TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
The petitioner, Johnel Edward Taylor, is serving sentences in a Georgia prison for murder and possession of a firearm. On July 8, 2005, he challenged the constitutional validity of his convictions in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed with the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 On October 26, 2006, the district court denied the writ as time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations created by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).2 He thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal, and we granted his application for a certificate of appealability (“COA”) as to one issue: whether the district court erred when it found that the Georgia procedural rule, which deems a petition for post-conviction relief filed when it is received and marked as filed by the clerk of the petitioned court, governs the date when AED-PA’s one-year limitations period is tolled.
I.
On December 1, 1998, a Spalding County Superior Court jury found Taylor guilty of felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The superior court thereafter sentenced him to life imprisonment on the murder charge and a consecutive five-year term for the firearm possession offense. His convictions and sentences were affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court on July 5, 2000. Taylor v. State, 272 Ga. 559, 532 S.E.2d 395 (2000). Taylor did not move the court for a rehearing or seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. Accordingly, his convictions became final on October 3, 2000. See Sup. Ct. R. 13 (“[A] petition for a writ of certio-rari to review a judgment in any case, civil or criminal, entered by a state court of last resort ... is timely when it is filed with the Clerk of this Court within 90 days [849]*849after entry of judgment.”); Bond v. Moore, 309 F.3d 770, 774 (11th Cir.2002) (holding that AEDPA’s statute of limitations does not begin to run until the 90-day window for seeking a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court expires.).
On January 17, 2001, Taylor signed and deposited a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, directed to the Superior Court of Chattooga County, into the prison mail system. The clerk of that court filed Taylor’s petition on February 2, 2001. On August 26, 2002, following two evidentiary hearings, the superior court denied relief. The Georgia Supreme Court denied Taylor a certificate of probable cause to appeal that decision on October 25, 2004.
On July 8, 2005, Taylor, proceeding pro se, signed the habeas petition now before us and presumably delivered it to the prison authorities for mailing. It was received by the clerk of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia four days later.3 Warden Williams, the respondent, moved the court to dismiss the petition as untimely, arguing that Taylor failed to file it within AED-PA’s one-year limitations period. As noted above, the district court dismissed the petition as time-barred on October 26, 2006.
II.
A.
In this case, AEDPA’s one-year limitations period began to run on October 3, 2000, the undisputed date that Taylor’s convictions became final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Thus, absent a tolling of the one-year limitations period, Taylor had until October 3, 2001, to file the instant petition.4
AEDPA’s limitations period is tolled while “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review ... is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).5 Taylor argues that we should use January 17, 2001, the date he signed his state habe-as petition and deposited it into the prison mail system, as the date that the petition was properly filed for tolling purposes. Warden Williams responds that February 2, 2001, the date the clerk of the Superior Court filed Taylor’s petition, is the appropriate date to begin tolling the limitations period. This distinction is of utmost importance. If tolling began on the date Taylor signed his petition, then only 362 days passed before he filed his federal petition.6 However, if tolling began on [850]*850February 2, 2001, when Taylor’s state petition was filed by the clerk of the Superior Court, then 378 days elapsed, and the instant petition would be time-barred under AEDPA.7 Our decision in this case, therefore, turns on when Taylor “properly filed” his state habeas petition, thereby tolling the one-year limitations period for filing his federal petition.8
B.
To determine when a state habeas petition has been “properly filed,” we look to the applicable state law governing filings. See Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S.Ct. 361, 364, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000); Wade v. Battle, 379 F.3d 1254, 1260 (11th Cir.2004). At the outset, it is important to note that the particular question before us has not been addressed by the Georgia courts. See Wade, 379 F.3d at 1258 n. 2 (“[W]e are aware of no Georgia court applying the mailbox rule to initial pro se state habeas petitions.”).9 A lack of explicit Georgia precedent on an issue, however, does not absolve us of our duty “to decide what the state courts would hold if faced with [the issue].” Arceneaux v. Texaco, Inc., 623 F.2d 924, 926 (5th Cir.1980) (citations omitted).10. We must anticipate what the Georgia Supreme Court would say. See Ernie Havre Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 260 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir.2001).
In Massaline v. Williams, 274 Ga. 552, 554 S.E.2d 720, 722-23 (2001), the Georgia Supreme Court adopted the mailbox rule when a pro se prisoner seeks to appeal from a superior court decision denying his habeas corpus petition. Adopting the reasoning of Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988), the Massaline court recognized that a mailbox rule was necessary because of the “unique obstacles” faced by pro se prisoners:
Unlike litigants who are not incarcerated, pro se prisoners cannot monitor the processing of their appellate filings to ensure that the clerk of the court timely receives them .... And, of course, being pro se, they cannot rely on their lawyer to ensure the safe and timely filing of their appeals.
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TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
The petitioner, Johnel Edward Taylor, is serving sentences in a Georgia prison for murder and possession of a firearm. On July 8, 2005, he challenged the constitutional validity of his convictions in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed with the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 On October 26, 2006, the district court denied the writ as time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations created by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).2 He thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal, and we granted his application for a certificate of appealability (“COA”) as to one issue: whether the district court erred when it found that the Georgia procedural rule, which deems a petition for post-conviction relief filed when it is received and marked as filed by the clerk of the petitioned court, governs the date when AED-PA’s one-year limitations period is tolled.
I.
On December 1, 1998, a Spalding County Superior Court jury found Taylor guilty of felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The superior court thereafter sentenced him to life imprisonment on the murder charge and a consecutive five-year term for the firearm possession offense. His convictions and sentences were affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court on July 5, 2000. Taylor v. State, 272 Ga. 559, 532 S.E.2d 395 (2000). Taylor did not move the court for a rehearing or seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. Accordingly, his convictions became final on October 3, 2000. See Sup. Ct. R. 13 (“[A] petition for a writ of certio-rari to review a judgment in any case, civil or criminal, entered by a state court of last resort ... is timely when it is filed with the Clerk of this Court within 90 days [849]*849after entry of judgment.”); Bond v. Moore, 309 F.3d 770, 774 (11th Cir.2002) (holding that AEDPA’s statute of limitations does not begin to run until the 90-day window for seeking a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court expires.).
On January 17, 2001, Taylor signed and deposited a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, directed to the Superior Court of Chattooga County, into the prison mail system. The clerk of that court filed Taylor’s petition on February 2, 2001. On August 26, 2002, following two evidentiary hearings, the superior court denied relief. The Georgia Supreme Court denied Taylor a certificate of probable cause to appeal that decision on October 25, 2004.
On July 8, 2005, Taylor, proceeding pro se, signed the habeas petition now before us and presumably delivered it to the prison authorities for mailing. It was received by the clerk of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia four days later.3 Warden Williams, the respondent, moved the court to dismiss the petition as untimely, arguing that Taylor failed to file it within AED-PA’s one-year limitations period. As noted above, the district court dismissed the petition as time-barred on October 26, 2006.
II.
A.
In this case, AEDPA’s one-year limitations period began to run on October 3, 2000, the undisputed date that Taylor’s convictions became final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Thus, absent a tolling of the one-year limitations period, Taylor had until October 3, 2001, to file the instant petition.4
AEDPA’s limitations period is tolled while “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review ... is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).5 Taylor argues that we should use January 17, 2001, the date he signed his state habe-as petition and deposited it into the prison mail system, as the date that the petition was properly filed for tolling purposes. Warden Williams responds that February 2, 2001, the date the clerk of the Superior Court filed Taylor’s petition, is the appropriate date to begin tolling the limitations period. This distinction is of utmost importance. If tolling began on the date Taylor signed his petition, then only 362 days passed before he filed his federal petition.6 However, if tolling began on [850]*850February 2, 2001, when Taylor’s state petition was filed by the clerk of the Superior Court, then 378 days elapsed, and the instant petition would be time-barred under AEDPA.7 Our decision in this case, therefore, turns on when Taylor “properly filed” his state habeas petition, thereby tolling the one-year limitations period for filing his federal petition.8
B.
To determine when a state habeas petition has been “properly filed,” we look to the applicable state law governing filings. See Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S.Ct. 361, 364, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000); Wade v. Battle, 379 F.3d 1254, 1260 (11th Cir.2004). At the outset, it is important to note that the particular question before us has not been addressed by the Georgia courts. See Wade, 379 F.3d at 1258 n. 2 (“[W]e are aware of no Georgia court applying the mailbox rule to initial pro se state habeas petitions.”).9 A lack of explicit Georgia precedent on an issue, however, does not absolve us of our duty “to decide what the state courts would hold if faced with [the issue].” Arceneaux v. Texaco, Inc., 623 F.2d 924, 926 (5th Cir.1980) (citations omitted).10. We must anticipate what the Georgia Supreme Court would say. See Ernie Havre Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 260 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir.2001).
In Massaline v. Williams, 274 Ga. 552, 554 S.E.2d 720, 722-23 (2001), the Georgia Supreme Court adopted the mailbox rule when a pro se prisoner seeks to appeal from a superior court decision denying his habeas corpus petition. Adopting the reasoning of Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988), the Massaline court recognized that a mailbox rule was necessary because of the “unique obstacles” faced by pro se prisoners:
Unlike litigants who are not incarcerated, pro se prisoners cannot monitor the processing of their appellate filings to ensure that the clerk of the court timely receives them .... And, of course, being pro se, they cannot rely on their lawyer to ensure the safe and timely filing of their appeals. Pro se prisoners also must entrust their legal papers to the prison officials, even though the warden is typically the named defendant in a habeas corpus action.
Massaline, 274 Ga. at 552-53, 554 S.E.2d 720 (citing Houston, 487 U.S. at 270-72, 108 S.Ct. at 2382, 101 L.Ed.2d 245).
The rationale of Massaline applies equally in the case, at. hand. We discern no basis for distinguishing between a pro [851]*851se prisoner filing a habeas petition and a pro se prisoner filing a habeas appeal, and we have no reason to believe that the Georgia Supreme Court would find one. “[Ajdopting a mailbox rule for pro se prisoners promotes judicial fairness and helps assure that habeas corpus cases are decided on the merits and not the overly technical application of procedural rules.” Id. at 722.11
We therefore hold that Taylor’s state habeas petition was “properly filed” when Taylor deposited it into his prison’s mail system on January 17, 2001. This was three days prior to the expiration of AED-PA’s one-year limitations period and thus was timely. The judgment of the district court is accordingly vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
VACATED and REMANDED.