Texas Midland Railroad v. H. L. Edwards & Co.

121 S.W. 570, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 643, 1909 Tex. App. LEXIS 569
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 1, 1909
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 121 S.W. 570 (Texas Midland Railroad v. H. L. Edwards & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Texas Midland Railroad v. H. L. Edwards & Co., 121 S.W. 570, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 643, 1909 Tex. App. LEXIS 569 (Tex. Ct. App. 1909).

Opinion

BOOKHOUT, Associate Justice.

This suit was brought by the defendant in error, H. L. Edwards & Company, in the District Court of Ivaufman County, Texas, against the plaintiff in error, the Texas Midland Bailroad, to recover the value of seventy-four bales of cotton which were, on'the 19th day of December, 1901, destroyed by fire while situated on the compress platform of the Shippers’ Warehouse and Compress Company, at Terrell, Texas. The plaintiff alleged that on the 18th and 19th days of December, 1901, the plaintiffs delivered to the defendant on its platform in the city of Terrell, Texas, three hundred and ten bales of cotton for immediate shipment by defendant to Liverpool, and one hundred bales of cotton for like immediate shipment to Havre. That said platform was the platform of the Shippers’ Warehouse and Compress 'Company at Terrell, but the same adjoins the tracks of defendant, and said platforms were on said dates and for a long time theretofore had been the only platforms for the purpose of receiving and shipping cotton of all kinds owned or controlled by defendant in Terrell, and the same were the usual places for its receipt of cotton for shipment and the only place that defendant had for such purpose at such time, and it was defendant’s universal custom to receive cotton for shipment on said platforms. That defendant received said cotton for immediate shipment and caused the same to be segregated and put in a place to itself, same being properly marked and tagged for shipment as aforesaid. That thereupon the plaintiffs prepared bills of lading for said cotton and said bills of lading were 0. K.-ed by defendant’s servants and agents, who checked said cotton and ascertained that it was there. That thereupon said bills of lading were handed to the station agent of defendant at 12 o’clock on the 19th and he was requested to sign the same. The said agent promised to sign said bills by two o’clock in the afternoon, but for some reason unknown to plaintiffs he failed and refused to sign the same at two o’clock, and for some hours thereafter,' although demand was made of him that he sign same. . That from said two o’clock until five ’ o’clock the said station agent kept promising to sign said bills, but had not done so at about five o’clock, when a fire broke out upon said platform and destroyed 74 bales of plaintiffs’ cotton which had been, as above alleged, delivered by it to defendant for shipment as aforesaid—sixty-nine out of the shipment for Liverpool and five out of the shipment for Havre. That after the destruction by fire plaintiffs still demanded of defendant that it sign and deliver them said bills of lading, but the agent then refused to do so. That plaintiffs had completed their delivery of said cotton to defendant, and had done all that they could do towards the shipment of same, and that defendant had received the same for shipment as a common carrier prior to its destruction by fire. The defendant answered by general demurrer, general denial, and specially answered, *645 alleging the facts why it claimed the plaintiffs ought not to recover. A trial resulted in a judgment for plaintiffs for $4,199.33, the value of the cotton burned, and defendant perfected a writ of error.

Conclusions of fact.—The cause was tried by the court without a jury and the court filed conclusions of fact, from which it appears: That in December, 1901, and for many years prior thereto, H. L. Edwards & Company had been buyers and exporters of cotton, and were represented at Terrell by Lucias Bash as their agent. That at the same time, and long prior thereto, the Texas Midland Bailroad had been in the business of a common carrier of freight and passengers, and as such had been engaged in the transportation of cotton for foreign shipment. That the defendant company had no facilities at its depot for the reception of cotton for shipment, and all cotton intended for foreign shipment over its road, as well as over the Texas & Pacific Bail-road, was delivered, to the respective roads on the platform of the Shippers’ Warehouse and Compress Company, the said railroads having spurs or sidetracks contiguous to said compress platform and on opposite sides thereof. That by the general custom and usual course of business dealing between the cotton shippers, the railroad and said compress company, which had prevailed for many years, all cotton, when intended for foreign shipment, was delivered on the compress platform; if the same was local cotton, that is, cotton which had been marketed from the wagons in the city of Terrell, the same was hauled from the cotton yards to the compress company’s platform, and the management of said compress issued what was known as-dray receipts for this local cotton as it was delivered at the compress. If the cotton intended for shipment was “located in” from the non-compress points, it was delivered by the railroad so transporting it to Terrell to the compress platform, where it was taken charge of by the compress management for the owner of the cotton, said compress management issuing receipts, or tickets, for this cotton, and tagging the same in order that it could be identified. Whenever any exporter of cotton desired to ship the same, they would, after having collected the same upon the compress platform, as aforesaid, and determining over which railroad they would ship, usually prepare their own bills of lading as a matter of convenience, and take them to the superintendent of the compress, who would check up the cotton and see that it was all on the compress platform, and would take up the dray receipts and also the receipts for the “localed in” cotton, which was included in the bills of lading, and after said cotton was ascertained to be on the platform, would O. K. this bill of lading. The approval at that time of the bills of lading consisted of “O. K.” signed by W. H. Flowers, who was superintendent of the compress. The bills of lading were left blank as to date, and after receiving the O. K. of the superintendent of the compress the shippers of the cotton or some one representing them would then take the bills of lading to the agent of the railroad over which the cotton was desired to be shipped, to be signed and dated by said agent.

There was an arrangement and agreement between the compress company and the Texas Midland Bailroad that said company should *646 protect it in the way of insurance against the cotton delivered on the compress platform for shipment over said railroad. The said compress company in pursuance of this agreement carried a blanket policy of $15,000 for the protection of the Texas Midland Bailroad, and if at any one time there was more cotton for shipment over the Texas Midland Bailroad than this blanket policy covered, then by said arrangement and agreement the compress company took out short-term policies to cover their excess; and the railroad company would decline to sign the hills of lading until it was protected for the amount of cotton then on the compress for compression and shipment, until it was protected either by the blanket policy or short-term policies in addition thereto. The plaintiffs in this case were not a party to this arrangement between the compress company and the railroad; had nothing to do with the payment of the insurance premiums, and the policies were not taken out for the benefit of the plaintiffs or other shippers, but solely for the benefit of the railroad.

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Bluebook (online)
121 S.W. 570, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 643, 1909 Tex. App. LEXIS 569, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/texas-midland-railroad-v-h-l-edwards-co-texapp-1909.