Latisha Gilbert v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Children
This text of 2020 Ark. App. 256 (Latisha Gilbert v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Children) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Cite as 2020 Ark. App. 256 Reason: I attest to the accuracy ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS and integrity of this document Date: 2021-06-15 16:53:03 Foxit PhantomPDF Version: DIVISION IV 9.7.5 No. CV-19-946
Opinion Delivered April 22, 2020 LATISHA GILBERT APPEAL FROM THE JOHNSON APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 36JV-18-70] V. HONORABLE KEN D. COKER, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF JUDGE HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR CHILDREN
APPELLEES AFFIRMED; MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED
N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Judge
Appellant Latisha Gilbert appeals from the September 2019 order of the Johnson
County Circuit Court terminating her parental rights to her two daughters, LT and KT.1
Appellant’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a no-merit brief pursuant to Linker-
Flores v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004), and
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(i), setting forth all adverse rulings from the termination
hearing and asserting that there are no issues of arguable merit to raise on appeal. The clerk
of this court mailed a certified copy of counsel’s motion and brief to appellant’s last-known
The parental rights of the children’s father, Michael Thompson, were also 1
terminated, but he does not appeal. Thompson did not participate in the case and was found to have abandoned the children. address informing her of her right to file pro se points for reversal, but she has filed no
points. We affirm the circuit court’s order and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
Termination of parental rights is a two-step process requiring a determination that
the parent is unfit and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Houseman v. Ark.
Dep’t of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 227, 491 S.W.3d 153. The first step requires proof
of one or more statutory grounds for termination; the second step, the best-interest analysis,
includes consideration of the likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted and of the potential
harm caused by returning custody of the child to the parent. Id. Statutory grounds and a
best-interest finding must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which is the degree
of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction regarding the allegation sought
to be established. Id. We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Id. The
appellate inquiry is whether the circuit court’s finding that the disputed fact was proved by
clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when,
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
As explained by counsel, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS)
became involved with this family in May 2018. Gilbert was under the influence of drugs
(methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marijuana) and unable to adequately supervise her
children, and the home was environmentally unsafe. KT was five, and LT was not yet one
year old. A protective-services case was opened, but by July 2018, efforts to help Gilbert
rectify the children’s living situation had not been fruitful. The maternal grandmother was
not a suitable caretaker; she later tested positive for numerous drugs and her home was
2 environmentally unsound. Despite DHS’s provision of services, Gilbert continued to
exhibit extremely erratic behavior, and the girls were often notably unclean.
Gilbert did not attend the adjudication hearing, although she was represented by
counsel, and the circuit court found the girls to be dependent-neglected. Gilbert was
ordered to complete the case plan and take advantage of the reunification services. Over the
next year, Gilbert did not put forth sustained efforts to comply nor did she maintain
meaningful progress. By the time of the termination hearing in September 2019, the
evidence showed that Gilbert had moved from place to place (including to an unsuitable,
dilapidated camper trailer on her mother’s property); she sporadically visited the girls,
missing about half of the offered visits; she did not complete outpatient drug treatment and
was dismissed from the program; she failed to keep a job for more than a few days or weeks;
and there were concerns of alcohol abuse. Gilbert did not deny her failings and agreed she
had made a big mistake by being absent for a long time. Gilbert maintained that she loves
her children and asked for additional time to “pull this together.”
The caseworker testified that KT and LT were adoptable, that KT and LT had no
impediments or barriers to adoption, and that their best interest would be served by
terminating parental rights. The attorney ad litem agreed that the girls should be cleared for
adoption, pointing to Gilbert’s numerous failures to comply with the case plan. The CASA
volunteer agreed with the recommendations to terminate parental rights.
The circuit court found that DHS had proved, by clear and convincing evidence,
two statutory grounds for termination (one-year failure-to-remedy ground and subsequent-
3 other-issues ground)2 and that it was in the girls’ best interest to terminate Gilbert’s parental
rights. The circuit court explained that it had considered the likelihood that the girls would
be adopted and the potential harm to the girls if returned to their mother’s custody. A
detailed four-page order was entered, memorializing the circuit court’s findings.
There could be no issue of arguable merit to raise on appeal as to the sufficiency of
the statutory grounds. Proof of only one statutory ground is sufficient to terminate parental
rights. Davis v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 406, 587 S.W.3d 57. We focus
on the subsequent-other-issues ground:
That other factors or issues arose subsequent to the filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect that demonstrate that placement of the juvenile in the custody of the parent is contrary to the juvenile’s health, safety, or welfare and that, despite the offer of appropriate family services, the parent has manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the parent’s circumstances that prevent the placement of the juvenile in the custody of the parent.
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a).
There was ample evidence to support the finding that Gilbert was unable or
unwilling to put forth the effort required to make herself a safe, suitable parent for her
daughters. Gilbert was unable or unwilling to provide her daughters an appropriate place to
live or stable and adequate income. Gilbert acknowledged that after a year she was still not
ready to have her children return to her custody and instead asked for more time. In
addition, there was proof that the girls were adoptable and that there was potential harm to
them if returned to their mother’s custody, so there was sufficient evidence to support the
finding that it was in their best interest to terminate parental rights. Counsel correctly states
2 See Ark. Code Ann. section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) and 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a) (Supp. 2019), respectively. 4 that there were no other rulings adverse to Gilbert in the termination proceeding, other
than the termination decision itself.
After carefully examining the record and counsel’s brief, we conclude that counsel
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2020 Ark. App. 256, 599 S.W.3d 725, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/latisha-gilbert-v-arkansas-department-of-human-services-and-minor-children-arkctapp-2020.