ACCEPTED 14-14-00823-cv FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 3/9/2015 4:12:59 PM CHRISTOPHER PRINE CLERK
NO. 14-14-00823-CV __________________________________________________________________ FILED IN 14th COURT OF APPEALS IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTEENTH DISTRICT HOUSTON, TEXAS AT HOUSTON, TEXAS 3/9/2015 4:12:59 PM __________________________________________________________________ CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
TEXAS TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION AND TED HOUGHTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHAIR OF THE TEXAS TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION, Appellants, V. CITY OF JERSEY VILLAGE, Appellee. __________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the 165th District Court of Harris County, Texas; Cause No. 2012-59338
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS TEXAS TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION AND TED HOUGHTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHAIR OF THE TEXAS TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION __________________________________________________________________
KEN PAXTON ANTHONY G. BROCATO, JR. Attorney General of Texas Assistant Attorney General State Bar No. 03039001 CHARLES E. ROY anthony.brocato@texasattorneygeneral.gov First Assistant Attorney General SUSAN DESMARAIS BONNEN Assistant Attorney General JAMES E. DAVIS State Bar No. 05776725 Deputy Attorney General for susan.bonnen@texasattorneygeneral.gov Civil Litigation Transportation Division P. O. Box 12548 RANDALL K. HILL Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Assistant Attorney General Telephone: (512) 463-2004 Chief, Transportation Division Fax Number: (512) 472-3855
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
RESPONSE TO THE CITY’S STATEMENT OF FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
ARGUMENT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
I. The City’s declaratory judgment claims are barred by the State’s sovereign immunity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A. The City’s general claim for declaratory relief is barred by sovereign immunity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. The City’s claim for general declaration of rights is barred by sovereign immunity.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. The City is seeking monetary relief, which is barred by sovereign immunity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. The City is seeking to control State action and thus, its claims as barred by sovereign immunity. . . . . . . . . . . . 11
B. The City’s alleged ultra vires claims are barred by sovereign immunity.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. The City’s alleged ultra vires claims against the Texas Transportation Commission are barred by sovereign immunity.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2. The City’s alleged ultra vires claims against Houghton are barred by sovereign immunity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
a. Section 203.092 must be strictly construed.. . . . 12
ii b. Section 203.092 does not require reimbursement for replacement easements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
i. The plain language of § 203.092 does not require reimbursement for replacement easements.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
ii. Reimbursement for replacement easements is not property attributable to relocation.. . . 16
iii. The City does not have a compensable interest in the land occupied by the facilities to be relocated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
c. Construction of Section 203.092 as requiring reimbursement for replacement easements would cause the State to pay betterment costs in violation of the Texas Constitution.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
II. The City’s claim under Article 1, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution is barred by the State’s sovereign immunity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
III. The City’s claims regarding Segment 7 are not ripe. . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
IV. The City’s claim for attorneys fees is barred by the State’s sovereign immunity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
PRAYER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
APPENDIX
A. Grizzard easement
iii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Anderson v. Truelove, 446 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Argyle Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Wolf, 234 S.W.3d 229 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009). . . . 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 21,24
City of Grand Prairie v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 405 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
City of Houston v. Williams, 216 S.W.3d 827 (Tex. 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
City of Hutchins v. Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. 1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
City of San Antonio v. TPLP Office Park Props., 218 S.W.3d 60 (Tex. 2007)(per curium) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
City of White Settlement v. Super Wash, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 770 (Tex. 2006) . . . . 20
Edwards v. Kaye, 9 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Elledge v. Friberg–Cooper Water Supply Corp., 240 S.W.3d 869 (Tex. 2007).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 591 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1979).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. 2012) . . . . . . . . . 23
Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. State, 925 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
iv Hubert v. Davis, 170 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . 19
John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem’l Found. v. Dewhurst, 90 S.W.3d 268 (Tex. 2002).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Magnolia Pipe Line Co. v. City of Tyler, 348 S. W.2d 537 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1961, writ ref’d).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 19
McLane Co., Inc. v. Strayhorn, 148 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Millwee-Jackson Joint Venture v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 350 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Montrose Mgmt. Dist. v. 1620 Hawthorne, Ltd., 435 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. App.—Houston 2014, pet. filed). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Robbins v. Limestone Cnty., 268 S.W. 915 (Tex. 1925).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
R.R. Comm’n. of Tex. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 380 S.W.2d 599 (Tex 1964). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88 (Tex. 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
State v. City of Austin, 331 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. 1960). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17
State v. Durham, 860 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. 1993).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Emmett, 401 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. granted).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Toll Rd. Auth., 282 S.W.3d 59 (Tex. 2009).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 13
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637(Tex. 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 19
v Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 24
Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. 2010).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 9
Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Johnson, 405 S.W.3d 776 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 24
Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. 2011).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10
Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Zapata Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., 90 S.W.3d 847 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. denied). . . . . . . . . . . 16
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules
43 Tex. Admin Code § 21.34. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
43 Tex. Admin. Code § 21.36. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
43 Tex. Admin Code § 21.37. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
43 Tex. Admin Code § 21.38. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.004.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.006.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 9
Tex. Const. art. I, § 17. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Tex. Transp. Code § 203.092. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 7, 12, 13, 14, 17, 21
vi Tex. R. App. P. 38.01. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
23 C.F.R. § 645.105.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15
23 C.F.R. § 645.111.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
23 C.F.R. § 645.201–.215. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
23 C.F.R. § 645.207.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
23 U.S.C. § 109. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Other
Annotation, Right of Public Body to Compensation Where Property Held by it is Taken for Another Public Purpose, 56 A.L.R. 365 (2011).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4A Julius L. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain (3d ed. 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . 18
29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 126 (2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
vii NO. 14-14-00823-CV __________________________________________________________________
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTEENTH DISTRICT AT HOUSTON, TEXAS __________________________________________________________________
TEXAS TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION AND TED HOUGHTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHAIR OF THE TEXAS TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION, Appellants,
V.
CITY OF JERSEY VILLAGE, Appellee. __________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 165th District Court of Harris County, Texas; Cause No. 2012-59338 __________________________________________________________________
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS TEXAS TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION AND TED HOUGHTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHAIR OF THE TEXAS TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION __________________________________________________________________
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
Appellants, the Texas Transportation Commission (TTC) and Ted Houghton,
in his official capacity as Chair of the Texas Transportation Commission (Houghton),
(collectively TxDOT or the State) submit this reply brief requesting that the claims
of Appellee City of Jersey Village (City) be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. RESPONSE TO THE CITY’S STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Court should not consider argument, and unsupported or inaccurate factual statements, contained in the City’s Statement of Facts.
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1 provides that briefs must state the facts
“without argument,” and the statement of facts must be supported by record
references.
Contrary to Rule 38.1, the City makes argument throughout its Statement of
Facts. For example, the City repeatedly asserts that it owns and holds a compensable
property interest in certain public utility easements, and that TxDOT is legally
required to reimburse it for replacement easements. See Brief of City at 2–3, 5–6,
9–10. These assertions are argument rather than facts and should not be considered
as facts by the Court.
The City’s assertion that the need to relocate utilities because the public
highway widening project “forces the City to acquire, at additional cost, replacement
easements for the utility lines to run under new properties,” see Brief of City at 3
(emphasis added), is inaccurate. The City concedes that it could relocate its utility
lines in the State’s new right of way but has chosen not to do so. CR 32.
The City’s claims that it would be unable to effectively service its utility lines
if they were placed in the State’s new right of way are not supported by any record
references. See Brief of City at 3–5. And the statement that “the City would be
2 required to obtain prior permission from TxDOT each and every time it needs to
access its utility lines for repair, maintenance or replacement,” see Brief of City at 3,
is simply untrue. Instead, TxDOT’s regulations provide that utilities give 48-hour
notice before engaging in non-emergency construction or maintenance, or that they
give notice as soon as possible in an emergency situation. See 43 Tex. Admin. Code
§ 21.38(a)(4).1 And of course, the utility must use proper traffic control measures
when engaged in such work to protect the safety of the traveling public. See
§ 21.38(c). These regulations are consistent with TxDOT’s recognition that “[u]nder
state law, public utilities have a right to operate, construct, and maintain their
facilities over, under, across, on, or along highways, subject to highway purposes.”
See 43 Tex. Admin. Code § 21.36(a).
Moreover, the City’s characterization of TxDOT as a “recalcitrant state
agency”, see Brief of City at 4 n.2, is both inappropriate and unjustified. The fact that
TxDOT, based on both its policy and its understanding of governing law, has refused
to reimburse the City for replacement of non-exclusive public utility easements with
1 Permission is only required when a utility wishes to cut into the pavement or concrete riprap. See § 21.38(a)(5). However, construction and maintenance generally will not require a utility to cut into the State’s pavement or concrete since longitudinal utility facilities are not placed under pavement or concrete. See 43 Tex. Admin. Code § 21.37(b)(7) (“On highways with frontage roads, longitudinal utility facility installations may be located between the frontage road and the right of way line. Utility facilities shall not be placed or allowed to remain in the center median, outer separation, or beneath any pavement, including shoulders.”).
3 exclusive private easements, is not proof that TxDOT fails to cooperate with utility
companies in their maintenance of utility lines within State right of way.
Contrary to the City’s suggestion, see Brief of City at 6, 7, TxDOT has not
previously conceded that Section 203.092 applies to the City’s request for
reimbursement for replacement of public utility easements with private easements.
And TxDOT does not claim in its Brief that it has never seen the “Grizzard
easement.” See Brief of City at 9. Instead, TxDOT noted that the City did not submit
the Grizzard easement when it submitted proof of a property interest as part of Utility
Agreement U14331. See Brief of TxDOT at 10–11; see also CR 116–25. The actual
facts regarding TxDOT’s so-called concession and the Grizzard easement are as
follows.
Prior to the City’s filing of suit,2 TxDOT repeatedly told the City that it could
avoid incurring the cost of new easements by relocating its utilities within the State’s
new right of way between the frontage road and the new right of way line. CR
133–36. However, the City indicated that it did not want to relocate its utilities within
the State’s new right of way. CR 133, 135. TxDOT also told the City that TxDOT
could not purchase right of way on behalf of another entity and that only exclusive
ownership rights in existing easements were eligible for reimbursement. CR 134–135.
2 E.g., the record includes a letter forwarded to the City nearly a year before suit was filed. CR 133–37.
4 In its letter to the City, TxDOT included an excerpt from its Right of Way Utility
Manual which provides that a “PUE [Public Utility Easement] does not convey a
replacement right of way interest to any occupants of the PUE.” CR 136.
The City responded in letters requesting that it be provided with either in-kind
easement replacement or reimbursement for the cost to obtain replacement easements.
CR 141, 152–53. The City also provided plats and deeds that, according to the City,
demonstrated that the City had a compensable ownership interest in the land that
obligated TxDOT to reimburse it for the cost of replacement easements. CR 140–41,
153. As indicated by the City, one of the documents provided to TxDOT would have
been the “Grizzard easement.” See Brief of City at 9. The Grizzard easement is an
easement that was actually conveyed to the City, and not a public utility easement.
CR 719–22. Thus, the Grizzard easement evidences an ownership interest held by the
City that TxDOT would consider reimbursable because it would be compensable in
eminent domain. However, the City did not submit the Grizzard easement when it
submitted proof of a property interest as part of Utility Agreement U14331. See Brief
of TxDOT at 10–11; see also CR 116–25. The City’s suggestion that this suit
involves both public and private easements, see Brief of City at 3 n.1, 9–10, 30, is not
accurate and not supported by the record. Rather, this suit involves only the City’s
request for reimbursement of the cost to replace the non-exclusive public utility
5 easements referenced in Utility Agreement U14331 with exclusive private easements.
See CR 116–125.
TxDOT responded to the City in a letter stating that the majority of the
information provided by the City did not “support cost participation by the State in
the value of the existing easements” because the easements were either public utility
easements or were easements owned by someone other than the City. CR 156.
TxDOT noted that it “cannot provide an exclusive easement for replacement of a non-
exclusive public utility easement granted through the City platting requirements.” Id.
However, TxDOT indicated that the Grizzard easement was the one exception that
was “eligible for replacement value subject to TxDOT policies and procedure.” CR
157.3 The Grizzard easement was eligible for replacement value because it was an
exclusive private easement conveyed to the City and not “a non-exclusive public
utility easement granted through the City platting requirements.” See CR 156–57.4
3 TxDOT’s description of the easement makes it clear that it is referencing the Grizzard easement. CR 156–57. The eligible easement is described as an easement 10 feet wide and approximately 432 feet long containing a 12-inch waterline. CR 157. The Grizzard easement is an easement that is 10 feet wide and approximately 432 feet long, CR 721, for a 12-inch waterline, CR 719 (The easement sketch states that the easement is ten feet wide and that it consists of 4,320 square feet. Thus, the easement would have to be 432 feet long. In addition the length of the northern boundary is a total of 431.97 feet long (85.14 + 346.83) and the southern boundary is a total of 432.05 feet long (80.06 + 351.99). CR 721. Attached as Appendix A is a copy of the easement with the relevant numbers highlighted in yellow.) 4 In spite of TxDOT’s recognition of the Grizzard easement as an exception, the City failed to submit the Grizzard easement as proof of property interest or to provide proof of the value of the Grizzard easement when it submitted Utility Agreement U14331. See CR 75–126. The only documents submitted as part of Utility Agreement U14331 were documents evidencing public utility easements. See id.
6 This exception was consistent with TxDOT’s position both before and after suit was
filed and does not represent a concession that Section 203.092 applies to the City’s
request for reimbursement for non-exclusive public utility easements.
ARGUMENT
I. The City’s declaratory judgment claims are barred by the State’s sovereign immunity.
A. The City’s general claim for declaratory relief is barred by sovereign immunity.
1. The City’s claim for a general declaration of rights is barred by sovereign immunity.
The City wrongly asserts that the Texas Supreme Court recognizes a waiver of
immunity under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) for suits seeking a
declaration construing a statute. See Brief of City at 12, 15, 35–36. In City of El Paso
v. Heinrich, the Supreme Court rejected the assertion that the UDJA § 37.004(a)’s
language regarding construction or validity of a statute constitutes a waiver of
immunity. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.004(a); City of El Paso v. Heinrich,
284 S.W.3d 366, 370–71 (Tex. 2009). Instead, it held that declaratory relief could be
sought to require state officers to comply with statutory or constitutional provisions,
referred to as the ultra vires exception. See id. at 371–72. Such claims do not
implicate immunity because they are not claims against the state, but instead are
claims to require state officers to comply with the law. Id. at 371–73. In addition, the
7 Supreme Court recognized that the UDJA’s § 37.006(b) waived immunity of
governmental entities “[f]or claims challenging the validity of ordinances or statutes.”
Id. at 373 n.6.
In 2010, a year after the Heinrich decision, the Supreme Court decided Texas
Lottery Commission v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. 2010).
DeQueen involved “a challenge to the validity of a statute.” Id. at 633. In discussing
Heinrich, the Court explained that in Heinrich it had “distinguished between claims
seeking declaratory relief in an ultra vires suit, . . . and suits challenging the validity
of an ordinance or statute” under UDJA § 37.006. Id. at 633–34. The Court also
specifically cited Heinrich’s holding that the UDJA’s § 37.006 waived immunity of
governmental entities for claims challenging the validity of ordinances or statutes. Id.
at 633–34 & n.4.
The City asserts that DeQueen supports a waiver of sovereign immunity
because DeQueen rejected the Lottery Commission’s argument that immunity
“applies only to suits involving constitutional invalidation and not to those involving
statutory interpretation.” See Brief of City at 35. However, the City misunderstands
the argument made by the Lottery Commission in DeQueen. The Commission’s
argument was that § 37.006(b) only waived immunity for claims that a statute was
invalid because it violated the Constitution, and not for claims that a statute was
invalid for other reasons, such as the statute in DeQueen that was found invalid
8 because it conflicted with another statute.5 The Court rejected the Commission’s
distinction. DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d at 634–35.6 However, the suggestion that the
Court’s rejection of the Commission’s argument constitutes recognition of a
wholesale waiver of immunity for statutory construction claims is not supported by
Heinrich, DeQueen or the Supreme Court opinions following them.7
In 2011, the Supreme Court issued two more opinions in which it discussed the
UDJA and immunity. In Texas Parks and Wildlife Department v. Sawyer Trust, 354
S.W.3d 384 (Tex. 2011), the Supreme Court again rejected the claim that § 37.004(a)
waived immunity from suit for a declaration of rights under a statute. See id. at 388
(“[T]here is no general right to sue a state agency for a declaration of rights.”).
Instead, it held that the only waiver of immunity contained in the UDJA was under
§ 37.006(b) for claims challenging the validity of ordinances or statutes. Id. Other
than the waiver under § 37.006(b), the Court declined to recognize any other waivers:
5 Section 37.006(b) provides: “In any proceeding that involves the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, the municipality must be made a party and is entitled to be heard, and if the statute, ordinance, or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the attorney general of the state must also be served with a copy of the proceeding and is entitled to be heard.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.006(b) (emphasis added). 6 The Court also rejected the Commission’s argument that § 37.006(b) only waived the immunity of a municipality. See DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d at 634. 7 TxDOT acknowledges that the City also cites this Court’s opinion in Montrose Management District v. 1620 Hawthorne, Ltd., 435 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. App.—Houston 2014, pet. filed). However, given that the Court dismissed claims because they sought relief for actions taken under a statute, that a petition for review is currently pending in Montrose, and in light of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Court’s discussion in Montrose of waiver for construction of statutes should be treated as non-binding dicta. See id. at 404.
9 While the DJA waives sovereign immunity for certain claims [those challenging the validity of ordinances or statutes], it is not a general waiver of sovereign immunity. But generally, the DJA does not alter a trial court's jurisdiction. Rather, the DJA is merely a procedural device for deciding cases already within a court's jurisdiction. And a litigant’s couching its requested relief in terms of declaratory relief does not alter the underlying nature of the suit. Consequently, sovereign immunity will bar an otherwise proper DJA claim that has the effect of establishing a right to relief against the State for which the Legislature has not waived sovereign immunity.
Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d at 388 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
In Texas Department of Transportation v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. 2011),
Sefzik argued that actions seeking a declaration of rights were exempt from the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. See id. at 621. Pointing to its holding in Heinrich,
the Court disagreed: “[In Heinrich] we necessarily concluded that the UDJA does not
waive the state's sovereign immunity when the plaintiff seeks a declaration of his or
her rights under a statute or other law.” See id. And, as in Heinrich, the Court
recognized only two allowable options for declaratory relief against the State: a claim
against state officials under the ultra vires exception and “a declaratory judgment
action that challenges the validity of a statute.” See id. at 622.
2. The City is seeking monetary relief, which is barred by sovereign immunity.
The City suggests that its suit is not one for money damages because “[n]o
money damages are sought as relief in this case,” and “no fiscal liability will be
imposed on the State for past damages pursuant to existing utility agreements with
10 the City.” See Brief of City at 39–40. However, on the other hand, the City admits
that it intends to utilize the judgment to force TxDOT to execute a new or modified
contract regarding Segment 6 that will include the reimbursement for replacement
easements that was not included in already-executed Utility Agreement U14331. See
Brief of City at 40; see also CR 623–24 (“the City will rely on the declaratory
judgment and execute a new or modified utility agreement with TxDOT for Segment
6”). The City’s suit is no different in kind from City of Houston v. Williams, 216
S.W.3d 827 (Tex. 2007), in which retired firefighters brought a declaratory judgment
action against the City to recover amounts allegedly previously withheld from lump-
sum termination payments in violation of the Local Government Code. See Heinrich,
284 S.W.3d 366, 374 (discussing Williams). In Williams, the Court held that
retrospective monetary claims are barred by immunity. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 374.
Likewise here, the City’s attempts to recover amounts withheld from Utility
Agreement U14331 are barred by immunity.
3. The City is seeking to control State action and thus, its claims are barred by sovereign immunity.
Contrary to the City’s claims, its suit seeks to impose liability on the State for
reimbursement for replacement easements. The City admits as much when it says it
intends to utilize the judgment to force TxDOT to execute a new or modified contract
regarding Segment 6 that will include the reimbursement for replacement easements,
11 and to require reimbursement for replacement easements in new and future contracts
regarding Segment 7. See Brief of City at 40. Thus, it is an attempt to control state
action by imposing liability on the State. See Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n
v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855–56 (Tex. 2002). Such claims are barred by sovereign
immunity. Id. at 856.
B. The City’s alleged ultra vires claims are barred by sovereign immunity.
1. The City’s alleged ultra vires claims against the Texas Transportation Commission are barred by sovereign immunity.
The City effectively concedes that its ultra vires claims against the Texas
Transportation Commission are barred by sovereign immunity. See Brief of City at
14 (recognizing that ultra vires suits must be brought against state officials.) Thus,
the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter its order against the Texas
Transportation Commission.
2. The City’s alleged ultra vires claims against Houghton are barred by sovereign immunity.
a. Section 203.092 must be strictly construed.
The Supreme Court has held that statutes such as § 203.092 must be strictly
construed. See Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Toll Rd. Auth., 282 S.W.3d 59, 64
(Tex. 2009). The City concedes that section 203.092 must be strictly construed but
asserts that under strict construction statutes must be given their plain meaning. See
12 Brief of City at 18. Nonetheless, the plain meaning of § 203.092 is that it doesn’t
include reimbursement for replacement easements. The City also suggests the Harris
County Toll Road Authority decision undermines TxDOT’s position because it
indicates that a utility may be eligible for reimbursement under § 203.092 if the utility
has a compensable property interest in the land occupied by the facility to be
relocated. See Brief of City at 19–20 n.3. Far from undermining TxDOT’s position,
the Supreme Court’s decision provides authoritative support since it equates having
a “compensable property interest in the land occupied by the facility to be relocated”
with the facts in Magnolia Pipe Line Co. v. City of Tyler, 348 S.W.2d 537, 543 (Tex.
Civ. App.—Texarkana 1961, writ ref'd), where a utility was entitled to reimbursement
because it had purchased easements from private owners. See Harris Cnty. Toll Rd.
Auth., 282 S.W.3d at 66.
In addition, to the extent that § 203.092 waives the State’s sovereign immunity
as to utility facility relocation costs, such waiver must be clear and unambiguous. See
Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034. The City fails to explain how § 203.092 could constitute
a clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity for reimbursement of the cost to replace
non-exclusive public utility easements with exclusive private easements. The City
also does not address this Court’s opinion in Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P. v.
Emmett, 401 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. granted), in
which the Court strictly construed another relocation statute.
13 b. Section 203.092 does not require reimbursement for replacement easements.
i. The plain language of § 203.092 does not require reimbursement for replacement easements.
The City urges that the plain language of § 203.092 requires reimbursement for
replacement easements. See Brief of City at 17–21, 24–27. Yet § 203.092 never even
mentions replacement easements. Instead, it only references facilities. The City
suggests that if the Legislature had intended to exclude replacement easements it
would have discussed them in subsection (d)’s list of deductions. See Brief of City
at 19–20. However, there is no reason to provide for deductions from reimbursement
for replacement easements when the statute doesn’t contemplate any reimbursement
for replacement easements. If the statute was intended to include reimbursement for
replacement easements there most surely would be something in the statute
delineating what type of property interest and how much property would be
reimbursable. And, contrary to the City’s claim, see Brief of City at 20,
reimbursement for replacement easements would do much more than preserve the
City’s status quo. The City’s right of access to non-exclusive public utility easements
that are not compensable would be replaced with exclusive private easements that
could be compensable if there was ever a need to further widen the highway.
Federal regulations do not support the City’s position. See Brief of City at
24–27. The City points out that 23 C.F.R. § 645.105 defines relocation as “the
14 adjustment of utility facilities required by the highway project” which includes among
other things, “acquiring necessary right-of-way on the new location.” See Brief of
City at 24. The City suggests that this phrase refers to reimbursement for replacement
easements. See id. However, “acquiring necessary right-of-way on the new location”
is a reference to the government’s own acquisition of right-of-way in which to place
all relocated utilities as part of a roadway project, and not reimbursement to specific
utilities for replacement easements. See 23 C.F.R. § 645.105.8 Federal participation
in the cost of replacement easements is governed by 23 Code of Federal Regulations
§ 645.111(a)(1) which requires that a utility hold an interest that is compensable in
eminent domain.
The City also points to 43 Texas Administrative Code § 21.34 which provides
that where federal or state law prescribes a “higher degree of protection for highway
facilities or the traveling public” than the regulations, then that law controls. See
Brief of City at 24–25. This provision has no relevance to the City’s argument.
8 See also 23 U.S.C. § 109(l); 23 C.F.R. §§ 645.201-.215. 23 U.S.C. § 109(l) prescribes standards to follow in accommodating utility facilities in the highway right-of-way. 23 C.F.R. §§ 645.201-.215 prescribe policies and procedures for accommodating utility facilities in the right- of-way of Federal-aid or direct Federal highway projects. Both 23 U.S.C. § 109(l)(2)(B) and 23 C.F.R. §§ 645.207 define “right-of-way” as “real property, or interests therein, acquired, dedicated or reserved for the construction, operation, and maintenance of a highway.”
15 ii. Reimbursement for replacement easements is not properly attributable to relocation.
In State v. City of Austin, 331 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. 1960), the Supreme Court
indicated that replacement easements are not properly attributable to relocation. See
id. at 746. The City argues that the Supreme Court’s statement was mere dictum that
should be ignored. See Brief of City at 28. However, a higher court’s statements of
law that are not pivotal to that court’s decision may still be considered binding on
lower courts. See, e.g., Elledge v. Friberg–Cooper Water Supply Corp., 240 S.W.3d
869, 870 (Tex.2007); R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 380 S.W.2d 599,
601 (Tex.1964). “Judicial dictum, a statement by the supreme court made very
deliberately after mature consideration and for future guidance in the conduct of
litigation, is ‘at least persuasive and should be followed unless found to be
erroneous.’” Zapata Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., 90 S.W.3d
847 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (quoting Edwards v. Kaye, 9
S.W.3d 310, 314 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied)). In City of
Austin, the Supreme Court’s statement that the cost of acquiring replacement
easements is not properly attributable to relocation appears to be judicial dictum,
made after careful consideration and for guidance in future cases. See City of Austin,
331 S.W.2d at 746.9 Thus, it should be followed.
9 It is instructive that in spite of the recommendation of two of its members, the majority of the Court refused to delete the statement from the Court’s opinion. See City of Austin, 331 S.W.2d
16 The City does cite City of Austin in support of its argument that it should be
reimbursed for replacement easements. See Brief of City at 21–24. However, City of
Austin did not involve reimbursement for replacement easements but rather
reimbursement for the utility facilities themselves that were being relocated in the
highway right of way. The State argued that 203.092’s predecessor statute was an
unconstitutional grant of public money but the Supreme Court disagreed. See id. at
745. Nonetheless, the Court specifically distinguished the cost of acquiring right of
way that would be owned by a utility saying reimbursement for those costs “would
be an unconstitutional gift for a private purpose.” Id. at 746. Therefore, the City
cannot rely on the City of Austin opinion to support its position.
Reimbursement for replacement easements also cannot be considered properly
attributable to relocation because the City has the right to relocate its lines within the
State’s new right of way, a location that is functionally equivalent to location in a
non-exclusive public utility easement, making the acquisition of replacement
easements totally unnecessary and a waste of scarce governmental resources. The
City responds that it has chosen not relocate its lines within the State’s new right of
way because it will not have control of and access to its utilities if they are placed in
the State’s new right of way. See Brief of City at 28–29. This argument is a red
herring given that the City has a legal right to operate, construct, and maintain its
at 747 (Smith, J., op. on mot. for reh’g).
17 facilities in the highway right of way, and TxDOT’s regulations only require notice
before engaging in construction, maintenance or repair. See supra pp. 2–3.
iii. The City does not have a compensable interest in the land occupied by the facilities to be relocated.
The City is not entitled to reimbursement for replacement easements because
the City’s interests are non-exclusive public utility easements held by the City in its
governmental capacity. See Brief of TxDOT at 25–27. The City does not deny that
the public utility easements are held by the City in its governmental capacity.10
Instead, it asserts that it is seeking reimbursement for public and private easements
that are compensable property interests. See Brief of City at 29–34. The City’s
assertion has no merit. First, the City is not seeking reimbursement for any private
easements. As discussed above, the only private easement pointed to by the City is
the Grizzard easement which was not submitted for reimbursement when Utility
Agreement U14331was submitted by the City. All of the property interests referenced
in Utility Agreement U14331are public utility easements. See CR 116–125; see also
supra pp. 2–3.
10 That property held by a municipality in its governmental capacity may be taken by the State without the payment of compensation appears to be black letter law. See 4A Julius L. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain § 15.01[3], at 15-8 (3d ed. 2004); Annotation, Right of Public Body to Compensation Where Property Held by it is Taken for Another Public Purpose, 56 A.L.R. 365, Part II.a. (2011); 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 126 (2014); see also Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2004) (“municipalities [do not] possess a superior ownership interest in public roads vis-a-vis the State that would support a right to compensation under the Constitution's takings clause when they are applied to another public use”); Robbins v. Limestone Cnty., 268 S.W. 915 (Tex. 1925).
18 Second, all of the cases cited by the City regarding the compensability of
easements, with the exception of the H L & P case, involved private easements. See
e.g., Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 591 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.
1979) (private easement); Hubert v. Davis, 170 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005,
no pet.) (same); Magnolia Pipe Line Co., 348 S.W.2d 537 (same); City of Grand
Prairie v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 405 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1969) (same).
Third, the Court’s holding in Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. State, 925
S.W.2d 312 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied), should be
distinguished. In H L & P, the utility was seeking reimbursement for the cost of
relocation of the facility, not for the cost of replacement easements. In addition, the
cases relied on by this Court in H L & P admittedly involved private easements not
public utility easements. Moreover, the State is entitled to argue for a change or
modification of law existing in this Court, especially given the Supreme Court’s
decision in Texas Department of Transportation v. City of Sunset Valley, issued
several years after the H L & P decision. See City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637
(Tex. 2004).
Fourth, the City’s contention that TxDOT is estopped from asserting that the
City doesn’t have a compensable interest in public utility easements, see Brief of City
at 32–33, must be rejected. The City states that TxDOT acknowledged the
applicability of § 203.092 by entering Utility Agreement U14331 regarding relocation
19 of the utility facilities themselves. Nevertheless, this agreement involved
reimbursement for the utility facilities not reimbursement for replacement easements.
Moreover, the State is not subject to estoppel. State v. Durham, 860 S.W.2d 63, 67
(Tex. 1993); see also City of San Antonio v. TPLP Office Park Props., 218 S.W.3d
60, 67 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (City not estopped from closing driveway to regulate
traffic); City of White Settlement v. Super Wash, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 770, 773–78 (Tex.
2006) (City was not estopped from enforcing ordinance which prevented access
driveway); City of Hutchins v. Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d 829, 835–36 (Tex. 1970) (City
not estopped from classifying property as residential for zoning purposes); Argyle
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Wolf, 234 S.W.3d 229, 240–46 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no
pet.) (School District was not estopped from changing policy regarding tuition even
though superintendent had previously stated in letter that residents of particular street
would not be charged tuition).
Finally, the City claims that during negotiations with the City TxDOT
recognized that replacement easements were compensable. See Brief of City at 33–34.
The City’s claim is not accurate. See supra pp. 4–6. TxDOT acknowledged that the
City could be reimbursed for the Grizzard easement because it was a private easement
that was compensable in eminent domain. See CR 156–57. TxDOT has never
acknowledged that non-exclusive public utility easements are compensable.
20 c. Construction of Section 203.092 as requiring reimbursement for replacement easements would cause the State to pay betterment costs in violation of the Texas Constitution.
TxDOT asserts that § 203.092 should not be interpreted to require the State to
reimburse the City for replacement of non-exclusive public utility easements with
exclusive private easements because such an interpretation may result in a
constitutional violation. The City contends that this Court may not consider a claim
under the Constitution for the first time on appeal, and that the courts may not
consider the merits on a plea to the jurisdiction. See Brief of City at 44–47. The City’s
contentions have no merits for several reasons.
First, TxDOT is not asserting a “claim” under the Constitution but rather an
argument why § 203.092 should not be interpreted to require the State to reimburse
the City to replace non-exclusive public utility easements with exclusive private
easements. Second, the Supreme Court recognized in Texas Department of Parks &
Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004), that where a jurisdictional
challenge implicates the merits of a plaintiff’s cause of action the court may review
relevant evidence to determine if a fact issue exists. See id. at 227. Third, the issue in
an ultra vires claim is whether a government official has failed to comply with a
statutory or constitutional provision. See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372. To determine
whether an official has failed to comply, and thus whether the court has jurisdiction,
21 the court must interpret the provision in question. See McLane Co., Inc. v. Strayhorn,
148 S.W.3d 644, 650 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied). Finally, jurisdiction
may be raised at any time. See Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88 (Tex. 2012);
Anderson v. Truelove, 446 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
Thus, TxDOT is not precluded from making jurisdictional arguments on appeal.
According to the City, reimbursement for replacement of non-exclusive public
utility easements with exclusive private easements would not result in betterment
because exclusive private easements would insure access to its utility lines and
TxDOT has conceded that Section 203.092 applies to the City’s request for
reimbursement for non-exclusive public utility easements. See Brief of City at 47–48.
However, as discussed above, the concern regarding access is a red herring given that
the City has a legal right to operate, construct, and maintain its facilities in the
highway right of way and TxDOT’s regulations only require notice before engaging
in construction, maintenance or repair. See supra pp. 2–3. Furthermore, TxDOT has
never acknowledged that non-exclusive public utility easements are compensable. See
supra pp. 4–6.
II. The City’s claim under Article 1, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution is barred by the State’s sovereign immunity.
In its first amended petition, the City asserted that Appellants’ actions violated
Article 1, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution. CR 33–5. The City asserts that it did
22 not intend to make a claim for inverse condemnation, and that it did not intend to seek
monetary relief for inverse condemnation through a request for declaratory relief. See
Brief of City at 49–50. But, to the extent that its petition could be interpreted as a
claim for inverse condemnation, the Court has no jurisdiction because such a claim
would be invalid. See Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 476
(Tex. 2012) (sovereign immunity is retained where a plaintiff fails to properly plead
or establish an inverse condemnation claim). The City cannot assert an inverse claim
for the taking of public utility easements because they are not property interests that
are compensable in eminent domain. See Brief of TxDOT at 25–27; see also supra
pp. 17–18.
To the extent that the City’s petition could be interpreted as an attempt to
characterize a suit for money damages as a declaratory judgment action it is also
barred by sovereign immunity. See Millwee-Jackson Joint Venture v. Dall. Area
Rapid Transit, 350 S.W.3d 772, 785–86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.).
III. The City’s claims regarding Segment 7 are not ripe.
TxDOT raised the jurisdictional issue of ripeness in the trial court but the City
did not come forward with any evidence of ripeness with respect to Segment 7. Thus,
the Court has no jurisdiction with respect to claims regarding Segment 7. See Tex.
Mun. Power Agency v. Johnson, 405 S.W.3d 776, 781 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (“A claim is not ripe if it concerns ‘uncertain or contingent
23 future events that may not occur as anticipated or may not occur at all,” quoting Waco
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 851–52 (Tex. 2000)).
IV. The City’s claim for attorneys’ fees is barred by the State’s sovereign immunity.
The UDJA does not waive the State’s sovereign immunity for the City’s claim
seeking construction of a statute. See Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 621; Heinrich, 284
S.W.3d at 370–71. In addition, the State’s sovereign immunity as to the City’s ultra
vires claim is not waived because such suits cannot be brought against the
Commission, and because Houghton did not fail to perform a nondiscretionary duty
under Section 203.092 of the Texas Transportation Code. See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d
at 372–73. Thus, the City’s UDJA claims are not authorized and the State retains
sovereign immunity from the claim for attorneys’ fees. See John G. & Marie Stella
Kenedy Mem’l Found. v. Dewhurst, 90 S.W.3d 268, 289 (Tex. 2002).
PRAYER
Appellants, Texas Transportation Commission and Ted Houghton, in his
official capacity as Chair of the Texas Transportation Commission, respectfully pray
that this Honorable Court of Appeals grant the following relief:
1) reverse (1) the court’s denial of Defendants’ Second Amended Plea to the
Jurisdiction and Amended Motion for Summary Judgment Under Tex. R. Civ.
P. 166a(b) and (c); (2) the court’s order, signed October 23, 2014, that denied
24 Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration; and (3) the court’s order signed
December 3, 2014 that denied Appellants’ second amended plea to the
jurisdiction.
2) dismiss all of Appellee’s claims for want of jurisdiction;
3) render judgment that Appellee take nothing; and
4) order that Appellee pay all costs incurred by Appellants.
Respectfully submitted,
KEN PAXTON ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
CHARLES E. ROY FIRST ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
JAMES E. DAVIS DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR CIVIL LITIGATION
RANDALL K. HILL ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL CHIEF, TRANSPORTATION DIVISION
/s/ Anthony G. Brocato, Jr. ANTHONY G. BROCATO, JR. Assistant Attorney General State Bar No. 03039001 anthony.brocato@texasattorneygeneral.gov SUSAN DESMARAIS BONNEN Assistant Attorney General State Bar No. 24053873 susan.bonnen@texasattorneygneral.gov Transportation Division
25 P.O. Box 12548 Austin, Texas 78711-2548
(512) 463-2004 (512) 472-3855 - Facsimile
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS TEXAS TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION AND TED HOUGHTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, AS CHAIR OF THE TEXAS TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that this document contains 6176 words as determined by the word count of the computer program used to prepare this document, excluding the sections of the document listed in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).
/s/ Anthony G. Brocato, Jr. ANTHONY G. BROCATO, JR. Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the 9th day of March, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants Texas Transportation Commission and Ted Houghton, in His Official Capacity as Chair of the Texas Transportation Commission has been sent via electronic service and email, to the following:
Mr. Charles W. Irvine Irvine & Conner, PLLC 4709 Austin Street Houston, Texas 77004 Attorney for Appellee, City of Jersey Village
/s/ Anthony G. Brocato, Jr. ANTHONY G. BROCATO, JR. Assistant Attorney General
26 Appendix A Page 1 of 4
: Apr’-2W—as8 l1:32A Grizzas-d Pv’op 713 521 7212 P 04
• ,.y TO119a • UTIliTY EASEME1ilT 51 C—50— 1988 THE STATE OF fJ( 05111198 100744001 1011293 SU0 COUNTY OF HARRIS CITY OF JERSEY VIlLAGE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE l’RESEt.7S, that GRJZZARD PARTNERSHIP. LTD.. hereinafter called Grantor(s). for and in c deraden of the sum of tan dOllars and other good and valuable services paid to Cirsatar(s) in hand by the City of Jersey Village, Feast, ban graistad. sold and conveyed, and by theta presents does gram. sell and convey 0 the City otPeraey Village, Tents. s monicips! corporation, 16501 Jersey Dtlve, Houston. Team 77040, a JO loot wide utilityassonant and an addtliozral 20 foot temporary working casement, said 20 foot temporary working easemrnt to rant ddritg the least atnouns of hose reasonably necessary to complete construction riie of a 12 water line In the 10 foot rr.illty eusemene (total macniece width temporary and permanent being 30 feet) to assist upon and cotaulcuci, esttot’sixuct, maintain, operate, inspect, replace, repair, and remove at. underground msmiepal utility line together whit all necessity appurtestances over said acroes is Eablbft A as the made a part hereof for all intense and purposes as if the name were copied verbatim heroin. The City hereby permanent to restore any portion of the property relative to this basement that ta disturbed for utility infraserucetsre purporce to easement) a reasonably similar condition as its original condition within a reasonable period of time after completion of the project, or any subsequent repairs thereto. hereby retain all righiri, abilities and authorities to cosssnuct and permanently Grantor and its butt’s and assigns maintain pavof aècess andior driveways across, over nd through said utility easements (both pernianetir and tetuporary).
To have and to bold rise above described premises, except as provided above, together with all and singular the rigito 4 aed appurtenances thereto in itty wine belonging, to die City of Jeroey Village, Texas, itt successors or assigns forever. The Grantor does hereby bind itself, its heirs anti assigns, to warrant sod forevor defend all arid singular the said easement to rite City of ieroey Village, Its successors and assigns, against every person whomsoever Iawhdty claiming or to claim the sante or any part thereof.
Euecuted thie 9,,lhday of 2 APRIL AD. 1998.
Dy ,
fdø2 Grizzard Partnership. lid. VLce—Preeident Plantation Land Company By pti t wenL enr seasorpreei rd Partnership. Ltd. Plantation Laod Company General Partner General Partner THE STATE OP COLORADO. COUNTY OF OUItAY
This Inslnimest was aeisnow)edgodbefoeemriou Be29thda ,of 1 APRIL . t998. bylamesM. Oriuart.
LJQIIA) Notary Public is aIi for The Sian of tlora5o Nutirys Prialed Name B°l rq,Lctsu My Cei”mision eripiresi Ii /301t 8 3
•1
(Any provision herein which restrict the sale, rental or use of the described Real Property because of color or race is invalid and unenforceable tsnder the Federal Law. Confidential information may have been redacted from the document in compliance with Qhe Public Information Act.
A Certified Copy Attest: 9/4/2014 Stan Stanart, County Clerk Harris County, Texac
‘ ._L4 ! - j Deputy Appendix A Page 2 of 4
51 —5tJ--1 9 • . THE STATEOP TEXAS. cOLJN’tOFHARRlS
• . tnat wdgcd ce of M4Y. 1998, by Sme G. Wer.
/L1 cr 7 c1c up
V
(v provision herein which restrict the sale, rental or use of the described Real Property because of color or race is invalid and unenforceable under the Federal Law. Confidential information may have been redacted from the document in compliance with Ithe Public Information Act.
A Certified Copy Attest: 9/4/2014 Stan Stanart, County Clerk Harris County, Texas
/ ‘L. Deputy r, . Appendix A Page 3 of 4
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(Any provision herein which restrict the sale, rental or use of the described Real Property because of color or race is invalid and unenforceable under the Federal Law. Confidential information may have been redacted from the document in compliance with lse Public Information Act.
A Certified Copy Attest: 9)4/2014 Stan Stanart, County Clerk Harris County, Texas
I! 4 _jg -- )“... C. Deputy Appendix A Page 4 of 4
51 e—50— I 9 I
CL,ojq
MAYZ 1 1998
Any provision herein which restrict the sale, rental or use of the described Real Property because of color or race is invalid and unenforceable under the Federal Law. Confidential information may have been redacted from the document in compliance with the Public Information Act.
A Certified Copy Attest: 9/4/2014 Stan Stanart, County Ckrk Harris Cpu,)ty, jexafr_)
i__i Deputy