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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 LATIKA TANEJA et al., CASE NO. 2:22-cv-00702-TL 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER ON THE PARTIES’ v. MOTIONS IN LIMINE 13 ALINNE CINTRA FREITAS et al., 14 Defendants. 15
16 17 This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs’ Motions in Limine (Dkt. No. 68) and 18 Defendants’ Motions in Limine (Dkt. No. 70). Having reviewed the Parties’ motions, their 19 respective responses (Dkt. Nos. 75, 77), and the relevant record, the Court now rules on the 20 motions. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 This case arises from a failed transaction involving the sale of Defendants’ home and 23 residential daycare business to Plaintiffs. The Court assumes familiarity with the facts of the 24 case. 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 “A motion in limine is a procedural mechanism to limit in advance [of trial] testimony or 3 evidence in a particular area.” United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009); see 4 also Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403. While the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly permit
5 motions in limine, they are a part of a “district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of 6 trials.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984). A motion in limine should not be used 7 to resolve factual disputes, weigh evidence, or as a substitute for a motion for summary 8 judgment. See, e.g., Coppi v. City of Dana Point, No. C11-1813, 2014 WL 12589639, at *3 9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2014). 10 In the case of a bench trial, however, this threshold ruling is “generally superfluous.” 11 Heller, 551 F.3d at 1112 (but such rulings may still be appropriate for “logistical and other 12 reasons”); see also Coppi, 2014 WL 12589639, at *3 (“[T]he first purpose of a motion in limine, 13 protecting the jury, is inapplicable in the context of a bench trial.”). A court may therefore decide 14 to defer its ruling on a motion in limine until trial, especially if the context of other evidence at
15 trial might prove to be helpful in the evaluation of admissibility. See, e.g., Wright v. Watkins & 16 Shepard Trucking, Inc., No. C11-1575, 2016 WL 10749220, at *3 (D. Nev. Jan. 19, 2016) (“The 17 more prudent course in a bench trial . . . is to resolve evidentiary doubts in favor of 18 admissibility.”); see also Parker v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. C14-176, 2021 WL 4819910, at *2 (W.D. 19 Wash. Oct. 15, 2021) (deferring rulings on some of the motions in limine until the bench trial). 20 Finally, a court’s ruling on a pre-trial motion in limine is preliminary and can be revisited 21 at trial based on the facts and evidence as they are actually presented. See, e.g., Luce, 469 U.S. 22 at 41 (“Indeed even if nothing unexpected happens at trial, the district judge is free, in the 23 exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling.”).
24 Subject to these principles, the Court issues these rulings for the guidance of the parties. 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 A. Plaintiffs’ Motions in Limine 3 1. Motion in Limine 1: Exclusion of Exhibits or Witnesses Not Identified in Plaintiffs’ Proposed Pretrial Order 4 Plaintiffs withdrew this motion. Dkt. No. 87. Therefore, the Court need not address this 5 motion. 6 2. Motion in Limine 2: Exclusion of Evidence Relating to Defendants’ Unclean 7 Hands Defense 8 Plaintiffs request the Court preclude Defendants from offering any evidence relating to 9 their unclean hands defense. Dkt. No. 68 at 4. Plaintiffs argue that any purported injury would 10 have been to an outside party (here, Key Bank), and no one was harmed as the loan did not close 11 so Key Bank suffered no loss. Id. at 6. Defendants argue that it is possible that Key Bank 12 complained after its deposition. Dkt. No. 77 at 9. 13 The Court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on their unclean hands 14 affirmative defense holding that: (1) the doctrine generally does not apply when the purported 15 wrongdoing is perpetrated on an outside party who does not complain; and (2) the activity 16 complained of by Defendants would have greatly benefitted them and did not produce any 17 injuries to them. Dkt. No. 86 at 22. Defendants’ speculation that Key Bank may have taken 18 action after its deposition completely ignores the requirement that for the doctrine of unclean 19 hands to apply the action must also have produced some injury. J.L. Cooper & Co. v. Anchor 20 Sec. Co., 113 P.2d 845, 857 (Wash. 1941). As such, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion. 21 22 23 24 1 B. Defendants’ Motions in Limine 2 1. Motion in Limine 1: Exclusion of Evidence of Spoliation 3 Defendants request the exclusion of evidence of spoliation as untimely and irrelevant. 4 Dkt. No. 70 at 4. The Court previously addressed Defendants’ untimeliness argument in its Order
5 on Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 86 at 9–10) and will not repeat itself here. 6 Defendants also assert that offering testimony and argument on this issue is highly 7 prejudicial. Dkt. No. 70 at 4. The issue may be relevant to the fraudulent inducement and 8 negligent misrepresentation claims. Further, because this is a bench trial, Defendants’ concerns 9 regarding potential prejudice are minimized. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion. 10 2. Motion in Limine 2: Exclusion of Defendants’ Tax and Financial Records 11 Defendants argue that the probative value of their tax returns is minimal so that “[t]he 12 distracting and confusing effect that tax returns would have greatly outweigh the probative value 13 of these records.” Id. at 5. First, the records could be probative with regard to damages, should 14 Plaintiffs prevail on liability. Second, as previously stated, this will be a bench trial so the danger
15 of distraction or confusion is minimized. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion. 16 3. Motion in Limine 3: Exclusion of Arguments as to Related Damages 17 Defendants assert that arguments regarding emotional distress caused by the lawsuit 18 should be excluded. Id. Plaintiffs do not object to this motion as they are not seeking “litigation- 19 related damages” other than their attorney’s fees and costs, should they succeed. Dkt. No. 75 20 at 7. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion. 21 4. Motion in Limine 4: Exclusion of Golden Rule/Reptile Arguments 22 Defendants request exclusion of improper “Golden Rule” arguments that ask the trier of 23 fact to place themselves in the shoes of a party. Dkt. No. 70 at 5. This is a bench trial to a judge
24 1 who is well aware that the case must be decided on the evidence. The Court DENIES Defendants’ 2 motion. 3 5. Motion in Limine 5: Exclusion of Arguments Regarding Litigation Expenses 4 The Parties agree that they will not present arguments regarding litigation expenses other
5 than as they relate to attorney fees and costs. Dkt. No. 70 at 7; Dkt. No. 75 at 8. As such, the 6 Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion. 7 6. Motion in Limine 6: Exclusion of Arguments Regarding Other Lawsuits or Verdicts 8 Defendants request the exclusion of evidence or arguments of other lawsuits against 9 either party, whether the lawsuits were similar or not, unless introduced for impeachment. Dkt. 10 No. 70 at 7. Plaintiffs are unaware of any other lawsuits or verdicts. Defendants’ motion raises 11 questions for both the Plaintiffs (Dkt. No. 75 at 9) and the Court. But based on the information 12 available at this time, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion. 13 7.
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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 LATIKA TANEJA et al., CASE NO. 2:22-cv-00702-TL 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER ON THE PARTIES’ v. MOTIONS IN LIMINE 13 ALINNE CINTRA FREITAS et al., 14 Defendants. 15
16 17 This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs’ Motions in Limine (Dkt. No. 68) and 18 Defendants’ Motions in Limine (Dkt. No. 70). Having reviewed the Parties’ motions, their 19 respective responses (Dkt. Nos. 75, 77), and the relevant record, the Court now rules on the 20 motions. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 This case arises from a failed transaction involving the sale of Defendants’ home and 23 residential daycare business to Plaintiffs. The Court assumes familiarity with the facts of the 24 case. 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 “A motion in limine is a procedural mechanism to limit in advance [of trial] testimony or 3 evidence in a particular area.” United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009); see 4 also Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403. While the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly permit
5 motions in limine, they are a part of a “district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of 6 trials.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984). A motion in limine should not be used 7 to resolve factual disputes, weigh evidence, or as a substitute for a motion for summary 8 judgment. See, e.g., Coppi v. City of Dana Point, No. C11-1813, 2014 WL 12589639, at *3 9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2014). 10 In the case of a bench trial, however, this threshold ruling is “generally superfluous.” 11 Heller, 551 F.3d at 1112 (but such rulings may still be appropriate for “logistical and other 12 reasons”); see also Coppi, 2014 WL 12589639, at *3 (“[T]he first purpose of a motion in limine, 13 protecting the jury, is inapplicable in the context of a bench trial.”). A court may therefore decide 14 to defer its ruling on a motion in limine until trial, especially if the context of other evidence at
15 trial might prove to be helpful in the evaluation of admissibility. See, e.g., Wright v. Watkins & 16 Shepard Trucking, Inc., No. C11-1575, 2016 WL 10749220, at *3 (D. Nev. Jan. 19, 2016) (“The 17 more prudent course in a bench trial . . . is to resolve evidentiary doubts in favor of 18 admissibility.”); see also Parker v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. C14-176, 2021 WL 4819910, at *2 (W.D. 19 Wash. Oct. 15, 2021) (deferring rulings on some of the motions in limine until the bench trial). 20 Finally, a court’s ruling on a pre-trial motion in limine is preliminary and can be revisited 21 at trial based on the facts and evidence as they are actually presented. See, e.g., Luce, 469 U.S. 22 at 41 (“Indeed even if nothing unexpected happens at trial, the district judge is free, in the 23 exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling.”).
24 Subject to these principles, the Court issues these rulings for the guidance of the parties. 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 A. Plaintiffs’ Motions in Limine 3 1. Motion in Limine 1: Exclusion of Exhibits or Witnesses Not Identified in Plaintiffs’ Proposed Pretrial Order 4 Plaintiffs withdrew this motion. Dkt. No. 87. Therefore, the Court need not address this 5 motion. 6 2. Motion in Limine 2: Exclusion of Evidence Relating to Defendants’ Unclean 7 Hands Defense 8 Plaintiffs request the Court preclude Defendants from offering any evidence relating to 9 their unclean hands defense. Dkt. No. 68 at 4. Plaintiffs argue that any purported injury would 10 have been to an outside party (here, Key Bank), and no one was harmed as the loan did not close 11 so Key Bank suffered no loss. Id. at 6. Defendants argue that it is possible that Key Bank 12 complained after its deposition. Dkt. No. 77 at 9. 13 The Court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on their unclean hands 14 affirmative defense holding that: (1) the doctrine generally does not apply when the purported 15 wrongdoing is perpetrated on an outside party who does not complain; and (2) the activity 16 complained of by Defendants would have greatly benefitted them and did not produce any 17 injuries to them. Dkt. No. 86 at 22. Defendants’ speculation that Key Bank may have taken 18 action after its deposition completely ignores the requirement that for the doctrine of unclean 19 hands to apply the action must also have produced some injury. J.L. Cooper & Co. v. Anchor 20 Sec. Co., 113 P.2d 845, 857 (Wash. 1941). As such, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion. 21 22 23 24 1 B. Defendants’ Motions in Limine 2 1. Motion in Limine 1: Exclusion of Evidence of Spoliation 3 Defendants request the exclusion of evidence of spoliation as untimely and irrelevant. 4 Dkt. No. 70 at 4. The Court previously addressed Defendants’ untimeliness argument in its Order
5 on Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 86 at 9–10) and will not repeat itself here. 6 Defendants also assert that offering testimony and argument on this issue is highly 7 prejudicial. Dkt. No. 70 at 4. The issue may be relevant to the fraudulent inducement and 8 negligent misrepresentation claims. Further, because this is a bench trial, Defendants’ concerns 9 regarding potential prejudice are minimized. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion. 10 2. Motion in Limine 2: Exclusion of Defendants’ Tax and Financial Records 11 Defendants argue that the probative value of their tax returns is minimal so that “[t]he 12 distracting and confusing effect that tax returns would have greatly outweigh the probative value 13 of these records.” Id. at 5. First, the records could be probative with regard to damages, should 14 Plaintiffs prevail on liability. Second, as previously stated, this will be a bench trial so the danger
15 of distraction or confusion is minimized. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion. 16 3. Motion in Limine 3: Exclusion of Arguments as to Related Damages 17 Defendants assert that arguments regarding emotional distress caused by the lawsuit 18 should be excluded. Id. Plaintiffs do not object to this motion as they are not seeking “litigation- 19 related damages” other than their attorney’s fees and costs, should they succeed. Dkt. No. 75 20 at 7. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion. 21 4. Motion in Limine 4: Exclusion of Golden Rule/Reptile Arguments 22 Defendants request exclusion of improper “Golden Rule” arguments that ask the trier of 23 fact to place themselves in the shoes of a party. Dkt. No. 70 at 5. This is a bench trial to a judge
24 1 who is well aware that the case must be decided on the evidence. The Court DENIES Defendants’ 2 motion. 3 5. Motion in Limine 5: Exclusion of Arguments Regarding Litigation Expenses 4 The Parties agree that they will not present arguments regarding litigation expenses other
5 than as they relate to attorney fees and costs. Dkt. No. 70 at 7; Dkt. No. 75 at 8. As such, the 6 Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion. 7 6. Motion in Limine 6: Exclusion of Arguments Regarding Other Lawsuits or Verdicts 8 Defendants request the exclusion of evidence or arguments of other lawsuits against 9 either party, whether the lawsuits were similar or not, unless introduced for impeachment. Dkt. 10 No. 70 at 7. Plaintiffs are unaware of any other lawsuits or verdicts. Defendants’ motion raises 11 questions for both the Plaintiffs (Dkt. No. 75 at 9) and the Court. But based on the information 12 available at this time, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion. 13 7. Motion in Limine 7: Requirement to Provide Notice of Witnesses 14 Defendants request the Parties provide notice of the next day’s witnesses by 7:00 pm on 15 the preceding court day. Dkt. No. 70 at 7. Plaintiff does not object to this request. Dkt. No. 75. 16 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion. 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 For the foregoing reasons, the Parties’ motions in limine are GRANTED IN PART and 19 DENIED IN PART as set forth in this Order. 20 Dated this 6th day of October 2023. 21 A 22 Tana Lin 23 United States District Judge 24