Tara Kelsheimer v. Pathfinder Vancouver Holdings, LLC, et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: May 7, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-05515
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 TARA KELSHEIMER, Case No. 3:25-cv-05515-TMC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 9 DENYING IN PART MOTION TO v. DISMISS 10 PATHFINDER VANCOUVER HOLDINGS, 11 LLC, et al., 12 Defendants. 13

14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 Plaintiff Tara Kelsheimer was previously a residential tenant at Creekside Village 16 (“Creekside”), an apartment complex in Vancouver, Washington. In October 2023, Kelsheimer 17 informed Creekside staff that she had experienced domestic violence at the complex and 18 intended to relocate. She now alleges that Defendants—Creekside’s owner Pathfinder Holdings, 19 LLC (“Pathfinder”), Creekside’s property management company Apartment Management 20 Consultants, LLC (“AMC”), and AMC employees Lyndsey Lange and Nikki Turner— 21 committed discriminatory and retaliatory conduct against her based on her sex and her 22 experience as a domestic violence survivor. In relevant part, she claims that Defendants violated 23 the Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) and the Washington Consumer 24 1 Protection Act (“CPA”), and that Pathfinder and AMC negligently supervised their employees 2 and agents. 3 Defendants AMC, Lange, and Turner (collectively, the “Movant Defendants”) seek

4 dismissal of Kelsheimer’s WLAD, CPA, and negligent supervision claims. Dkt. 17. As explained 5 further below, the Court agrees that Kelsheimer has failed to state a claim for negligent 6 supervision. However, her WLAD and CPA claims are sufficient to go forward at this stage. The 7 Court therefore GRANTS the motion to dismiss as to Kelsheimer’s negligent supervision claim 8 and DENIES the motion as to her WLAD and CPA claims. 9 II. BACKGROUND The Court accepts all factual allegations in Kelsheimer’s amended complaint as true and 10 draws all reasonable inferences in her favor. 11 12 A. Facts In September 2023, while Kelsheimer lived at Creekside, an ex-partner engaged in 13 violent and threatening behavior toward her at her home. Dkt. 9 ¶¶ 14–15. She obtained a 14 protection order against the ex-partner, who violated the order within a week. Id. ¶¶ 16–17. 15 On October 5, 2023, Kelsheimer timely paid her October rent in full. Id. ¶ 18. She then 16 informed a Creekside manager that she had experienced domestic violence and intended to 17 exercise her rights under the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) to relocate out of 18 Creekside. Id. ¶ 19; see 24 C.F.R. § 5.2005(e). She also provided Defendants with a copy of the 19 protection order. Dkt. 9 ¶ 20. The next day, she initiated VAWA’s emergency transfer process. 20 Id. ¶ 21. 21 Between October 10 and November 14, 2023, Defendants sent Kelsheimer multiple 22 eviction notices and claims of overdue payments. Id. ¶¶ 22–27. Kelsheimer alleges that her 23 interactions with Defendants during this time “were marked by misinformation, illegal demands, 24 1 and refusal to acknowledge Ms. Kelsheimer’s rights under VAWA.” Id. ¶ 26; see also id. ¶ 28. 2 Because of the eviction notices, Kelsheimer “was forced to vacate and temporarily reside with 3 family, before she had obtained replacement housing.” Id. ¶ 28.

4 B. Procedural history 5 Kelsheimer initiated this action on June 12, 2025. Dkt. 1. On August 21, she filed an 6 amended complaint. Dkt. 9. On October 27, the Movant Defendants moved to dismiss the 7 WLAD, CPA, and negligent supervision claims in the amended complaint. Dkt. 17. Kelsheimer 8 responded (Dkt. 20), and the Movant Defendants replied (Dkt. 22). The motion to dismiss is now 9 ripe for the Court’s review. 10 III. JURISDICTION The Court has federal question jurisdiction over this matter because it arises under the 11 Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court exercises 12 supplemental jurisdiction over Kelsheimer’s state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Royal Canin 13 U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 31 (2025) (“The federal court has supplemental 14 jurisdiction over state-law claims sharing a ‘common nucleus of operative fact’ with the federal- 15 law ones.” (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966))). 16 IV. LEGAL STANDARD 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and 18 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Under Federal Rule of 19 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon 20 which relief can be granted.” Rule 12(b)(6) motions may be based on either the lack of a 21 cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. 22 Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation 23 omitted). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint “does not need detailed factual 24 1 allegations,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), but “must contain sufficient 2 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” Boquist v. 3 Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

4 (2009)). “A claim is facially plausible ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 5 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” 6 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 7 The Court “must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all 8 reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,” Retail Prop. Tr. v. United Bhd. of 9 Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014), but need not “accept as true a 10 legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A] plaintiff’s 11 obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and 12 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

13 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the 14 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 15 556 U.S. at 678. 16 V. DISCUSSION 17 A. Kelsheimer has stated a claim for sex discrimination under the WLAD. The parties dispute whether Kelsheimer’s allegations about how Defendants responded to 18 her experience of domestic violence can sustain a claim for sex discrimination under the WLAD. 19 The WLAD expressly prohibits discrimination “because of” the following categories: 20 sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship 21 or immigration status, families with children status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability, or the 22 use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability. 23 24 1 RCW 49.60.222(1); see Dkt. 17 at 4–6; Dkt. 20 at 4–8. Because WLAD does not enumerate 2 “domestic violence survivor” as a protected status, the primary question before the Court is 3 whether discrimination based on one’s experience of domestic violence can constitute

4 discrimination “because of sex.” See Dkt. 20 at 4–6. The Movant Defendants challenge 5 Kelsheimer’s WLAD claim solely on this basis. Dkt. 17 at 4–6; Dkt. 22 at 2–5. 6 The Washington legislature has mandated that the WLAD be “construed liberally,” 7 RCW 49.60.020, and Washington courts thus “view with caution any construction that would 8 narrow the coverage of the law.” State v. City of Sunnyside, 3 Wn.3d 279, 316–17, 550 P.3d 31 9 (2024) (quoting Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wn.2d 97, 108, 922 P.2d 43 (1996)). Moreover, 10 “Washington courts have . . . recognized the necessity of construing the WLAD broadly to affect 11 the legislative purpose of the WLAD: to eliminate and prevent discrimination in real estate 12 transactions based on sex.” Tafoya v. State Hum. Rts. Comm’n, 177 Wn. App. 216, 225, 311 P.3d

13 70 (2013), as amended (Nov. 13, 2013). 14 Washington courts have not considered the question of whether discrimination based on a 15 person experiencing domestic violence can constitute sex discrimination under the WLAD. 16 When faced with an unsettled question like this one, the Court “may look to the federal case law 17 when a federal anti-discrimination law contains the same protections and mandates the same 18 broad construction.” Id. at 224. And where the WLAD differs from a corresponding federal law, 19 it has typically been construed to afford “greater . . . protections than its federal counterparts.” 20 City of Sunnyside, 3 Wn.3d at 317 (quoting Kumar v. Gate Gourmet Inc., 180 Wn.2d 481, 491, 21 325 P.3d 193 (2014)). Because this matter concerns allegations of housing discrimination, the 22 proper corollary is the FHA, which prohibits “discriminat[ion] against any person in the terms,

23 conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities 24 in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 1 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b); see also Tafoya, 177 Wn. App. at 224 (comparing the WLAD and the 2 FHA). 3 Like the WLAD, the FHA does not enumerate domestic violence survivors as members

4 of a protected group. But numerous federal courts interpreting the FHA have held “that claims 5 alleging discrimination based on status as a victim of domestic violence are not per se invalid.” 6 Wilson v. Guardian Mgmt., LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 1105, 1109 (D. Or. 2019); see, e.g., Bouley v. 7 Young-Sabourin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675, 678 (D. Vt. 2005) (concluding that a lease termination 8 based on the tenant’s status as a domestic violence survivor “could constitute unlawful 9 discrimination under the Fair Housing Act”); Creason v. Singh, No. 13-CV-03731-JST, 2013 10 WL 6185596, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2013), aff’d, 650 F. App’x 462 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting 11 that “[t]here is persuasive authority that, at least in some cases, evicting a tenant with a valid 12 domestic violence defense could constitute discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of

13 Section 3604” but not deciding the question definitively); Butler v. Sundo Cap., LLC, 559 F. 14 Supp. 3d 452, 457–58 (W.D. Pa. 2021) (concluding that “domestic violence victims or 15 survivors” were members of a protected class under the FHA and were “therefore not barred 16 from bringing their disparate impact claim based on Defendants’ allegedly discriminatory 17 enforcement of their early termination and rent acceleration provisions”); see also Antonelli v. 18 Gloucester Cnty. Hous. Auth., No. CV 19-16962 (RBK/AMD), 2019 WL 5485449, at *7 (D.N.J. 19 Oct. 25, 2019) (“[S]everal courts have found that a failure to comply with VAWA can permit an 20 inference that a defendant acted with the intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in violation of 21 the FHA.”). These decisions align with a 2011 guidance memo from the Department of Housing 22 and Urban Development, which “explains that discrimination against victims of domestic

23 violence ‘because of their history or the acts of their abusers’ may be illegal under the FHA.” 24 Wilson, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 1109 (quoting United States Department of Housing and Urban 1 Development, Assessing Claims of Housing Discrimination against Victims of Domestic 2 Violence under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Violence against Women Act (VAWA)). 3 Other courts have reasoned that a landlord’s awareness that a tenant had experienced

4 domestic violence could be considered evidence of discriminatory intent. See Meister v. Kansas 5 City, No. 09-2544-EFM, 2011 WL 765887, at *6 (D. Kan. Feb. 25, 2011); Dickinson v. 6 Zanesville Metro. Hous. Auth., 975 F. Supp. 2d 863, 872 (S.D. Ohio 2013). Finally, a minority of 7 courts have ruled that evidence of discrimination based on domestic violence survivor status is 8 not enough to support a sex discrimination claim. See McVicker v. Muskogee Hous. Auth., 9 No. 22-CV-108-JFH, 2024 WL 4416555, at *8 (E.D. Okla. Oct. 4, 2024); Delgado v. Morris 10 Cnty. Hous. Auth., No. CV1815092ESMAH, 2018 WL 5962478, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 13, 2018); 11 Barnett v. Pickering, No. 09-CV-264-PB, 2010 WL 144359, at *2 (D.N.H. Jan. 8, 2010). 12 In short, while there is some disagreement among courts that have considered the

13 question, the weight of authority suggests that discrimination based on one’s experience as a 14 domestic violence survivor can permit a finding of sex discrimination under the FHA. Given the 15 Washington Supreme Court’s directive to interpret the WLAD liberally and with at least the 16 same protections as the FHA, the Court applies this same reasoning to Kelsheimer’s WLAD 17 claim. To use the language of the WLAD, evidence that a defendant discriminated against a 18 tenant based on her experience of domestic violence can allow a factfinder to conclude that the 19 tenant’s sex was a “substantial factor” in the landlord’s action. See City of Sunnyside, 3 Wn.3d at 20 316 (“[W]e have described the causation component of WLAD claims as a requirement that the 21 plaintiff show the protected class was a ‘substantial factor.’” (quoting Mackay v. Acorn Custom 22 Cabinetry, Inc., 127 Wn.2d 302, 310, 898 P.2d 284 (1995))).

23 Kelsheimer alleges that she informed Defendants that she had experienced domestic 24 violence, provided them a copy of the protection order against her ex-partner, and expressed an 1 intent to exercise her rights under VAWA. Dkt. 9 ¶¶ 19–21. She claims that even though she had 2 paid her October 2023 rent on time, Defendants then issued her multiple eviction notices and 3 notices of overdue payments, all while “refus[ing] to accept her VAWA claims.” Id. ¶¶ 18, 22–

4 28. These allegations show that Defendants were aware of Kelsheimer’s experience as a 5 domestic violence survivor, and they draw a connection between that experience and 6 Defendants’ subsequent actions. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Kelsheimer’s favor, see 7 Retail Prop. Tr., 768 F.3d at 945, the Court thus concludes that Kelsheimer has sufficiently 8 stated a claim for sex discrimination under the WLAD.1 The motion to dismiss is DENIED as to 9 this claim. 10 B. Kelsheimer has successfully alleged a per se CPA violation based on the WLAD claim. 11 There are five elements to a valid CPA claim: “(1) unfair or deceptive act or practice; 12 (2) occurring in trade or commerce; (3) public interest impact; (4) injury to plaintiff in his or her 13 business or property; (5) causation.” Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. 14 Co., 105 Wn.2d 778, 780, 719 P.2d 531 (1986). For the purposes of the CPA, a violation of the 15 WLAD is “a matter affecting the public interest, is not reasonable in relation to the development 16 and preservation of business, and is an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce”—in other 17 words, the first three elements of a CPA claim. RCW 49.60.030(3). 18 Under RCW 49.60.030(3), “any unfair practice in a real estate transaction which is the 19 basis for relief specified in the amendments to RCW 49.60.225 contained in chapter 69, Laws of 20

21 1 Kelsheimer also argues that the allegations in the amended complaint are sufficient to state claim for relief under the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act (“RLTA”), RCW 59.18.580(2). 22 Dkt. 20 at 9. Under RLTA, “[a] landlord may not terminate a tenancy . . . based on the tenant’s or applicant’s or a household member’s status as a victim of domestic violence.” It is unclear to 23 the Court whether a damages action is available for this provision of RLTA, and this issue has not been sufficiently briefed by the parties. If Kelsheimer seeks to pursue this theory of relief, 24 she must move for leave to amend. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 1 1993,” is excepted from the general rule that an unfair practice under the WLAD constitutes a 2 per se CPA violation. In the reply brief, the Movant Defendants suggest that Kelsheimer’s claims 3 fall under this exception. Dkt. 22 at 5–6. But this exception operates to prevent a plaintiff who

4 obtains the remedies enumerated in RCW 49.60.225—civil penalties imposed by the Washington 5 State Human Rights Commission—from also establishing a per se CPA claim based on the same 6 wrongful conduct. Instead of seeking relief before the Commission, Kelsheimer chose to file suit 7 in federal court. This exception thus does not apply here. 8 Because Kelsheimer has successfully stated a claim under the WLAD, she has also stated 9 a claim for a per se violation of the CPA. The motion to dismiss is DENIED as to this claim. 10 C. Kelsheimer fails to state a claim for negligent supervision. 11 The Movant Defendants argue that Kelsheimer fails to state a negligent supervision claim 12 because she does not allege any actions falling outside of the scope of any individual

13 Defendant’s employment. Dkt. 17 at 8; Dkt. 22 at 7. The Court agrees. 14 A negligent supervision claim is only actionable when an employee acted outside the 15 scope of employment. Anderson v. Soap Lake Sch. Dist., 191 Wn.2d 343, 361, 423 P.3d 197 16 (2018). “An employee is within the scope of employment if he or she is (1) engaged in the 17 performance of duties required by his employment contract or specifically directed by the 18 employer—i.e., fulfilling his or her job functions, or (2) engaged in the furtherance of the 19 employer’s interests.” Evans v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 195 Wn. App. 25, 37, 380 P.3d 553, 20 559 (2016). By contrast, “[a]n employee’s conduct will be outside the scope of employment if it 21 ‘is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too 22 little actuated by a purpose to serve the [employer].’” Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d 35,

23 53, 59 P.3d 611 (2002) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(2) (1958)). “The 24 l proper inquiry is whether the employee was fulfilling his or her job functions at the time he or 2 she engaged in the injurious conduct.” Jd. 3 Kelsheimer argues, without citation to any authority, that “[g]enerally intentional acts 4 || that are illegal or criminal are considered outside the scope of employment.” Dkt. 20 at 10-11. 5 But Washington case law establishes that “intentional or criminal” acts may be within the scope 6 of employment. Robel, 148 Wn.2d at 53 (concluding that prior Washington cases “simply do not 7 stand for the proposition that intentional or criminal conduct is per se outside the scope of 8 employment”); Evans, 195 Wn. App. at 39; see also Niece v. Elmview Grp. Home, 79 Wn. App. 9 660, 664, 904 P.2d 784 (1995), aff'd, 131 Wn.2d 39, 929 P.2d 420 (1997). Kelsheimer does not 10 || Point to specific allegations of any Defendant employee acting beyond what was authorized or 11 outside of “job functions,” nor can the Court identify any such allegations in the amended 12 complaint. The Court thus GRANTS the motion to dismiss as to this claim and DISMISSES the 13 negligent supervision claim with prejudice. 14 VI. CONCLUSION 15 The motion to dismiss (Dkt. 17) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED PART. Plaintiff's

16 negligent supervision claim is DISMISSED with prejudice. 17 18 Dated this 7th day of May, 2026.

0 Tiffany M. Cartwright United States District Judge 21 22 23 24