Tabitha Smith v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Child
This text of 2020 Ark. App. 470 (Tabitha Smith v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Child) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Cite as 2020 Ark. App. 470 Reason: I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS document Date: 2021-07-15 10:15:53 Foxit PhantomPDF Version: DIVISION IV 9.7.5 No. CV-20-306
Opinion Delivered: October 7, 2020
TABITHA SMITH APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE WHITE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 73JV-17-236]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE ROBERT EDWARDS, HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR JUDGE CHILD APPELLEES AFFIRMED; MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED
MIKE MURPHY, Judge
Appellant, Tabitha Smith, appeals from the February 10, 2020 order of the White
County Circuit Court terminating her parental rights to her child, ET. Appellant’s counsel
has filed a motion to withdraw and a no-merit brief pursuant to Linker-Flores v. Arkansas
Department of Human Services, 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004), and Arkansas Supreme
Court Rule 6-9(i), setting forth all adverse rulings from the termination hearing and asserting
that there are no issues of arguable merit to raise on appeal. The clerk of this court mailed a
certified copy of counsel’s motion and brief to appellant’s last-known address informing her
of her right to file pro se points for reversal, but the package was returned and marked
“attempted-not known.” The clerk’s office made several additional attempts to locate Smith
but has been unable to do so. We affirm the circuit court’s order and grant counsel’s motion
to withdraw. As explained by counsel, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a
petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect for Smith’s five children on
October 27, 2017.1 The petition alleged the children were at risk for harm due to Smith’s
incarceration, inability to provide for her children, and drug issues. An ex parte order for
emergency custody was issued, and the children were later adjudicated dependent-
neglected.
During the course of the case, multiple review and permanency-planning hearings
were held, but Smith never improved to a point where the court returned custody of her
children to her. One year after the children entered DHS custody, DHS filed a petition to
terminate Smith’s parental rights. A termination hearing was set to be held on January 24,
2019, but the court continued the case to March and used the January hearing date as
another permanency-planning hearing because there was a chance that the children could
be placed with a relative. That placement fell through, and on October 3, 2019, almost two
full years after the case had opened, the court held a termination hearing as it pertained to
ET’s three siblings not yet placed. The court terminated Smith’s parental rights to those
children. Her rights to ET were not terminated at that hearing because there was a possibility
ET could be placed with his father. That placement also fell through, and the father
relinquished his rights to ET. A hearing to terminate Smith’s parental rights to ET was held
on January 31, 2020.
1 This appeal only pertains to Smith’s parental rights to ET. Of her remaining four children, one was placed in the permanent custody of a family friend, and her parental rights as to the other three were terminated in an earlier order from which Smith did not appeal.
2 Termination of parental rights is a two-step process requiring a determination that
the parent is unfit and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Houseman v. Ark.
Dep’t of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 227, 491 S.W.3d 153. The first step requires proof
of one or more statutory grounds for termination; the second step, the best-interest analysis,
includes consideration of the likelihood that the child will be adopted and of the potential
harm caused by returning custody of the child to the parent. Id. Statutory grounds and a
best-interest finding must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which is the degree
of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction regarding the allegation sought
to be established. Id. We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Id. The
appellate inquiry is whether the circuit court’s finding that the disputed fact was proved by
clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when,
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
After a review of the record, we conclude that the termination of Smith’s parental
rights was the only adverse ruling. At the hearing, the circuit court heard testimony from
the DHS caseworker, an advocate from CASA, and Smith. The caseworker testified that at
the time of the hearing, Smith was incarcerated and that DHS had been involved with the
family providing services since 2003. She testified that ET remained in an out-of-home
placement despite the services offered to Smith. She said that Smith had failed to complete
the case plan and had used drugs recently. She opined that ET is adoptable and that if he
were returned to Smith, he would face a likelihood of harm because Smith did not have a
home, did not have a job, used drugs, and was currently incarcerated. The witness from
3 CASA testified that she believed it was in ET’s best interest for Smith’s parental rights to be
terminated because the lack of permanency in foster care was detrimental to his
development. Smith testified that she was currently incarcerated on a ninety-day
commitment on a probation revocation for contempt of court and failure to appear. She
said that she was scheduled to be released February 16, 2020, and had plans to go to a
homeless shelter. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court terminated Smith’s
parental rights to ET pursuant to multiple statutory grounds. It found that doing so was in
ET’s best interest. Smith now appeals.
There could be no issue of arguable merit to raise on appeal as to the sufficiency of
the statutory grounds. Proof of only one statutory ground is sufficient to terminate parental
rights. Gilbert v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 256, at 4, 599 S.W.3d 725,
727–28. Here, one of the grounds on which termination was based was the failure-to-
remedy ground, codified at Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) (Supp.
2019), which allows for the termination of parental rights when (1) a child has been out of
the home of the parent for at least twelve months, (2) the child was adjudicated dependent-
neglected, and (3) the parent failed to remedy the issues causing the child’s removal despite
the offer of meaningful reunification services.
It cannot be disputed that ET was adjudicated dependent-neglected or that he
remained out of Smith’s custody since his placement in foster care on October 24, 2017.
We then turn to whether Smith remedied the cause of ET’s removal and whether DHS
offered meaningful reunification services. The children were removed due to Smith’s
incarceration, drug use, and inability to care for her children. More than two years later,
4 Smith was still incarcerated, continued to use drugs, and had no viable plans for taking care
of ET. Services offered by DHS included drug assessments, drug treatment, and counseling,
none of which Smith completed. This is sufficient evidence to terminate parental rights on
the failure-to-remedy ground.
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2020 Ark. App. 470, 610 S.W.3d 161, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tabitha-smith-v-arkansas-department-of-human-services-and-minor-child-arkctapp-2020.