"Walkeb, J".,
after stating the case: This was a military school, and in the “Horner Cadet Regulations” it is provided that, “Any cadet who shall disobey the command of the principal or of any professor, instructor, or other superior' officer, or behave himself in a refractory or disrespectful manner, .shall be expelled, or otherwise punished,” and in the Horner School catalogue is the following provision: “The discipline is not severe, but firm and decided, and no boy will be retained who does not cheerfully comply with the rules and regulations, or whose influence is known to be injurious to the morals and scholarship of his fellows.” There was also a rule that if a pupil received more than 100 demerits for misconduct, he would be expelled or thrashed, -at the discretion of the principal. There is ample evidence in the case to show that this boy misbehaved himself frequently, ran his demerits up rapidly to 150, after he. had been duly warned that if they reached 100 he would be expelled, and that he was generally unruly and refractory. The principal seems to have exercised forbearance until it ceased to be a virtue, and the boy’s conduct had become so bad that it was demoralizing in its effect upon the school. Besides his personal misbehaviors, he was backward in his lessons and receiving no benefit himself, but doing much injury to others by his example. If the principal had longer submitted to this gross breach of school discipline, amounting almost to defiant insubordination, it may have done incalculable harm to the school. The defendant had the undoubted power to adopt and enforce suitable rules and regulations for the government and management of the school. 25 A. and E. Enc. of Law (2 Ed.), 27, 28. They should be reasonable and enforced for the purpose contemplated, and not maliciously or arbitrarily. 'If need be, punishment for the infraction of the rules may extend to the dismissal of the pupil who violates them. 35 Cyc., 1140, 1141. The conduct of the recreant pupil may he'such that his continued presence in the school for a day, or an hour, may be disastrous to its proper discipline, and even to the morals of his fellows, and to permit him to “run the school,” instead of obeying its rules and submitting himself to the
authority of bis superiors, would produce insubordination, which in its turn would soon disorganize it. • In such a case it seems imperative and essential to the welfare of the school that the power should reside in the teacher to suspend the offender at once from its privileges, and he must necessarily decide for. himself whether the case requires that remedy, unless some other method is provided for that purpose. This doctrine was clearly treated and formulated by the Court in
S. ex rel. Burpee v. Burton,
45 Wis., 150, where
Judge Lyon
said: “In the school, as in the family, there exist on the part of the pupils the obligations of obedience to lawful commands, subordination, civil deportment, respect for the rights of other pupils, and fidelity to duty. These obligations are inherent in any proper school system, and constitute, so to speak, the common law of the school. Every pupil is presumed to know this law, and is subject to it, whether it has or has not been reenacted by the district board in the form of written rules and regulations. Indeed, it would seem impossible to frame rules which would cover all cases of insubordination and all acts of viqious tendency which the teacher is liable to encounter daily and hourly. The teacher is responsible for the discipline of his school, and for the progress, conduct, and deportment of his pupils. It is his imperative duty to maintain good order, and to require of his pupils a faithful performance of their duties. If he fails to do so, he is unfit for his position. To enable him to discharge these duties effectually, he must necessarily have the power to enforce prompt obedience to his lawful commands. For this reason the law gives him the power, in proper cases, to inflict corporal punishment upon refractory pupils. But there are cases of misconduct for which such punishment, is ail inadequate remedy. If the offender is incorrigible, suspension or expulsion is the only adequate remedy.” The Court, after an able and learned discussion of the question, concluded that the teacher has, in a proper case, the inherent power to dismiss a pupil for misconduct and infractions of the rules and regulations of the school, especially when'they are repeated and'persistent, so that the pupil must finally yield or the teacher’s au
thority over him be destroyed. “The plaintiff, by entering the defendant’s school, subjected himself to (its) reasonable rules of discipline. The power is vested in the faculties of all schools and 'colleges to suppress and punish unbecoming conduct.”
Kabus v. Seftner,
69 N. Y. Supp., 983.
It appeared in
Curry v. Lasell Seminary Co.,
168 Mass., 7 (46 N. E., 110), that plaintiff had entered her daughter, as a pupil, at the defendant company’s school, to be boarded, instructed, and cared for through the school year. The Court held that if there had been no express contract, the plaintiff, by placing her daughter as a pupil in the school, would have impliedly agreed that she should obey all reasonable rules and regulations of the school. This is the duty of every pupil who attends a public school, and a parent has no right to have his child remain in the school if he persists in willfully disregarding such reasonable rules. These important principles, so necessary to the proper regulation and to the welfare of our educational institutions, have been quite uniformly adopted by the courts!
Manson v. Culver Military School,
141 Ill. App., 250;
Fessman v. Seely,
30 S. W. Rep., 268;
Benedict Memorial School v. Bradford,
36 S. E. (Ga.), 920;
Hodgins v. Inh. of Rockport,
105 Mass., 475;
Vermillion v. S. ex rel. Englehardt,
110 N. W. Rep. (Neb.), 736.
In the
Vermillion case
the Court said that the authorities are. generally to the effect that where a pupil is- guilty of such misconduct as to interfere with the discipline and government of the school, he may be suspended or expelled, citing many cases.
In the
Manson case, supra,
the Court held that the only requirement necessary, so far as concerns a review by a court of justice of the manager’s action in dismissing a pupil, in that case, as here, a cadet, is that it sháll be so unreasonable and oppressive- as to warrant a conclusion that it was done maliciously, unfairly, or from some 'improper motive, and not- for the enforcement of the school’s rules and regulations and the maintenance of propert discipline.
An examination of our own cases, while they do not deal with the subject in every phase presented in this'record, will show
that we have substantially approved, tbe doctrine as already stated. It is founded upon justice and common sense, and should prevail, as in no other way could our schools be successfully conducted.
Horner & Graves v. Baker,
74 N. C., 65;
Horner School v. Westcott,
124 N. C., 518.
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"Walkeb, J".,
after stating the case: This was a military school, and in the “Horner Cadet Regulations” it is provided that, “Any cadet who shall disobey the command of the principal or of any professor, instructor, or other superior' officer, or behave himself in a refractory or disrespectful manner, .shall be expelled, or otherwise punished,” and in the Horner School catalogue is the following provision: “The discipline is not severe, but firm and decided, and no boy will be retained who does not cheerfully comply with the rules and regulations, or whose influence is known to be injurious to the morals and scholarship of his fellows.” There was also a rule that if a pupil received more than 100 demerits for misconduct, he would be expelled or thrashed, -at the discretion of the principal. There is ample evidence in the case to show that this boy misbehaved himself frequently, ran his demerits up rapidly to 150, after he. had been duly warned that if they reached 100 he would be expelled, and that he was generally unruly and refractory. The principal seems to have exercised forbearance until it ceased to be a virtue, and the boy’s conduct had become so bad that it was demoralizing in its effect upon the school. Besides his personal misbehaviors, he was backward in his lessons and receiving no benefit himself, but doing much injury to others by his example. If the principal had longer submitted to this gross breach of school discipline, amounting almost to defiant insubordination, it may have done incalculable harm to the school. The defendant had the undoubted power to adopt and enforce suitable rules and regulations for the government and management of the school. 25 A. and E. Enc. of Law (2 Ed.), 27, 28. They should be reasonable and enforced for the purpose contemplated, and not maliciously or arbitrarily. 'If need be, punishment for the infraction of the rules may extend to the dismissal of the pupil who violates them. 35 Cyc., 1140, 1141. The conduct of the recreant pupil may he'such that his continued presence in the school for a day, or an hour, may be disastrous to its proper discipline, and even to the morals of his fellows, and to permit him to “run the school,” instead of obeying its rules and submitting himself to the
authority of bis superiors, would produce insubordination, which in its turn would soon disorganize it. • In such a case it seems imperative and essential to the welfare of the school that the power should reside in the teacher to suspend the offender at once from its privileges, and he must necessarily decide for. himself whether the case requires that remedy, unless some other method is provided for that purpose. This doctrine was clearly treated and formulated by the Court in
S. ex rel. Burpee v. Burton,
45 Wis., 150, where
Judge Lyon
said: “In the school, as in the family, there exist on the part of the pupils the obligations of obedience to lawful commands, subordination, civil deportment, respect for the rights of other pupils, and fidelity to duty. These obligations are inherent in any proper school system, and constitute, so to speak, the common law of the school. Every pupil is presumed to know this law, and is subject to it, whether it has or has not been reenacted by the district board in the form of written rules and regulations. Indeed, it would seem impossible to frame rules which would cover all cases of insubordination and all acts of viqious tendency which the teacher is liable to encounter daily and hourly. The teacher is responsible for the discipline of his school, and for the progress, conduct, and deportment of his pupils. It is his imperative duty to maintain good order, and to require of his pupils a faithful performance of their duties. If he fails to do so, he is unfit for his position. To enable him to discharge these duties effectually, he must necessarily have the power to enforce prompt obedience to his lawful commands. For this reason the law gives him the power, in proper cases, to inflict corporal punishment upon refractory pupils. But there are cases of misconduct for which such punishment, is ail inadequate remedy. If the offender is incorrigible, suspension or expulsion is the only adequate remedy.” The Court, after an able and learned discussion of the question, concluded that the teacher has, in a proper case, the inherent power to dismiss a pupil for misconduct and infractions of the rules and regulations of the school, especially when'they are repeated and'persistent, so that the pupil must finally yield or the teacher’s au
thority over him be destroyed. “The plaintiff, by entering the defendant’s school, subjected himself to (its) reasonable rules of discipline. The power is vested in the faculties of all schools and 'colleges to suppress and punish unbecoming conduct.”
Kabus v. Seftner,
69 N. Y. Supp., 983.
It appeared in
Curry v. Lasell Seminary Co.,
168 Mass., 7 (46 N. E., 110), that plaintiff had entered her daughter, as a pupil, at the defendant company’s school, to be boarded, instructed, and cared for through the school year. The Court held that if there had been no express contract, the plaintiff, by placing her daughter as a pupil in the school, would have impliedly agreed that she should obey all reasonable rules and regulations of the school. This is the duty of every pupil who attends a public school, and a parent has no right to have his child remain in the school if he persists in willfully disregarding such reasonable rules. These important principles, so necessary to the proper regulation and to the welfare of our educational institutions, have been quite uniformly adopted by the courts!
Manson v. Culver Military School,
141 Ill. App., 250;
Fessman v. Seely,
30 S. W. Rep., 268;
Benedict Memorial School v. Bradford,
36 S. E. (Ga.), 920;
Hodgins v. Inh. of Rockport,
105 Mass., 475;
Vermillion v. S. ex rel. Englehardt,
110 N. W. Rep. (Neb.), 736.
In the
Vermillion case
the Court said that the authorities are. generally to the effect that where a pupil is- guilty of such misconduct as to interfere with the discipline and government of the school, he may be suspended or expelled, citing many cases.
In the
Manson case, supra,
the Court held that the only requirement necessary, so far as concerns a review by a court of justice of the manager’s action in dismissing a pupil, in that case, as here, a cadet, is that it sháll be so unreasonable and oppressive- as to warrant a conclusion that it was done maliciously, unfairly, or from some 'improper motive, and not- for the enforcement of the school’s rules and regulations and the maintenance of propert discipline.
An examination of our own cases, while they do not deal with the subject in every phase presented in this'record, will show
that we have substantially approved, tbe doctrine as already stated. It is founded upon justice and common sense, and should prevail, as in no other way could our schools be successfully conducted.
Horner & Graves v. Baker,
74 N. C., 65;
Horner School v. Westcott,
124 N. C., 518. These decisions clearly recognize the principle that there is an implied promise, if it is not expressed, that the pupil who has entered the school will comply with its reasonable rules and regulations, and may be dismissed, in a proper ease, for failing to do so. The school authorities, it is true, may excuse or condone the offense of the pupil, but of course are not compelled to do so, .and it would often be subversive of good discipline to do so, especially in the case of an incorrigible offender. The interest of every pupil is involved in the welfare of the school, and there is no reason why its success should be imperiled by the misconduct of one of them.
Our opinion is, upon the evidence we find in the record, if believed, that plaintiff is not entitled to recover any part of the money he has paid, and that defendant is entitled to recover the balance of what would have been paid by the plaintiff, but for the former’s indulgence. This, we think, is settled by
Horner School v. Westcott, supra; Bingham, v. Richardson,
60 N. C., 217, and by clear implication in
Horner & Graves v. Balter, supra,
for we have the evidence in this case, which the Court, by
Chief Justice Pearson,
held was lacking in that one. The Court said in
Horner School v. Westcott, supra:
“As it was the defendant’s duty to. have paid this installment when it was' due, and not the plaintiff’s fault that it was not paid, it seems that defendant should not complain if he has to pay now.” It is apparent, upon the evidence, that plaintiff was to pay the full amount in advance, and if he had paid it, as his contract required him to do, the defendant could have retained it. This being so, and as said in
Horner School v. Westcott, supra,
he is entitled to the balance of the amount due at the beginning of the session.
Fessman v. Seeley, supra.
We
have discussed the ease in the light of the evidence now before us. The boy was not called and examined, and," in the absence of his evidence, there is nothing to contradict the de
fendant’s testimony as to the rules and regulations. There is strong additional evidence that plaintiff received the catalogue containing the rules. There is no evidence that defendant acted ' maliciously, oppressively, or unreasonably in expelling the plaintiff’s son, but, on the contrary, as it now appears to us, the act was fully justified. The court was, therefore, right in setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial, and for the reasons given by the learned judge, which are set out in the record.
No error.