Tatem v. United States

499 F. Supp. 1105, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16062
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Alabama
DecidedOctober 28, 1980
DocketCiv. A. 79-197-N
StatusPublished

This text of 499 F. Supp. 1105 (Tatem v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tatem v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 1105, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16062 (M.D. Ala. 1980).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HOBBS, District Judge.

This case arises out of a helicopter crash at Fort Rucker, Alabama in which the plaintiff as a pilot instructor sustained injuries when the rear skid of his helicopter struck a four to six inch lip of a helicopter ramp. The suit is against the United States as the owner of the helicopter landing field and alleges that the United States negligently or wantonly allowed a hazardous condition to exist which caused the helicopter to crash. The Court granted a joint motion by the parties for a bifurcated trial and the issue of liability is now before the Court. The Court holds that defendant is not liable for plaintiff’s injuries.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Pursuant to a contract entered into between Doss Aviation, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Doss) and the United States, Doss agreed to provide instructors to conduct rotary wing (helicopter) flight training at a field owned by the United States and known as Hatch Stagefield, Fort Rucker, Alabama. Plaintiff, a civilian, was employed by Doss as an instructor pilot (hereinafter referred to as IP). On June 30, 1977, plaintiff was assigned to Hatch Stage-field to train Army student pilots to fly the TH-55A helicopter. 1

On said date, plaintiff was to instruct a student who was in his third day of flight training and had completed only 1.7 hours of flight time. Although the United States Army Flight Training Guide suggests that .a student not be allowed to practice hovering until his fourth or fifth day of training, the IP is given the discretion to teach this procedure prior to the recommended date. Plaintiff considered that the student was capable of performing this maneuver subject to the extra control and care which plaintiff insisted he exercised over the aircraft. Plaintiff sought and obtained permission to use the hover area at the south ramp of Hatch Stagefield.

This ramp is made of asphalt and is commonly referred to as a hardstand. Constructed within the hardstand are several twenty feet by twenty feet concrete slabs used as parking pads for helicopters. At certain points along the edge of the ramp, erosion had caused the level of the sod to be as much as four to six inches below the level of the ramp. Since plaintiff had not been at Hatch Stagefield within ten months prior to June 30, 1977, he was unaware of the erosion on that date. Several people, however, including Doss’ Director of Safety and Assistant Director of Safety testified that they were aware of the erosion around the ramp.

Plaintiff demonstrated to the student pilot how to hover at an altitude of three feet. The student was then allowed to attempt this maneuver, while plaintiff kept his hands on the controls. Hovering is considered a very difficult maneuver for student pilots, especially for those with less than two hours’ flight time. Although the Flight Training Guides provide as a stan *1107 dard that a proficient student should be able to maintain a three-foot hover without varying the altitude by more than one foot or drifting in any direction by more than one foot, it is typical for a student practicing hovering for the first time to vary considerably from the standards. Recognizing this, it is recommended by Doss that its IPs require their students to first practice hovering at an altitude of between five and ten feet to provide a larger room for error. Plaintiff, however, instructed this student to attempt to hover at a three-foot altitude.

As expected, the student caused the helicopter to drift or “wallow,” but as this occurred, plaintiff would take control and stabilize the aircraft. Plaintiff at all times kept his hands within a fraction of an inch of the controls. Nevertheless, plaintiff allowed the helicopter to drift off the hardstand, and to a distance of approximately thirty-five feet from the designated hovering spot. When plaintiff finally took control of the helicopter, he allowed it to move in a rearward motion at the rate of a “brisk walk” or faster. As the helicopter moved backward, the rear of the left skid came in contact with the four to six inch lip of the asphalt ramp. This caused the aircraft to tip over. In an effort to prevent the fall or tipping over of the helicopter, plaintiff stuck his leg out of the helicopter. This effort proved futile, and resulted in plaintiff sustaining a broken leg.

JURISDICTION

Plaintiff filed this suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., alleging that the United States negligently and wantonly caused his injuries by failing to provide plaintiff with a safe place to work. The Court, therefore, takes jurisdiction of this cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Federal Tort Claims Act grants a remedy against the United States on claims for personal injury, by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of government employees acting within the scope of their employment “where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The phrase “law of the place” has been held to require courts to apply the “whole law” of the state where the act or omission occurred, Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 82 S.Ct. 585, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962); Marcum v. United States, 452 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1971). Therefore, Alabama law controls in this case.

I. Condition of Premises

Under the law of Alabama the owner of premises owes the same duty to an employee of an independent contractor that he owes to an invitee. E. g., Green v. Reynolds Metals Co., 328 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1964). This duty is to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. Green v. Reynolds Metals Co., supra; Foster v. Kwik Chek Super Markets, Inc., 284 Ala. 348, 224 So.2d 895 (1969). Plaintiff claims that the four to six inch lip was a hazardous condition and that defendant negligently and wantonly breached its duty by allowing this condition to remain. The abundance of evidence in this cause, however, established that this lip did not keep the field from being reasonably safe. Several qualified helicopter pilots who had many hundreds of hours as helicopter instructor pilots testified that they did not regard the erosion around the ramp as creating a hazard to flight-even when an instructor was conducting hovering training in the area.

These instructor pilots based their opinions on several undisputed facts. First, an instructor pilot is not to allow the aircraft to get off the ramp area during the hovering instruction. Second, the instructor is not to allow the aircraft to get to ground level during the hovering exercise.

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Related

Richards v. United States
369 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Columbus Green v. Reynolds Metals Company
328 F.2d 372 (Fifth Circuit, 1964)
Foster v. Kwik Chek Super Markets, Inc.
224 So. 2d 895 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1969)
Crawford Johnson & Co. v. Duffner
189 So. 2d 474 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1966)
Shafer v. Myers
112 So. 230 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1927)
Connors-Weyman Steel Co. v. Kilgore
66 So. 609 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1914)

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Bluebook (online)
499 F. Supp. 1105, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16062, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tatem-v-united-states-almd-1980.