Begovic v. Water Pik 04-CV-447-SM 04/06/05 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Rusmir Begovic, Plaintiff
v. Civil No. 04-CV-447-SM Opinion No. 2005 DNH 059 Water Pik Technologies, Inc., Defendant
_________________________________ O R D E R
Rusmir Begovic brings this discrimination suit against Water
Pik Technologies, Inc. ("Water Pik" or "the company"), claiming
he was subjected to disparate treatment in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (Counts I, II, and III). He also asserts a claim
of retaliation by the defendant in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3 (Count IV), along with two related state claims.
Defendant now moves for summary judgment, and plaintiff
moves for partial summary judgment (Count IV). For the reasons
set forth below, defendant's motion for summary judgment is
granted and plaintiff's motion is denied. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record demonstrates
"that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
F e d . R. C i v . P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary
judgment, the court must view the record "in the light most
hospitable" to the nonmoving party. Euromodas, Inc. v. Zanella,
Ltd., 368 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Houlton Citizens'
Coalition v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178, 184 (1st Cir. 1999);
Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1990)). An
issue is " ’ 'genuine' if the parties' positions on the issue are
supported by conflicting evidence." Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196,
200 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 250 (1986)). An issue is " ’ 'material' if it potentially
affects the outcome of the suit." Id. at 199-200.
In support of its summary judgment motion, the moving party
must "identify[] those portions of [the record] which . . .
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of a material fact."
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the
2 moving party successfully demonstrates the lack of a genuine
issue of material fact, "the burden shifts to the nonmoving party
. . . to demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could find
in [its] favor." DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st
Cir. 1997) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25) . Once the burden
shifts, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon mere allegations
or denials of his [or her] pleading, but must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
BACKGROUND
The facts, set forth in the light most favorable to Begovic
are as follows. Begovic "was born in the former Yugoslavia, and
immigrated to the United States of America in 1993." (Compl.
5 6.) Around October of 1993, Begovic was hired by Teledyne
Laars, a corporate predecessor to Water Pik, as a CNC Machinist.
(Compl. 5 4.) He was primarily responsible for "making manifolds
for commercial boilers." (Compl. 5 4.) Begovic's position did
not reguire that he supervise other employees. (Def.'s Mot.
Summ. J., Tab 2 (Farrell Aff.) 5 5.)
3 In December 2001, Water Pik posted a job announcement for a
"Production Supervisor." (Farrell Aff., Ex. A.) The person
selected for the position was expected to "supervise
approximately 45 employees," and accordingly, the announcement
sought candidates with "experience in supervising not only the
manufacturing process, but also in supervising the employees."
(Farrell Aff. 5 3.) Begovic applied for the position along with
three other employees, all of whom were interviewed by Water Pik
personnel. (Farrell Aff. 5 4.) Because none of the four in-
house applicants, including Begovic, were found gualified. Water
Pik hired someone from outside the company, Steve Bailey, to fill
the position. (Farrell Aff. 55 6-8.)
Begovic learned that he was not selected for the position
when he received a memorandum dated January 2, 2002, noting that,
in order to become a production supervisor, he must "develop
[his] interviewing skills" and "be able to provide examples of
resume knowledge." (Farrell Aff., Ex. B.)
Several months later, another opening, this time for a
"Pennant Production Lead," became available. (Farrell Aff. 5 9.)
4 Begovic applied for that position but was again turned down,
because the company "did not consider him to be a person likely
to communicate well with others." (Farrell Aff. 5 10.) The
company reached that conclusion, in part, because Begovic "had
been disciplined for 'inappropriate behavior towards another'
employee." (Farrell Aff. 5 10.) The position was filled by
another Water Pik employee who demonstrated "strong communication
and teamwork skills." (Farrell Aff. 5 11.) Begovic was notified
of the company's decision, in writing, on April 16, 2003.
(Farrell Aff., Ex. D.)
In addition to his attempts at professional advancement
within Water Pik, Begovic participated in the company's tuition
reimbursement plan. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Tab 3 (Hope-Reese
Aff.) 5 8.) That plan allowed employees of Water Pik to "enhance
and sharpen skills that each employee brings to his or her job."
(Hope-Reese Aff., Ex. H.) The company reguired that "the subject
of the class or program of study . . . be directly related to the
employee's current position or to future positions in the
company." (Hope-Reese Aff. 5 9.)
5 Over a period of approximately six years, Begovic obtained
reimbursement of $20,662.85 - more than any other Water Pik
employee - for tuition incurred while he pursued both an
associate's and a bachelor's degree. (Hope-Reese Aff. 1 8.)
Begovic continued his education, pursuing a Master's degree in
Business Administration ("MBA"), and continued to submit reguests
for tuition reimbursement to Water Pik. (Hope-Reese Aff. $[$[ 9-
11.) On March 8, 2002, Begovic was given his last tuition
reimbursement payment, and was notified that "no further reguests
. . . would be honored." (Hope-Reese Aff. 1 10.)
Out of 137 employees, Begovic was one of three who took
advantage of the tuition reimbursement program. (Hope-Reese Aff.
1 12.) The other two participants, both Caucasian males, were
working toward degrees that the company believed "would benefit
both [the employee] and [Water Pik] in the future." (Hope-Reese
Aff. I 12.) The company believed that continuing to pay for
Begovic's education, however, "would further no business purpose
for the company, directly or indirectly." (Hope-Reese Aff.
I 11.) Any company positions for which Begovic was eligible
would not "reguire an [MBA] ... or the knowledge gained in the
6 pursuit of [an M B A ] ( H o p e - R e e s e Aff. 5 11.) Water Pik's
concerns were exacerbated by a comment Begovic made on December
27, 2001, explaining that after he received his degree, he
"intended to leave Water Pik to start his own import-export
business." (Hope-Reese Aff. 5 11.) The company was also facing
"budgetary constraints" which affected "many operations of the
business unit, including employee benefits." (Hope-Reese Aff.
5 1 1 .)
On March 24, 2002, Begovic sent an e-mail to Water Pik's
Vice President of Human Resources, Theresa Hope-Reese, alleging
harassment by some of his coworkers and complaining about being
denied tuition benefits. (Hope-Reese Aff., Ex. E.) The company
promptly investigated. (Hope-Reese Aff. 5 4.) On September 15,
1999, Begovic filed a complaint with the Egual Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging employment
discrimination against him on the basis of his religion and
national origin. (Hope-Reese Aff. 5 25.) The 1999 complaint was
eventually dismissed, but Begovic filed another complaint on
February 26, 2003, alleging employment discrimination on the
basis of national origin. (Hope-Reese Aff. 5 26.) Although the
7 2003 complaint was also dismissed, the EEOC issued a Right-to-Sue
letter on September 2, 2004. (Compl., Appx. A.)
Begovic is paid an hourly wage based upon a structured pay
scale that corresponds to his job classification. (Hope-Reese
Aff. 5 14.) According to the company's records, Begovic has
received twelve pay increases since he started working for Water
Pik (Hope-Reese Aff. 5 12), six of which took place after
Begovic's complaints were filed with the EEOC. Begovic's most
recent pay increase, effective May 11, 2004, was the result of a
"company initiative" to "improve [Water Pik's] competitive
advantage in recruiting skilled workers." (Hope-Reese Aff. 5
16.) The initiative increased the pay range for everyone in
Begovic's job classification. (Hope-Reese Aff. 5 16.)
As a result of being denied two promotions and additional
tuition reimbursement reguests, and based upon a belief that he
has been underpaid since November 1999, Begovic brought this six-
count suit against Water Pik for violations of his rights under
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3, and related state statutes. DISCUSSION
Defendant moves for summary judgment on all six counts,
arguing that, as to Counts I, II, and III, plaintiff has failed
to establish a prima facie case of unlawful employment
discrimination. Regarding Count IV, defendant contends that
plaintiff has failed to set forth any evidence to support his
retaliation claim. Defendant does not appear to make any direct
argument regarding Counts V and VI, which arise under state law.
I. Title VII Claims
"The operative provision of Title VII makes it unlawful to
'discriminate against any individual with respect to his [or her]
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's . . . [race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin].'" Noviello v. City of Boston, No. 04-1719,
2005 U.S. A p p . LEXIS 2664, *27 (1st Cir. Feb. 16, 2005) (guoting
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). "[I]n a disparate treatment case,
'[t]he central focus of the inguiry . . . is always whether the
employer is treating some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.'" Thomas v. Digital Eguip. Corp., 880 F.2d 1486, 1490 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 577 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although "[t]he core inquiry in . . . disparate treatment
cases is whether the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff because of [his or] her gender . . .
[d]irect evidence of discriminatory intent is not required."
Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62, 71 (1st Cir. 2004)
(internal citations omitted). In considering the plaintiff's
claim, absent any direct evidence of discrimination, the court
must "use the burden-shifting analysis first established by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973)." Che v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31, 38 (1st
Cir. 2003) (citing Feliciano de la Cruz v. El Conguistador Resort
& Country Club, 218 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2000)).
Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, which in turn gives rise to an inference of discrimination. See Dichner v. Liberty Travel, 141 F.3d 24, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1998). The employer then must state a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. See Zapata- Matos v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc., 277 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2002). If the employer can state such a reason, the inference of discrimination disappears and the plaintiff is required to show that the employer's
10 stated reason is a pretext for discrimination. See id. at 45 .
Kosereis v. Rhode Island, 331 F.3d 207, 212 (1st Cir. 2003) .
"Because employment discrimination cases arise in a variety
of contexts, the prima facie elements must be tailored to the
given case." Rodriguez-Torres v. Caribbean Forms Mfr., Inc.,
Nos. 03-2223, 03-2573, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 3016, *10 (1st Cir.
Feb. 22, 2005) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506
(2002)). Put differently, "[t]he elements of the plaintiff's
prima facie case vary according to the nature of [his or] her
claim." Rathbun, 361 F.3d at 71. The court, therefore,
considers each count in terms of its unigue prima facie case
reguirements.
A. Disparate Treatment - Failure to Promote (Count I)
In order to prevail on his Title VII failure to promote
claim, plaintiff must show that he " (i) is a member of a
protected class who (ii) was gualified for an open position for
which [he] applied, but (ill) was rejected (iv) in favor of
11 someone possessing similar qualifications." Id. (citing Gu v .
Boston Police Dep't, 312 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 2002)).
It is uncontested that Begovic was rejected on two occasions
for job openings at Water Pik's Rochester, New Hampshire
facility, and that plaintiff is a member of a protected class.1
Defendant argues it is entitled to summary judgment because
plaintiff has failed to establish two elements of his prima facie
case: (1) that he was qualified for the positions; and (2) he was
denied the promotions in favor of someone with similar
qualifications. Defendant is correct.
The first position for which plaintiff applied required,
according to the published job description, 5 to 7 years of
supervisory experience. Plaintiff did not have any supervisory
1 There is, however, some dispute as to the protected class to which plaintiff claims to belong. Defendant notes that "plaintiff casts his status as 'South Slav' against a class of people he alleges to be 'Caucasian.'" (Def. Mem. of Law at 10.) Because "this is a contrast between persons of differing 'national origin' and 'race[,]'" defendant suggests that plaintiff may not have appropriately pled his claims. Nevertheless, defendant concedes that "for the purpose of this motion only, 'Caucasian' is to be read as 'American.'" (Def. Mem. of Law at 10-11.) The court therefore proceeds as if there is no dispute on this element.
12 experience. The second position required strong interpersonal
and communication skills. Plaintiff's disciplinary history,
coupled with the fact that his current position does not require
him to work closely with other people rendered him facially less
qualified (and probably unqualified) for that position than he
otherwise might have been.
Aside from several bald assertions that he was "qualified"
for each of the two positions, plaintiff offers no evidence that
he met the requisite qualifications sufficient to satisfy his
burden on the first disputed element of the prima facie case -
certainly not with respect to the first position. It is doubtful
that he was qualified for the second position but defendants have
not provided the specific minimum requirements for that position.
Plaintiff's argument that the individuals eventually selected
were less qualified than he is also unsupported. Plaintiff
simply alleges that he was more qualified, but he produces no
evidence to support his bald assertion.
In any event, assuming plaintiff did meet his prima facie
burden, the burden shifts to defendant to offer a non-
13 discriminatory reason for his adverse action. Once an employer
provides a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its
actions, as defendant has done here, under McDonnell Douglas,
"the inference of discrimination disappears and the plaintiff is
reguired to show that the employer's stated reason is a pretext
for discrimination." Kosereis, 331 F.3d at 212 (citation
omitted). While making "the prima facie case" is "not onerous,"
id. at 213 (citing Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless
Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 1999)), and reguires only "a
'small showing,'" id. (citing Reed v. LaPage Bakeries, Inc., 244
F.3d 254, 259 (1st Cir. 2001)), "the pretext analysis . . . is
more demanding." Id. (citing Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981)).
"Plaintiffs can show that an employer's stated reasons are
pretextual in any number of ways. One method is to produce
evidence that the plaintiff was treated differently than other
similarly situated employees." Kosereis, 331 F.3d at 214 (citing
Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 55). Specifically, "a plaintiff must
show 'that others similarly situated to him in all relevant
respects were treated differently by the employer.'" Id. (citing
14 Conward v. Cambridge Sch. Comm., 171 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir.
1999)).
Plaintiff here has arguably not met even the prima facie
burden, but, again, assuming he did, the burden shifted to
defendant to offer a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
See Gu, 312 F.3d at 11. Defendant did so by explaining that its
officials reasonably believed plaintiff was insufficiently
gualified for the open positions. The burden then shifts back to
plaintiff to demonstrate that the non-discriminatory reason put
forth by defendant is merely a pretext for discrimination.
Plaintiff has utterly failed to offer any evidence of pretext,
much less evidence sufficient to posit a genuine dispute of
material fact relative to that issue.
Accordingly, defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on Count I, plaintiff having failed to offer evidence from
which a pretext for discrimination could be found.
15 B. Disparate Treatment - Tuition Reimbursement (Count II)
Although there appears to be no controlling precedent
related to disparate treatment in the administration of tuition
reimbursement programs, there is some Title VII authority related
to employee benefit programs. " [A]n employee establishes a prima
facie case of benefit discrimination by . . . showing that he or
she is a member of a protected class, was eligible to receive a
benefit, was denied a benefit, and non-protected group members
received the benefit." Ramos v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 256 F.
Supp. 2d 127, 134 (D.P.R. 2003) (citing L e x K. L a r s o n , L a r s o n ' s
Employment D iscrimination § 14.01 (2d ed. 1994)). Defendant asserts
that it is entitled to summary judgment on this claim because it
has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
denying plaintiff tuition reimbursement benefits.
Plaintiff has satisfied his burden to establish a prima
facie case of benefit discrimination. As with Count I, there is
no dispute that plaintiff is a member of a protected class.
Moreover, plaintiff established, and defendant effectively
concedes, that plaintiff is eligible to participate in the
tuition reimbursement program as demonstrated by the defendant's
16 past reimbursement of over $20,000 in education-related expenses.
Finally, the company concedes that two other employees, both
Caucasian males, continue to receive tuition benefits.
As plaintiff has met his burden to establish at least a
prima facie case of discrimination, under McDonnell Douglas, the
burden shifts to defendant to "'articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason' for its actions." Gu, 312 F.3d at 11.
Here, defendant asserts that it denied plaintiff any future
tuition reimbursement benefits because his studies were unrelated
to his current or future work with Water Pik.
It is apparent that Water Pik's tuition reimbursement
program is designed to help employees improve skills and
abilities of significance to the company. To that end, the
policy reguires that "the subject of the class or program of
study must be directly related to your current position or to
future positions in the company." (Hope-Reese Aff. 1 11.)
Although plaintiff stated his objectives in terms consistent with
that policy - "to obtain his Master's Degree so that he can
obtain a better position within the company" (Compl. 1 13), the
17 company asserts that the positions for which plaintiff is
otherwise qualified do not require academic deqrees, particularly
not an MBA. Moreover, plaintiff made specific statements about
his future plans to leave the company as soon as he received his
Master's deqree. The company has articulated a leqitimate,
nondiscriminatory business reason for rejectinq plaintiff's
tuition reimbursement requests under the benefit plan.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the nondiscriminatory
reason set forth by defendant is merely a pretext for
discrimination. In attempting to meet that burden, plaintiff
points to "several other employees" who still receive tuition
reimbursement benefits. (Compl. 5 14.) Plaintiff fails,
however, to demonstrate that those other employees are similarly
situated in all relevant respects. To the contrary, the company
has shown, and plaintiff has failed to refute, that the two
individuals presently receiving tuition reimbursement benefits
are pursuing academic programs that will benefit the company,
unlike plaintiff's academic pursuits, which are unlikely to
18 either benefit Water Pik, or enhance plaintiff's opportunities
for promotion within the company.
Having failed to produce evidence that defendant's
justification for denying plaintiff's tuition benefits is merely
a pretext for discrimination, plaintiff's benefit denial claim
fails, and defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
on Count 11.
C. Disparate Treatment - Compensation (Count III)
Although the First Circuit has yet to articulate a specific
test against which to measure the sufficiency of a prima facie
case of disparate treatment in compensation, the Seventh Circuit
has held that:
[t]o state a prima facie case of disparate compensation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) [he or] she is a member of a protected group; (2) [he or] she was fulfilling her employer's legitimate performance expectations; and (3) [he or] she suffered an adverse employment action in that [he or] she was paid a lower salary than a ''similarly situated' nonprotected class member.
19 Dandy v. UPS, Inc., 388 F.3d 263, 274 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing
Hildebrandt v. 111. Dept, of Natural Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1030-31
(7th Cir. 2002)) .
As with plaintiff's other claims, there is no dispute that
he is a member of a protected class. It is also undisputed that,
generally, plaintiff was fulfilling defendant's performance
expectations. Plaintiff received a satisfactory rating on his
most recent performance review and, other than a memorandum
regarding inappropriate behavior issued on March 22, 2002, there
is no allegation that plaintiff failed to satisfactorily perform
the duties of his job. Defendant argues it is entitled to
summary judgment because plaintiff has not established the third
element of the prima facie case, that he was paid at a lower
rate than similarly situated employees outside the protected
class.
Although the precise nature of plaintiff's claim is
difficult to discern from the pleadings he has filed, it appears
that he claims that his two most recent pay increases2 should
2 Those increases were from $10.80 to $11.04 per hour on February 2, 2003 (an increase of $0.24), and from $11.04 to
20 have taken effect in 1999. But like many of the assertions in
his complaint, this one is supported by neither evidence nor a
logical explanation. Defendant has offered evidence that
plaintiff's rate of pay was increased on twelve separate
occasions, the last being part of a companywide restructuring of
its position classification and compensation scheme, which
resulted in a pay increase for all individuals falling within
plaintiff's job classification. Except for a long-winded
narrative of plaintiff's personal assessment of the company's
compensation policies, plaintiff has not offered any evidence to
refute that produced by defendant. Plaintiff also failed to
produce any evidence which demonstrates that other, similarly
situated employees, were paid more than he for performing
substantially identical work.
Because plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he was paid
less than similarly situated employees outside the protected
class, he has failed to establish a prima facie case under Title
VII. Conseguently, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on
Count III.
$12.56 per hour on May 11, 2004 (an increase of 1.52) (Hope- Reese A f f . 1 14.)
21 D. Retaliation (Count IV)
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff
must show that "(1) [he or she] engaged in protected conduct
under Title VII; (2) [he or she] suffered an adverse employment
action; and (3) the adverse action is causally connected to the
protected activity." Dressier v. Daniel, 315 F.3d 75, 78 (1st
Cir. 2003) (citing White v. N.H. Dep't of Corr., 221 F.3d 254,
262 (1st Cir. 2000)).
For purposes of this motion, the court assumes that
plaintiff first engaged in protected conduct when he complained
by e-mail on March 24, 2002, about being denied tuition benefits
The court further assumes, for purposes of this motion, that the
denial of tuition benefits and denial of promotions constitute
adverse employment actions. Given those assumptions, plaintiff
must produce evidence demonstrating that the adverse employment
actions were causally related to his protected conduct. He has
failed to do so.
Most of the adverse employment actions plaintiff claims to
have suffered took place before he first engaged in protected
22 conduct. The first promotion was denied on January 2, 2002,
tuition benefits were first denied on March 8, 2002, and
plaintiff claims he has been underpaid since 1999. All of these
adverse employment actions took place before his first complaint
to the company on March 24, 2002. The sequence of events does
not support plaintiff's claim that adverse employment actions
were causally related to his protected conduct.
The only adverse employment action that took place after
plaintiff's protected conduct was the second promotion denial,
dated April 16, 2003. In that one instance, the sequence of
events supports a possibility of a causal link. But plaintiff's
claim still fails because he does not offer any evidence to
support his assertion. In his objection to summary judqment,
plaintiff summarily criticizes defendant's evidence and questions
its validity, but produces no evidence of his own tendinq to
refute defendant's supported assertions. Plaintiff has, thus,
failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.
Even if plaintiff had satisfied the three elements of a
prima facie case of retaliation, his claim would still fail
23 because, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, defendant has
offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting
plaintiff. Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence that the
reason provided by defendant was merely a pretext for
discrimination.
In short, the seguence of the majority of adverse employment
actions juxtaposed with the date of plaintiff's initial complaint
to the company does not support a conclusion that the former was
caused by the latter. In the one instance where the seguence of
events might logically support a causal link, plaintiff failed to
produce evidence sufficient to establish that his protected
conduct was causally related to the adverse employment action.
Defendant is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
Count IV.
II. State Claims
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), a federal court
with original jurisdiction over federal claims may also exercise
"supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction
24 . . Another portion of the same statute, § 1367(c), provides
that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a plaintiff's state law claim when:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals has held that "if the [district] court
dismisses the foundational federal claims, it must reassess its
jurisdiction, this time engaging in a pragmatic and case-specific
evaluation of a variety of considerations that may bear on the
issue." Camelio v. Am. Fed'n, 137 F.3d 666, 672 (1st Cir. 1998)
(guoting Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249,
256-57 (1st Cir. 1996)). The factors district courts consider
when determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over state law claims include: (1) the interests of fairness;
(2) judicial economy; (3) convenience; and (4) comity. See id.
Explaining the fairness and comity factors, the Supreme Court
noted:
25 Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial even though not unsubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (footnote
omitted).
In the interest of comity, this court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's motion for summary judgment (document no. 13) is
granted as to the Title VII claims (Counts I, II, III, and IV),
and plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment (document no.
15) is necessarily denied. The court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims (Counts V and
VI) which are, accordingly, dismissed without prejudice. The
clerk of the court shall enter judgment in accordance with this
order and close the case.
26 SO ORDERED.
McAuliffe 'Chief Judge
April 6, 2005
cc: Rusmir Begovic, pro se Lee S. MacPhee, Esq.