Mr. Justice CLIFFORD
delivered the opinion of the court.
Collision cases usually present difficult questions of fact, arising from conflicting testimony, and the case before the court is one of that class, but both of the subordinate courts decided in favor of the libellants, and our decision, with brief explanations, must be in the same way.
The libellants are the owners of the steam ferry-boat James Watt, employed in transporting passengers and freight between the port of New York and the city of Hoboken, in the State of New Jersey, and they filed the libel in the District Court against the steamtug Cayuga, usually employed in towing vessels and' other water-craft, charging that the steamtug was so improperly and unskilfully managed and navigated that she ran into and upon the James Watt, causing to the latter steamboat great .injury and damage, as more fully set forth in the libel. By the pleadings and evidence it appears that the collision occurred at four o’clock in the afternoon of the thirteenth of June, 1866, in clear weather and under circumstances which show beyond all doubt that one or both vessels weve in fault. Daily trips were made by the James Watt, and at the time she was making her regular trip down the river to her place of destination at the foot of Barclay Street, on the New York side of the.river. She started from her regular slip §.t Hoboken, and as she proceeded on her route she was heading obliquely across the
river towards the wharf to which she was bound. Shortly after the James Watt left her wharf at Hoboken the Cayuga came out from the slip at the foot of Desbrosses Street, and having rounded to, nearly opposite Hubert Street, she then took a course down the river, heading for the Jersey side of the river, though less obliquely than the ferry-boat of the libellants, and they collided when the-former had advanced about one-third of the way across the river towards the Jersey shore. Enough appears to show that the James Watt was heading in a south by east course, and that she was running in the track she usually followed in making her daily trips, and that the Cayuga was heading nearly in a south-southwest course for the place of her ultimate destination on the opposite side of the river. Both steamers were well manned, and each was seasonably seen from the other and at about the same time, and as it was daylight and good weather, and as it was obvious that their courses intersected, it must hav'e been known to those intrusted with their navigation that a collision might ensue unless some proper precaution was seasonably adopted to prevent such a disaster. They had plenty of sea-room, and if either had changed,her helm the collision would have beeu prevented, but as the Cayuga had the James Watt on her own starboard side throughout, from the time she took her course down the river to the time of the disaster, the sailing rules made it her duty to keep out of the wáy. Article fourteen prescribes that “if two ships under steam are crossing-so as to involve risk of collision, the ship which has the other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way of the other,” and the court is of the opinion that the Circuit judge was correct in deciding that that rule is applicable in this case.
Suggestion is made, and perhaps it is correct, that the Cayuga was slightly ahead when she first took her course and started down the river, but the speed of the James Watt being somewhat the greater it appears that .she soon made such an advance that it became evident that unless one or the other gave way the danger of collision would become 'imminent. Apply that rule and it is clear that 'it was the
duty of the Cayuga to keep out of the way, inasmuch as she had the James Watt on her own starboard side. Every vessel overtaking anQther vessel, it is said, shall keep out of the way of the vessel ahead, but that rule cannot properly be applied in this case, as the two steamers were crossing or running on intersecting lines, in which case the question is not in general affected by the comparative speed of the two vessels, nor by the'fact that the one or the other was slightly ahead when the necessity for precaution commenced.
Undoubtedly where two ships are running in the same direction, the ship astern, if she is sailing faster than the ship ahead, is in general bound to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid a collision, but it is clear that the rule does not in general apply in a case where the ships are crossing or are distant from each other on a right line and are running on intersecting lines, as it is expressly enacted where two steamships are crossing that the ship which has the other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way of the other.
Such is the express regulation enacted by Congress, and the correlative duty of the other vessel is described in the eighteenth article, which is, that where'one of two ships is required to keep out of the way the other shall keep her course, subject to the qualifications contained in the succeeding article, which is entitled a “proviso to save special cases.” By that proviso it is prescribed that in obeying and construing those rules due regard must be had ’ to all dangers of navigation, and to any special circumstances which may exist in any particular case, rendering a departure from those rules necessary in order to avoid immediate danger.
Persons engaged in navigating vessels upon the seas are bound to observe the nautical rules enacted by Congress, .whenever they apply, and in other.cases-to be governed by the rules recognized and approved by the courts. Nautical rules, however, were framed and are administered to prevent such disasters and to afford security to life and property, but
it is a mistake to suppose that either the act of Congress, or the decisions of the courts, require the observance of any-given rule in a case where it clearly appears that the rule cannot be followed without-defeating the end for which it was prescribed or without producing the mischief which it was intended to avert. Qualifications of that character were sanctioned by this court years before-the existing rules were enacted by Congress, and no doubt is entertained that the proviso to save special cases contained in those rules was intended -to affirm in substance and effect the views upon that subject which this court had previously expressed.
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Mr. Justice CLIFFORD
delivered the opinion of the court.
Collision cases usually present difficult questions of fact, arising from conflicting testimony, and the case before the court is one of that class, but both of the subordinate courts decided in favor of the libellants, and our decision, with brief explanations, must be in the same way.
The libellants are the owners of the steam ferry-boat James Watt, employed in transporting passengers and freight between the port of New York and the city of Hoboken, in the State of New Jersey, and they filed the libel in the District Court against the steamtug Cayuga, usually employed in towing vessels and' other water-craft, charging that the steamtug was so improperly and unskilfully managed and navigated that she ran into and upon the James Watt, causing to the latter steamboat great .injury and damage, as more fully set forth in the libel. By the pleadings and evidence it appears that the collision occurred at four o’clock in the afternoon of the thirteenth of June, 1866, in clear weather and under circumstances which show beyond all doubt that one or both vessels weve in fault. Daily trips were made by the James Watt, and at the time she was making her regular trip down the river to her place of destination at the foot of Barclay Street, on the New York side of the.river. She started from her regular slip §.t Hoboken, and as she proceeded on her route she was heading obliquely across the
river towards the wharf to which she was bound. Shortly after the James Watt left her wharf at Hoboken the Cayuga came out from the slip at the foot of Desbrosses Street, and having rounded to, nearly opposite Hubert Street, she then took a course down the river, heading for the Jersey side of the river, though less obliquely than the ferry-boat of the libellants, and they collided when the-former had advanced about one-third of the way across the river towards the Jersey shore. Enough appears to show that the James Watt was heading in a south by east course, and that she was running in the track she usually followed in making her daily trips, and that the Cayuga was heading nearly in a south-southwest course for the place of her ultimate destination on the opposite side of the river. Both steamers were well manned, and each was seasonably seen from the other and at about the same time, and as it was daylight and good weather, and as it was obvious that their courses intersected, it must hav'e been known to those intrusted with their navigation that a collision might ensue unless some proper precaution was seasonably adopted to prevent such a disaster. They had plenty of sea-room, and if either had changed,her helm the collision would have beeu prevented, but as the Cayuga had the James Watt on her own starboard side throughout, from the time she took her course down the river to the time of the disaster, the sailing rules made it her duty to keep out of the wáy. Article fourteen prescribes that “if two ships under steam are crossing-so as to involve risk of collision, the ship which has the other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way of the other,” and the court is of the opinion that the Circuit judge was correct in deciding that that rule is applicable in this case.
Suggestion is made, and perhaps it is correct, that the Cayuga was slightly ahead when she first took her course and started down the river, but the speed of the James Watt being somewhat the greater it appears that .she soon made such an advance that it became evident that unless one or the other gave way the danger of collision would become 'imminent. Apply that rule and it is clear that 'it was the
duty of the Cayuga to keep out of the way, inasmuch as she had the James Watt on her own starboard side. Every vessel overtaking anQther vessel, it is said, shall keep out of the way of the vessel ahead, but that rule cannot properly be applied in this case, as the two steamers were crossing or running on intersecting lines, in which case the question is not in general affected by the comparative speed of the two vessels, nor by the'fact that the one or the other was slightly ahead when the necessity for precaution commenced.
Undoubtedly where two ships are running in the same direction, the ship astern, if she is sailing faster than the ship ahead, is in general bound to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid a collision, but it is clear that the rule does not in general apply in a case where the ships are crossing or are distant from each other on a right line and are running on intersecting lines, as it is expressly enacted where two steamships are crossing that the ship which has the other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way of the other.
Such is the express regulation enacted by Congress, and the correlative duty of the other vessel is described in the eighteenth article, which is, that where'one of two ships is required to keep out of the way the other shall keep her course, subject to the qualifications contained in the succeeding article, which is entitled a “proviso to save special cases.” By that proviso it is prescribed that in obeying and construing those rules due regard must be had ’ to all dangers of navigation, and to any special circumstances which may exist in any particular case, rendering a departure from those rules necessary in order to avoid immediate danger.
Persons engaged in navigating vessels upon the seas are bound to observe the nautical rules enacted by Congress, .whenever they apply, and in other.cases-to be governed by the rules recognized and approved by the courts. Nautical rules, however, were framed and are administered to prevent such disasters and to afford security to life and property, but
it is a mistake to suppose that either the act of Congress, or the decisions of the courts, require the observance of any-given rule in a case where it clearly appears that the rule cannot be followed without-defeating the end for which it was prescribed or without producing the mischief which it was intended to avert. Qualifications of that character were sanctioned by this court years before-the existing rules were enacted by Congress, and no doubt is entertained that the proviso to save special cases contained in those rules was intended -to affirm in substance and effect the views upon that subject which this court had previously expressed.
Responsive to the charge that the Cayuga did not observe the fourteenth- article of the sailing rules, the respondents attempt to show that the James Watt did not keep her course, as required-by the eighteenth article — that she was running .faster than the steamtug, and that, having passed her on the starboard side she suddenly sheered across her bows, and that the two steamboats in a few seconds came together, the stern of the Cayuga striking against the port stern-quarter of the ¿Tames Watt and caused the injuries alleged in the libel.- Instead of that the District Court found, as matter of fact, that the Cayuga, just before she reached the point of intersection, stopped her engine, giving those in charge of the ferry-boat to understand that the latter steamer could pass in safety, which had the effect to mislead those in charge' of the James Watt, as the Cayuga in a brief period put her engine in motion and started ahead, and that the collision immediately ensued.
Additional testimony was taken, subsequent to the appeal from the decree of the District Court, but the Circuit Court, in view of- the whole case, was still inclined to the opinion that the finding of the District judge was correct. Considerable conflict exists in the testimony on that point, but it is not necessary to decide it, as the same conclusion must be adopted even if it be admitted that the steamtug did not stop her.engine and mislead the ferry-boat, as is supposed
by the libellants, as it is clear that the charge made against the James Watt that she changed her course is not sustained.
Even if the Cayuga did not do anything to mislead the James Watt it is clear that, she did not keep out of the way, as required by the fourteenth sailing rule, nor did she adopt any proper precaution to prevent a collision. Bound as she was to keep out of the way, the fact that she did not comply with that requirement is as complete an answer to the defence set up by the claimants as the proof would be that she misled the other yessel, as charged by the libellants. Having done nothing to prevent the collision she must abide the consequences, unless she can show some good reason for her failure to perform her duty in that regard. All the excuse, or the principal one, offered is the one before mentioned, that she was ahead and that it was the duty of the James Watt to have adopted the necessary precautions.
Where a steamer astern, in an open séa and iu go,od weather, is pursuing the same general course as the one ahead, and at greater speed, the steamer astern, as a general rule, is required to give way or to adopt the necessary precautions to prevent a collision, as the steamer ahead is entitled to the road, but the court here concurs with the Circuit Court that that rule did'not apply in this case, even if it be conceded that the Cayuga, after she rounded to, and vfhen she first took her course down the river, was slightly ahead, as the relative situation of the two steamers even at that time, was that described in the fourteenth article of the sailing rules, and not that described in the seventeenth article, as is supposed by the respondents. Precautions at that time were not necessary, as the distance between the two steamers, measuring east and west, was very considerable, but they were running on converging lines, and as they advanced that distance was fast reduced, which soon created the necessity for precautions to prevent a collision, and the testimony entirely satisfies the court that at the time the necessity for precaution commenced, the two steamers, were nearly abreast, and that the Circuit Court was right in holding that the fourteenth sailing rule is applicable to the case,
and that it was the duty of the Cayuga to keep out of the way.
Reference was made to a commissioner in the District Court to ascertain the amount of the damages, and he reported the whole amount to be two thousand six hundred and seventy-two dollars and thirty cents, as more fully shown in the record. Exceptions were duly taken by the respondents to various items of the report, but the court overruled the exceptions and confirmed the report. In eluded in the report of the commissioner was an allowance of seventy-five dollars per day for the seventeen days the steamer was detained while the repairs were being made, and to that allowance the respondents still object. Other exceptions to the commissioner’s report were taken at. the time, but they have not been much pressed in argument and are overruled as not well fouuded. Reasonable demurrage is certainly a proper charge, as the leading maxim is
restitutio in iniegram
in all suits for damages occasioned to vessels by collision.
Subject to the provision that owners of ships and vessels are not now liable for any such loss, damage, or injury, beyond the amount of their interest in the ship and her freight then pending, it is settled law that the damages which the owner of the injured vessel is entitled to recover in cases of collision are to be estimated in the same manner as in other suits of like nature for injuries to personal property, and the owner, as the suffering party, is not limited to compensation for the immediate effects of the injury inflicted, but the claim for compensation may extend to loss of freight, necessary expenses incurred in making repairs, and unavoidable detention.
Tested by that rule it is quite clear that the explanations given by the respective judges in the subordinate courts are sufficient to show that the report of the commissioner was correct. Many other authorities might be referred to in support of the rule here laid down,
but inasmuch as the subject was fully considered in the case of
The Baltimore,
the court does not deem it necessary to give it much additional consideration.
Decree aeeirmed.