TARA HENRY CICONE v. STARLITE FAMILY ENTERTAINMENT, INC.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: January 20, 2026
• Docket: A26A0790
• Status: Published

Opinion

FOURTH DIVISION MCFADDEN, P. J., WATKINS AND PADGETT, JJ.

January 20, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A0790. CICONE v. STARLITE FAMILY ENTERTAINMENT, INC. et al.

WATKINS, Judge.

In this civil action, Tara Henry Cicone filed a motion to strike pursuant to

Georgia’s anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (“anti-SLAPP”)

statute, OCGA § 9-11-11.1. After the trial court entered an order setting a hearing on

the motion, Cicone filed an emergency motion to vacate or revise the order, or in the

alternative to certify the order for immediate review, or in the second alternative, to

set an expedited briefing schedule in advance of the hearing. The trial court denied the

emergency motion, and Cicone filed this direct appeal. We, however, lack jurisdiction.

As a general rule, a direct appeal is permitted only from a judgment or order

that is final, which means the case is no longer pending below.1 Here, the action

remains pending below. The law, however, permits a direct appeal from certain

1 See OCGA § 5-6-34(a) (1); Fein v. Chenault, 330 Ga. App. 222, 227 (767 SE2d 766) (2014). non-final orders, including “[a]n order granting or denying a motion to dismiss or a

motion to strike” under Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute.2 Cicone contends that the

order setting a hearing on the motion to strike, as well as the denial of her emergency

motion to revise the order setting the hearing, are also appealable under these statutes.

Because the trial court’s orders were not denials of a motion to strike or a motion to

dismiss, the orders are not appealable under OCGA § 9-11-11.1(e). It follows that

Cicone has no right to a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(13).

Because the action, including Cicone’s motion to strike under Georgia’s anti-

SLAPP statute, remains pending below, Cicone was required to comply with the

interlocutory appeal procedures, including obtaining a certificate of immediate review,

to appeal the trial court’s order.3 Her failure to do so deprives us of jurisdiction over

this appeal, which is hereby dismissed.

Appeal dismissed. McFadden, P. J., and Padgett, J., concur.

2 OCGA § 9-11-11.1(e); see OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(13). 3 See OCGA § 5-6-34(b); Boyd v. State, 191 Ga. App. 435, 435 (383 SE2d 906) (1989). Further, the denial of a certificate of immediate review is not subject to either a direct or discretionary appeal. Price v. State, 237 Ga. 352, 352-353(2) (227 SE2d 368) (1976); see OCGA § 5-6-35(a). 2 A26A0790. CICONE v. STARLITE FAMILY

ENTERTAINMENT, INC. et al.

MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge, concurring fully and specially.

I concur fully. We must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The

appellant failed to follow the procedures necessary to invoke our jurisdiction over his

appeal from an interlocutory scheduling order.

I write specially to address the facial contradiction between OCGA § 5-6-

34(a)(13) and OCGA § 9-11-11.1(e). OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(13) authorizes direct appeals

from “[a]ll judgments or orders entered pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-11.1[,]” the anti-

SLAPP Act. But OCGA § 9-11-11.1(e) provides that “[a]n order granting or denying a motion to dismiss or motion to strike shall be subject to direct appeal in accordance

with subsection (a) of Code Section 5-6-34.”

Cicone urges us to apply OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(13), disregard OCGA § 9-11-11.1

(e), and so construe these statutes to permit a direct appeal from every ruling at every

stage of the proceedings in a SLAPP matter. Starlite urges us to apply OCGA § 9-11-

11.1 and limit the right to direct appeals to rulings on motions to dismiss or to strike.

The construction Cicone advocates is antithetical to the purpose of the anti-

SLAPP statute: to advance “the public interest to encourage participation by the

citizens of Georgia in matters of public significance and public interest through the

exercise of their constitutional rights of petition and freedom of speech.” OCGA § 9-

11-11.1(a). Permitting direct appeals from every interlocutory order in a proceeding

under the anti-SLAPP statute, rather than from only those orders identified in OCGA

§ 9-11-11.1(e), could lead to delays significantly impeding that purpose.

Moreover, the rules of statutory construction favor the narrower rule of OCGA

§ 9-11-11.1(e). “[I]t is well-established that the terms of a specific statute govern over

those of a more general statute.” Vineville Capital Group v. McCook, 329 Ga. App. 790,

794(1)(a) (766 SE2d 156) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted). OCGA § 9-11-

11.1(e) is part of the anti-SLAPP Act. So under that principle of statutory 2 construction, the only judgments and orders entered under OCGA § 9-11-11.1 that are

subject to direct appeal in accordance with OCGA § 5-6-34(a) are those “denying a

motion to dismiss or motion to strike. . . .” OCGA § 9-11-11.1(e).

This court has failed, in some cases, to acknowledge the tension between

OCGA §§ 5-6-34(a)(13) and 9-11-11.1(e). In both Trabue v. Hanson, __ Ga. App. __

(922 SE2d 684) (2025), and Potts v. Richardson, 376 Ga. App. 90 (918 SE2d 146)

(2025), we cited OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(13) as support for our exercise of jurisdiction over

rulings in SLAPP actions without mentioning the limitations of OCGA § 9-11-11.1(e).

See Trabue, A25A0847, slip op. 1 at n. 1 (Ga. App. Oct. 28, 2025) (citing OCGA § 5-6-

34(a) as authority for denying a motion to dismiss an appeal from an attorney fee

award in a SLAPP action); Potts, 376 Ga. App. at 93 n. 4 (holding that the fact that the

trial court reserved ruling on the amount of an attorney fee award in a SLAPP action

“has no bearing on our jurisdiction over this matter” in light of OCGA § 5-6-34(a)).

But neither Trabue nor Potts holds that OCGA § 5-6-34(a) permits direct

appellate review of interlocutory rulings in proceedings under the anti-SLAPP statute

beyond those specified in OCGA § 9-11-11.1(e). The rulings at issue in Trabue were

final, not interlocutory, and so were directly appealable on that ground. See Trabue,

A25A0847, slip op. at 2-4 (explaining that the underlying action had been voluntarily 3 dismissed before the trial court entered the attorney fee rulings that were the subject

of the appeal); see also OCGA § 5-6-34 (a)(1)(B) (permitting direct appeals from final

judgments unless subject to the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35).

And the ruling at issue in Potts fell squarely within the language of OCGA § 9-11-

11.1(e), in that it was an order granting a motion to dismiss under OCGA § 9-11-11.1.

See Potts, 376 Ga. App. at 90.