OPINION
HECHT, Justice.
Following publication of the 1990 United States decennial census, the Seventy-Second Legislature enacted Senate Bill 311 and House Bill 150,2 reapportioning state senatorial and representative districts, respectively, as required by article III, section 28 of the Texas Constitution.3 In litigation challenging the accuracy of the 1990 census and the validity of any redistrieting based upon it, Hon. Mario E. Ramirez, Judge of the 332nd District Court in Hidal-go County, Texas, has ordered that all elections for the Texas Senate and House of Representatives be based, not upon the reapportionment statutes enacted by the Legislature, but upon districts reconfigured by the court.
Two judgments rendered by the district court affect state senatorial districts, one dated October 11, 1991, in Cause No. G-454-91-F, styled Mena v. Richards, and the other dated October 7, 1991, in Cause No. C-4395-91-F, styled Quiroz v. Richards. Both judgments were based upon a settlement agreement between the plaintiffs in the two cases and three of the defendants, the Governor and the director and executive director of the Texas Legislative Council. These defendants are represented by the Texas Attorney General, who executed the settlement agreement on their behalf.
In the original mandamus proceeding now before this Court, five individuals who were not parties in either suit4 request us to direct the district court to vacate these two judgments. They argue, in essence, that the district court, in redistricting the State by merely approving an agreement of the Governor, the Attorney General, and a few other individuals, encroaches upon a power which the Constitution commits to the Legislature. They also ask that the Attorney General be directed to rescind his agreement to the judgments, and that the Secretary of State be directed to withdraw the districting plan created by the judgments from preelearance consideration by the United States Department of Justice [714]*714under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
We hold that a district court cannot order a reapportionment plan for the State based upon nothing more than the agreement of the Governor, the Attorney General, and a few citizens. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the requested relief directed to Judge Ramirez. We deny relief against the Attorney General and Secretary of State.
I
A somewhat detailed history of the Mena and Quiroz litigation out of which the present proceeding arises is important to place in context the legal issues raised.
The Mena lawsuit, filed February 7, 1991, originally sought to prohibit use of the 1990 census to reapportion the State’s legislative, congressional, and state board of education districts. The suit was filed against two groups of defendants: the Governor, the director and executive director of the Texas Legislative Council, whom we refer to as “the state defendants”, all of whom are represented by the Attorney General; and the county judge and commissioners of Hidalgo County, whom we refer to as “the county defendants”, and who are not represented by the Attorney General. Plaintiffs alleged that the 1990 census disproportionately under-counted racial and ethnic minority populations in Texas, and that any reapportionment based upon it, without adjusting for such undercount, would violate article I, sections 3, 3a, 19 and 29 of the Texas Constitution.5
Notwithstanding this lawsuit, the Legislature during its regular session enacted Senate Bill 31 and House Bill 150, reapportioning state senatorial and representative districts, respectively, using the 1990 census. The Legislature did not reapportion congressional or board of education districts during the regular session. Plaintiffs in the Mena suit then amended their petition to request a declaration that Senate Bill 31 and House Bill 150 are unconstitutional, to enjoin elections based upon those statutes, and to require that legislative districts be redrawn. Plaintiffs also challenged the constitutionality of pre-1991 congressional districts, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 197g (Vernon Supp.1991), and board of education districts, Tex.Educ.Code § 11.21. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and for a temporary injunction.
Beginning August 5, 1991, the district court heard evidence and argument for approximately three days on plaintiffs’ application for temporary injunction. The court also heard argument on plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The state defendants, represented by the Attorney General, defended the validity of the Legislature’s apportionment statutes. The county defendants aligned themselves with plaintiffs. Following this hearing, on August 22, the district court granted partial summary judgment for plaintiffs, declaring that the 1990 census disproportionately un-dercounted Mexican-American and African-American populations in Texas, that use of unadjusted 1990 census data as a basis for any reapportionment violates article I, sections 3, 3a, 19 and 29 of the Texas Constitution, and that Senate Bill 31 and House Bill 150, which are based upon unadjusted 1990 census data, violate the same sections of the Texas Constitution as well as article III, sections 25, 26 and 28.
While this ruling as requested by plaintiffs is very broad, the district court went [715]*715much further. It held that further use of all legislative, congressional and board of education districts apportioned on the basis of 1980, not 1990, census data, would also be unconstitutional. The district court issued a temporary injunction mandating the state defendants to submit, by September 30, 1991, new reapportionment plans using adjusted census figures to compensate for the undercounting found by the court. The court also enjoined any further reapportionment based upon 1990 census data and any legislative elections based upon Senate Bill 31 and House Bill 150. The court set trial on the merits for October 1.
Three days later, the Legislature in its second called session enacted congressional and board of education reapportionment statutes based upon 1990 census data. Act of Aug. 25, 1991, 72nd Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 2, 1991 Tex.Sess.Law Serv. 2 (Vernon) (board of education districts); Act of Aug. 25, 1991, 72nd Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 7, 1991 Tex. Sess.Law Serv. 41 (Vernon) (congressional districts). Despite the district court’s sweeping temporary injunction, the Governor signed these statutes. Plaintiffs have not directly challenged them.
On August 23, the day after the district court issued its order, the state defendants filed their notice of direct appeal to this Court. They filed their statement of jurisdiction in this Court on September 23, and moved to stay proceedings in the district court so that the parties could focus their efforts on the appeal. We granted the motion on September 24. Despite this stay, on September 27 the district court signed extensive findings of fact and con-elusions of law in support of its August 22 order.
On October 4, nineteen of the thirty-one state senators requested the Attorney General to propose an alternate senate redistricting plan to plaintiffs to settle that portion of the litigation. The Lieutenant Governor did not endorse the plan but indicated that he would abide by the will of the Senate and encouraged the Attorney General to settle the case if possible. On October 7, plaintiffs and the state defendants entered into an agreement to settle their dispute regarding state senatorial districts based upon the proposed alternate plan. In accordance with the agreement, the parties took the following actions, all on October 7, to avoid the effect of our stay of proceedings in Mena. Plaintiffs filed a new lawsuit against the state defendants in the 332nd District Court, styled Quiroz v. Richards. Plaintiffs alleged essentially the same claims against Senate Bill 31 as in Mena, but against the state defendants only. The state defendants answered. All parties filed a joint motion for entry of an agreed final judgment prohibiting any elections based upon Senate Bill 31 and ordering that elections for the State Senate be based instead on the alternate redistricting plan attached to the judgment until enactment of another under Texas law and pre-clearance under federal law. The state defendants expressly did not concede the invalidity of Senate Bill 31 and the agreed judgment did not hold the statute invalid. The district court signed the agreed judgment “[bjased upon the Joint Motion for Entry of Agreed Final Judgment, and arguments and stipulations of counsel”.6 [716]*716The Secretary of State notified the United States Department of Justice that he was substituting the agreed plan for the Senate Bill 31 plan for preelearance consideration.7 And the state defendants moved this Court to lift its stay of proceedings in Mena to allow the trial court to consider the same proposed settlement in that case.
On October 9, we noted probable jurisdiction over the direct appeal in Mena. Richards v. Mena, 820 S.W.2d 371 (1991); see Tex. Const, art. V, § 3-b; Tex.Gov’t Code § 22.001(c); Tex.R.App.P. 140. We also granted the parties’ requests to expedite consideration, established a briefing schedule, and set the case for oral submission on October 29. Richards, 820 S.W.2d at 371. On October 10, we granted the state defendants’ motion to lift our stay of proceedings in the district court. Id. at 371. On October 11, the district court rendered in Mena a “partial final” judgment, presumably interlocutory, essentially the same as the judgment it had rendered four days before in Quiroz.8 As in Quiroz, the Mena judgment was based upon the parties’ agreement and joint motion and did not adjudicate Senate Bill 31 to be invalid. The county defendants did not join in the settlement agreement but did approve the judgment.
On October 30, the day after the direct appeal was argued before this Court, we lifted our stay of proceedings in the district court altogether to allow the parties to proceed to trial and the district court to render a final judgment as expeditiously as possible. We retained jurisdiction of the appeal, suspending enforcement of the district court’s August 22 order, but expressed no opinion on the issues raised. [717]*717Richards v. Mena, 820 S.W.2d 371 (1991).9
On November 5, State Senators Bill Sims and Eddie Lucio, Jr. attempted to intervene in Mena and Quiroz, and filed a motion for new trial in each case asking the district court to vacate the agreed judgments and proceed to trial on the merits. Plaintiffs moved to strike the intervention in both cases. The district court heard evidence and argument on these motions on November 25 and 26. On November 27, the court signed an order in Mena striking Sims and Lucio’s intervention for lack of standing and denying their motion for new trial. That same day the court signed what purports to be a final judgment in Mena, adopting a state representative redistricting plan proposed by plaintiffs without agreement, or counteroffer, from the state defendants, and prohibiting further use of House Bill 150. On December 3, 1991, the court struck Sims and Lucio’s intervention in Quiroz and denied their motion for new trial in that case.
On November 25, five individuals not parties to the Mena or Quiroz cases moved for leave to file their petition for writ of mandamus in this Court. Relators ask that the district court be directed to vacate its October 7 and October 11 judgments ordering reconfigured senatorial districts. Rela-tors also ask that the Attorney General be directed to rescind the settlement agreement, and that the Secretary of State withdraw the plan ordered by the district court from preclearance consideration by the Department of Justice. Relators do not challenge in this proceeding the court’s judgment reconfiguring representative districts. We granted relators’ motion on December 3, and set the case for oral argument the following week. 35 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 168, 170.
II
A
The responsibility for apportioning the State into legislative districts belongs primarily to the Legislature. Tex. Const. art. Ill, § 28. The judiciary, however, is both empowered and, when properly called upon, obliged to declare whether an apportionment statute enacted by the Legislature is valid. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Clements v. Valles, 620 S.W.2d 112 (Tex.1981); Smith v. Craddick, 471 S.W.2d 375 (Tex.1971); Smith v. Patterson, 111 Tex. 535, 242 S.W. 749 (1922). A judicial determination that an apportionment statute violates a constitutional provision is no more an encroachment on the prerogative of the Legislature than the same determination with respect to some other statute. The Legislature, as well as the judiciary, must comply with the United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution. Yet a court’s duty to consider a party’s constitutional challenge to a statute, never to be taken lightly, and the deference owed a coordinate branch of government, are rarely more sensitive or serious matters than when the statute attacked involves the highly politically charged subject of apportionment.10
Although state courts in Texas have invalidated apportionment statutes, none has ever imposed a substitute plan upon the State. Nevertheless, we do not doubt [718]*718the power of our courts to do so. United States District Courts have this power, Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586-87, 84 S.Ct. at 1394-95, and have exercised it in Texas. E.g., Terrazas v. Clements, 537 F.Supp. 514 (N.D.Tex.1982) (holding pre-1981 apportionment plans for state legislature unconstitutional, and adopting temporary-plans), stay denied, 456 U.S. 902, 102 S.Ct. 1745, 72 L.Ed.2d 158, further proceedings, 581 F.Supp. 1319 (N.D.Tex.1983) (state senate), and 581 F.Supp. 1329 (N.D.Tex.1984) (state house of representatives); Seamon v. Upham, 536 F.Supp. 931 (E.D.Tex.), vacated and remanded, 456 U.S. 37, 102 S.Ct. 1518, 71 L.Ed.2d 725, on remand, 536 F.Supp. 1030 (E.D.Tex.1982), further proceedings sub nom. Stroke v. Seamon, 469 U.S. 801, 105 S.Ct. 63, 83 L.Ed.2d 14 (1984) (mem.); Graves v. Barnes, 343 F.Supp. 704 (W.D.Tex.), aff'd in part and reversed in part sub nom. Archer v. Smith, 409 U.S. 808, 93 S.Ct. 62, 34 L.Ed.2d 68 (1972) (mem.), and aff'd in part and reversed in part sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973), on remand, 378 F.Supp. 640 (W.D.Tex. 1974), vacated and remanded sub nom. White v. Regester, 422 U.S. 935, 95 S.Ct. 2670, 45 L.Ed.2d 662 (1975), on remand, 408 F.Supp. 1050 (W.D.Tex.1976), further proceedings, 446 F.Supp. 560 (W.D.Tex.1977), aff'd sub nom. Briscoe v. Escalante, 435 U.S. 901, 98 S.Ct. 1444, 55 L.Ed.2d 492 (1978) (mem.); Kilgarlin v. Martin, 252 F.Supp. 404 (S.D.Tex.1966), aff'd in part and rev’d and remanded in part sub nom. Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 87 S.Ct. 820, 17 L.Ed.2d 771 (1967) (per cu-riam); Bush v. Martin, 224 F.Supp. 499 (S.D.Tex.1963), aff'd, 376 U.S. 222, 84 S.Ct. 709, 11 L.Ed.2d 656 (1964) (per curiam), further proceedings, 251 F.Supp. 484 (S.D.Tex.1966). See also White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 93 S.Ct. 2348, 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973), dismissed on appeal after remand, 505 F.2d 912 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 993, 95 S.Ct. 1998, 44 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975). State courts in other jurisdictions have also ordered apportionment plans after invalidating legislative plans. E.g., Legislature of California v. Reinecke, 9 Cal.3d 166, 107 Cal.Rptr. 18, 507 P.2d 626 (1973), pursuant to jurisdiction retained in 7 Cal.3d 92, 101 Cal.Rptr. 552, 496 P.2d 464, modifying 6 Cal.3d 595, 99 Cal.Rptr. 481, 492 P.2d 385 (1972); Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 586, 682 P.2d 539, and 106 Idaho 617, 682 P.2d 570 (order), pursuant to jurisdiction retained in 106 Idaho 571, 682 P.2d 524, and 106 Idaho 585, 682 P.2d 538 (1984) (order), after remand in 104 Idaho 858, 664 P.2d 765 (1983); People ex rel. Engle v. Kerner, 33 Ill.2d 11, 210 N.E.2d 165 (1965), appeal dismissed, 384 U.S. 30, 86 S.Ct. 1284, 16 L.Ed.2d 332 (1966), pursuant to jurisdiction retained in 32 Ill.2d 212, 205 N.E.2d 33 (1965); Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 261 Iowa 1309, 158 N.W.2d 170 (1968), pursuant to jurisdiction retained in 258 Iowa 1121, 142 N.W.2d 355, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 851, 87 S.Ct. 79, 17 L.Ed.2d 80 (1966); Monier v. Gallen, 122 N.H. 474, 446 A.2d 454 (1982); Butcher v. Bloom, 420 Pa. 305, 216 A.2d 457 (1966), pursuant to jurisdiction retained in 415 Pa. 438, 203 A.2d 556 (1964); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 23 Wis.2d 606, 128 N.W.2d 16, pursuant to jurisdiction retained in 22 Wis.2d 544, 126 N.W.2d 551 (1964); but see Sweeney v. Notte, 95 R.I. 68, 183 A.2d 296, 303 (1962). Reason and experience argue that courts empowered to invalidate an apportionment statute which transgresses constitutional mandates cannot be left without the means to order appropriate relief. While this power has generally been exercised by a state’s highest court, we see no constitutional reason why it does not also reside in a trial court of general jurisdiction.
Although Texas courts may order apportionment, that power ought to be used only after investigation and careful consideration of the many, diverse interests affected, after due deference to the Legislature to rectify its own statutes, and after due regard for the effect of the court’s order on the election process. We comment on each of these considerations in turn.
Apportionment affects every person in the State, yet only a very few parties can [719]*719be involved in any lawsuit challenging redistricting. The trial court must attempt to consider the interests, not only of the parties in the case, but of others who are not present. For this reason, the agreement of the parties in a reapportionment lawsuit cannot alone be conclusive of either the validity of the statute or, if it is found to be invalid, the relief to be granted.
In most cases, the agreement of the parties to a suit is sufficient basis for rendition of judgment. See Pope v. Powers, 132 Tex. 80, 120 S.W.2d 432, 436 (1938). In some cases, however, even if the parties present agree, judgment cannot be rendered without evidence and a hearing. Invariably, these rules are erected to protect the interest of some person or group which has not been adequately represented in the settlement. In some instances, this interest may belong to a party to a lawsuit, such as a minor or an incompetent, Tex.R.Civ.P. 44, Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 487 (Tex.1990) (Hecht, J., dissenting) (“[a]ny settlement with minor children must be judicially approved, necessitating the filing of a lawsuit and appointment of a guardian ad litem”); a member of a class, Tex.R.Civ.P. 42(e); or a defendant served by publication, Tex.R.Civ.P. 244. In others, however, the individuals or groups to be protected are those who are not participants in the litigation, but whose rights and interests are affected thereby.
This principle has been recognized in a broad array of cases. Janus Films, Inc. v. Miller, 801 F.2d 578, 582 (2nd Cir.1986) (copyright case consent decree); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 714 F.2d 436, 455 (5th Cir. 1983) (shareholder derivative actions); Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161, 170 n. 40 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1021, 104 S.Ct. 1272, 79 L.Ed.2d 678 (1984) (school desegregation: “a court should enter a consent decree affecting the public interest only after considering the substantive validity of the decree”); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 643 F.2d 195, 225 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998, 102 S.Ct. 2283, 73 L.Ed.2d 1294 (1982) (antitrust: “[t]he reason the court is called on to review a settlement is to protect the rights of the many absent class members who were not involved in the negotiations leading to settlement”); Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir.1977) (Title VII cases); Neel v. Fuller, 557 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tex.1977) (receiver-ships). In multiparty litigation, when a settlement between some but not all of the parties affects others, the court’s duty is summarized in United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir.1981) (en banc):
When presented with a proposed consent decree, the court’s duty is akin, but not identical to its responsibility in approving settlements of class actions, stockholders’ derivative suits, and proposed compromises of claims in bankruptcy. In these situations, the requisite court approval is merely the ratification of a compromise. The court must ascertain only that the settlement is “fair, adequate and reasonable.”
Because the consent decree does not merely validate a compromise but, by virtue of its injunctive provisions, reaches into the future and has continuing effect, its terms require more careful scrutiny. Even when it affects only the parties, the court should, therefore, examine it carefully to ascertain not only that it is a fair settlement but also that it does not put the court’s sanction on and power behind a decree that violates Constitution, statute, or jurisprudence. This requires a determination that the proposal represents a reasonable factual and legal determination based on the facts of record, whether established by evidence, affidavit, or stipulation. If the decree also affects third parties, the court must be satisfied that the effect on them is neither unreasonable nor proscribed.
This same principle applies in redistricting suits, in which the public as a whole is peculiarly affected. Thus, courts in such cases have implemented procedures to elicit broad input before making their determinations. For example, the California Supreme Court has stated:
Before this court, in the discharge of its duty to insure the electorate equal protection of the laws, undertakes to draft [720]*720reapportionment plans of its own, it should afford all interested parties an opportunity to be heard.
Reinecke, 107 Cal.Rptr. at 19, 507 P.2d at 627. The need for an open process and for active judicial scrutiny is particularly acute in those situations in which the principal parties have, in whole or in part, resolved their differences, and there remains no party to actively represent conflicting public interests. An apportionment statute cannot be invalidated and an alternate plan ordered without hearing and eareful deliberation. As the court stated in Terrazas v. Clements, 581 P.Supp. at 1322-23:
[T]he consent decree proposed by the State’s Motion clearly affects the rights of third parties since it involves the adoption of a reapportionment plan for all the Senate districts in the State. Further, the proposed decree contemplates that it will remain in effect for all state senatorial elections until following publication of the federal decennial census of 1990 or until such earlier date as a valid plan is enacted by the State of Texas and becomes effective. Under these circumstances, this Court is obligated to examine the proposed consent decree carefully to ascertain not only that it is fair, adequate and reasonable as to the parties and affected third parties but also that it does not violate the United States Constitution or any other applicable federal or state law.
See Overton v. City of Austin, 748 F.2d 941, 953 (5th Cir.1984). The hearing should provide sufficient evidence, adduced by testimony, documents, stipulations or some other manner, to permit the district court to make an informed ruling that can be reviewed on appeal.
Furthermore, the court must give due deference to the Legislature before ordering a substitute apportionment plan. Apportionment involves uniquely political judgments, and for sound practical as well as theoretical reasons is constitutionally committed to the legislative branch. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Connor v. Fitch, 431 U.S. 407, 414-15, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1833-34, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977): “a state legislature is the institution that is by far the best situated to identify and then reconcile traditional state policies within the constitutionally mandated framework of substantial population equality.” Thus, “judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to ... constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586, 84 S.Ct. at 1394. After a legislative plan has been invalidated, respect for the separation of powers explicitly recognized in article II, section 1 of our Constitution requires that the Legislature be given a reasonable opportunity to enact a substitute statute. Only in the most exigent circumstances should a court intrude into this arena without affording the Legislature a full opportunity to remedy any defects.
Moreover, the court must attempt to give effect to as many of the Legislature’s redistricting decisions as are not invalid. There are a vast number of possible plans for apportioning state legislative districts that fully comply with all applicable laws. When a court sets aside the plan chosen by the Legislature, the beginning point for fashioning a substitute plan must be those aspects of the legislated scheme which are valid. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 93 S.Ct. 2348, 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973).
Finally, the court must consider the impact of its decision upon the electoral process. In lieu of postponing the elections, the court may determine that it is more advisable to allow elections to proceed under the lines drawn by the Legislature. Many courts have permitted impending elections to proceed under lines already declared unconstitutional in order to permit the legislative process to perform in an orderly fashion. See, e.g., Upham, 456 U.S. at 44, 102 S.Ct. at 1522-23; Bullock v. Weiser, 404 U.S. 1065, 92 S.Ct. 750, 30 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) (stayed district court order imposing new congressional district boundaries and retained jurisdiction to ex[721]*721tend filing deadline in the event the Governor called a special legislative session), on subsequent appeal, White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 93 S.Ct. 2348, 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973); Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 113-14, 91 S.Ct. 1803, 1806-07, 29 L.Ed.2d 352 (1971); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. at 121, 87 S.Ct. at 821, aff'g in this respect and rev’g and remanding in part on other grounds Kilgarlin v. Martin, 252 F.Supp. 404 (permitting 1966 election for Texas House of Representatives to proceed despite a determination of unconstitutionality); Watkins v. Mabus, 771 F.Supp. 789, 803-05 (S.D.Miss.), aff'd as modified, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 412, 116 L.Ed.2d 433 (1991); Burton v. Hobbie, 543 F.Supp. 235, 239 (M.D.Ala.), aff'd 459 U.S. 961, 103 S.Ct. 286, 74 L.Ed.2d 272 (1982) (mem.); Cosner v. Dalton, 522 F.Supp. 350, 364 (E.D.Va.1981); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 246 F.Supp. 953, 955 (S.D.N.Y.1965), aff'd sub nom. Travia v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 287, 86 S.Ct. 436, 15 L.Ed.2d 336 (1965); Petuskey v. Clyde, 234 F.Supp. 960, 964 (D.Utah 1964); Buckley v. Hoff, 234 F.Supp. 191, 200 (D.Vt.1964), modified, 379 U.S. 359, 85 S.Ct. 503, 13 L.Ed.2d 352 (1965); Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F.Supp. 471 (D.Colo.1962); Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F.Supp. 248, 259 (N.D.Ga.1962), vacated in part on other grounds and remanded, 379 U.S. 621, 85 S.Ct. 598, 13 L.Ed.2d 527 (1965) (mem.); Reinecke, 99 Cal.Rptr. at 486, 492 P.2d at 390; White v. Anderson, 155 Colo. 291, 394 P.2d 333, 338 (1964); Hellar, 664 P.2d at 766; Kruidenier, 142 N.W.2d at 376, and 158 N.W.2d at 173. Such deference, in the absence of unconscionable delay, is entirely appropriate. See Swann v. Adams, 383 U.S. 210, 211, 86 S.Ct. 767, 767-68, 15 L.Ed.2d 707 (1966) (court could not delay effectuation of remedy until 1969 legislative session in case filed in 1962).
In some circumstances, however, a court possesses the equitable power to postpone or even cancel elections. See, e.g., Butterworth v. Dempsey, 229 F.Supp. 754 (D.Conn.), aff'd sub nom. Pinney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 564, 84 S.Ct. 1918, 12 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1964), on remand or subsequent appeal, Butterworth v. Dempsey, 237 F.Supp. 302 (D.Conn.1965). But there is far more authority for allowing elections to go forward, even on unconstitutional plans, than there is for postponing or canceling them.
B
To reiterate, only after giving full and careful consideration to the interests affected by its ruling and the effect upon the election process, and after affording the Legislature sufficient opportunity to correct the constitutional infirmities in apportionment legislation, may the district court order its own apportionment plan.11 The judgments challenged in this proceeding do not meet these standards.
In Mena, the only parties were a few citizens as plaintiffs, the Governor and two other state defendants represented by the Attorney General, and the county defendants. Only the plaintiffs and the state defendants joined in the settlement agreement upon which agreed judgments were rendered in both Mena and Quiroz.
The parties in this proceeding have focused much of their argument on the power of the Attorney General to execute the settlement agreement. The concurring opinions of Justice Gonzalez and Justice CoRNYN would hold that the Attorney General exceeded his authority. We do not agree with their views. The Attorney General, as the chief legal officer of the State, has broad discretionary power in conducting his legal duty and responsibility to represent the State. See Tex. Const. art. IV, § 22; Tex.Gov’t Code § 402.021; see also Maud v. Terrell, 109 Tex. 97, 200 S.W. 375 (1918); Lewright v. Bell, 94 Tex. 556, [722]*72263 S.W. 623 (1901); Bullock v. Texas Skating Ass’n, 583 S.W.2d 888, 894 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.). This discretion includes theauthority to propose a settlement agreement in an action attacking the constitutionality of a reapportionment statute. The Attorney General has participated in such settlements on previous occasions. Terrazas, 581 F.Supp. at 1321; Graves, 408 F.Supp. at 1052. Although the Attorney General appears to have acted throughout this litigation only on behalf of the state defendants and not for himself, he had the authority, certainly for his clients and even on his own, to suggest possible remedies after the district court rendered an interlocutory summary judgment holding Senate Bill 31 unconstitutional. He also had the power to negotiate a settlement with the plaintiffs and to execute an agreement with them. To hold that he did not would be to give him less authority than any party or any other attorney participating in the case.
The real issue, however, is not whether the Attorney General had the power to do what he did in this case, but what the effect of his action was. As he conceded at oral argument, he certainly had no power to effectuate a valid reapportionment of senatorial districts himself; that could be done only by judgment of the district court. The settlement agreement may have been a valid agreement between plaintiffs and the state defendants. It alone could not, however, support rendition of a judgment without evidence and without other interested parties being encouraged to intervene in the litigation.
In Quiroz, where the agreed judgment regarding senatorial districts was first rendered, the court heard no evidence concerning the settlement agreement. The suit and answer were filed, and judgment was rendered, all in one day, in the span of a few minutes. There was literally no opportunity at all for comment. This irregular procedure was designed to avoid our stay of proceedings in Mena, and we do not approve it. A few days later, the same judgment was rendered in Mena on the same basis, again with no opportunity to be heard. Two State Senators directly affected by the judgment attempted to intervene in both cases and set aside the judgments, but their interventions were struck by the district court. The manner in which the judgments were rendered in these cases excluded any comment by anyone not a party to the settlement agreement.
Justice Mauzy’s dissent argues that the Court approved this procedure by its October 10 order lifting the stay of proceedings in Mena to allow rendition of the same judgment in that case that the district court had already rendered in Quiroz. Post, at 743. The dissent states that the motion to lift the stay sought “our specific approval for the trial court to incorporate [the parties’] agreement in the Mena proceedings.” Post, at 742. In fact, the parties’ motion requested that the stay be lifted to “permit the parties to present to the trial court for its consideration a proposed settlement.” Requesting us to allow a settlement proposal to be presented is not the same as asking us to approve its “incorporation” in a case. The effective part of our order granting the motion stated: “The parties in this cause shall be permitted to present to the trial court for its consideration, a proposed settlement of plaintiff’s challenge to Senate Bill 31.” The dissent contends that this order “told the trial court that he could proceed with the settlement”. Post, at 745. To the contrary, the order does not address the trial court at all, but merely allows the parties to present a proposed settlement. It does not by any stretch direct the district court to accept the proposed settlement or adjudicate the propriety of the district court’s rendition of an agreed judgment. The state defendants’ unopposed motion to lift the stay, unaccompanied by any record, raised no issue concerning the validity of the agreed judgment. By granting the motion, we did not, and indeed could not, address such issues. See Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779, 782 (Tex.1967). We simply allowed the parties to proceed, without ruling on the validity of their actions. Similarly, on October 30 we ordered the stay lifted altogether to allow the case to proceed to trial. This order, [723]*723like our October 10 order, allowed further proceedings in the district court. The dissent does not and could not reasonably contend that the effect of the October 30 order was to affirm all subsequent proceedings in the case simply because we allowed them to occur. The October 10 order was no broader.
The district court ordered a reapportionment plan without a determination that Senate Bill 31 was invalid. Although the court granted summary judgment in Mena invalidating the statute, the state defendants appealed that ruling. In the settlement agreement the state defendants reserved their contention that the statute is valid, just as plaintiffs reserved their claims. The court expressly based its judgment upon the settlement agreement and not upon any prior evidence or findings. Indeed, to have adjudicated the invalidity of the statute in the agreed judgment would have been contrary to the settlement agreement. Without a determination that Senate Bill 31 is invalid, the district court was prohibited from suspending its effect by article I, section 28 of the Texas Constitution which states: “No power of suspending laws in this State shall be exercised except by the Legislature.” We are aware of no instance in any other jurisdiction when a court reapportioned state legislative districts without first deciding that the statutory plan was invalid.
Under these circumstances, the settlement agreement does not provide sufficient basis for the rendition of the judgment dated October 7, 1991, in Quiroz, and the judgment dated October 10, 1991, in Mena.
Ill
Having concluded that the judgments of which relators complain were rendered improperly, we must consider whether relators are entitled to relief by mandamus.
To be entitled to mandamus, relators must have a justiciable interest in the underlying controversy. Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex.1984); Mitchell v. Dixon, 140 Tex. 520, 168 S.W.2d 654, 656 (1943). Relators as registered voters, like plaintiffs in Mena and Quiroz, have a justi-ciable interest in reapportionment. Baker, 369 U.S. at 204-208, 82 S.Ct. at 703-705. A person need not be a party to the underlying litigation in order to seek mandamus relief. Stewart v. McCain, 575 S.W.2d 509 (Tex.1978); Hennessy v. Marshall, 682 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984, original proceeding).
As a rule, mandamus is not available to compel an action which has not first been demanded and refused. Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 556 (Tex.1990); Doctors Hosp. Facilities v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 750 S.W.2d 177, 178 (Tex.1988); Stoner v. Massey, 586 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex.1979); Hursey v. Bond, 172 S.W.2d 305, 306 (Tex.1943). Application of this rule has not been entirely consistent or without exceptions. In Hursey, we said: “Mandamus will not lie to compel a court to perform an act ... in the absence of a request for such performance by the party at interest and a refusal to perform on the part of the court.” Id. In Stoner, however, we expressly excused this requirement when the request would have been futile and refusal little more than a formality. There, two parties, Stoner and Hud-gins, sought to compel the court of civil appeals to file and rule upon their respective third motions for rehearing. The appeals court had stated in its judgment that it would not entertain further motions for rehearing, and its clerk had refused to file the motion tendered by Stoner. Although Hudgins did not tender her motion to the appeal court clerk, this Court excused the requirement that she do so. “[I]t would have been pointless,” we wrote, “to make such an attempt in view of the language of the last judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals. The action of the clerk in refusing to file Stoner’s third motion makes that conclusion all the more certain.” Stoner, 586 S.W.2d at 846. In somewhat similar circumstances in Doctors Hospital, we deemed the court of appeals’ dismissal of a motion for rehearing as a refusal to deny it, even though the movant did not specifically request that it be denied rather than dismissed. In fact, when directed to [724]*724rule on the motion, the appeals court granted it. Rose v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 778 S.W.2d 66 (Tex.1989). See also City of Austin v. Cahill, 99 Tex. 172, 88 S.W. 542, 545 (1905); Crouch v. Shields, 385 S.W.2d 580, 584 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 907, 86 S.Ct. 232, 15 L.Ed.2d 159 (1965); Lake LBJ Mun. Utility Dist. v. Coulson, 771 S.W.2d 145, 156 (Tex.App.—Austin 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 781 S.W.2d 594 (Tex.1989).
Request and refusal have not been required for mandamus relief in every case. In State Bd. of Ins. v. Betts, 158 Tex. 612, 315 S.W.2d 279 (1958), the Board of Insurance initiated an original mandamus proceeding in this Court to compel the district court to appoint a statutorily designated liquidator as receiver in a pending proceeding. It does not appear that the Board of Insurance was a party to the receivership proceeding in the district court, or that it requested that court to appoint the receiver mandated by statute. In State v. Ferguson, 133 Tex. 60, 125 S.W.2d 272 (1939), the State and other parties moved for mandamus in this Court to compel two district courts in Hidalgo County to vacate their temporary restraining orders prohibiting enforcement of a penal statute. Although it appears that some of the relators were parties in the district court, it does not appear that the State was, or that any of relators requested the district courts to vacate their orders.
Relators had no reasonable opportunity to intervene in Mena. They had no reason to want to do so as long as the state defendants were actively defending the validity of Senate Bill 31. To hold that they should have intervened anyway would mean that anyone who might possibly have an interest in a redistricting case must in every situation intervene as soon as he learns of the case or lose the right to do so. Such a requirement would clearly be unreasonable. Not until after September 24, when we stayed all proceedings in Mena, did the state defendants abandon their defense of Senate Bill 31 in favor of a settlement with plaintiffs. Of course, relators could not intervene at that time because of our stay.
The dissents assert that relators deliberately chose not to intervene in Mena as part of their overall litigation strategy. There is nothing in the record before us to substantiate this assertion, although it was made by counsel opposing relators at oral argument. Justice Mauzy’s dissent even goes so far as to state that “Relators may have been in Judge Ramirez’s Edinburg courtroom” the day he rendered final judgment in Mena. There is absolutely no suggestion of that before us in any form.
Relators in this proceeding had no opportunity at all to object to the rendition of judgment in Quiroz, as Justice Mauzy’s dissent concedes. The dissent states, however: “The lack of opportunities to intervene in Quiroz, though, does not excuse the Relators’ failure to intervene in Mena. Even if the Quiroz judgment were set aside, the Mena judgment would still remain.” Post, at 742. In other words, even if relators could have intervened in Mena and opposed rendition of judgment in that case, their doing so would not relieve them of the effect of the judgment in Quiroz. By their procedural ploys the parties in Mena constructed a trap for relators from which the dissent would not let them escape.
Even if relators had attempted to intervene in Mena and Quiroz, there is no reason to suppose that they would have been more successful than Sims and Lucio. The dissents call this “pure speculation”, post, at 743, but a review of even the limited record before us demonstrates that the district court determined not to allow intervention in the proceedings once plaintiffs and the state defendants resolved their differences. The district court not only rejected Sims and Lucio’s claims, it struck their intervention. In support of its decision, the district court cited Tarrant County v. Ashmore, 635 S.W.2d 417 (Tex.1982). Ashmore holds that a public official does not have a property interest in his office protected from a taking without just compensation. This holding does not control whether Sims and Lucio, who are State Senators, but who are also citizens and voters of Texas like plaintiffs, have stand-[725]*725mg to intervene. Justice Mauzy’s dissent states that relators “clearly had the right to intervene”. Post, at 740. If that is true, surely Sims and Lucio had an equal right to intervene. Inasmuch as the district court struck Sims and Lucio’s intervention, despite their “clear right” to do so, it is not unreasonable for relators to conclude that their moving to intervene would be equally futile.
Although relators might have moved to set aside the judgment in Quiroz even after it was rendered, we do not view this as a prerequisite to mandamus in this proceeding. It is apparent that any such attempt would have been as futile as attempting to intervene. Sims and Lucio did move to set aside the judgment, and the district court denied their motion. Again, there is no reason to believe that relators would have prevailed where Sims and Lucio failed. As in Stoner, the relief relators seek has been requested from the district court by other parties similarly situated and denied. It is very clear that the district court’s intention to render the judgment to which plaintiffs and the state defendants agreed was not reasonably subject to being altered by any request of relators.
Justice HightoweR’s dissent agrees that the district court’s judgments were rendered improperly, but argues that if rela-tors are entitled to any relief, it is only that we direct the district court to permit them to intervene. The dissent does not recognize the full ramifications of its argument. If relators must be permitted to intervene at this stage in Mena and Quiroz, the only relief they could seek from the district court would be to set the judgments in those cases aside. Assuming that they would be required to show that they were not to be faulted for conscious indifference or other inequitable conduct in not intervening sooner, they would meet this requirement as a matter of law in Quiroz. In that case, relators indisputably had no opportunity whatever to intervene. Even if the judgment in Quiroz were vacated, the judgment pertaining to Senate Bill 31 in Mena would remain. According to the dissents, relators could not show lack of conscious indifference as a matter of law in Mena. The net result would be that rela-tors would have accomplished nothing. The coexistence of two judgments in two separate cases concerning the same subject matter makes this an unusual case. Rela-tors did not cause these procedural complexities; they are entirely the doing of plaintiffs and the state defendants to avoid the effect of an order of this Court. To deny any effective relief to relators because of the very actions of which they complain would be unjust indeed.
This case does not, as Justice Hightower’s dissent suggests, threaten a deluge of mandamus petitions in this Court. It comes to us in a most unusual posture. In the procedural quagmire that this case presents, we hold that relators satisfy the prerequisites for mandamus relief. They have also demonstrated that they have no adequate legal remedy in this case. They cannot appeal from the judgments rendered in Mena and Quiroz because they are not parties in those cases. Although it might be possible for them to mount a direct attack upon those judgments in a separate proceeding, it would be virtually impossible for any such litigation to be resolved in time to preserve their claims for relief, given the imminence of elections. The district court’s conduct constitutes a clear abuse of discretion, and relators are entitled to mandamus against the district court.
Relators have not demonstrated a right to mandamus against the Attorney General and Secretary of State, however. As we have noted above, the Attorney General acted well within his discretion in attempting to arrange a settlement of the litigation. He has not violated any clear duty in this case. Nor has the Secretary of State done more than submit to the Department of Justice for preclearance the only senatorial districting plan available to him at the time. For these reasons, mandamus will not issue against these officials.
IV
The district court has previously granted partial summary judgment invali[726]*726dating Senate Bill 31. However, it also set the case for trial on the merits, apparently anticipating the need for additional evidence before the case could finally be adjudicated. The effect of the relief we order today is to return the case to that interlocutory posture. Although we do not address the district court’s judgment in Mena ordering an alternate representative district-ing plan in lieu of House Bill 150, we assume the district court will consider whether it suffers the same infirmities as the judgments which are set aside. As we have previously urged, we hope the district court will proceed expeditiously in view of the impending elections.
The court must provide a reasonable opportunity, in these circumstances several days, for interested persons to intervene and be heard. The court should attempt to ascertain whether the Governor, who is a party to the litigation, may be expected to summon the Legislature into special session at once to consider legislative reapportionment. Although article III, section 28 of the Texas Constitution explicitly requires the Legislature to reapportion legislative districts in the first regular session after each United States decennial census is published, neither that section nor any other constitutional provision prohibits the Legislature from acting in later special or regular sessions after the constitutional authority of the Legislative Redistricting Board has expired. Bickerstaff, Reapportionment by State Legislatures: A guide for the 1980’s, 34 SW.L.J. 607, 661 (1980); White, 412 U.S. at 789 n. 7, 93 S.Ct. at 2351 n. 7; Seamon, 536 F.Supp. at 938; Bush, 224 F.Supp. at 513, 516 (Noel, J., dissenting). Cf. Mauzy v. Legislative Redistricting Board, 471 S.W.2d 570, 574 (Tex.1971) (question of whether Legislature could reapportion in special session not decided); but cf. Terrazas, 537 F.Supp. at 520, 548. If the Governor elects not to do so, the court should consider whether further deference to allow the Legislature to act is warranted. After hearing any additional evidence and argument on an expedited basis, the court may determine what relief should be ordered. In making this decision, the court should consider the interests of all persons who appear before it, the interests of the State as a whole, and the decisions of the Legislature reflected in Senate Bill 31. See White, 412 U.S. 783, 93 S.Ct. 2348. The court must also consider what effect its final judgment may have on the 1992 election schedule.
In sum, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in rendering the judgment dated October 7, 1991, in Quiroz, and the judgment dated October 11, 1991, in Mena. Because relators are entitled to mandamus, we direct the district court to vacate those judgments. We are confident that the district court will comply promptly, and our writ will issue only if it does not. Relators’ request for relief against the Attorney General and the Secretary of State is denied. Because of the importance of resolving the issues that have been raised as expeditiously as possible to avoid any unnecessary disruption to the 1992 elections, we will refuse to consider any motions for rehearing, and none may be filed.
PHILLIPS, C.J., and COOK, J., join in this opinion.
Concurring opinion by GONZALEZ, J.
Concurring opinion by CORNYN, J.
Dissenting opinion by MAUZY, J., in which DOGGETT, J., joins.
Dissenting opinion by HIGHTOWER, J., in which GAMMAGE, J., joins.