NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 24-2520 __________
TARIQ WYATT, Appellant
v.
SUPERINTENDENT MAHANOY SCI; L. CRONAUER, DSFM Deputy Superintendent of SCI-Mahanoy; JOHN E. WETZEL, Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; GEORGE LITTLE, Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-00414) District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) April 2, 2025 Before: RESTREPO, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 9, 2025) ___________
OPINION* ___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Tariq Wyatt appeals pro se from the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint.
We will affirm.
I.
Wyatt is a Pennsylvania state prisoner. He was previously housed at SCI
Mahanoy. In 2019, SCI Mahanoy issued a memorandum advising of the prison’s
violence deterrence strategy. Under the policy, the prison could lock down a unit for up
to 36 hours if any inmate in the unit committed certain violent acts. Wyatt alleged that
the policy had been implemented statewide, and that the 36-hour lockdowns were
“continuing and systematic” and had occurred more than 20 times throughout the state.1
Wyatt claimed that the policy was unconstitutional because the prisons were
punishing innocent inmates to deter future violent behavior. He explained that punishing
an innocent person “causes pent up rage[] and has a deep psychological effect on
someone.” Wyatt further explained that he experienced psychological trauma from being
punished for others’ actions. According to Wyatt, he resided in a treatment unit for
inmates with mental illness, he spoke with mental health staff on numerous occasions, the
staff knew that he was not responding well mentally, and his mental stability was
deteriorating from the lockdowns.
Wyatt filed a civil rights complaint against the Superintendent and Deputy
Superintendent of Mahanoy, and the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of
1 For this reason, Wyatt requested that his case be certified as a class action. 2 Corrections, alleging that the violence reduction strategy violated his rights under the
Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. He sought declaratory relief and an
injunction to cease the policy, as well as monetary damages and a jury trial. A Magistrate
Judge recommended dismissing the complaint with prejudice against the defendants in
their official capacities because the Eleventh Amendment barred the claims. The
Magistrate Judge determined that Wyatt failed to state a claim for relief against the
individual defendants, but that he should be granted leave to amend the complaint.
Having received no objection to the report and recommendation, the District Court
adopted it, dismissing the complaint with prejudice against the defendants in their official
capacities, but with leave to amend as to the defendants in their individual capacities.
Wyatt notified the Court that he had not received the report and recommendation
in time to object because his mail had been returned to sender, and he sought additional
time to file his objections. The Court denied the request as moot. Later, when Wyatt
filed his second amended complaint, he objected to being required to amend his
complaint instead of having additional time to challenge the Magistrate Judge’s report
and recommendation. The District Court overruled the objections, explaining that the
Court had given Wyatt ample time to amend his complaint, and therefore Wyatt suffered
no prejudice from the denial of his request for additional time to object to the Magistrate
Judge’s report and recommendation.
3 The defendants moved to dismiss Wyatt’s second amended complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court granted the motion and
dismissed the complaint without further leave to amend. Wyatt appealed.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise plenary review over a
District Court’s decision to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss” for failure to state a
claim, “accept[ing] all factual allegations as true and constru[ing] the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 377 (3d Cir.
2016).
Wyatt’s arguments on appeal lack merit.2 First, Wyatt argues that the District
Court erred by failing to extend his time to object to the Magistrate Judge’s report and
recommendation. We review this issue for abuse of discretion. See Drippe v. Tobelinski,
604 F.3d 778, 783 (3d Cir. 2010). We cannot say that the District Court abused its
discretion here because Wyatt has not established any prejudice from the claimed
inability to object. After the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and
recommendation, Wyatt had two opportunities to amend his complaint against the
individual defendants. Wyatt appears to argue that, had he been given more time to
object, he would have challenged the determination that he could not bring a claim for
injunctive relief against the defendants in their official capacities. But any objection to
2 Wyatt does not challenge the District Court’s dismissal of his Fifth Amendment claim. 4 that determination would not have changed the case outcome because, as explained
below, Wyatt failed to allege plausibly that the defendants violated his constitutional
rights.
Wyatt also argues that the District Court erred by dismissing his Eighth
Amendment claims. To succeed on a claim that confinement conditions violate the
Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the alleged deprivation was
“objectively, sufficiently serious,” and (2) the prison official had a “sufficiently culpable
state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). A plaintiff can satisfy the first element by alleging sufficient facts
that he was “deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Thomas v.
Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). A plaintiff satisfies the second
element by alleging facts that “show[] that prison officials acted with deliberate
indifference to the inmate’s health or safety or conditions of confinement that violated the
inmate’s constitutional rights.” Id. (citation omitted). A plaintiff might also plead an
Eighth Amendment claim by showing that (1) “the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his or her medical needs” and (2) “those needs were [objectively] serious.”
Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 24-2520 __________
TARIQ WYATT, Appellant
v.
SUPERINTENDENT MAHANOY SCI; L. CRONAUER, DSFM Deputy Superintendent of SCI-Mahanoy; JOHN E. WETZEL, Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; GEORGE LITTLE, Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-00414) District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) April 2, 2025 Before: RESTREPO, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 9, 2025) ___________
OPINION* ___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Tariq Wyatt appeals pro se from the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint.
We will affirm.
I.
Wyatt is a Pennsylvania state prisoner. He was previously housed at SCI
Mahanoy. In 2019, SCI Mahanoy issued a memorandum advising of the prison’s
violence deterrence strategy. Under the policy, the prison could lock down a unit for up
to 36 hours if any inmate in the unit committed certain violent acts. Wyatt alleged that
the policy had been implemented statewide, and that the 36-hour lockdowns were
“continuing and systematic” and had occurred more than 20 times throughout the state.1
Wyatt claimed that the policy was unconstitutional because the prisons were
punishing innocent inmates to deter future violent behavior. He explained that punishing
an innocent person “causes pent up rage[] and has a deep psychological effect on
someone.” Wyatt further explained that he experienced psychological trauma from being
punished for others’ actions. According to Wyatt, he resided in a treatment unit for
inmates with mental illness, he spoke with mental health staff on numerous occasions, the
staff knew that he was not responding well mentally, and his mental stability was
deteriorating from the lockdowns.
Wyatt filed a civil rights complaint against the Superintendent and Deputy
Superintendent of Mahanoy, and the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of
1 For this reason, Wyatt requested that his case be certified as a class action. 2 Corrections, alleging that the violence reduction strategy violated his rights under the
Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. He sought declaratory relief and an
injunction to cease the policy, as well as monetary damages and a jury trial. A Magistrate
Judge recommended dismissing the complaint with prejudice against the defendants in
their official capacities because the Eleventh Amendment barred the claims. The
Magistrate Judge determined that Wyatt failed to state a claim for relief against the
individual defendants, but that he should be granted leave to amend the complaint.
Having received no objection to the report and recommendation, the District Court
adopted it, dismissing the complaint with prejudice against the defendants in their official
capacities, but with leave to amend as to the defendants in their individual capacities.
Wyatt notified the Court that he had not received the report and recommendation
in time to object because his mail had been returned to sender, and he sought additional
time to file his objections. The Court denied the request as moot. Later, when Wyatt
filed his second amended complaint, he objected to being required to amend his
complaint instead of having additional time to challenge the Magistrate Judge’s report
and recommendation. The District Court overruled the objections, explaining that the
Court had given Wyatt ample time to amend his complaint, and therefore Wyatt suffered
no prejudice from the denial of his request for additional time to object to the Magistrate
Judge’s report and recommendation.
3 The defendants moved to dismiss Wyatt’s second amended complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court granted the motion and
dismissed the complaint without further leave to amend. Wyatt appealed.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise plenary review over a
District Court’s decision to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss” for failure to state a
claim, “accept[ing] all factual allegations as true and constru[ing] the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 377 (3d Cir.
2016).
Wyatt’s arguments on appeal lack merit.2 First, Wyatt argues that the District
Court erred by failing to extend his time to object to the Magistrate Judge’s report and
recommendation. We review this issue for abuse of discretion. See Drippe v. Tobelinski,
604 F.3d 778, 783 (3d Cir. 2010). We cannot say that the District Court abused its
discretion here because Wyatt has not established any prejudice from the claimed
inability to object. After the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and
recommendation, Wyatt had two opportunities to amend his complaint against the
individual defendants. Wyatt appears to argue that, had he been given more time to
object, he would have challenged the determination that he could not bring a claim for
injunctive relief against the defendants in their official capacities. But any objection to
2 Wyatt does not challenge the District Court’s dismissal of his Fifth Amendment claim. 4 that determination would not have changed the case outcome because, as explained
below, Wyatt failed to allege plausibly that the defendants violated his constitutional
rights.
Wyatt also argues that the District Court erred by dismissing his Eighth
Amendment claims. To succeed on a claim that confinement conditions violate the
Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the alleged deprivation was
“objectively, sufficiently serious,” and (2) the prison official had a “sufficiently culpable
state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). A plaintiff can satisfy the first element by alleging sufficient facts
that he was “deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Thomas v.
Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). A plaintiff satisfies the second
element by alleging facts that “show[] that prison officials acted with deliberate
indifference to the inmate’s health or safety or conditions of confinement that violated the
inmate’s constitutional rights.” Id. (citation omitted). A plaintiff might also plead an
Eighth Amendment claim by showing that (1) “the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his or her medical needs” and (2) “those needs were [objectively] serious.”
Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
The District Court properly explained that Wyatt did not allege in his complaint
how many times he experienced the 36-hour lockdowns personally. But even if we
assume that he experienced them for the more than 20 times that he alleged they occurred
“throughout the Pennsylvania state prisons,” Wyatt still failed to plead facts sufficient to 5 state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim. Wyatt did not provide enough detail about
the conditions he faced during the lockdowns, or his mental health, such that a court
could conclude that he was denied basic life necessities. Cf. Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th
167, 173-74, 179-80 (3d Cir. 2022) (holding that the plaintiff, who was previously
diagnosed with bipolar disorder and paranoid schizophrenia, stated a plausible Eighth
Amendment claim for being placed in isolation for 7 months by alleging that he
experienced “increased hallucinations, paranoia, self-mutilation, sleeplessness, and
nightmares”); Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 216-17, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding
that the parents of a prisoner who was previously diagnosed with impulse control
disorder and anti-social personality disorder, had been identified as a suicide behavior
risk, and had previously engaged in self-harm plausibly stated an Eighth Amendment
claim for the prisoner’s multiple 30-day stints in solitary confinement, during which he
committed suicide). Further, although Wyatt claimed that staff knew that the lockdown
policy was deteriorating his mental stability, he did not indicate that any of the named
defendants were aware of his alleged injuries or were involved in his treatment, or lack
thereof. See Thomas, 948 F.3d at 138; Pearson, 850 F.3d at 534-35. Finally, as Wyatt
concedes, the lockdowns were intended to deter prison inmate violence, which is a
legitimate penological interest. See Porter v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 446 (3d
Cir. 2020); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003) (stating that
promoting internal security in prisons is “perhaps the most legitimate of penological
goals”); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974) (“[C]entral to all other corrections 6 goals is the institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections facilities
themselves.”).
Next, Wyatt argues that the District Court erred by dismissing his Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim. To determine whether an inmate has sufficiently stated a
due process claim for deprivation of a liberty interest, the Court considers whether the
alleged deprivation “impose[d] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706-07 (3d
Cir. 1997) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). Wyatt claims that his
allegations regarding his mental health were enough to show that he suffered an atypical
and significant hardship. But again, Wyatt did not provide sufficient factual detail about
his mental health. And aside from the lockdowns’ durations, Wyatt provided no detail
about the lockdown conditions such that this court could conclude that any hardship he
experienced was atypical in relation to ordinary prison life. Cf. Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d
140, 143-44 (3d Cir. 2000). Nor did he sufficiently allege that the lockdowns’ durations
were atypical. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 532 (3d Cir. 2003).
Because Wyatt failed to state a claim for relief, the District Court did not abuse its
discretion by declining to consider Wyatt’s class action certification request. See Polsky
v. United States, 844 F.3d 170, 172 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam). Accordingly, we
will affirm the District Court’s judgment. To the extent that Wyatt seeks other relief on
appeal, it is denied.