1) “no children;” 2) “3 persons;” 3) “ideal for couple or professional single;” 4) “(for one person);” and 5) “(for one person).” At the close of all the evidence, Acme and the other defendants filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. Acme contended that the FHC had failed to establish injury sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement imposed by Article III of the United States Constitution. The district court deferred ruling on this motion and submitted the case to the jury.
On December 4, 1996, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the FHC, awarding the FHC $25,000 in compensatory damages. On December 17, 1996, Acme renewed its Rule 50 motion, again arguing that the FHC lacked standing to pursue its claims under the Fair Housing Act. The district court granted this renewed motion on January 28, 1997, stating that it had “acted prematurely in submitting the case to the jury as[the FHC] did not have standing to bring any of the claims asserted in its Complaint.” Fair Hemsing Council of Suburban Philadelphia v. Main Line Times, No. 96-1379, 1997 WL 30642 at *6 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 27, 1997). This timely appeal followed.
II.
This appeal requires that we revisit, albeit in a different context, the identical issue raised in Fair Housing Council of Suburban Philadelphia v. Montgomery Newspapers, 141 F.3d 71 (3d Cir.1998): whether the FHC has shown “distinct and palpable” injury sufficient to satisfy Article III standing requirements under the Fair Housing Act. Resolution of this question turns on the application of constitutional standing requirements. We reviewed the parameters of these requirements at length in our opinion in Montgomery Newspapers, and will not repeat that discussion here.
We begin our examination of the issue before us by noting that Article III principles governing standing are by now well-settled. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), the Supreme Court summarized the law of standing as follows:
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is a) concrete and particularized, and b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be “fairly ... traee[able] to the challenged action of the defendant and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Third, it must be “likely” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”
(Citations omitted.) These requirements— particularly the need for injury in fact—were applied in the fair housing context in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378-79, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 1124, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982). There, the Supreme Court wrote that:
In determining whether [a fair housing organization] has standing under the Fair Housing Act, we conduct the same inquiry as in the case of an individual: Has the [442]*442plaintiff “ ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal court jurisdiction”? ... If, as broadly alleged, petitioner’s practices have perceptibly impaired [the organization]^ ability to provide counseling and referral services for low- and moderate-income homeseekers, there can be no question that the organization has suffered injury in fact. Such concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities—with the consequent drain on the organization’s resources—constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.
455 U.S. at 378-79, 102 S.Ct. at 1124 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The easelaw establishes that in order to defeat the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the FHC was required to submit “evidence showing through specific facts ... that ... it [was] ‘directly affected [by the alleged discrimination].” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562, 112 S.Ct. at 2137-38 (emphasis added). “Since [the elements of standing] are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, ie. with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. at 2136.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge.
In this action brought pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, The Fan-Housing Council of Suburban Philadelphia (“FHC”) appeals an order of the district court granting a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict filed by Acme Newspapers, Inc. (“Acme”), its publication, The Main Line Times, and the paper’s publisher. The district court granted this motion based on its conclusion that the FHC lacked standing under Aticle III of the United States Constitution to maintain this suit. Because we agree that the FHC failed to establish any “perceptible impairment” to its operation caused by the alleged discrimination and thus failed to satisfy the minimum standing requirements embodied in Article III, we will affirm the order of the district court.
I.
The FHC, a fair housing group which has operated in the Philadelphia area for more than forty years, describes itself as a nonprofit organization whose “purpose is to educate and promote fair housing and to oppose segregation based on the protected classes found in the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as amended.”
On February 21, 1996, the FHC filed eleven lawsuits in federal court, nine of which charged various newspaper publishers and related defendants with violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604.1 In this suit, [441]*441the FHC sought damages for injuries alleged to have been caused by real estate advertisements placed in the Main Line Times on a number of occasions during 1994 and 1995. In its complaint, the FHC alleged that:
On or about December, 1994 through at least November, 1995, defendants approved and published real estate advertisements that stated “no children,” “three persons,” as well as, upon information and belief, many other advertisements which indicated a preference or limitation on the basis of familial status.
The case was tried before a jury in December, 1996. At that time, five advertisements were at issue. These advertisements contained the following allegedly discriminatory phrases 1) “no children;” 2) “3 persons;” 3) “ideal for couple or professional single;” 4) “(for one person);” and 5) “(for one person).” At the close of all the evidence, Acme and the other defendants filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. Acme contended that the FHC had failed to establish injury sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement imposed by Article III of the United States Constitution. The district court deferred ruling on this motion and submitted the case to the jury.
On December 4, 1996, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the FHC, awarding the FHC $25,000 in compensatory damages. On December 17, 1996, Acme renewed its Rule 50 motion, again arguing that the FHC lacked standing to pursue its claims under the Fair Housing Act. The district court granted this renewed motion on January 28, 1997, stating that it had “acted prematurely in submitting the case to the jury as[the FHC] did not have standing to bring any of the claims asserted in its Complaint.” Fair Hemsing Council of Suburban Philadelphia v. Main Line Times, No. 96-1379, 1997 WL 30642 at *6 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 27, 1997). This timely appeal followed.
II.
This appeal requires that we revisit, albeit in a different context, the identical issue raised in Fair Housing Council of Suburban Philadelphia v. Montgomery Newspapers, 141 F.3d 71 (3d Cir.1998): whether the FHC has shown “distinct and palpable” injury sufficient to satisfy Article III standing requirements under the Fair Housing Act. Resolution of this question turns on the application of constitutional standing requirements. We reviewed the parameters of these requirements at length in our opinion in Montgomery Newspapers, and will not repeat that discussion here.
We begin our examination of the issue before us by noting that Article III principles governing standing are by now well-settled. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), the Supreme Court summarized the law of standing as follows:
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is a) concrete and particularized, and b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be “fairly ... traee[able] to the challenged action of the defendant and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Third, it must be “likely” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”
(Citations omitted.) These requirements— particularly the need for injury in fact—were applied in the fair housing context in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378-79, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 1124, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982). There, the Supreme Court wrote that:
In determining whether [a fair housing organization] has standing under the Fair Housing Act, we conduct the same inquiry as in the case of an individual: Has the [442]*442plaintiff “ ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal court jurisdiction”? ... If, as broadly alleged, petitioner’s practices have perceptibly impaired [the organization]^ ability to provide counseling and referral services for low- and moderate-income homeseekers, there can be no question that the organization has suffered injury in fact. Such concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities—with the consequent drain on the organization’s resources—constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.
455 U.S. at 378-79, 102 S.Ct. at 1124 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The easelaw establishes that in order to defeat the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the FHC was required to submit “evidence showing through specific facts ... that ... it [was] ‘directly affected [by the alleged discrimination].” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562, 112 S.Ct. at 2137-38 (emphasis added). “Since [the elements of standing] are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, ie. with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. at 2136. Despite the jury verdict in the FHC’s favor, the district court concluded that the FHC failed to meet its burden of proof, producing nothing of substance at trial to support the damage allegations set forth in the complaint.2 There was no “evidence upon which the jury could properly find a verdict for [the FHC].” Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir.1993).
Judgment as a matter of law is to be granted sparingly. We will affirm an order granting judgment as a matter of law “only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference ... it is apparent that the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence.” Id. We have carefully reviewed the FHC’s damage allegations and the evidence introduced to support them and are convinced that this is one of those rare cases where, following a jury verdict, judgment as a matter of law was warranted.
III.
The FHC alleges that it suffered impairment sufficient to establish Article III standing when it was forced to divert resources from counseling and other activities to: (1) an investigation designed to determine the existence and extent of on-going discrimination in advertising; (2) litigation; and (3) an educational campaign designed to counteract the discriminatory effect of the advertisements. We considered and rejected identical damage claims based on the need to divert funds to investigation and litigation in Montgomery Newspapers. As the “proof’ offered on these issues is virtually identical to that offered and found lacking in Montgomery Newspapers, we need not detail that proof or repeat our analysis here.
[443]*443Because, however, the evidence regarding the need for an educational campaign to counteract the alleged discrimination differs somewhat from that offered in Montgomery Newspapers, we address it briefly. At trial, the FHC’s Executive Director sought to establish that the FHC had suffered injury sufficient to satisfy Article III by offering the following testimony:
For [forty years, the FHC] educates. We go out to all kinds of organizations, groups ... and educate them about their rights to obtain housing on a nondiseriminatory basis. We also spend a tremendous amount of time educating the industry---- So, when these ads appear in the paper and even if it’s only one ad, it sort of undoes— not sort of, it definitely undoes all that good work, all that hard work, all that education. Its back to where we started from. It’s as though we never did this. It’s broadcast to tens of thousands of people. First of all, people see it and think that they could be turned down for housing. Other Realtors, landlords, see this, think either the laws don’t exist or they’re not enforced. We have filed complaints against people and they’ve come to us with dozens of ads from the newspaper that say, look, here’s ads that say not children, no children, adults only, adults preferred, perfect for single. And they say, well, what’s wrong? This is in the newspaper.
Q. Are you talking about people you’ve charged?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A —people that we have filed complaints against.
Q. Like who?
A Individual landlords____ So our job is to educate. And all this education goes down the drain when these ads appear in the paper.
While we can agree intuitively that continued publication of discriminatory advertising in general could have an adverse effect on public perception, thus making the job of the FHC more difficult, we are convinced that even were we to assume injury, the evidence submitted failed to establish the necessary “causal connection between the injury and the [particular advertisements].” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at 2136.
The evidence submitted by the FHC did not show that the advertisements at issue created any adverse effects upon families seeking housing or upon public perception of the advertisements’ legality. The evidence offered was probative only as to the effect of discriminatory advertising generally on landlords and realtors. The testimony offered by the FHC with respect to the five specific advertisements failed to establish that they had been read by anyone outside the FHC or that the FHC was required to modify its operation in any way as a result of these advertisements.3 As Acme correctly observes, “No injury to the cause of fair housing—or consequent impairment of the Council’s programs—could follow from the publication of advertising which was only proven to have been observed by persons who knew that it was illegal, i.e. the Council’s staff members.”
TV.
Faced with the difficulties inherent in its evidence, the FHC takes the position that, because it holds the status of a private attorney general, it need show nothing more than a violation of the Act in order to establish Article III standing. We disagree. The fact that a housing organization is able to show that a particular advertisement violates [444]*444the Act is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III; a violation of the Act does not automatically confer standing on any plaintiff, even one who holds the status of a private attorney general. An organization acting as a private attorney general is relieved only of prudential limitations on standing and may bring suit to enforce the rights of others only where the organization itself is able to demonstrate that it has suffered injury in fact. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572-73, 112 S.Ct. at 2142-43 (requiring that an organization holding status of private attorney general show injury in fact). The required demonstration of legally cognizable injury is absent in this case. Although we have given serious consideration to the jury’s verdict and award of compensatory damages in favor of the FHC, our analysis of the record compels us, nonetheless, to conclude that the record is devoid of “evidence upon which the jury could properly [have found a] verdict for [the FHC].” Lightning Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d at 1166.
V.
In concluding that the strictures of Article III bar the FHC from maintaining this suit, we emphasize here, as we did in Montgomery Newspapers, that the goal of “eliminating discrimination in housing is vitally important.” (Slip Opinion at 18.) Even this laudable objective does not, however, warrant an evisceration of Article III. As Acme points out:
[T]he most impassioned public policy arguments cannot eliminate the case or controversy requirement from the Constitution. If anything, the appeal to public policy should highlight ... the separation of powers rationale from which the ease or controversy doctrine flows. Adjudicating actual controversies, not legislating social policy, is the province of the judiciary.
Our adherence to the requirements of Article III should not impede vigorous enforcement of the Fair Housing Act. The easelaw is replete with examples of housing organizations which have successfully established injury sufficient to carry them over the Article III threshold. As we observed in Montgomery Newspapers, “It should not be insurmountably difficult for these organizations to establish standing either in their own right or on behalf of their members by referring to well-established standing principles and adjusting their pleadings and proof accordingly.” (141 F.3d at-.)
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the district court.