Tan v. Goldman Sachs Group Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 31, 2023
Docket1:21-cv-08413
StatusUnknown

This text of Tan v. Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (Tan v. Goldman Sachs Group Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tan v. Goldman Sachs Group Inc., (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CHEW KING TAN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, . Plaintiff No. 21-CV-8413 (PAC) □

v. OPINION & ORDER

GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC. and MORGAN STANLEY Defendants.

THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:' 1:21-cv-08618-PAC 1:21-cv-08752-PAC 1:21-cv-08897-PAC 1:21-cv-10286-PAC 1:21-cv-10791-PAC 1:22-cv-00169-PAC

Defendants Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (“Goldman Sachs”) and Morgan Stanley (collectively, “‘Defendants”) move to dismiss the Amended Complaints in several coordinated actions” for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

This motion concerns a series of related cases, all dealing with Defendants’ conduct with non- party Archegos over the course of March 2021. The Court refers in this Opinion only to the Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) in Tan v. Goldman Sachs, No. 21-CV-8413 (PAC), ECP No. 54, one of the consolidated cases, consistent with the briefing of the parties. 2 Case Nos. 1:21-cv-08618-PAC, 1:21-cv-08752-PAC, 1:21-cv-08897-PAC, 1:21-cv-10286-PAC, 1:21-cv-10791-PAC, 1:22-cv-00169-PAC.

BACKGROUND Each Plaintiff in these coordinated actions represents a class of investors in: Vipshop Holdings Ltd. (“Vipshop”); Gaotu Techedu Inc., formerly known as GSX Techedu inc., (“Gaotu”); Tencent Music Entertainment Group (“Tencent”); ViacomCBS, Inc. (“ViacomCBS”); IQTYI, Inc. (“IQTYT”); Baidu, Inc. (“Baidu”); and Discovery, Inc. (“Discovery”; collectively, the “Issuers”). Compl. { 2, ECF No. 54. These are the Issuers in which Archegos Capital Management, LP and Archegos Fund, LP (collectively, “Archegos”) acquired “large, non-public positions” by March 22, 2021. Id. Plaintiffs’ claims center on a market manipulation scheme perpetuated by Archegos through these nonpublic positions that lead to the eventual collapse of its entire portfolio. Tan v. Goldman Sachs Grp. Inc., No. 1:21-CV-08413-PAC, 2022 WL 718395, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2022). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, two of Archegos’ prime brokers, possessed material non- public information (“MNPI”) about Archegos’ imminent collapse and engaged in a series of trades before MNPI became public, materially harming the Issuer’s investors. Compl. { 1. The following facts are alleged in the Complaint and documents incorporated by reference therein and are taken as true. See Lively v. WAFRA Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc., 6 F.4th 293, 299 n.1 (2d Cir. 2021). I. The Relationship Between Defendants and Archegos Prior to its collapse, Archegos was a family office headquartered in New York, New York that managed over $36 billion in investment capital. Compl. [ 25. Archegos was wholly operated by Sung Kcook (or Bill) Hwang “for the [] purpose of managing and investing the assets of Hwang and the Hwang’s [sic] family.” Id. § 27. Archegos was founded in approximately 2013, after Hwang’s previous venture—Tiger Asia Fund—underwent a series of legal troubles involving insider trading and wire fraud. fd. [§ 91-93. In 2012, Tiger Asia Fund settled with the SEC on the claims, pleaded guilty to criminal wire fraud, and Hwang was banned from “managing money

on behalf of clients for at least five years.” Id. Under these circumstances, Hwang brought □ Archegos into being. Despite its billing as a family office (which allowed Archegos to to escape SEC scrutiny), Archegos was a sophisticated operation with 50 employees and numerous brokers. Id. {| 94-95. Between 2020 and 2021, Archegos “began building extraordinarily large positions in a scattering of securities.” Id. 97-98. □

Beginning in spring 2020 and continuing through March 2021, Archegos, along with its securities brokers and a number of other Counterparties (including Defendants), engaged in a series of total return swaps (“TRS”). Id. [J] 97, 114-115. A TRS is a form of synthetic financing and is an alternative to a more traditional form of margin lending. Id. 56. Under a TRS, two parties jointly engage in the purchase of an asset, generally some form of security: the broker (in this case, each Defendant) and the client (in this case, Archegos). Jd. While the client produces a marginal percentage of the value of the asset, the broker provides funding for the remainder of the asset. Id. ¥57. The client, through this funding, “purchases” the asset, but the broker continues to hold title. Jd. 58. Thus, the client essentially leases it from the broker, holding a certain, attenuated interest connected to the financial performance of the asset. /d. Thus, if the security appreciates in value, the client receives the benefit of the appreciation. Id. 7 57, The broker, on the other hand, earns interest on the financing and, if the asset depreciates in value, the ability to make a “margin call” on its financing. Jd. [§ 56, 60. The margin call allows the broker to call upon the client and demand payment of the difference between the initial price of the asset and the depreciation in value, id. 54. This shifts the risk associated with the asset from the broker to the client. fd. [J 56, 60.

Other courts in this Circuit have noted the implications of TRS agreements. For example, as the Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan articulated, [ijn practical economic terms, a TRS referenced to stock places the [client] in substantially the same economic position that it would occupy if it owned the referenced stock or security. There are two notable exceptions. First, since it does not have record ownership of the referenced shares, it does not have the right to □ vote them. Second, [client] looks to the [broker], rather than to the issuer of the referenced security for distributions and the marketplace for any appreciation in value. CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 521 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 292 F, App’x 133 (2d Cir. 2008), and aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded, 654 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2011). Further, as the Honorable Andrew Borrok described in connection with the Archegos scheme at issue here, “[b]ecause the underlying securities do not appear on the investor’s balance sheet, even if the investor acquires a substantial exposure (as Archegos did), the position may not be publicly known as the investor need not file a Form 13D with the SEC.” Camelot Event Driven Fund vy, Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, 182 N.Y.S.3d 602 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2023). In 2020 and 2021, Defendants and several other entities (including several other large prime brokers) acted as counterparties (collectively, “Counterparties”) in TRS agreements with Archegos. When the Counterparties would undertake TRS agreements, “Defendants Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and the Counterparties ensured that any corollary synthetic exposure... was fully hedged.” Jd. { 111. To ensure that this exposure was adequately hedged, whenever Defendants “filled Archegos’s orders,” they would simultaneously purchase their own shares in the Issuers. Consequently, as the Counterparties filled Archegos’s orders, they contemporaneously purchased their own shares from the Issuers to hedge any synthetic exposure created by the TRSs. Id. Between mid-November 2020 and late March 2021, Archegos established positions pursuant to this type of swap arrangement, each exceeding $5 billion in 8 different Issuers—the

investors of which are now Plaintiffs in these cases. Id. § 98. By relying on the TRS format, Archegos ensured it would never legally take more than 5% ownership in any of the Issuers itself. Id. 104.

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