Taal v. Hannaford Bros. CV-05-82-PB 01/19/06
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Jai Taal
v. Case No. 05-cv-82-PB Opinion No. 2006 DNH 004 Hannaford Bros. C o .
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Jai Taal alleges that her former employer,
Hannaford Bros. Co. ("Hannaford"), engaged in acts of racial
discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Hannaford moves
for summary judgment, arguing that Taal's claims are either
barred by the applicable statute of limitations or there is no
evidence to support them. Taal objects and has filed her own
motion for summary judgment. Because I agree with Hannaford, I
grant its motion and deny Taal's motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Taal, an African-American woman, was employed at a grocery
store owned by Hannaford from 1995 to 2002. Compl. 5 1. Taal
claims that during the course of her employment, Hannaford discriminated against her on the basis of race by paying her on a
different wage scale than other employees, not giving her cost-
of-living adjustments, not giving her any training or career
development opportunities, not nominating her to any committees
(such as the "Culture Committee"), and giving her an unfair work
load. Id. 55 4-8. She also claims that she was subjected to a
hostile work environment. In one instance, a co-worker allegedly
placed a stuffed monkey at Taal's workstation and, after she
complained, the department manager allegedly replaced the stuffed
animal with a picture of herself dressed as a member of the Ku
Klux Klan. Id. 5 2. Finally, Taal claims that an assistant
manager retaliated against her by giving negative references to
potential employers. Id. 5 9. Taal resigned from her position
with Hannaford in March 2002.
Taal filed her complaint with this court on March 15, 2005,
after the New Hampshire Human Rights Commission (NHHRC) made a
finding of no probable cause and the Egual Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) issued a right-to-sue letter. I dismissed
Taal's Title VII claims because they were not timely filed. See
Order dated July 8, 2005 (Doc. No. 20). Hannaford now moves for
summary judgment on her § 1981 claims.
- 2 - II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c) . In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, I construe
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir. 2001) .
The party moving for summary judgment "bears the initial
responsibility of . . . identifying those portions of [the
record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden
shifts to the adverse party to "produce evidence on which a
reasonable finder of fact, under the appropriate proof burden,
could base a verdict for it; if that party cannot produce such
evidence, the motion must be granted." Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol
Myers-Sguibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 94 (1st Cir. 1996). The "adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the
adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response . . .
- 3 - must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Evidence that is
"merely colorable, or is not significantly probative" is
insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249 (citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Disparate Treatment
I analyze Taal's disparate treatment claims by using the
familiar burden-shifting framework first established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, which in turn gives rise to an inference of discrimination. The employer then must state a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. If the employer can state such a reason, the inference of discrimination disappears and the plaintiff is reguired to show that the employer's stated reason is a pretext for discrimination.
Kosereis v. Rhode Island, 331 F.3d 207, 212 (1st Cir. 2003)
(citations omitted). "The ultimate guestion in every employment
discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is
- 4 - whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional
discrimination." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000) .
1. Pay discrimination
To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment in
terms of pay, Taal must show that: (1) she is a member of a
protected class; (2) she performed her job in keeping with her
employer's expectations; and (3) she was paid less than similarly
situated employees who held the same position. See Rathbun v.
Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62, 77 (1st Cir. 2004); Begovic v. Water
Pik Techs., Inc., 2005 DNH 59, 2005 WL 768595, at *7 (D.N.H.
April 6, 2005). Taal alleges that she "and other African
American employees [were] on a different wage scale and job
description" and "made substantially less than other white
employees, who performed the same if not less duties." Compl. 5
4. She also alleges that she "was never eligible" for the
company's cost-of-living raises. Id. 5 7.
Taal attempts to support her claims of disparate pay with a
copy of her wage record, which shows that between December 15,
1995 and May 1, 1999, her hourly wage increased from $4.50 to
$7.65. PI. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 8. Hannaford has provided further
- 5 - documentation to show that as of May 2001, Taal was paid $8.45
per hour. Def. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. G to Toner Aff. This pay rate
was consistent with the company's pay scale for part-time
employees at that store location. Def. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B, Part
4.
Despite the fact that her pay rate increased periodically
throughout the course of her employment, Taal contends that other
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Taal v. Hannaford Bros. CV-05-82-PB 01/19/06
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Jai Taal
v. Case No. 05-cv-82-PB Opinion No. 2006 DNH 004 Hannaford Bros. C o .
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Jai Taal alleges that her former employer,
Hannaford Bros. Co. ("Hannaford"), engaged in acts of racial
discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Hannaford moves
for summary judgment, arguing that Taal's claims are either
barred by the applicable statute of limitations or there is no
evidence to support them. Taal objects and has filed her own
motion for summary judgment. Because I agree with Hannaford, I
grant its motion and deny Taal's motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Taal, an African-American woman, was employed at a grocery
store owned by Hannaford from 1995 to 2002. Compl. 5 1. Taal
claims that during the course of her employment, Hannaford discriminated against her on the basis of race by paying her on a
different wage scale than other employees, not giving her cost-
of-living adjustments, not giving her any training or career
development opportunities, not nominating her to any committees
(such as the "Culture Committee"), and giving her an unfair work
load. Id. 55 4-8. She also claims that she was subjected to a
hostile work environment. In one instance, a co-worker allegedly
placed a stuffed monkey at Taal's workstation and, after she
complained, the department manager allegedly replaced the stuffed
animal with a picture of herself dressed as a member of the Ku
Klux Klan. Id. 5 2. Finally, Taal claims that an assistant
manager retaliated against her by giving negative references to
potential employers. Id. 5 9. Taal resigned from her position
with Hannaford in March 2002.
Taal filed her complaint with this court on March 15, 2005,
after the New Hampshire Human Rights Commission (NHHRC) made a
finding of no probable cause and the Egual Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) issued a right-to-sue letter. I dismissed
Taal's Title VII claims because they were not timely filed. See
Order dated July 8, 2005 (Doc. No. 20). Hannaford now moves for
summary judgment on her § 1981 claims.
- 2 - II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c) . In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, I construe
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir. 2001) .
The party moving for summary judgment "bears the initial
responsibility of . . . identifying those portions of [the
record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden
shifts to the adverse party to "produce evidence on which a
reasonable finder of fact, under the appropriate proof burden,
could base a verdict for it; if that party cannot produce such
evidence, the motion must be granted." Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol
Myers-Sguibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 94 (1st Cir. 1996). The "adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the
adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response . . .
- 3 - must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Evidence that is
"merely colorable, or is not significantly probative" is
insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249 (citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Disparate Treatment
I analyze Taal's disparate treatment claims by using the
familiar burden-shifting framework first established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, which in turn gives rise to an inference of discrimination. The employer then must state a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. If the employer can state such a reason, the inference of discrimination disappears and the plaintiff is reguired to show that the employer's stated reason is a pretext for discrimination.
Kosereis v. Rhode Island, 331 F.3d 207, 212 (1st Cir. 2003)
(citations omitted). "The ultimate guestion in every employment
discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is
- 4 - whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional
discrimination." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000) .
1. Pay discrimination
To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment in
terms of pay, Taal must show that: (1) she is a member of a
protected class; (2) she performed her job in keeping with her
employer's expectations; and (3) she was paid less than similarly
situated employees who held the same position. See Rathbun v.
Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62, 77 (1st Cir. 2004); Begovic v. Water
Pik Techs., Inc., 2005 DNH 59, 2005 WL 768595, at *7 (D.N.H.
April 6, 2005). Taal alleges that she "and other African
American employees [were] on a different wage scale and job
description" and "made substantially less than other white
employees, who performed the same if not less duties." Compl. 5
4. She also alleges that she "was never eligible" for the
company's cost-of-living raises. Id. 5 7.
Taal attempts to support her claims of disparate pay with a
copy of her wage record, which shows that between December 15,
1995 and May 1, 1999, her hourly wage increased from $4.50 to
$7.65. PI. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 8. Hannaford has provided further
- 5 - documentation to show that as of May 2001, Taal was paid $8.45
per hour. Def. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. G to Toner Aff. This pay rate
was consistent with the company's pay scale for part-time
employees at that store location. Def. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B, Part
4.
Despite the fact that her pay rate increased periodically
throughout the course of her employment, Taal contends that other
employees doing the same work made more than she did. Pi. Mot.
Summ. J. at 5. However, she does not cite any specific examples
of similarly situated employees who held the same position and
received a higher wage. Even assuming that Taal could establish
a prima facie case of disparate treatment, Hannaford explains
that any apparent wage discrepancies were due to the fact that
the employees who were paid more either held different positions
or worked full-time.1 Toner Aff. 1 10.
Where, as here, the plaintiff in a disparate treatment race discrimination case offers comparative evidence in [her] guest to raise an inference of racial discrimination, [she] must provide a suitable provenance for the evidence by showing that others similarly situated to [her] in all relevant respects
1 Because Hannaford uses different wage scales for full-time and part-time employees, a full-time employee holding the same position as Taal may have received a higher hourly wage.
- 6 - were treated differently by the employer.
Conward v. Cambridge Sch. Comm., 171 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1999).
Taal's attempt to compare herself with employees who do not
closely resemble her in all relevant aspects is insufficient to
meet her burden of showing that any wage discrepancies were the
result of racial animus. Thus, Hannaford is entitled to summary
judgment on Taal's pay discrimination claim.
2. Failure to promote
To prove her failure-to-promote claim, Taal must show that:
(1) she is a member of a protected class who (2) was gualified
for an open position for which she applied, but (3) was rejected
(4) in favor of someone possessing similar gualifications. See
Rathbun, 361 F.3d at 71. Taal concedes that she never applied
for a promotion, but she claims that this was because Hannaford
did not advertise openings for higher positions. Pi. Obj. to
Mot. Summ. J. at 3. Nonetheless, she has not presented any
evidence that she was denied a position in favor of someone who
was similarly gualified. Thus, she has not met her minimal
burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment.
Likewise, to the extent that Taal claims she was treated
differently from similarly situated employees in other respects,
- 7 - including training and career development, her bare allegations
do not suffice to establish a prima facie case of disparate
treatment. See Compl. 55 5, 6.
3. Retaliation
In her complaint, Taal alleged that an assistant manager
retaliated against her by giving negative references to potential
employers. Compl. 5 9. Although Hannaford did not address this
claim directly in its motion, Hannaford sought summary judgment
on all of Taal's § 1981 claims. Hannaford's summary judgment
materials reveal that the assistant manager remembers receiving a
call from a potential employer and she directed the caller to
contact Hannaford's headguarters in Scarborough, Maine, because
she could not provide a reference at the store level. Def. Mem.
of Law in Supp. of Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B, Part 1, at 5. Taal has
not provided any evidence to contradict Hannaford's version of
this incident. Thus, I propose to grant summary judgment unless,
within 10 days, Taal files supplemental material that comports
with Rule 56 and demonstrates that a genuine factual dispute
exists as to this claim. See Fed. R. Civ P. 56.
- 8 - B. Hostile work environment
To prove her hostile work environment claim, Taal must show
"that she was subjected to severe or pervasive harassment that
materially altered the conditions of her employment." Noviello
v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 92 (1st Cir. 2005). A § 1981
claim of hostile work environment is subject to the four-year
statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 1658. Jones v. R.R.
Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382-83 (2004). Thus, Taal's
claim is time-barred if it is based solely on incidents that
occurred more than four years before she filed her complaint on
March 15, 2005. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536
U.S. 101, 117 (2002) .
On January 9, 2001, Taal sent a letter to Hannaford's
Executive Vice President that described incidents in which co
workers allegedly placed a stuffed monkey at her workstation and
referred to her as the "Black sheep" and the "Beans".2 A Human
Resource Specialist investigated the incidents and, after
receiving conflicting stories from other Hannaford employees.
2 The "beans" comment allegedly derives from an incident in which Texaco's senior management referred to African-American employees as black jelly beans. deemed the matter inconclusive. Pi. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 5. In
April 2001, Taal sent a letter to Hannaford's Director of Human
Resources stating that she disagreed with some of the conclusions
from the investigation. Pi. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 7. She also
stated, however, that "the harassment has stopped and, I now work
in an acceptable environment." Id. The letter concluded: "To
sum it up I am pleased that you ensured that I work in a harass-
free [sic] environment." Id.
Although Taal argues that Hannaford engaged in a "consistent
continuous violation," she has not presented any evidence of
harassing incidents that occurred after March 15, 2001.3 Pi.
Obj. to Mot. Summ. J. at 4. As a result, her hostile work
environment claim is time-barred.
IV. CONCLUSION
Taal's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 31) is denied.4
3 According to the NHHRC's investigation, the incident in which a co-worker allegedly dressed as a Ku Klux Klansman occurred in February 2001. Taal's Complaint does not mention any other specific incidents of harassment that occurred after she sent the January 2001 letter.
4 Taal's reguest for summary judgment on the basis that Hannaford has not complied with discovery deadlines is denied
- 10 - Hannaford's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 38) is granted
except as to Taal's retaliation claim, on which I will grant
summary judgment if Taal does not provide, within 10 days,
supplemental material that demonstrates that a genuine factual
dispute exists as to this claim.
SO ORDERED.
/s/Paul Barbadoro__________ Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge
January 19, 2006
cc: Jai Taal, pro se William B. Pribis, Esg.
because these issues have been addressed in the court's orders on the parties' motions to compel discovery. Her reguest for oral argument (Doc. No. 48) is also denied because it will not assist in the resolution of the pending motions. See LR 7.1(d).
- 11 -