JERRE S. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:
This proceeding challenges the district court’s denial of a motion for an attorney’s fees award in a case in which the appellants had partial success on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. We agree with the district court that the appellants were not “prevailing parties” and therefore are not eligible for an award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and we affirm.
I. Factual Background And Prior Proceedings
The Texas State Teachers Association (TSTA), the Garland Education Association (GEA), and several individuals belonging to or employed by these organizations filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit in federal court on March 13,1981, challenging a regulation of the Garland Independent School District (GISD). This regulation, GISD Administrative Regulation 412, was construed by GISD administrators and by this Court to prohibit visits to GISD campuses by outside representatives of teacher employee organizations1 during regular school hours (8:00 a.m. — 3:45 p.m., including lunch and nonteaching time), such representatives’ use of a GISD school’s internal communication systems, private conversations be[191]*191tween two teachers regarding teacher employee organizations, and teacher use of a school’s internal mail system and bulletin boards for this subject. Texas State Teachers Assoc. v. Garland Independent School District, 777 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir.1985).
The challenge to Regulation 412 apparently arose when nine TSTA representatives visited several GISD schools during school hours in January 1981, and were refused permission by school administrators to distribute their literature or to meet with teachers or TSTA faculty representatives. In their suit, appellants claimed the regulation violated their free speech and free association rights under the First Amendment and violated the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. They also claimed the regulation was unconstitutionally over-broad. Appellants sought nominal, actual, and exemplary damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Both sides filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court granted GISD’s motion for summary judgment and denied appellants’ summary judgment motion with two exceptions not at issue before us.2 The district court’s opinion focused on the application of Regulation 412 in preventing outside representatives of employee organizations from recruiting, organizing, or meeting with GISD teachers on GISD campuses during school hours and in denying them access to GISD schools’ internal mail systems, teacher mailboxes, bulletin boards, and public address systems. The district court held that this application of Regulation 412 did not violate appellants’ constitutional rights to free speech, free association, or equal protection. The district court found no merit in appellants’ due process challenge.
The court’s discussion of Regulation 412’s application to conversations among GISD teachers regarding employee organizations consisted of a single footnote. In that footnote the district court held that prohibiting teachers from discussing employee organization business among themselves during non-class time would be unconstitutional, but the court noted that there had not been any attempt to enforce such an interpretation of the regulation. The court held, however, that Regulation 412 could be used to prohibit teachers from promoting an employee organization or working for such an organization during the school day but during off-duty hours of teachers.
On appeal, this Court agreed with the district court that Regulation 412 was constitutional as it applied to outside representatives of employee organizations by preventing their access to GISD campuses and employees during school hours and preventing their use of school communication facilities. 777 F.2d at 1050-53. We held, however, that Regulation 412 was unconstitutional as it applied to prohibit “any discussions among teachers relating to TSTA or TSTA business or relating to any teacher organization that occur on school premises during school hours, even though those discussions occur during lunch hour or other non-class time.” 777 F.2d at 1053. (emphasis in original). We disagreed with the district court’s holding that this issue was not properly before the court. We held that conversations about employee organizations between GISD teachers during nonclass times during the school day could not be prohibited since there was no showing “that such conversations result in a ‘material and substantial interference with the activities or discipline of the school.’ ” 777 F.2d at 1055.
We also struck down the regulation’s ban on the use of school internal mail facilities and bulletin boards by GISD teachers to transmit messages relating to employee organizations.
[192]*192GISD filed a petition for rehearing before this Court, and a suggestion for rehearing en banc, contesting this Court’s invalidation of Regulation 412 as it applied to teacher-teacher communication. These petitions were denied by the court. GISD filed a Motion for Stay of Enforcement and/or Recall of Mandate which we also denied. GISD appealed our decision to the Supreme Court and filed an Application For Stay of Enforcement pending appeal with the Supreme Court which that Court denied. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed our judgment, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 41, 93 L.Ed.2d 4 (1986).
Appellants subsequently moved the district court for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court denied the request for attorney’s fees, holding that although the appellants had achieved “partial success” in their suit against GISD, they did not prevail on the “central issue” which was GISD’s policy limiting communications and access between employee organizations and GISD teachers. TSTA and the various appellants appeal this holding.
II. Attorney’s Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
In pertinent part, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 reads: “In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,1982,1983,1985, and 1986 of this title, ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” (emphasis added). The term “prevailing party” is not defined by the statute, but has been judicially defined by the courts. We have held that the test for “prevailing party” status as it applies to plaintiffs is “whether the plaintiff prevailed on the central issue by acquiring the primary relief sought.” Simien v. City of San Antonio,
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JERRE S. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:
This proceeding challenges the district court’s denial of a motion for an attorney’s fees award in a case in which the appellants had partial success on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. We agree with the district court that the appellants were not “prevailing parties” and therefore are not eligible for an award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and we affirm.
I. Factual Background And Prior Proceedings
The Texas State Teachers Association (TSTA), the Garland Education Association (GEA), and several individuals belonging to or employed by these organizations filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit in federal court on March 13,1981, challenging a regulation of the Garland Independent School District (GISD). This regulation, GISD Administrative Regulation 412, was construed by GISD administrators and by this Court to prohibit visits to GISD campuses by outside representatives of teacher employee organizations1 during regular school hours (8:00 a.m. — 3:45 p.m., including lunch and nonteaching time), such representatives’ use of a GISD school’s internal communication systems, private conversations be[191]*191tween two teachers regarding teacher employee organizations, and teacher use of a school’s internal mail system and bulletin boards for this subject. Texas State Teachers Assoc. v. Garland Independent School District, 777 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir.1985).
The challenge to Regulation 412 apparently arose when nine TSTA representatives visited several GISD schools during school hours in January 1981, and were refused permission by school administrators to distribute their literature or to meet with teachers or TSTA faculty representatives. In their suit, appellants claimed the regulation violated their free speech and free association rights under the First Amendment and violated the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. They also claimed the regulation was unconstitutionally over-broad. Appellants sought nominal, actual, and exemplary damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Both sides filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court granted GISD’s motion for summary judgment and denied appellants’ summary judgment motion with two exceptions not at issue before us.2 The district court’s opinion focused on the application of Regulation 412 in preventing outside representatives of employee organizations from recruiting, organizing, or meeting with GISD teachers on GISD campuses during school hours and in denying them access to GISD schools’ internal mail systems, teacher mailboxes, bulletin boards, and public address systems. The district court held that this application of Regulation 412 did not violate appellants’ constitutional rights to free speech, free association, or equal protection. The district court found no merit in appellants’ due process challenge.
The court’s discussion of Regulation 412’s application to conversations among GISD teachers regarding employee organizations consisted of a single footnote. In that footnote the district court held that prohibiting teachers from discussing employee organization business among themselves during non-class time would be unconstitutional, but the court noted that there had not been any attempt to enforce such an interpretation of the regulation. The court held, however, that Regulation 412 could be used to prohibit teachers from promoting an employee organization or working for such an organization during the school day but during off-duty hours of teachers.
On appeal, this Court agreed with the district court that Regulation 412 was constitutional as it applied to outside representatives of employee organizations by preventing their access to GISD campuses and employees during school hours and preventing their use of school communication facilities. 777 F.2d at 1050-53. We held, however, that Regulation 412 was unconstitutional as it applied to prohibit “any discussions among teachers relating to TSTA or TSTA business or relating to any teacher organization that occur on school premises during school hours, even though those discussions occur during lunch hour or other non-class time.” 777 F.2d at 1053. (emphasis in original). We disagreed with the district court’s holding that this issue was not properly before the court. We held that conversations about employee organizations between GISD teachers during nonclass times during the school day could not be prohibited since there was no showing “that such conversations result in a ‘material and substantial interference with the activities or discipline of the school.’ ” 777 F.2d at 1055.
We also struck down the regulation’s ban on the use of school internal mail facilities and bulletin boards by GISD teachers to transmit messages relating to employee organizations.
[192]*192GISD filed a petition for rehearing before this Court, and a suggestion for rehearing en banc, contesting this Court’s invalidation of Regulation 412 as it applied to teacher-teacher communication. These petitions were denied by the court. GISD filed a Motion for Stay of Enforcement and/or Recall of Mandate which we also denied. GISD appealed our decision to the Supreme Court and filed an Application For Stay of Enforcement pending appeal with the Supreme Court which that Court denied. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed our judgment, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 41, 93 L.Ed.2d 4 (1986).
Appellants subsequently moved the district court for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court denied the request for attorney’s fees, holding that although the appellants had achieved “partial success” in their suit against GISD, they did not prevail on the “central issue” which was GISD’s policy limiting communications and access between employee organizations and GISD teachers. TSTA and the various appellants appeal this holding.
II. Attorney’s Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
In pertinent part, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 reads: “In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,1982,1983,1985, and 1986 of this title, ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” (emphasis added). The term “prevailing party” is not defined by the statute, but has been judicially defined by the courts. We have held that the test for “prevailing party” status as it applies to plaintiffs is “whether the plaintiff prevailed on the central issue by acquiring the primary relief sought.” Simien v. City of San Antonio, 809 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir.1987). See also Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 720 F.2d 1383, 1385 (5th Cir.1983); Taylor v. Sterrett, 640 F.2d 663, 669 (5th Cir.1981); Iranian Students Association v. Edwards, 604 F.2d 352, 353 (5th Cir.1979).
Our definition of “prevailing party” is narrower than that of some of the other Federal appellate courts. “Prevailing parties” for § 1988 attorney’s fees purposes has also been defined as parties who “ ‘succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.’ ” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-9 (1st Cir.1978). In Hensley, the Supreme Court merely accepted the “generous formulation” of the “prevailing party” definition found in some of the circuits but did not hold it to be the only correct definition. See 461 U.S. at 433 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. at 1939 n. 8.
Clearly the “prevailing party” issue is a threshold inquiry to be made by a district court prior to the exercise of its discretion in deciding whether to award attorney’s fees under § 1988. If plaintiffs are not the “prevailing parties” under § 1988, then they are not even eligible for an attorney’s fees award.3
Applying this Court’s definition of “prevailing party” to the facts of this case, we agree with the conclusion of the district court that appellants did not succeed on the central issue of their suit and did not obtain the primary relief sought. The main thrust of this lawsuit was appellants’ attempt to open up GISD school campuses during school hours to outside representatives of employee organizations like TSTA and GEA and to allow such organizations the [193]*193use of school communication facilities. Appellants failed in this attempt, and this was the primary relief sought in this lawsuit. Granted, appellants did succeed on significant secondary issues by having Regulation 412 declared unconstitutional as it applied to teacher to teacher conversation and teacher use of school communication systems. But this was not the primary relief sought. The central issue in this case was employee organization access to GISD campuses, not internal teacher communication within those campuses.
III. Conclusion
The district court was correct in holding that appellants were not eligible for an attorney’s fees award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because they were not “prevailing parties” under § 1988.
AFFIRMED.