In Re Derek Obialo v. the State of Texas
Opinion
Opinion issued July 6, 2023
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
Background
On June 22, 2021, Anita F. Kawaja filed a TCPA motion to dismiss claims made by relator Obialo. On July 23, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on Kawaja’s TCPA motion to dismiss. The trial court did not rule on the motion within 30 days, and on August 24, 2021, Kawaja filed a notice of appeal from the denial by operation of law of her TCPA dismissal motion.
On September 9, 2021, the trial court signed an order, granting with prejudice Kawaja’s motion to dismiss. The trial court’s order stated that the court extended the time for ruling on the motion to September 9, 2021, pursuant to the authority granted by the Texas Supreme Court’s Emergency Order.2
presiding. Kawaja is the sole real party in interest involved in this original proceeding.
2 The Texas Supreme Court’s Fortieth Emergency Order Regarding the COVID-19 State of Disaster provides in part:
3. Subject only to constitutional limitations, all courts in Texas may in any case, civil or criminal, without a participant’s consent:
a. except as provided in paragraph 4, modify or suspend any and all deadlines and procedures, whether prescribed by statute, rule, or order, for a stated period ending no later than October 1, 2021;
....
8. This Order is effective August 1, 2021, and expires October 1, 2021, except as otherwise stated herein, unless extended by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
....
Misc. Docket No. 21-9079 (Tex. July 19, 2021).
Kawaja questioned the validity of the September 9, 2021 order granting her motion to dismiss under the TCPA because it was entered while the statutory automatic stay was in effect. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(b) (providing for stay of all proceedings in trial court pending resolution of appeal of denial of motion to dismiss under TCPA). Kawaja dismissed her interlocutory appeal, see Kawaja v. Obialo, No. 01-21-00458-CV, 2021 WL 4256091, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 17, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.), and she asked the trial court to sign a new order granting her TCPA motion to dismiss.
On September 27, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on Kawaja’s motion for the court to sign a new order granting the TCPA motion to dismiss. At the hearing, Kawaja’s counsel acknowledged that the September 9, 2021 order was void because it was entered while the automatic stay was in effect. Obialo argued, among other things, that extending the time to rule on Kawaja’s TCPA dismissal motion would violate the Texas Constitution’s limitations on retroactivity. The trial court and the parties discussed the unusual procedural posture and whether the court had the power to grant the relief that Kawaja had requested, considering the statutory deadline for ruling on a TCPA dismissal motion, the Supreme Court’s emergency orders, the general rule that a trial court with plenary power may vacate its own earlier interlocutory orders before entering final judgment, and concerns about the rights and timeliness of a potential second interlocutory appeal. They
also discussed what an order granting Kawaja’s request should specifically state, including whether it should expressly vacate any earlier orders.
On September 27, 2021, the trial court signed an order that was substantially the same as the September 9, 2021 order, except that it extended the time for determining the motions until September 27, 2021. That same day, Kawaja filed a notice of interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court’s earlier denial by operation of law of her TCPA motion to dismiss.
In this Court, all the parties involved filed motions to dismiss this second interlocutory appeal, including both Kawaja and Obialo. On May 2, 2023, we dismissed the appeal, noting that no opinion had issued.3 See Kawaja v. Obialo (II), No. 01-21-00519-CV, 2023 WL 3183319, *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 17, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).
On May 23, 2023, Obialo filed this petition for writ of mandamus.
Analysis
In this court, Obialo asks us to order the trial court to vacate its September 27, 2021 order as void. He makes several arguments to support his contention that the order granting Kawaja’s TCPA dismissal motion was void because it had already been denied by operation of law and the Supreme Court’s COVID-19 order
3 Kawaja has since filed a combined motion for rehearing and motion for en banc reconsideration. By separate order, the Court today grants Kawaja’s motion for rehearing.
did not permit an after-the-fact extension of time. Kawaja responds that mandamus is inappropriate because Obialo has not made a predicate request, such as asking the trial court to vacate the order. I. Standards of review “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, not issued as a matter of right, but at the discretion of the court.” Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera, 858 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex. 1993) (citing Callahan v. Giles, 137 Tex. 571, 575, 155 S.W.2d 793, 795 (1941)). “Although mandamus is not an equitable remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles.” Id.; accord In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 634 S.W.3d 38, 42 (Tex. 2021). A writ of mandamus will issue only if the trial court clearly abused its discretion, and the relator has no adequate remedy on appeal. In re Dawson, 550 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tex. 2018) (original proceeding) (per curiam) (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004)). “A trial court abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law . . . .” In re Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (footnote omitted) (internal quotations omitted). A trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts, even when the law is unsettled. Dawson, 550 S.W.3d at 628; Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 135. When a relator asserts that a challenged order is void, he does not need to
show that there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000); In re Florence, No. 01-20-00556-CR, 2023 WL 362889, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 24, 2023, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). II. Waiver Before we reach the merits of Obialo’s arguments, we consider Kawaja’s contention that he has waived his right to seek mandamus by failing to make a predicate request of the trial court.
“Equity is generally not served by issuing an extraordinary writ against a trial court on a ground that was never presented to the court and that the court thus had no opportunity to address.” In re Tex. Best Staff Leasing, Inc., No. 01-08- 00296-CV, 2008 WL 4531028, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 9, 2008, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); accord In re Khanduja, No. 01-20-00041-CV, 2020 WL 543418, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 4, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Mandamus relief generally requires a predicate request for an action and a refusal of that request. In re Perritt, 992 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. 1999) (citing Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 556 (Tex. 1990)). However, the requirement that there be a predicate request and an adverse ruling is excused “when the request would have been futile and refusal little more than a formality.” Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829 S.W.2d 712, 723 (Tex. 1991); accord Tex.
Best Staff Leasing, 2008 WL 4531028, at *5. To determine whether a request would have been futile, courts examine whether the request would have added anything for the court’s consideration. Perritt, 992 S.W.2d at 446.
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