Tangren v. Snyder

368 P.2d 711, 13 Utah 2d 95, 1962 Utah LEXIS 154

• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Decided: February 13, 1962
• Docket: 9504
• Status: Published

Opinions

WADE, Chief Justice.

This appeal is from a judgment of no cause for action and dismissal of the plaintiff’s action with prejudice and on the merits.

The action was brought by O. A. Tangren, who is the appellant herein, as the Ancillary Executor of the Estate of E. R. Miles, Deceased, to compel the Executrix of the Estate of George W. Snyder to approve a claim for the payment of a debt due the Estate of E. R. Miles, Deceased, founded upon a judgment in favor of appellant’s decedent against respondent’s decedent. The claim was filed before the expiration of the time to present creditors’ claims on a form printed in conformity with the statute, and appellant was appointed ancillary executor of the estate and commenced this suit within three months after respondent had given notice of rejection of the claim, “because not filed by right party.”

The record discloses the claim was made for the Estate of E. R. Miles, Deceased, and the affidavit was made by a member of the Utah State Bar as special counsel for the foreign executor of the estate, who had not qualified to act in Utah, and no direct statement was made by this attorney of a reason why the Estate of E. R. Miles, Deceased, did not make the claim.

The court granted respondent’s motion for dismissal of the action on the ground that the claim as presented was fatally defective because it was not made and presented in the name of the claimant, but by special counsel in Utah for the California executor of the Estate of E. R. Miles, Deceased, who had not qualified as executor in the state of Utah, and therefore, such claim failed to' comply with the provisions of Section 75-9-5, U.C.A.1953, so much of which as is pertinent here reads:

"Every claim which is due, when -presented to the executor or administrator, must be supported by the affidavit of the claimant or someone in his behalf * * *. When the affidavit is made by a person other than the claimant he must set forth in the affidavit the reason why it is not made by the claimant.”

Respondent contends that the court was correct in dismissing the action with prejudice because courts in states having similar statutes have held the requirements in the affidavit to be mandatory and have strictly construed them so that an omission or failure to comply exactly with the literal wording of the statute was fatal to the presentment and upon rejection could not be the basis of a complaint thereon.¹

We are not in accord. We are of the opinion that the statutory requirements of the contents of the claim and affidavit in support thereof should be liberally construed and that such statutes were, as aptly stated in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Keck,² “not intended to make it easier to avoid payment of a just claim, but were intended to make a claimant set forth his claim with such particularity that the executor or administrator in passing upon it would be fully advised as to just what was claimed. * * * ” In the instant case it was readily apparent from the creditor’s claim as presented that the debt was claimed for the Estate of E. R. Miles, Deceased, and the verification was made by one Elliot R. Wight because he was the attorney in Utah for the estate, and as such attorney, he attested that the amount stated therein was justly due; that no payments were made which were not credited and that there were no offsets to his knowledge.

Respondent’s contentions that there was insufficient compliance with our statute because the affidavit was made by the attorney for a foreign representative of an estate who had not qualified as such in this state, and that affiant had further failed to state the reason why he was making the affidavit in place of the claimant is without merit.

While it is true this court has stated in Wilcox v. District Court of Salt Lake County et al.³ that it adheres to the principle that a personal representative of a deceased person can be a party as such representative in an action or proceeding only in the state in which he is appointed, it does not follow that such a representative cannot file a creditor’s claim for a debt due his decedent in a state other than the one in which he has been appointed or that he cannot retain an attorney in a foreign state to act for him in such a matter. Filing a claim does not necessitate suing or being sued or being a party to any action or proceeding. Certainly such a representative could write to a debtor of the deceased person, whose estate he represents, who happens to reside in another state and request payment, and if such payment were made, he could give a binding receipt therefor. There appears no good reason of public policy or protection of other estates of deceased persons why foreign representatives should not be able to file such creditors’ claims.

We are also not persuaded that the requirement of our statute that where the claim is made by a person other than the claimant, the reason must be set forth therein, means there must be a separate statement setting forth such reason. Affiant having stated in the affidavit that he was verifying the claim as the attorney for the representative of the estate to whom the debt was claimed to be due as effectively advised respondent of the reason therefor as if he had said in so many words, I am making this affidavit because I am the attorney for executor. There can be no doubt that an attorney where retained may act for a client and such employment would be sufficient reason to make the affidavit instead of the claimant. The statute does not require any particular reason, but merely requires that the reason be “set forth.” There is also no specific requirement that the reason be set forth in a special statement. By stating that he was counsel for the representative of decedent’s estate, he has sufficiently informed respondent and “sel forth” the reason to substantially comply with this requirement of our statute.

Reversed. Costs to appellant.

McDonough, callister, and CROCKETT, JJ„ concur.

1 . Perkins v. Onyett, 86 Cal. 348, 24 P. 1024; Maier Packing Co. v. Frey, 5 Cal. App. 80, 89 P. 875; Burke v. Unger, 88 Okl. 226, 212 P. 993 and Ullman Co. v. Adler, 59 Mont. 232, 196 P. 157.

2 . United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Keek, 75 Cal.App.2d 828, 171 P.2d 731. See also In re Swain, 67 Cal. 637, 8 P. 497.

3 . Wilcox v. District Court of Salt Lake County et al., 2 Utah 2d 227, 272 P.2d 157.