Taylor v. San Francisco Sheriff's Department

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MECHIEL TAYLOR, Case No. 23-cv-04121-DMR

8 Plaintiff, OMNIBUS ORDER ON MOTIONS TO 9 v. DISMISS

10 SAN FRANCISCO SHERIFF'S Re: Dkt. Nos. 18, 20, 24, 41, 50, 64 DEPARTMENT, et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 Plaintiff Mechiel Taylor, representing herself, filed a first amended complaint against 14 sixteen defendants1 alleging civil rights and state tort law claims relating to incidents that 15 happened during her employment with Five Keys Schools and Programs (“Five Keys”). [Docket 16 No. 13 (First Amended Complaint, “FAC”).] Eleven2 of the defendants now move to dismiss in 17 six different motions: 18 - Superior Court of California Contra Costa County (“Superior Court”) [Docket No. 18]; 19 - United Educators of San Francisco (“UESF”) and Matthew Milton (collectively “UESF 20 Defendants”) [Docket No. 20]; 21 - City and County of San Francisco (“CCSF”) and San Francisco Sheriff’s Department 22 (“SFSD”) (collectively “San Francisco Defendants”) [Docket No. 24]; 23 - County of Alameda, Alameda County Sheriff’s Office (“ACSO”), and Nicole 24

25 1 The complaint includes the City of San Ramon as a seventeenth defendant. Plaintiff has since voluntarily dismissed the City of San Ramon as a party. 26

2 Five of the defendants—Five Keys, Melanie Fukuhara, Steve Good, Lisa Haynes, and Mary 27 Vigil, collectively “Five Keys Defendants”—filed an answer to the complaint instead of moving 1 Tremaine Allen (collectively “Alameda Defendants”) [Docket No. 41]; 2 - State of California (“California”) [Docket No. 50]; and 3 - Gregory Ahern and Daniel Brodie [Docket No. 64]. 4 Plaintiff opposes all motions. [Docket Nos. 54, 55, 59, 70, 71, 72.] The court held a hearing on 5 March 28, 2024. [Docket No. 98.] For the following reasons, the motions are granted. 6 I. BACKGROUND 7 A. Statement of Facts 8 Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the FAC, which the court takes as true for 9 purposes of this motion.3 Plaintiff is a Black woman who resides in Contra Costa County. FAC 10 ¶¶ 7, 47. On July 20, 2016, Five Keys hired Plaintiff as a teacher for Inmate Services at Santa Rita 11 Jail in Alameda County. Id. at ¶ 24. On September 13, 2016, the County of Alameda approved a 12 contract for educational services in Alameda County jails provided by Five Keys which would be 13 valid from September 14, 2016 to September 13, 2019. Id. at ¶¶ 25-26. Gregory Ahern, a sheriff 14 and coroner employed by ACSO, signed the contract. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 26. 15 In 2018, Nicole Tremaine Allen, a deputy sheriff employed by ACSO and a Black woman, 16 began working in Inmate Services at Santa Rita Jail. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 27, 47. Around December 5, 17 2021, Allen “engaged in an unreasonable search, unreasonable seizure, and a continuing seizure of 18 the Plaintiff and her property at the Plaintiff’s residence.” Id. at ¶ 29. On June 12, 2022, Plaintiff 19 made a formal complaint of abuse and stalking against Allen with Five Keys and requested unpaid 20 leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act and a temporary restraining order against Allen. 21 Id. at ¶¶ 30-31. On June 17, 2022, Five Keys notified Plaintiff that they would be performing a 22 preliminary workplace harassment investigation. Id. at ¶ 44. Plaintiff alleges that Five Keys then 23 began “intimidating, discriminating, and retaliating against Plaintiff for filing the formal 24 complaint” and began “evading Plaintiff and refused Plaintiff’s return to worksite.” Id. at ¶¶ 45- 25 46. Five Keys restricted Plaintiff’s access to coworkers “through isolation and deactivation of 26

27 3 When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all 1 work email account.” Id. at ¶ 51. Plaintiff believes she was excluded from the Five Keys 2 Harassment and Sexual Misconduct Policy under Title IX. Id. at ¶¶ 47-48. 3 Also on June 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed and was granted a temporary civil harassment 4 restraining order against Allen by Judge Judith Craddick of the Superior Court of California 5 Contra Costa County (“Superior Court”). Id. at ¶ 39. The restraining order was in effect through 6 August 9, 2022. Id. at ¶ 40. Plaintiff requested a permanent restraining order and submitted 7 supporting evidence, but Judge Craddick denied the permanent order on August 9, 2022. Id. at ¶ 8 41-42. In her order, Judge Craddick stated: “You felt things were happening which I don’t think 9 were intended by Ms. Allen.” Id. at ¶ 42. 10 On June 21, 2022, Plaintiff made a formal complaint of abuse and stalking against Allen 11 with UESF, the exclusive representative of teachers employed by Five Keys. Id. at ¶¶ 18, 56. 12 UESF did not respond to the complaint. Id. at ¶ 56. On or about June 28, 2022, Plaintiff 13 contacted UESF about Five Keys denying her “salary, benefits, and a safe work environment.” Id. 14 at ¶ 57. Matthew Milton, the Santa Rita Jail site union representative for UESF, called Plaintiff 15 and said the issue was “[o]ut of their hands,” which was the last time he communicated with 16 Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 58. Plaintiff alleges that UESF denied her Catastrophic Leave, Health and 17 Welfare Funds, union representation, a safe work environment, and safety at Plaintiff’s home after 18 receiving information that a crime may have occurred. Id. at ¶ 59. 19 Also on June 21, 2022, Plaintiff made a formal complaint of abuse and stalking against 20 Allen with ACSO, which confirmed knowledge and receipt of the Superior Court’s temporary 21 restraining order against Allen. Id. at ¶ 52. However, from June 21, 2022 to August 9, 2022, 22 Allen violated the restraining order in Plaintiff’s workplace at Santa Rita Jail. Id. at ¶ 53. On 23 October 10, 2022, Plaintiff heard Allen at her front door. Id. at ¶ 68. The incident was reported to 24 ACSO on October 17, 2022. Id. at ¶ 71. On October 21, 2022, Plaintiff mailed the County of 25 Alameda a completed government claim form “along with evidence from Deputy Allen.” Id. at ¶ 26 73. At some point, ACSO met with Plaintiff, during which they asked Plaintiff “irrelevant 27 questions about Plaintiff’s prior behavior” and “attempted to coerce Plaintiff into making a 1 November 3, 2022, ACSO informed Plaintiff that they had not interviewed Allen regarding 2 Plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at ¶ 74. Plaintiff ultimately received ACSO’s investigation disposition 3 letter on August 2, 2023 informing Plaintiff that her allegations against Allen were not sustained. 4 Id. at ¶¶ 87-88. 5 On November 4, 2022, Plaintiff reported ACSO to the State of California for “policy 6 violations.” Id. at ¶ 79. On November 14, 2022, Plaintiff applied to the State of California 7 Victim’s Compensation Board for moving expenses “out of terror of living at the home where 8 Deputy Allen had trespassed” and included evidence from Allen in her application. Id. at ¶ 81. 9 The Victim’s Compensation Board ultimately denied her application because the only report they 10 received from ACSO was an unrelated report written three years prior by Allen. Id. at ¶¶ 84-86. 11 In July or August 2022, Plaintiff was diagnosed with “psychological injury from 12 cumulative trauma.” Id. at ¶ 60. She has been prescribed medication for chronic violent 13 nightmares and ongoing panic attacks. Id. ¶¶ 64, 72. Plaintiff has been on leave without pay from 14 Five Keys since July 1, 2022. Id. at ¶ 61. 15 Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants “did not provide policy, procedure, or law about being 16 an alleged victim of a crime.” Id. at ¶ 67. 17 B. Procedural History 18 Plaintiff filed her complaint on August 14, 2023. [Docket No. 1.] She amended the 19 complaint on October 23, 2023. [Docket No. 13 (FAC).] The Five Keys Defendants filed an 20 answer on January 8, 2024. [Docket No. 47.] The remaining eleven Defendants now move to 21 dismiss all claims against them pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), 12(b)(1) and 22 12(b)(6). 23 The FAC contains seven claims for relief: 1) violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right 24 to free speech; 2) violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to protection from unreasonable 25 search and seizure; 3) violation of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection 26 under the law; 4) a Title VII hostile work environment claim; 5) a Title IX hostile environment 27 claim; 6) trespass to chattel; and 7) invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion. Plaintiff 1 Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief. 2 II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS 3 The court sets forth the elements for each of Plaintiff’s claims before addressing the 4 arguments raised in each motion to dismiss. 5 A. Section 1983 6 Plaintiff brings the first three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “provides a 7 cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 8 Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) 9 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely 10 provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Nunn v. LeBlanc, No. C 11 14-0905 PJH, 2014 WL 1089551, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2014) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 12 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989)). To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two 13 essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 14 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of 15 state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 16 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff makes section 1983 claims based on three different constitutional rights: 17 the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. 18 To allege that her First Amendment rights were violated, Plaintiff must show: “(1) that the 19 plaintiff ‘was engaged in constitutionally protected activity’; (2) that the defendant's actions 20 caused the plaintiff ‘to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from 21 continuing to engage in that activity’; and (3) that the ‘defendant's adverse action was substantially 22 motivated as a response to the plaintiff's exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.’” Knapps 23 v. City of Oakland, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1160–61 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Mendocino 24 Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300–01 (9th Cir.1999)). 25 To assert that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated, Plaintiff must show that her 26 “persons, houses, papers, [or] effects” were subject to an “unreasonable search[] and seizure[].” 27 Patel v. City of Los Angeles, 738 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. 1 upon one of these enumerated areas, or invades a protected privacy interest, for the purpose of 2 obtaining information.” Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3 (2012); Katz v. 3 United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967)). Where the search did not involve a physical 4 intrusion, the plaintiff must show that an “objectively reasonable” expectation of privacy was 5 violated. See Price v. Turner, 260 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). A seizure is a “meaningful 6 interference with an individual’s possessory interests in [their] property.” Brewster v. Beck, 859 7 F.3d 1194, 1196 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992)). 8 To assert that her rights were violated under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 9 Amendment, Plaintiff must show “that a class that is similarly situated has been treated 10 disparately.” Arizona Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2014) 11 (quoting Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221, 1225 12 (9th Cir.1990)). Plaintiff must show that “the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to 13 discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” Lee v. City of Los 14 Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 15 (9th Cir. 1998)). 16 In any section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted “under color of 17 state law.” See McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2000). This requires that the 18 defendant “exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the 19 defendant is clothed with the authority of state law.” Id. 20 B. Title VII 21 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination based on 22 race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Plaintiff alleges Title VII 23 discrimination under a hostile work environment theory. 24 Title VII prohibits “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” which is “so severe or 25 pervasive that it create[s] a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, 26 religion, or national origin.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) (internal 27 citation omitted). To establish a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, the plaintiff 1 [plaintiff’s protected category]; (2) the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) the conduct was 2 sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive 3 working environment.” Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 2008). In 4 evaluating a hostile work environment claim, courts consider “all the circumstances, including the 5 frequency of the allegedly discriminatory conduct, its severity, and whether it unreasonably 6 interferes with an employee's work performance.” Id. 7 C. Title IX 8 Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex 9 “under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 10 1681. A plaintiff can pursue a private right of action “against recipients of federal education 11 funding for alleged Title IX violations.” Karasek v. Regents of Univ. of California, 956 F.3d 12 1093, 1104 (9th Cir. 2020). The funding recipient does not have to be a traditional educational 13 institution. See Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying Title IX to 14 prison educational programs). However, Title IX only applies if the discrimination occurred in the 15 context of the funding recipient’s education program, and the plaintiff may only recover damages 16 if the “official policy” of the recipient discriminates on the basis of sex. See Karasek, 956 F.3d at 17 1104 (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998)). “In sexual 18 harassment cases, it is the deliberate failure to curtail known harassment, rather than the 19 harassment itself, that constitutes the intentional Title IX violation.” Mansourian v. Regents of 20 Univ. of California, 602 F.3d 957, 967 (9th Cir. 2010). 21 If the Title IX claim for damages arises from harassment on the basis of sex, the plaintiff 22 must show: (1) the defendant “exercise[d] substantial control over both the harasser and the 23 context in which the known harassment occur[red]”; (2) the plaintiff must have suffered 24 harassment “that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the 25 [plaintiff] of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the [defendant]”; (3) 26 an official with “authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective 27 measures on the [defendant’s] behalf” must have had “actual knowledge” of the harassment; (4) 1 defendant’s “response to the harassment or lack thereof [was] clearly unreasonable in light of the 2 known circumstances”; and (5) the defendant’s deliberate indifference must have “subject[ed the 3 plaintiff] to harassment.” See Karasek, 956 F.3d at 1105 (citing Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of 4 Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 739 (9th 5 Cir. 2000)). 6 D. State Tort Claims 7 Taylor brings two claims under state tort law: trespass to chattel and invasion of privacy by 8 intrusion upon seclusion. 9 Under California law, trespass to chattel “lies where an intentional interference with the 10 possession of personal property has proximately caused injury.” Thrifty–Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 11 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1566 (1996). To establish intentional interference, the plaintiff must show 12 that either (a) the defendant “dispossesse[d]” the plaintiff of the personal property; (b) the personal 13 property “is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value”; (c) the plaintiff “is deprived of the use 14 of the [personal property] for a substantial time”; or (d) “bodily harm is caused to the [plaintiff], or 15 harm is caused to some person or thing in which the [plaintiff] has a legally protected interest.” 16 Restatement Second of Torts § 218. 17 Intrusion upon seclusion under California law has two elements: “(1) intrusion into a 18 private place, conversation or matter, (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.” 19 Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 231 (1998). To establish an intrusion, the 20 plaintiff “must show the defendant penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy 21 surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to data about, the plaintiff.” Id. at 232. The plaintiff 22 must have had an “objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, 23 conversation or data source.” Id. Determination of whether an intrusion was offensive involves 24 analysis of all the relevant circumstances, including “the degree of intrusion, the context, conduct 25 and circumstances surrounding the intrusion as well as the intruder’s motives and objectives, the 26 setting into which he intrudes, and the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded.” Miller v. 27 Nat’l Broad. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1483-84 (1986). III. LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING MOTIONS TO DISMISS 1 Pleadings by a self-represented litigant must be liberally construed and “held to less 2 stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. The 3 Ninth Circuit has held that “where the petitioner is pro se,” courts have an obligation, “particularly 4 in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of 5 any doubt.” Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). “This rule 6 relieves pro se litigants from the strict application of procedural rules and demands that courts not 7 hold missing or inaccurate legal terminology or muddled draftsmanship against them.” Blaisdell 8 v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013). “This duty applies equally to pro se motions.” 9 United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). However, “a liberal interpretation of a 10 pro se civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 11 pled.” Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) 12 (quoting Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992)). 13 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), leave to amend should be granted as a matter 14 of course, at least until the defendant files a responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). After 15 that point, Rule 15(a) provides generally that leave to amend the pleadings before trial should be 16 given “freely . . . when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “This policy is to be applied 17 with extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 18 2003) (quotation omitted). However, leave to amend may be denied where the complaint “could 19 not be saved by any amendment,” i.e., “where the amendment would be futile.” Thinket Ink Info. 20 Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004). 21 A. FRCP 8(a) 22 Rule 8(a) provides that a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 23 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he short and plain 24 statement must provide the defendant with fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the 25 grounds upon which it rests.” Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (quotation 26 omitted). 27 B. FRCP 12(b)(1) 1 A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is a 2 challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. A court will dismiss a party’s claim for lack of 3 subject matter jurisdiction “only when the claim is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by 4 prior decisions of th[e Supreme] Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve 5 a federal controversy.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (citation 6 and quotation marks omitted). When reviewing a 12(b)(1) motion, the court sculpts its approach 7 according to whether the motion is “facial or factual.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 8 2000). A facial challenge asserts that “the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on 9 their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 10 (9th Cir. 2004). A factual challenge asserts that subject-matter jurisdiction does not exist, 11 independent of what is stated in the complaint. White, 227 F.3d at 1242. In contrast with a facial 12 challenge, a factual challenge permits the court to look beyond the complaint, without 13 “presum[ing] the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. (citation omitted). Even the 14 presence of disputed material facts “will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the 15 merits of jurisdictional claims.” Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987) 16 (citations omitted). 17 C. FRCP 12(b)(6) 18 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in 19 the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). 20 When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all 21 of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, and may dismiss a 22 claim “only where there is no cognizable legal theory” or there is an absence of “sufficient factual 23 matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief,” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 24 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); 25 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)) (quotation marks omitted). A claim has 26 facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 27 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate “more than labels and 2 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. 3 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007). 4 IV. SUPERIOR COURT 5 Plaintiff brings her third, fourth, and fifth claims against Defendant Superior Court (section 6 1983 claim for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII, and Title IX). The Superior 7 Court moves pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for lack of subject matter 8 jurisdiction. [Docket No. 18 (“Superior Court Mot.”).] The Superior Court raises two arguments: 9 that state superior courts are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and that federal 10 courts are barred from reviewing previous state court decisions under the Rooker-Feldman 11 doctrine. The Superior Court also moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12 12(b)(6). 13 A. Eleventh Amendment 14 Under the Eleventh Amendment, Plaintiff cannot sue the Superior Court under section 15 1983. 16 “[T]he Court long ago held that the Eleventh Amendment bars a citizen from bringing suit 17 against the citizen's own State in federal court.” Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways and Pub. 18 Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 97 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 19 U.S. 1, 10, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890)). The exception is when Congress has 20 “unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the immunity ... pursuant to a valid exercise of [its] 21 power.” Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 22 (1996) (internal quotations omitted). Based on this exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, 23 a plaintiff may bring Section 1983 claims against cities and counties. Greater L.A. Council on 24 Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987). But a plaintiff cannot bring section 25 1983 claims against the state or an “arm of the state.” Munoz v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty., 26 91 F.4th 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2024). The Superior Court of California Contra Costa County is an 27 “arm” of the State of California, so it is immune from section 1983 claims. See id. This immunity 1 claim against the Superior Court is dismissed with prejudice. 2 However, a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to Title VII and 3 Title IX upon receipt of federal funds. See, e.g., Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 982 4 F. Supp. 1396, 1405 (N.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d, 237 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2001); Steshenko v. Gayrard, 5 70 F. Supp. 3d 979, 990 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Plaintiff asserts in her opposition that the Superior 6 Court receives federal funds, which would abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect 7 to Title VII and Title IX. 8 The Superior Court argues under Rule 12(b)(6) that Plaintiff has failed to state claims 9 under Title VII or Title IX. Plaintiff concedes in her opposition that the Superior Court is not her 10 employer. [Docket No. 54 (Sup. Ct. Opp’n) 4.] Therefore, her Title VII claim is dismissed with 11 prejudice. Plaintiff argues that the Superior Court is a recipient of federal funding and operates 12 educational programs under Title IX. However, Plaintiff is not able to allege that she suffered 13 discrimination in an education program being operated by the Superior Court. See Karasek, 956 14 F.3d at 1104. Title IX only prohibits sex discrimination in the context of the educational programs 15 or activities operated by the defendant. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Title IX prohibits sex 16 discrimination “under” an education program or activity. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). The plain meaning 17 of this statute is that the discrimination has to be in the context of the education program operated 18 by the defendant. See Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 19 629, 645 (1999) (defining “under” as “subject to the authority, direction, or supervision of”). 20 Plaintiff cannot allege that she experienced sex discrimination under an education program 21 operated by the Superior Court. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Title IX claim is also dismissed with 22 prejudice. 23 B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 24 In addition, all three of Plaintiff’s claims against the Superior Court are barred by the 25 Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 26 “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a well-established jurisdictional rule prohibiting federal 27 courts from exercising appellate review over final state court judgments.” Reusser v. Wachovia 1 court from filing suit in federal district court complaining of an injury caused by a state court 2 judgment, and seeking federal court review and rejection of that judgment.” Bell v. City of Boise, 3 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). “The purpose of the doctrine is to protect state judgments from 4 collateral federal attack. Because district courts lack power to hear direct appeals from state court 5 decisions, they must decline jurisdiction whenever they are ‘in essence being called upon to 6 review the state court decision.’” Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 7 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 n.16 (1983)). The 8 doctrine applies to both final judgments and “interlocutory state court decisions.” Doe & Assocs., 9 252 F.3d at 1030. 10 To determine whether the doctrine applies, “a district court first must determine whether 11 the action contains a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court decision.” Bell, 709 F.3d at 897 12 (citing Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003)). “A de facto appeal exists when ‘a 13 federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision.’ In contrast, if ‘a federal plaintiff asserts 14 as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does 15 not bar jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164). 16 If a plaintiff seeks to bring a forbidden de facto appeal, the plaintiff “may not seek to 17 litigate an issue that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court judicial decision from which 18 the forbidden de facto appeal is brought.” Id. (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158). The Ninth Circuit 19 has clarified that the “inextricably intertwined” language “is not a test to determine whether a 20 claim is a de facto appeal, but is rather a second and distinct step in the Rooker-Feldman analysis. 21 Should the action not contain a forbidden de facto appeal, the Rooker-Feldman inquiry ends.” Id. 22 (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted). 23 Plaintiff’s claims against the Superior Court rest on her contention that Judge Craddick 24 “used her opinion instead of evidence” when deciding on Plaintiff’s permanent restraining order. 25 FAC ¶ 42. Plaintiff argues that her claims are not a de facto appeal because she is not asking the 26 court to review the Superior Court’s decision, but only to review Plaintiff’s exhibits and the 27 exhibits attached to the Alameda Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice. Sup. Ct. Opp’n 2; 1 [Docket No. 42 (“Alameda RJN”)].4 2 Plaintiff’s sole challenge is that in the order denying Plaintiff’s request for a permanent 3 restraining order, Judge Craddick stated: “You felt things were happening which I don’t think 4 were intended by Ms. Allen.” Id. at ¶ 42.5 Plaintiff essentially attacks Judge Craddick’s reasoning. This is precisely the type of act protected by Rooker-Feldman. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 5 1163. The appropriate remedy when a judge allegedly uses flawed reasoning in a decision is to 6 appeal the decision. Plaintiff does not bring any complaints against the Superior Court which are 7 not “inextricably intertwined” with Judge Craddick’s decision. Further supporting this conclusion 8 is Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief; Plaintiff requests that the Superior Court reverse its prior 9 decision and grant Plaintiff’s permanent restraining order against Allen. In short, this is a 10 prohibited de facto appeal. 11 In her opposition, Plaintiff points to the “policy” described in Judge Craddick’s temporary 12 restraining order which prohibits the recipient of the order from owning or possessing guns, other 13 firearms, or ammunition. Sup. Ct. Opp’n 5. However, this “policy” is merely a statement of law 14 ordered by Judge Craddick. It is not separate from the judge’s exercise of her decision-making 15 power. Plaintiff’s claims arise solely from Judge Craddick’s reasoning supporting her decision 16 not to issue the permanent restraining order. 17 In sum, Plaintiff’s claims against the Superior Court are dismissed with prejudice. 18 V. UESF DEFENDANTS 19 Plaintiff brings her third, fourth, and fifth claims against the UESF Defendants (UESF and 20 Matthew Milton). These are the same claims she asserted against the Superior Court. As 21 previously explained, Plaintiff alleges that she attempted to make a formal complaint of abuse and 22 stalking against Allen with UESF, but UESF did not respond. FAC ¶ 56. Plaintiff later contacted 23 24 4 For reasons discussed below, the court denies judicial notice of the Alameda RJN. 25

5 Plaintiff’s makes two allegations against the Superior Court: that it “prohibit[ed] Plaintiff to 26 peacefully assemble at work and her private residence after receiving evidence that a suspected crime had occurred,” id. at ¶ 43, and that it “did not provide policy, procedure, or law about being 27 an alleged victim of a crime.” Id. at ¶ 67. These allegations are conclusory and confusing. At the 1 UESF about Five Keys denying her “salary, benefits, and a safe work environment,” but Milton 2 (on behalf of UESF) responded that the issue was “[o]ut of their hands.” Id. at ¶¶ 57-58. Plaintiff 3 alleges that UESF denied her Catastrophic Leave, Health and Welfare Funds, union 4 representation, a safe work environment, and safety at Plaintiff’s home after receiving information 5 that a crime may have occurred. Id. at ¶ 59. 6 The UESF Defendants move to dismiss all three claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). [Docket 7 No. 20 (“UESF Mot.”).] 8 A. Section 1983 9 Plaintiff’s third claim is for deprivation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 10 U.S.C. § 1983. In any section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted “under 11 color of state law.” See McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2000). “Generally, 12 private individuals and entities cannot be held liable under section 1983, because this section 13 ‘excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.’” I.H. 14 by & through Hunter v. Oakland Sch. for the Arts, No. 16-CV-05500-SI, 2017 WL 565069, at *3 15 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2017) (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Action taken by private individuals and entities 17 are only under color of state law if the action meets one of four tests: “(1) the public function test; 18 (2) the joint action test; (3) the state compulsion test; [or] (4) the governmental nexus test.” 19 Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1997). 20 Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against the UESF Defendants does not meet any of the state 21 actor tests. The union does not serve a “public function” traditionally performed by the state. See 22 id. The claim also does not meet the joint action test. The joint action test requires “an agreement 23 or meeting of the minds” between the defendant and a state actor. See Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 24 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff does not plead an agreement between the UESF Defendants 25 and the state. Plaintiff alleges that the UESF Defendants denied her benefits and failed to properly 26 respond to her complaints against Allen. She does not allege that the UESF Defendants acted 27 jointly with the state, nor does she raise any facts indicating a conspiracy between the UESF 1 does not allege that the state coerced or encouraged the UESF Defendants to deny her benefits. 2 See id. at 1119-20. Lastly, the claim does not meet the governmental nexus test. This test requires 3 a “sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so 4 that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. at 1120. 5 In her opposition, Plaintiff states that the UESF Defendants and state actors “acted 6 pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy or a widespread or longstanding practice or 7 custom.” [Docket No. 59 (“UESF Opp’n”) 10.] This is conclusory. Plaintiff’s opposition also 8 contends that Milton had “a conversation” with Melanie Fukuhara, a principal at Five Keys, on the 9 same day that Milton called Plaintiff. UESF Opp’n 11. Plaintiff does not allege that Melanie 10 Fukuhara or Five Keys are state actors. Even if she did, the mere fact of a “conversation” does not 11 create a “nexus” or evidence of a conspiracy. See Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (finding that 12 defendant’s conversations with the police did not demonstrate that defendant had conspired with 13 the police). “To be liable as a co-conspirator, a private defendant must share with the public entity 14 the goal of violating a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Id. at 445. Plaintiff has alleged no facts 15 that would allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that Five Keys and UESF shared a 16 common goal of violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 17 The UESF Defendants were private actors, not state actors, when they allegedly denied 18 Plaintiff’s union benefits and did not properly respond to her complaints. See Franklin, 312 F.3d 19 at 446. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot state a viable section 1983 claim against them. Plaintiff’s 20 section 1983 claims against the UESF Defendants are dismissed with prejudice. See Thinket Ink 21 Info. Res., Inc., 368 F.3d at 1061 (denying leave to amend “where the amendment would be 22 futile”). 23 B. Title VII and Title IX claims 24 Title VII and Title IX claims cannot be brought against individuals. Lum v. Kauai Cnty. 25 Council, 358 F. App'x 860, 862 (9th Cir. 2009) (“there is no individual liability under Title VII”); 26 Doe By & Through Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1563 (N.D. Cal. 1993) 27 (“Title IX makes institutions, not individuals, liable”). Plaintiff’s Title VII and Title IX claims 1 At the March 28, 2024 hearing Plaintiff conceded that her complaint was unrelated to any 2 educational programs or activities operated by UESF. As discussed above, Title IX only applies if 3 sex discrimination occurred under the funding recipient’s education program. See Karasek, 956 4 F.3d at 1104. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Title IX claim against UESF is dismissed with prejudice. 5 With respect to the Title VII claim, Plaintiff conceded at the hearing that UESF was not 6 her employer. However, Title VII applies to unions as well as employers. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e– 7 2(c), 2000e–3(a). “[§ 2000e–2(c)] forbids discrimination by any labor organization, and [§ 8 2000e–3(a)] forbids retaliation against a person who has asserted rights under Title VII or 9 supported another person's assertion of rights.” Green v. Am. Fed'n of Tchrs./Illinois Fed'n of 10 Tchrs. Loc. 604, 740 F.3d 1104, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014). A union may be liable under Title VII if a 11 union member can show that the member “was singled out and treated less favorably than others 12 similarly situated on account of race or any other criterion impermissible under the statute.” Beck 13 v. United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 99, 506 F.3d 874, 884 fn. 4 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 14 Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 694 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir.1982)). The plaintiff does 15 not have to show that the union breached its duty of fair representation or that the collective 16 bargaining agreement was violated in order to make a Title VII claim. See Garity v. APWU Nat'l 17 Lab. Org., 828 F.3d 848, 863 (9th Cir. 2016). 18 Taylor did not plead facts to support that UESF treated her less favorably than others 19 similarly situated because of her race or gender. She also did not plead facts to support that the 20 union retaliated against her because she was asserting her Title VII rights. At the March 28, 2024 21 hearing, Plaintiff alleged that UESF denied her benefits because UESF had a preference for San 22 Francisco Unified School District employees as opposed to Five Keys employees, and because 23 UESF improperly applied its non-fraternization policy to Plaintiff’s complaint. Neither of these 24 allegations implicate Title VII, because they do not suggest that UESF’s conduct was motivated 25 by Plaintiff’s race or gender. Plaintiff’s Title VII claim against UESF is dismissed with 26 prejudice.6 27 1 In sum, Plaintiff’s claims against Milton and UESF are dismissed with prejudice. 2 VI. SAN FRANCISCO DEFENDANTS 3 Plaintiff brings her first, third, fourth, fifth, and seventh claims against the San Francisco 4 Defendants (CCSF and SFSD). These claims are for violation of the First Amendment and the 5 Fourteenth Amendment (both brought under section 1983), Title VII, Title IX, and invasion of 6 privacy. In her opposition, Plaintiff dropped her invasion of privacy claim against the San 7 Francisco Defendants.7 [Docket No. 70 (“SF Opp’n”) 13.] 8 The San Francisco Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them for improper 9 joinder under Rule 21 and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). At the March 28, 2024 10 hearing, CCSF argued that the court may consider facts outside of Plaintiff’s complaint in order to 11 determine if joinder of the San Francisco Defendants is proper. However, CCSF did not brief the 12 court on the propriety of considering outside facts in its motion to dismiss [Docket No. 24 (“SF 13 Mot.”)] or in its request for judicial notice [Docket No. 28 (“SF RJN”)]. Under Ninth Circuit law 14 a defendant may present facts beyond the plaintiff’s complaint showing misjoinder, but only in the 15 specific circumstance of an alleged “fraudulent joinder” where the plaintiff joined the defendant to 16 defeat complete diversity and the defendant is seeking removal to federal court. See McCabe v. 17 Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987). That is not the case here. Therefore, the 18 court will not consider facts beyond Plaintiff’s complaint and judicially noticeable facts when 19

20 unfair labor practices. UESF Mot. 8. PERB does have exclusive jurisdiction over unfair practice charges brought under the Education Employment Relations Act (EERA). Cal. Gov. Code § 21 3541.5. PERB also has exclusive jurisdiction over common law and state law claims which have “potential overlap” with the unfair practice charges. El Rancho Unified Sch. Dist. v. Nat'l Educ. 22 Assn., 33 Cal. 3d 946, 959 (1983) (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cnty. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 200 (1978)). However, this exclusive jurisdiction does not extend to 23 federal civil rights claims. See De Malherbe v. Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, 438 F. Supp. 1121, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (finding that the court had jurisdiction over federal civil rights 24 claims, concurrent with NLRB’s jurisdiction over overlapping unfair labor practice charges under the NLRA); El Rancho Unified Sch. Dist., 33 Cal. 3d at 953 (“the principles defining the 25 preemptive reach of the NLRA are generally applicable in determining the scope of PERB’s preemptive jurisdiction under EERA”). Plaintiff only brought federal civil rights claims against 26 the UESF Defendants. This court has jurisdiction over her claims.

27 7 Plaintiff conceded that her invasion of privacy claim should be dismissed against the San 1 evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint under both Rule 21 and Rule 12(b)(6). 2 A. SFSD 3 The San Francisco Defendants argue that SFSD is not a separate legal entity from CCSF 4 and should be dismissed as a defendant because Plaintiff has effectively named CCSF as a 5 defendant twice. SF Mot. 11. A governmental entity that lacks separate legal status from its home 6 municipality is “incapable of suing or being sued in its own name.” Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 7 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2015). In such situations, the court may substitute the municipality as a 8 party in lieu of the governmental entity. See id. 9 To sue SFSD, Plaintiff must provide evidence that CCSF intended to create the Sheriff’s 10 Department as a separate legal entity, such as evidence that SFSD has an operating budget as an 11 independent entity. See Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 792 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended on denial 12 of reh'g (Dec. 5, 1995). Plaintiff does not allege facts to support that SFSD was created as a 13 separate legal entity subject to suit. Ordinarily, the court would substitute CCSF as the proper 14 party. See id. Because CCSF is already a named defendant and the same claims are alleged 15 against it as against SFSD, the court simply dismisses SFSD as a party. 16 B. CCSF 17 1. Misjoinder 18 Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in relevant part, permits a plaintiff to join 19 multiple defendants into one action if “(A) any right to relief is asserted against them . . . arising 20 out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any 21 question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 22 20(a)(2). When determining whether defendants are properly joined, the court should “liberally 23 construe [the requirements] in the interest of convenience and judicial economy in a manner that 24 will secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the action.” Call of the Wild Movie, 25 LLC v. Does 1-1,062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 342 (D.D.C. 2011) (citation & quotation marks 26 omitted); see United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966); Diabolic Video 27 Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865-PSG, at *3. If defendants do not satisfy the test for 1 be prejudiced by the severance.” Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997) 2 (citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (“Misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissing an 3 action. On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party”). 4 Plaintiff’s claims against CCSF arise from her allegation that CCSF is “the local 5 governmental unit for which [Five Keys] worked at all times relevant hereto.” FAC ¶ 20. 6 Plaintiff does not plead any challenged actions taken independently by CCSF. Instead, at the 7 March 28, 2024 hearing, she asserted that CCSF operates Five Keys and is therefore responsible 8 for Five Keys’ acts against her. Plaintiff represented that she has documentary evidence showing 9 that SFSD was her employer during the events in her complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims 10 against CCSF can only go forward if Plaintiff can plead facts that support a reasonable inference 11 that CCSF violated her rights as her employer, or if she can otherwise plead that CCSF is legally 12 liable for the actions of Five Keys. 13 The FAC does not allege sufficient facts under either theory. The court liberally construes 14 the pleadings to allege that Five Keys is (or was) also called “San Francisco Sheriff’s Department 15 Five Keys Charter School.” FAC ¶ 8. This allegation supports the possibility of a connection 16 between SFSD and Five Keys. However, it does not support the inference that SFSD controlled 17 Five Keys during the relevant time period, rather than at some earlier time. In her opposition, 18 Plaintiff alleges that the Five Keys Board of Directors includes CCSF employees and affiliates, 19 including “Sheriff Paul Miyomoto in his official capacity.” SF Opp’n 7-8. Even if Plaintiff were 20 to amend her complaint to add allegations that San Francisco employees sit on the board of Five 21 Keys, this would not be sufficient to support the inference that CCSF controls the actions of Five 22 Keys. 23 At the March 28, 2024 hearing, Plaintiff stated that she could amend the complaint to 24 include other facts and evidence showing that CCSF was her employer during the relevant time 25 period. Plaintiff’s claims against CCSF are dismissed, but Plaintiff is granted leave to amend her 26 complaint with facts showing that CCSF was her employer.8 27 2. Section 1983 1 Even if Plaintiff is able to plausibly allege that CCSF was her employer during the relevant 2 time period, Plaintiff must also plead sufficient facts to state a claim against CCSF. The FAC fails 3 to state a section 1983 claim. 4 Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments do 5 not meet the requirements for municipal liability, also known as “Monell” liability. A 6 municipality may face section 1983 liability if it “‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or 7 ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 8 (2011) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)). 9 However, the municipality may be held liable “only for ‘[its] own illegal acts.’” Id. (quoting 10 Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)). It cannot be held vicariously liable for its 11 employees’ actions. Id. (citations omitted). To establish municipal liability, plaintiffs “must 12 prove that ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused their injury.” Id. (quoting Monell, 13 436 U.S. at 691). “The ‘official policy’ requirement ‘was intended to distinguish acts of the 14 municipality from acts of employees of the municipality,’ and thereby make clear that municipal 15 liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.” Pembaur, 475 16 U.S. at 479-80 (emphasis in original). Official municipal policy includes “the decisions of a 17 government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and 18 widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (citations omitted). 19 Such policy or practice must be a “moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights.” 20 Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). 21 In the Ninth Circuit, a municipality may be liable under section 1983 under three possible 22 theories. Rodriguez v. Cnty. Of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 802 (9th Cir. 2018). The first is where 23 “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose 24 edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflict[ed] the injury.” Id. (quoting 25 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Second, “a local government can fail to train employees in a manner 26

27 government claims filed by Plaintiff against CCSF. Because these documents do not shed light on 1 that amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to a constitutional right, such that ‘the need for more or 2 different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of 3 constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been 4 deliberately indifferent to the need.’” Id. (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 5 (1989)). Finally, a municipality may be liable under section 1983 if “the individual who 6 committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority or such an 7 official ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Id. at 802- 8 03 (quoting Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation 9 marks and citation omitted)). 10 Here, Plaintiff has not stated a Monell claim against CCSF. The FAC does not contain any 11 allegation that Plaintiff was harmed by the execution of a CCSF policy or custom. This is not like 12 the facts in Monell, where the plaintiffs alleged that the Department of Social Services and of the 13 Board of Education of the city of New York had an official policy which forced pregnant 14 employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons, 15 and the plaintiffs were harmed by that unlawful forced leave. Monell, 436 U.S. at 661. The 16 complaint also does not contain any allegation that CCSF failed to train its employees in a manner 17 that amounts to “deliberate indifference” to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Rodriguez, 891 18 F.3d at 802-03 (finding that a “failure to investigate and discipline employees in the face of 19 widespread constitutional violations” could show deliberate indifference). Nor does the complaint 20 allege that a CCSF official with final policy-making authority harmed Plaintiff or ratified a 21 subordinate’s harm of Plaintiff. See Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1347-50 (9th Cir. 1992) 22 (finding no municipal liability for the allegedly unconstitutional discipline of a fire fighter, where 23 the chief of the fire department did not create the city’s policy on disciplining fire fighters, and 24 where the city manager did not make a deliberate choice to endorse the chief’s decision to 25 discipline the fire fighter). 26 At the hearing, the court asked Plaintiff to identify any additional facts she could allege to 27 support Monell liability against CCSF. She could not. Therefore, Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims 3. Title VII 1 Plaintiff’s Title VII claim fails because she has not alleged that CCSF was her employer, 2 as discussed above. Even if CCSF were her employer during the relevant time period, Plaintiff 3 has not sufficiently pleaded facts to support a Title VII claim based on a hostile work 4 environment. 5 To establish a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must show: 6 “(1) the defendants subjected [plaintiff] to verbal or physical conduct based on [plaintiff’s 7 protected category]; (2) the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe 8 or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive working 9 environment.” Surrell, 518 F.3d at 1108. Additionally, if a non-employee is the harasser, the 10 plaintiff must show that the employer “either ratifies or acquiesces in the harassment by not taking 11 immediate and/or corrective actions when it knew or should have known of the conduct.” 12 Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff has not 13 alleged that Allen is a CCSF employee. Plaintiff has also not alleged any specific facts to show 14 that CCSF ratified or acquiesced in Allen’s harassment. 15 Plaintiff’s Title VII claim against CCSF is dismissed with leave to amend to show that 16 CCSF was her employer during the relevant time, and to add specific facts supporting her 17 allegation of hostile work environment against CCSF. 18 4. Title IX 19 As discussed above, a plaintiff can only bring a Title IX claim against a federal funding 20 recipient if the discrimination occurred within the context of the funding recipient’s education 21 programs or activities. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681. Like Plaintiff’s Title VII claim, Plaintiff’s Title IX 22 claim against CCSF fails because Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to support that CCSF 23 was her employer at Five Keys. 24 Similar to her Title VII claim, Plaintiff has failed to show that CCSF was deliberately 25 indifferent to known harassment. See Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 967. Plaintiff alleges no facts 26 supporting that CCSF had “substantial control” over Allen or the Five Keys workplace; that a 27 CCSF official with authority to institute corrective measures had “actual knowledge” of the 1 harassment; or that CCSF’s response to the harassment was “clearly unreasonable,” subjecting 2 Plaintiff to further harassment. See Karasek, 956 F.3d at 1105. Plaintiff’s Title IX claim against 3 CCSF is dismissed with leave to amend. 4 In summary, Plaintiff’s claims against SFSD are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff’s 5 section 1983 claim against CCSF is dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff’s Title VII and Title IX 6 claims against CCSF are dismissed with leave to amend the complaint by making non-conclusory 7 allegations to support that CCSF was her employer, to establish the elements of a hostile work 8 environment, and to establish that CCSF ratified or acquiesced in the harassment (for Title VII) or 9 was deliberately indifferent (for Title IX). 10 VII. CALIFORNIA 11 Plaintiff brings her third, fourth, and fifth claims against California. Plaintiff clarified at 12 the March 28, 2024 hearing that her claims against California are based on how the California 13 Department of General Services handled her complaint against Allen and County of Alameda, and 14 how the Victim’s Compensation Board handled her application for moving expenses. California 15 moves to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and Rule 12(b)(6). [Docket Nos. 50 16 (“Cal. Mot.”) and 70 (“Cal. Reply”).] 17 A. Eleventh Amendment 18 As discussed above with respect to Defendant Superior Court, a plaintiff cannot bring 19 section 1983 claims against the state. Munoz v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty., 91 F.4th 977, 20 980 (9th Cir. 2024). Taylor’s section 1983 claim against California is dismissed with prejudice. 21 However, a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to Title VII and Title IX 22 upon receipt of federal funds. See Carmen, 982 F. Supp. at 1405. 23 B. Failure to State a Claim 24 Plaintiff’s Title VII claim against California is dismissed with prejudice because Plaintiff 25 cannot assert that California is her employer. 26 Plaintiff’s Title IX claim against California is dismissed with prejudice because her 27 allegations are unrelated to any education programs or activities operated by California. As 1 in the context of the defendant’s education programs or activities. 2 For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against California are dismissed with prejudice. 3 VIII. ALAMEDA DEFENDANTS 4 Plaintiff pleads all seven claims against the Alameda Defendants (County of Alameda, 5 ACSO, and Allen). As previously explained, Plaintiff alleges that Allen “engaged in an 6 unreasonable search, unreasonable seizure, and a continuing seizure of the Plaintiff and her 7 property at the Plaintiff’s residence” on December 5, 2021. FAC ¶ 29. Plaintiff alleges that she 8 made a formal complaint of abuse and stalking against Allen with ACSO on June 21, 2022 and 9 notified ACSO of the temporary restraining order against Allen, but ACSO allowed Allen to 10 violate the restraining order. Id. at ¶ 53. On October 10, 2022, Plaintiff heard Allen at her front 11 door. Id. at ¶ 68. The incident was reported to ACSO on October 17, 2022. Id. at ¶ 71. ACSO 12 later met with Plaintiff, during which they asked Plaintiff “irrelevant questions about Plaintiff’s 13 prior behavior” and “attempted to coerce Plaintiff into making a statement about a piece of 14 evidence that Plaintiff brought to the meeting.” Id. at ¶¶ 76-77. On November 3, 2022, ACSO 15 informed Plaintiff that they had not interviewed Allen regarding Plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at ¶ 74. 16 Plaintiff ultimately received ACSO’s investigation disposition letter on August 2, 2023 informing 17 Plaintiff that her allegations against Allen were not sustained. Id. at ¶¶ 87-88. 18 The Alameda Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them under Rule 12(b)(6). 19 [Docket No. 41 (“Alameda Mot.”).] For the same reasons discussed above regarding SFSD and 20 its relationship to CCSF, ACSO is dismissed as a party pursuant to Rule 21 because the complaint 21 already asserts claims against County of Alameda.9 22 A. Section 1983 Claims Against Allen 23 Defendant Allen argues that she is not liable under section 1983 because she was not 24 acting under color of state law with respect to her actions challenged by Plaintiff in this lawsuit. 25 “[A] state employee who is on duty, or otherwise exercises his official responsibilities in 26 9 The Alameda Defendants request judicial notice of the transcript of the August 9, 2022 Superior 27 Court hearing on Plaintiff’s petition for a permanent restraining order against Allen. Alameda 1 an off-duty encounter, typically acts under color of state law.” Naffe v. Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1037 2 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing West, 487 U.S. at 49–50, 108 S.Ct. 2250; McDade, 223 F.3d at 1139–41). 3 “That is true even if the employee's offensive actions were illegal or unauthorized.” Naffe, 789 4 F.3d at 1037. “A state employee who is off duty nevertheless acts under color of state law when 5 (1) the employee purports to or pretends to act under color of law, (2) his pretense of acting in the 6 performance of his duties had the purpose and effect of influencing the behavior of others, and (3) 7 the harm inflicted on plaintiff related in some meaningful way either to the officer’s governmental 8 status or to the performance of his duties. On the other hand, a government employee does not act 9 under color of state law when he pursues private goals via private actions.” Id. (cleaned up, 10 citations omitted). 11 Allen asserts that Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims against her arise solely from her 12 “domestic disputes” with Plaintiff. Alameda Mot. 6-7. Plaintiff’s allegations are sparse and do 13 not elaborate on the nature of her relationship with Allen or provide any context for the claims she 14 asserts against Allen. The FAC does not contain enough facts about Allen’s challenged conduct to 15 survive a motion to dismiss. However, the court cannot rule out the possibility that Plaintiff could 16 make allegations to support that Allen (a deputy sheriff) was a state actor with respect to 17 Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims against Allen, as opposed to a private citizen. Plaintiff is granted 18 leave to amend her complaint. 19 In addition, Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims against Allen fail because she has not alleged 20 facts showing that Allen violated her constitutional rights. To allege that her First Amendment 21 rights were violated, Plaintiff must show: “(1) that the plaintiff ‘was engaged in constitutionally 22 protected activity’; (2) that the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff ‘to suffer an injury that 23 would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity’; and (3) that 24 the ‘defendant’s adverse action was substantially motivated as a response to the plaintiff’s exercise 25 of constitutionally protected conduct.’” Knapps, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 1160–61. To assert that her 26 Fourth Amendment rights were violated, Plaintiff must show that her “persons, houses, papers, 27 [or] effects” were subject to an “unreasonable search[] and seizure[].” Patel, 738 F.3d at 1061. 1 Amendment, Plaintiff must show that Allen “acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate 2 against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” See Lee, 250 F.3d at 686. The 3 FAC makes only conclusory allegations that Plaintiff’s rights were violated, and it does not allege 4 any facts to support the elements of each claim described above. 5 Plaintiff’s claims under section 1983 (claims one, two, and three) against Allen are 6 dismissed. Plaintiff may amend her complaint to allege specific facts about what Allen did to 7 violate her constitutional rights and how Allen was acting under color of law. 8 B. Section 1983 claim against County of Alameda 9 As previously discussed, to establish Monell liability, a plaintiff “must prove that ‘action 10 pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused their injury.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 60. Here, 11 Plaintiff has not stated a Monell claim against the County of Alameda, as the complaint does not 12 contain any facts supporting Plaintiff’s allegation that her constitutional rights were injured by an 13 official municipal policy. This claim is dismissed with leave to amend. 14 C. Title VII and Title IX claims against Allen 15 Plaintiff’s Title VII and Title IX claims against Allen are dismissed with prejudice because 16 such claims cannot be brought against individuals. See Lum v. Kauai Cnty. Council, 358 F. App'x 17 860, 862 (9th Cir. 2009); Doe By & Through Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 18 1563 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 19 D. Title VII claim against County of Alameda 20 1. Common-law agency test 21 Defendant County of Alameda argues that Plaintiff’s Title VII claim should be dismissed 22 because County of Alameda was not Plaintiff’s employer. Plaintiff’s complaint states that 23 Plaintiff was a Five Keys employee, and that Five Keys signed a contract with County of Alameda 24 to provide educational services in Alameda County jails. In her opposition, Plaintiff argues that 25 Alameda County was her employer because it controlled “the means and manner of Plaintiff’s 26 work performance.” [Docket No. 55 (Alameda Opp’n) 8.] Plaintiff alleges that County of 27 Alameda provided her with her original hiring document, that it controlled her security clearance 1 Alameda employee) to supervise her classroom. Id. 2 Under Title VII, an employee may have two or more “joint employers” who are equally 3 liable for discrimination. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 915 F.3d 4 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2019). The Ninth Circuit applies the common-law agency test to determine 5 whether a party is a joint employer. Id. at 639. “Under the common-law test, ‘the principal 6 guidepost’ is the element of control—that is, ‘the extent of control that one may exercise over the 7 details of the work of the other.’” Id. at 638 (quoting Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, 8 P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 447 (2003). The Ninth Circuit provided a non-exhaustive list of 9 factors to determine the extent of control:

10 the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the 11 parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion 12 over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part 13 of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment 14 of the hired party. 15 Id. (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992)). 16 The fact that Plaintiff worked in an Alameda County jail because Five Keys had a contract 17 with County of Alameda is not enough by itself to support an inference that County of Alameda 18 and Five Keys were her joint employers. The FAC does not currently state a claim against County 19 of Alameda on a joint employer theory. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the complaint to 20 include factual allegations supporting a reasonable inference that County of Alameda is her joint 21 employer. 22 2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 23 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s Title VII claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff 24 did not plead exhaustion of administrative remedies. See Surrell v. California Water Serv. Co., 25 518 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that Title VII requires the plaintiff to exhaust 26 administrative remedies before seeking a private action for damages). Plaintiff did not plead 27 exhaustion in the complaint, but in her opposition, she states that she received her right-to-sue 1 against County of Alameda. Alameda Opp’n 9. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the complaint 2 to plead exhaustion of administrative remedies. 3 3. Failure to State a Claim 4 County of Alameda argues that Plaintiff’s Title VII claim should be dismissed for failure 5 to allege a prima facie case of discrimination. As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to establish 6 the elements of a hostile work environment claim. Plaintiff’s belief, asserted in her opposition 7 brief, that “if a male engaged in the same type of misconduct as Defendant Allen, [Plaintiff’s] 8 complaint would have been handled correctly,” is conclusory and speculative. Alameda Opp’n 9. 9 Factual allegations in a complaint must be more than speculative. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 10 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 11 Plaintiff’s Title VII claim against County of Alameda is dismissed. Plaintiff is granted 12 leave to amend her complaint with specific facts and evidence showing that County of Alameda 13 was her joint employer and that County of Alameda discriminated against her based on a hostile 14 work environment theory. 15 E. Title IX claim against County of Alameda 16 Like her Title VII claim, Plaintiff’s Title IX claim fails because she makes only conclusory 17 allegations of harassment on the basis of sex. In addition, she has not clearly alleged facts 18 sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the County of Alameda exercised “substantial 19 control” over both the harasser and the context in which the harassment occurred; that the County 20 of Alameda acted with “deliberate indifference” to the harassment, such that the defendant’s 21 “response to the harassment or lack thereof [was] clearly unreasonable in light of the known 22 circumstances”; or that such deliberate indifference subjected her to further harassment. See 23 Karasek, 956 F.3d at 1105. 24 Plaintiff’s Title IX claim against County of Alameda is dismissed. Plaintiff is granted 25 leave to amend her complaint with specific facts and evidence showing that she was harassed on 26 the basis of sex and that County of Alameda is liable under a deliberate indifference theory. 27 F. State law claims against Allen 1 actual harm. Allen moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim because Plaintiff failed 2 to plead an offensive intrusion in a private place. 3 1. Trespass 4 Plaintiff’s trespass claim appears to be based on Allen’s “unauthorized physical contact 5 with Plaintiff’s Wi-Fi network, front door, and cellphone at Plaintiff’s residence.” FAC ¶ 107. 6 “[T]respass to a chattel may be committed by intentionally (a) dispossessing another of the chattel, 7 or (b) using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another.” Alfaro, 645 F. Supp. 3d 8 at 958. In order to make out a claim for trespass to chattel, “the defendant’s interference must . . . 9 have caused some injury to the chattel or to the plaintiff’s rights in it.” Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 10 Cal. 4th 1342, 1350 (2003). Where there is a trespass to personal property, the owner “may 11 recover only the actual damages suffered by reason of the impairment of the property or the loss of 12 its use.” Zaslow v. Kroenert, 29 Cal. 2d 541, 551 (1946). Plaintiff makes only conclusory 13 allegations that Allen had “unauthorized physical contact” with her personal property. Plaintiff 14 does not plead that this “contact” damaged her property or interfered with its use. 15 In her opposition, Plaintiff alleges that Allen committed trespass to land by forcing her 16 way into Plaintiff’s home. Alameda Opp’n 11. But Plaintiff’s claim is for trespass to chattel 17 (personal property), not land (real property). Even if Plaintiff did claim a trespass to land, her 18 allegations are still deficient. In order to plead trespass to land, the plaintiff must show that: “(1) 19 the plaintiff’s ownership or control of the property; (2) the defendant’s intentional, reckless, or 20 negligent entry on the property; (3) lack of permission to enter the property, or acts in excess of 21 the permission; (4) actual harm; and (5) the defendant’s conduct as a substantial factor in causing 22 the harm.” Williams v. Santander Bank, No. CV1504188SJORAOX, 2015 WL 4484202, at *3 23 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2015) (quoting Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers 24 Union Local 8, 186 Cal.App. 4th 1078, 1085 (2010)). Plaintiff has not pleaded specific facts to 25 show that Allen intentionally, recklessly, or negligently entered her property; that Allen lacked 26 permission to enter her property; and that Allen’s conduct was a substantial factor in Plaintiff’s 27 harm. 2. Intrusion upon Seclusion 1 An action for intrusion upon seclusion has two elements: “(1) intrusion into a private place, 2 conversation or matter, (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Shulman, 18 3 Cal. 4th at 231. The plaintiff must have had an “objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or 4 solitude in the place, conversation or data source.” Id. at 232. Liberally construing the pleadings, 5 Plaintiff has alleged that Allen obtained unwanted access to data about Plaintiff’s personal 6 schedule. FAC ¶ 111. Plaintiff has not explained why she would have an “objectively reasonable 7 expectation” that she could keep this schedule private, and why Allen’s access to the schedule 8 would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.” See Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 231. Plaintiff 9 must allege enough non-conclusory facts for the court to evaluate the nature of Allen’s alleged 10 intrusions and whether they were objectively offensive. Plaintiff’s intrusion upon seclusion claim 11 is dismissed with leave to amend. 12 G. State law claims against County of Alameda 13 Defendant County of Alameda moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s two state law claims against it 14 because Allen’s alleged conduct did not occur in the scope of her employment. 15 “The doctrine of respondeat superior applies to public and private employers alike.” Mary 16 M. v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 3d 202, 209 (1991). “[R]espondeat superior liability attaches if 17 the activities ‘that cause[d] the employee to become an instrumentality of danger to others’ were 18 undertaken with the employer’s permission and were of some benefit to the employer or, in the 19 absence of proof of benefit, the activities constituted a customary incident of employment.” 20 Purton v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 218 Cal. App. 4th 499, 509, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 912, 919 (2013) 21 (quoting Childers v. Shasta Livestock Auction Yard, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 3d 792, 804 (Ct. App. 22 1987)). Liability does not attach “where the misconduct does not arise from the conduct of the 23 employer’s enterprise but instead arises out of a personal dispute . . . or is the result of a personal 24 compulsion.” Farmers Ins. Grp. v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 11 Cal. 4th 992, 1006 (1995). “In such 25 cases, the risks [of harm] are engendered by events unrelated to the employment, so the mere fact 26 that an employee has an opportunity to abuse facilities or authority necessary to the performance 27 of his or her duties does not render the employer vicariously liable.” Id. 1 Plaintiff has alleged that Allen was employed by the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office. 2 FAC ¶ 10. However, Plaintiff’s trespass claim against County of Alameda appears to be based 3 entirely on Allen’s conduct as a private individual. Plaintiff does not allege that Allen trespassed 4 in the course of providing some benefit to County of Alameda, or that the trespass was within the 5 scope of Allen’s employment. Plaintiff’s opposition alleges that Allen harassed Plaintiff while on 6 duty, but harassment is not an element of trespass. Alameda Opp’n 10. 7 Plaintiff’s intrusion upon seclusion claim appears to be based on Allen acquiring Plaintiff’s 8 personal schedule from other Five Keys employees. Plaintiff does not allege that the acquisition 9 of her personal schedule was for the benefit of County of Alameda or otherwise within the scope 10 of Allen’s employment with County of Alameda. 11 Plaintiff’s state law claims against County of Alameda are dismissed with leave to amend. 12 IX. AHERN AND BRODIE 13 Defendant Gregory Ahern was sheriff and coroner of ACSO. Defendant Daniel Brodie 14 was the captain of ACSO’s Internal Affairs when Plaintiff made her formal complaint against 15 Allen to ACSO. Plaintiff brings her third, fourth, and fifth claims against Defendants Ahern and 16 Brodie. Ahern and Brodie move to dismiss. [Docket No. 64 (“Ahern Mot.”).] 17 Plaintiff’s Title VII and Title IX claims against Ahern and Brodie are dismissed without 18 leave to amend because such claims cannot be brought against individuals. See Lum, 358 F. 19 App’x at 862; Doe By & Through Doe, 830 F. Supp. At 1563. The only remaining claim against 20 Ahern and Brodie is under section 1983 for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 21 It is not clear from the pleadings, but Plaintiff seems to be alleging that Ahern and Brodie 22 discriminated against Plaintiff in their capacity as ACSO employees. She elaborates in her 23 opposition that Ahern and Brodie are liable for Allen’s discriminatory harassment because they 24 were Allen’s supervisors, were aware of the harassment, and did not take action to stop it. 25 [Docket No. 72 (“Ahern Opp’n”) 9.] “A supervisor is liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s 26 constitutional violations ‘if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the 27 violations and failed to act to prevent them.’” Maxwell v. Cnty. Of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1 To begin with, Ahern and Brodie could only be liable under a supervisory theory if Allen 2 is liable under section 1983 herself, and Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts supporting 3 this claim, as discussed above. 4 Plaintiff also did not plead sufficient facts showing that Ahern and Brodie were Allen’s 5 supervisors. Liability does not attach to “administrators [who] had no supervisory authority over 6 the [state actor] who allegedly committed the violations. . . . They cannot be supervisors of 7 persons beyond their control.” Felarca v. Birgeneau, 891 F.3d 809, 820 (9th Cir. 2018). Plaintiff 8 states that Ahern is a “sheriff” and Brodie is a “captain,” but this does not support an inference 9 that they had supervisory authority over Allen or that Allen was within their chain of command. 10 See Wright v. Airway Heights Correction Ctr. MSU, No. 2:20-CV-00436-MKD, 2022 WL 11 17543678, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2022). Additionally, Plaintiff makes only conclusory 12 allegations that Ahern and Brodie were aware of Allen’s discriminatory harassment and failed to 13 act on it. 14 Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims against Ahern and Brodie are dismissed with leave to 15 amend. 16 X. CONCLUSION 17 The court rules as follows: 18 - Superior Court’s motion to dismiss is granted without leave to amend. 19 - UESF Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted without leave to amend. 20 - San Francisco Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiff may amend only her 21 Title VII and Title IX claims against CCSF. 22 - California’s motion to dismiss is granted without leave to amend. 23 - Alameda Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiff may amend all her claims 24 against County of Alameda. Plaintiff may amend her section 1983 and state law claims 25 against Allen. 26 - Ahern and Brodie’s motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiff may amend only her section 27 1983 claims against Ahern and Brodie. 1 California against Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint by June 21, 2024. The 2 court refers Plaintiff to the link entitled “Representing Yourself” on the Court’s website, located at 3 https://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-litigants/, as well as the Court’s Legal Help Centers for 4 unrepresented parties. Parties may schedule an appointment by calling 415-782-8982 or emailing 5 FedPro@sfbar.org. 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 Dated: May 31, 2024 9 ______________________________________ Donna M. Ryu 10 Chief Magistrate Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27